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SUMMARY 
Mental illness that affects an accused’s fitness to stand trial is an ill-explored topic in the South 
African criminal justice system.  The necessity to explore this topic is motivated by the increasing 
number of persons with mental illness moving into the criminal justice systems in South Africa, 
Canada, and the United States of America.  
An accused’s fitness to stand trial is assessed once concern about his ability to follow the 
proceedings, or give proper instructions to his legal representative, is in doubt.  The assessment is 
conducted in the forensic system where the vastly different fields of law and psychiatry meet.  The 
South African forensic system is plagued with resources and skills shortages.  These inadequacies 
cause delays in resolving pre-trial issues for an accused in respect of whom fitness is at issue.  
The accused is oftentimes detained in a correctional facility awaiting fitness assessment for 
anything between three months to two years.  Generally, detention in a correctional facility has a 
negative effect on the mental state of a person with a mental illness. 
The logistics of fitness assessments differ between the three jurisdictions referred to above. 
However, the threshold for fitness in these jurisdictions is relatively low, with the result that the 
majority of accused persons sent for fitness assessments are found fit to stand trial.  Such a finding 
does not imply that the accused is not mentally ill; it simply means that the illness does not affect 
his understanding of the court proceedings and that it does not influence his ability to communicate 
with his legal representative.  An accused with a serious mental illness such as schizophrenia or 
major depression can, for example, be found fit to stand trial. 
After a fitness assessment, a court may either find an accused fit to stand trial or unfit to stand trial.  
The fact that many persons found fit to stand trial have a mental illness suggests that there is a 
third category on the fitness continuum that must be acknowledged, namely, fit but mentally ill 
accused persons.  No alternatives to traditional prosecution currently exist in South Africa for this 
third group of accused persons despite the fact that their situation in the criminal justice system 
calls for a therapeutic response. 
The South African legislative framework that regulates fitness assessments and the processes 
associated therewith are not without challenges.  The assessment practices have recently been 
under scrutiny by the Constitutional court, which judgment changed the position for the accused 
found unfit to stand trial.  The position of the fit but mentally ill accused remains unregulated. 
The Canadian and American criminal justice systems have implemented diversion programmes for 
fit but mentally ill accused persons in the form of Mental Health Courts.  The underlying principle of 
v 
a Mental Health Court is therapeutic jurisprudence.  Therapeutic jurisprudence evaluates the 
impact of the law on those in conflict with it. It promotes the inclusion of expertise from other 
disciplines to improve the effectiveness of the law in a particular set of circumstances. 
Many South African scholars acknowledge the need for mental health expertise in the criminal 
justice system, and suggestions have been made for the diversion of mentally ill accused persons 
charged with minor offences.  Those above notwithstanding, no formal diversion programmes exist 
in South Africa for the fit but mentally ill accused.  
This research investigates the Mental Health Court as a therapeutic response to the mentally ill 
accused in the South African criminal justice system.  The Mental Health Court models as 
employed in Canada and the United States of America are studied to identify elements thereof that 
can be employed in the South African context to provide an effective alternative to traditional 
prosecution for the mentally ill accused. 
The Toronto Mental Health Court is studied in the Canadian context as a court that is not a 
diversion programme as such but has a diversion component attached to it.  Diversion in Canada 
is reserved for those charged with less serious offences, and only these accused persons are 
allowed into the diversion component of the Mental Health Court.  However, the Canadian Mental 
Health Court assists those who do not qualify for diversion but who need the specialised skills of 
the Mental Health Court for purposes of, for example, a bail application.  The Brooklyn Mental 
Health Court in the United States of America is investigated as a model that constitutes a complete 
diversion programme and considers diversion of accused persons charged with more serious 
offences.  
The unique structure and procedure of each of these Mental Health Courts are investigated with 
due consideration to the eligibility criteria of each and the sanctions employed for non-compliance 
of the court-monitored treatment programmes. Further, the successes and challenges of each 
model are highlighted. 
Finally, a proposal is made for a Mental Health Court model mindful of the uniquely South African 
factors that have to be taken into account when building such a model.  Amendments to the 
existing legislative framework are proposed to incorporate a Mental Health Court as a therapeutic 
response to mentally ill accused persons in the South African criminal justice system.  
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INTRODUCTION AND CONCEPTUALISATION 
1  INTRODUCTION 
Mental illness in the criminal justice system is investigated most often in relation to criminal 
capacity, and in particular in relation to the insanity defence.1  A sturdy body of research 
has been produced in this field. 
Far less has, however, been written about the impact of a mental illness on an accused’s 
fitness to stand trial.  An equally ill-explored topic, at least in South Africa, is diversion 
programmes for mentally ill accused persons at the pre-trial stage.  This research focuses 
on both these relatively under-researched topics in the South African context.   
The suggestion of a Mental Health Court as a therapeutic response to mentally ill accused 
persons in the South African criminal justice system forms the crux of this research.  The 
Mental Health Court plays an important role in fitness assessments and offers diversion 
programmes to eligible mentally ill but fit, accused persons. 
This chapter gives background to the research questions and explains why the practices 
surrounding fitness to stand trial require re-examination.  The research questions are 
introduced, and important concepts for this research are explained.  This chapter further 
serves to demarcate the research and gives a brief overview of the structure thereof. 
2  BACKGROUND AND ORIENTATION 
This research is motivated by the fact that the number of persons suffering from mental 
illness in society is increasing globally, so much so that it is the leading cause of disability in 
                                                
1  See for instance Sithole SE A Comparative Analysis of Mental Illness as a Defence in Criminal Law 
(LL.M Dissertation Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University 2007) and Möller L The constitutionality 
of the onus of proof in cases where mental illness is averred (LL.M Dissertation University of Pretoria 
2011).  Also, see Kaliski S “Does the insanity defence lead to an abuse of human rights?”  2012 (15) 
Afr J Psychiatry 83-87.  Also see Africa A “Insanity and Diminished Capacity Before the Courts” 
https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/17210882/insanitypdf# (Date of use: 10 March 2015).  
See further Le Roux J and Stevens GP “Pathological criminal incapacity and the conceptual 
interface between law and medicine” 2012 (1) SACJ 44-66.  Lastly see Meintjies van Der Walt L 





certain countries.2  The number of mentally ill persons in the criminal justice system is also 
increasing 3 to the extent that individuals, who suffer from mental illnesses, are currently 
overrepresented in some criminal justice systems.4    
The overrepresentation of persons with mental illness in a criminal justice system is a result 
of various factors.  Deinstitutionalisation is, however, the common denominator among the 
jurisdictions that form part of this research that most prominently contributes towards this 
overrepresentation.  The impact of deinstitutionalisation on the criminal justice system is 
explained briefly below.  Jurisdiction specific consequences and responses to 
deinstitutionalisation are discussed later in this research.  
In the 1960s and 1970s, as more treatment options for the mentally ill, including psychiatric 
medication, became available globally, the automatic institutionalisation of the mentally ill 
was no longer desirable.5  Resultantly, the deinstitutionalisation movement emerged.  The 
                                                
2  For details on the statistics per jurisdiction dealt with in this research, see the individual chapters on 
the respective jurisdictions.  See Simpson B and Chipps J “Mental health legislation: Does it protect 
the rights of people with mental health problems?”  2012 (48) Social Work 47-57 at 47 where it is 
stated that persons with mental illness comprise a large portion of the South African population.  
Mental illness is identified as the main cause of disability in Canada and the United States of 
America.  See World Health Organisation.  World Health Report: Mental Health: New Understanding, 
New Hope.  http://www.who.int/whr/2001/en/whr01_en.pdf (Date of use:  29 May 2014). 
3 Schneider RD, Bloom H and Heerema M Mental Health Courts – Decriminalizing the Mentally Ill 
(Irwin Law Canada 2007) at 2.  Also see Torrey EF, Stieber J, Ezekiel J, Wolfe SM, Sharfstein J, 
Noble JH and Flynn LM Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill.  The Abuse of Jails as Mental 
Hospitals (Public Citizen’s Health Research Group and the National Alliance for the Mentally ill 1992) 
at 40-42 where the statistics of the period from 1968 to 1992 in selected states are set out.  The 
increase in numbers is due inter alia to deinstitutionalisation that is discussed later on in this 
research. 
4  Sirotich F “The criminal justice outcomes of jail diversion programs for persons with mental illness:  A 
review of the evidence” 2009 (37) J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry Law 461-472 at 461.  Also see 
Parliamentary Information and Research Service Current issues in Mental Health in Canada: Mental 
Health and the Criminal Justice System (Library of Parliament Ottawa Canada 2013) at 1 where it is 
pointed out that mental illness in the Canadian federal system are three times as prevalent as in the 
general population.  See further Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 41 where it is 
explained that the number of mentally ill persons encountering the criminal justice system in the 
United States of America has been rapidly increasing since 1970 after the onset of the 
deinstitutionalisation movement.  See chapters 4 and 5 of this research for further detail about the 
increase in the number of mentally ill persons in Canada and the United States of America 
respectively. 
5  McLachlin B “Medicine and the law:  The challenges of mental illness” 2010 (33) Dalhousie Law 
Journal 15-33 at 20.  Also see Frailing K “The genesis of mental health courts in the United States 
and their possible applicability for the United Kingdom” 2008 C.S.L.R 63-73 at 63-64 who explains 
that the renewed focus on mental health law, occurred at the same time as the civil rights movement 
in the liberal era.  Also see Slate RN, Buffington-Vollum JK and Johnson WW The Criminalization of 
Mental Illness:  Crisis and Opportunity for the Justice System 2nd ed (Carolina Academic Press North 




motivation and thinking behind deinstitutionalisation were that mentally ill persons should be 
released from institutions and cared for in the community.6  Deinstitutionalisation was 
further motivated by the belief that most mentally ill individuals do not need long term 
hospitalisation, and state hospitals, where mental health services used to be provided, 
should be replaced by outpatient clinics, residential programmes and supported 
employment.7   
Deinstitutionalisation eventually resulted in the closing of state hospitals in the 1980s.8  The 
intended community support services were not in place, which left many people in need of 
mental health care literally out on the street, and often resulted in them encountering the 
criminal justice system. 9 
                                                                                                                                                   
with plans to reduce the number of mentally ill persons in State hospitals.  Pres. Kennedy had a 
special interest in mental health issues since he had a sister that was institutionalised for most of her 
life and eventually lobotomised.  Also see Odegaard AM “Therapeutic jurisprudence:  The impact of 
mental health courts on the criminal justice system” 2007 (83) North Dakota Law Review 225-259 at 
231. 
6  Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 52.  Also see Slate, Buffington-Vollum and 
Johnson Criminalization of Mental Illness at 38.  See further Draine J, Wilson AB and Pogorzelski W 
“Limitations and potential in current research on services for people with mental illness in the 
Criminal Justice system” 2007 (45) Journal of Offender Rehabilitation 159-177 at 159, 160 where it is 
stated that it was seen as the most humane treatment of mentally ill persons at the time to have 
them treated in the community.  In hindsight, the deinstitutionalisation approach, to move mentally ill 
persons from hospitals to community care, can be criticised as oversimplified.  Also see D’Emic MJ 
“The promise of mental health courts:  Brooklyn criminal justice system experiments with treatment 
as an alternative to prison” 2007 Criminal Justice 25-29 at 25.  See further Garner SG and 
Hafemeister TL “Restorative justice, therapeutic jurisprudence and mental health courts:  Finding a 
better means to respond to offenders with a mental disorder” 2003 (22) Developments in Mental 
Health Law 1-15 at 3.  
7  Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 50, 52.  In line with this vision, mentally ill 
persons in the United States of America became eligible for federal programmes such as Medicaid, 
Medicare, disability Insurance, federal housing subsidies and food stamps for which the federal 
government provided sufficient funding.  The federal government further provided sufficient funding 
for community health care centres.  Also, see Rossman SB, Willison JB, Mallik-Kane K, Kim K, 
Debus-Sherrill S and Downey PM Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness: 
Evaluation of Mental Health Courts in Bronx and Brooklyn, New York (USA National Institute of 
Justice 2012) at 4. 
8  Frailing 2008 C.S.L.R 63 at 64.  Also see D’Emic 2007 Criminal Justice 25 at 25.  See further Garner 
and Hafemeister 2003 Developments in Mental Health Law 1 at 3. 
9  Frailing 2008 C.S.L.R 63 at 64, 65.  Also see Rogers R and Shuman DW Fundamentals of Forensic 
Practice:  Mental Health and Criminal Law (Springer USA 2005) at 85 who confirm that the number 
of inpatient beds has decreased dramatically and that the result is that many people with chronic 
mental illnesses were left with no support, often clashing with the criminal justice system.  These 
authors refer to jails as “the poor man’s mental health facility”.  Also see D’Emic 2007 Criminal 
Justice 25 at 25 where the movement of persons from the mental health care system to the criminal 
justice system during the deinstitutionalisation period, is referred to as trans-institutionalisation.  See 




Hospital treatment options were reduced because of deinstitutionalisation, and community 
treatment options were not as accessible as they should have been.10  The admission 
requirements for involuntary mental health care at a psychiatric facility became stricter 11 , 
leading to many mentally ill persons not qualifying for treatment.  The primary focus for 
admission to a psychiatric hospital was based on the dangerousness of the individual.12  
The effect was that non-dangerous mentally ill persons did not qualify for involuntary mental 
health treatment.    
Gaps in the availability of treatment in the community lead to increased arrests, especially 
among homeless persons with mental illness.13   As it became more challenging to have a 
                                                                                                                                                   
operations, and effectiveness of mental health courts” 2009 (2) The Justice System Journal 196-218 
at 197.  Also see Rossman et al Criminal justice interventions for offenders with mental illness at 4 
where it is confirmed that community treatment was not properly funded and made available to those 
most in need thereof. 
10  Garner and Hafemeister 2003 Developments in Mental Health Law 1 at 3-4.  See further Denckla D 
and Berman G “Rethinking the revolving door” 2001 Centre for Court innovation, New York.  
www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/rethinkingtherevolvingdoor.pdf (Date of use:  7 March 
2011) at 3.  Also see Odegaard 2007 North Dakota Law Review 225 at 322.   
11  Torrey et al Criminalizing the seriously mentally ill at 40.  Also see in general Sosowsky L “Crime and 
violence among mental patients reconsidered in view of the legal relationship between state and 
mentally ill” 1978 (135) American Journal of Psychiatry 33-42.  Also, see Slate, Buffington-Vollum 
and Johnson Criminalization of Mental Illness at 34 where it is explained that the disability rights 
movement fought for the rights of the mentally ill.  One of their main objectives was to limit 
involuntary commitment to cases where it was absolutely necessary.  Also, see Rossman et al 
Criminal justice interventions for offenders with mental illness at 1 where it is stated that these 
stricter requirements for involuntary care contributed to the rising number of persons with mental 
illness in the criminal justice system. 
12  See Frailing 2008 C.S.L.R 63 at 64 who discusses the case of Alberta Lessard from MIwaukee 
Wisconsin, who challenged her involuntary admission in court and succeeded.  This resulted in 
legislative changes in the 1970’s across many states in the United States of America to the effect 
that the main criteria for involuntary psychiatric treatment, was dangerousness, not only to oneself, 
but to others as well.  A further requirement was that such dangerousness must be of an immediate 
nature.    
13  Draine, Wilson and Pogorzelski 2007 Journal of Offender Rehabilitation 159 at 160.  Also, see 
Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 143 where it is stated that persons with mental 
illness are falling through the cracks of the mental health care system and thereby increasing the 
number of mentally ill persons in the criminal justice system.  Also, see this source at 162 where it is 
stated that persons who are homeless or unemployed who suffer from a mental illness are at a 
higher risk of arrest.  Also see Hemmens C, Brody DC and Spohn CC Criminal Courts.  A 
Contemporary Perspective (Sage Los Angelas 2013) at 454.  Problems with service delivery have 
been labelled as the root of the problem and identified as a priority that has to be addressed, rather 
than the symptoms of the problem, being the increased number of mentally ill persons being 
arrested.  Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 161, 162 stress that improved mental 
health care services to those with mental illnesses can ensure that the mentally ill do not come into 
contact with the criminal justice system in the first place.  The authors warn against initiatives that 
allow the mental health care system to shun or shift their responsibilities to other departments, 
unfortunately, Mental Health Courts could potentially be one such initiative.  They point out further 




person admitted for mental health treatment, persons with mental illness seem to have 
entered the criminal justice system more frequently.14  A direct link between strict 
requirements for civil commitment and an increase in the number of the mentally ill accused 
in the criminal justice system emerged.  The number of mentally ill people in hospitals and 
those in prisons is interrelated, i.e. if one falls, the other invariably rises.15  This is the 
balloon principle.16  Others refer to the phenomenon as trans-institutionalisation with people 
shifting from state mental institutions to jails.17  Deinstitutionalisation can, at the very least, 
be said to have contributed to the criminalisation of persons with mental illness.18  The 
discourse surrounding mental health services has, in fact, shifted from deinstitutionalisation 
to decriminalisation.19    
Mentally ill persons are mostly arrested and detained on charges of petty crimes rather than 
                                                                                                                                                   
in the system, came from the criminal justice sector, rather than the mental health sector and that 
more focus should be placed on what the mental health sector has to offer in terms of solutions for 
reducing the number of mentally ill persons in the criminal justice system. 
14  Slate, Buffington-Vollum and Johnson Criminalization of Mental Illness at 43.  Also, see Rossman et 
al Criminal justice interventions for offenders with mental illness at 1 who mentions the difficulty of 
having a person admitted for involuntary care as one of the reasons for the increase of persons with 
mental illness in the criminal justice system.  See further Odegaard 2007 North Dakota Law Review 
225 at 231 who elaborates on the fact that admission to a psychiatric institution became more 
difficult in the 1970’s.  This was a consequence of the deinstitutionalisation movement. 
15  Torrey et al Criminalizing the seriously mentally ill at 41.  This is confirmed by the fact that public 
hospitals have been closing down whilst prisons are being built to accommodate the increasing 
number of prisoners, among whom those with mental illnesses.  Also see Frailing 2008 C.S.L.R 63 
at 64, 65 who points out that the closure of hospitals during the 1980’s and the deinstitutionalisation 
of the mentally ill left many in need of mental health care, destitute.   
16  If the one side of the balloon is pushed another part of the balloon will bulge out.  Torrey et al 
Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 41.  Also see in general Penrose L “Mental disease and 
crime:  Outline of a comparative study of European statistics” 1939 (18) British Journal of Medical 
Psychology 1-15.  See further Palermo GB, Smith MB and Liska FJ “Jails versus mental hospitals:  a 
social dilemma” 1991 International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology” 35-
97 who published findings of research done on data of jails and hospitals over a 83 year period.  
Their findings support the thesis of “progressive trans institutionalization” where more and more 
mentally ill persons are found in jails and prisons than in hospitals.  Also see Albanese JS Criminal 
Justice 5th ed (Pearson Boston 2013) at 243 who states that there are twice as many persons with 
mental illness in prison in the United States of America than in state psychiatric hospitals.  
17 Slate, Buffington-Vollum and Johnson Criminalization of Mental Illness at 38, 39 where it is 
confirmed that many of those who were released from hospital as part of the deinstitutionalisation 
movement, was arrested and incarcerated or ended up on the streets.  Also see Lurigio and 
Snowden 2009 The Justice System Journal 196 at 197. 
18  Slate, Buffington-Vollum and Johnson Criminalization of Mental Illness at 43. 
19  Draine, Wilson and Pogorzelski 2007 Journal of Offender Rehabilitation 159 at 159.  Also see 
Bernstein R and Seltzer T “Criminalization of people with mental illness:  The role of Mental Health 
Courts in system reform” 2003 (7) D C L Review 143-162 at 143 where it is stated that the increased 




serious offences,20 although the serious offences committed by a mentally ill person often 
receive wide media coverage, raising awareness of the purported dangerousness of 
mentally ill persons.  The motivation for many of these minor offences committed by 
mentally ill persons is pure survival, as many of these individuals are homeless at the time 
of the arrest.21    
The criminal behaviour of mentally ill persons is often a manifestation of an untreated but 
treatable psychiatric illness.22  Arrests are often made for behaviour that is not criminal but 
unusual due to lack of treatment.23  Incarceration of a mentally ill person results in the 
deterioration of the mental health of such person.24 
The consequences of the mentally ill's deinstitutionalisation are that there is more pressure 
on the criminal justice system to deal with mentally ill individuals.25  This is currently also 
                                                
20  Often referred to as “mercy bookings”.  See Frailing K “Issues affecting outcomes for mental health 
court participants” 2009 C.S.L.R 145-157 at 148.  Also see Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously 
Mentally Ill at 46, 48.  According to McCampbell SW “Mental Health Courts.  What Sheriffs need to 
know” 2001 (53) Sheriff 40-43 less than one percent of those suffering from a mental illness are 
reported to have violent tendencies. 
21  The fact that the homeless that are mentally ill are more at risk of being arrested and thus coming 
into contact with the criminal justice system, is confirmed by Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously 
Mentally Ill at 20 where the results of a survey is discussed that found that those that are homeless 
and that are suffering from a mental illness, are particularly vulnerable and hence at risk of coming 
into contact with the criminal justice system.  Also see Slate, Buffington-Vollum and Johnson 
Criminalization of Mental Illness at 39 where it is confirmed that many mentally ill persons ended up 
homeless after their deinstitutionalisation from hospital into the community where no support 
services were rendered to them.  See further O’Keefie K The Brooklyn Mental Health Court 
Evaluation:  Planning, Implementation, Courtroom Dynamics, and Participant Outcomes (Centre for 
Court Innovation New York 2006) at vi where it is indicated that 15% of all the Brooklyn Mental 
Health Court participants were homeless at some point in the year preceding arrest.  Also, see 
Rossman et al Criminal justice interventions for offenders with mental illness at 5 where it is stated 
that persons with mental illness are generally more at risk of homelessness.  
22  Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 48.  Also, see Lurigio and Snowden 2009 The 
Justice System Journal 196 at 196. 
23  Draine, Wilson and Pogorzelski 2007 Journal of Offender Rehabilitation 159 at 160. 
24 Slate, Buffington-Vollum and Johnson Criminalization of Mental Illness at 10.  Also, see Slate RN 
“Mental Health Courts” in Mays LG and Gregware PR Court and Justice 3rd ed (Waveland Press Inc 
Long Grove Illinois 2004) at 425.  See further Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 145 
where it is pointed out that, in addition to the deterioration of the mental condition of the accused, 
mentally ill incarcerated persons are at a higher risk of assault and intimidation by other inmates.  
Also, see Odegaard 2007 North Dakota Law Review 225 at 234. 
25  Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 40.  This was predicted as a result of 
deinstitutionalisation by Dr March Abrahamson who coined the term “criminalization of the mentally 
ill”.  He said that, as the mental health care system is forced to release patients prematurely, due to 
for example changes in Legislation (as was the case in California at the time (1968)), more pressure 
will be put on the criminal justice system to ensure the re-institutionalisation of these individuals.  




the case in the South African criminal justice system.26  This research explores how the 
South African criminal justice system currently deals with this increased load and explores 
the Mental Health Court as a therapeutic response to accused persons with mental illness 
in the criminal justice system. 
3  MENTAL ILLNESS AND SOUTH AFRICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE  
Mental illness, or intellectual disability, may become relevant during criminal proceedings in 
South African courts for two reasons.  Firstly, it may affect the accused’s ability to follow the 
court proceedings and conduct his 27 defence.28  Secondly, it may affect the accused’s 
criminal capacity in the sense that the accused could not distinguish between right and 
wrong at the time of the commission of the offence and /or could not direct his actions 
accordingly.29  Mental illness or intellectual disability can, of course, have an impact on both 
fitness and criminal capacity in some instances. 
Fitness to stand trial is mainly a pre-trial issue but can also be raised at any point during the 
trial.  Fitness has to be established first before criminal capacity can be considered.30  
Criminal capacity is dealt with during the trial and impacts the accused’s sentence as it is 
                                                
26  See the discussion of the forensic system in chapter 2 of this research where the lack of resources 
to properly deal with accused persons with mental illness is discussed.  Such lack of resources is 
contributing to delays in fitness assessments and finalisation of trials of accused persons with mental 
illness.  The South African Department of Correctional Services has identified accused persons with 
mental illness in correctional facilities as a special group of accused persons that require a 
specialised approach. 
27  Reference to the male gender shall include the female gender and visa versa unless expressly 
indicated otherwise.  The choice to make use of the male gender as a default is because the majority 
of persons with mental illness in criminal justice systems across the globe are male.  This is also the 
case in South Africa.  See Calitz FJW, van Rensburg PHJJ, Fourie C, Liebenberg E, van den Berg 
C, Joubert G “Psychiatric evaluation of offenders referred to the Free State Psychiatric Complex 
according to sections 77 and 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act” 2006 (12) SAJP 47-50 at 49 for a 
discussion of a particular study in which 94% of all patients sent for psychiatric observation were 
male.  See further Strydom N, Pienaar C, van der Merwe L, Jansen van Rensburg B, Calitz FWJ, 
van der Merwe LM, Joubert G “Profile of forensic psychiatric inpatients referred to the Free State 
Psychiatric Complex, 2004 – 2008” 2011 SAJP 40-43 at 40.  See chapter 2 of this research for 
information on the relevant statistics. 
28  Section 77 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (hereinafter referred to as the “Criminal 
Procedure Act”).  Also, see Burchell J South African Criminal Law and Procedure 4th Edition (Juta 
Cape Town 2001) at 282 who explains that an accused may be unfit to stand trial resulting from his 
mental illness or mental defect. 
29  Section 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act.  This incapacity is a result of the impact that the mental 
illness or intellectual disability had on him at the time of commission of the alleged offence.  
30  Pillay AL “Competency to stand trial and criminal responsibility examinations: are there solutions to 
the extensive waiting list?”  2014 (44) South African Journal of Psychology 48-59 at 51.  Also see S v 




only considered at the end of the trial.   
Once the mental illness is raised as a concern during the trial, the accused is sent for 
psychiatric observation to assess his mental state.  The enquiry into the accused’s fitness is 
a separate and distinctly different enquiry from the one during which criminal capacity is 
established.  Fitness concerns the accused’s current state of mind, whereas criminal 
capacity is a retrospective inquiry into the accused's state of mind at the time of committing 
the offence.  Fitness does not presuppose criminal capacity, and unfitness does not 
presuppose a lack of criminal capacity.  An accused found fit to stand trial may, for 
instance, raise the lack of criminal capacity as a defence.31   
This research focuses on fitness to stand trial.  South African law provides for an accused 
who is unable, due to mental illness, to follow the proceedings against him to be declared 
unfit to stand trial.32  Such a person will not be tried unless and until he regains his fitness to 
stand trial.33   
On the other side of the spectrum, the court may find that an accused is indeed fit to stand 
trial, not implying that the accused does not have a mental illness, but rather that the mental 
                                                
31  In a study conducted by Strydom et al 2011 SAJP 40 the findings of a group of persons sent for 
psychiatric observation is discussed.  It is explained that some of the accused persons were found fit 
to stand trial but not criminally responsible whereas others were found not fit to stand trial but 
criminally responsible.  See, however, Kaliski SZ, Borcherds M and Williams F “Defendants are 
clueless – the 30-day psychiatric observation” 1997 (87) SAMJ 1351-1355 for a discussion of a 
study that found that all those in the study found unfit to stand trial, were also found to lack criminal 
capacity.  Also, see Kruger A Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses 7th ed (LexisNexis 2010) at 222 
who explains that the assessment for criminal capacity, which looks at the accused’s state of mind 
retrospectively, in many cases also answers the question pertaining to whether the accused is fit to 
stand trial.  Also see Van der Wolf M, van Marle H, Mevis P and Roesch R "Understanding and 
evaluating contrasting unfitness to stand trial practices: A comparison between Canada and the 
Netherlands” International Journal of Forensic Mental Health 2010 (9) 245-258 at 251 who explain 
that, in Canada 12% of persons who are eventually successful with the insanity plea was found unfit 
at some point in the past.   
32  Section 77 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
33  A person found unfit to stand trial is detained as a state patient in terms of the Mental Health Care 
Act 17 of 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the “Mental Health Care Act”) if it can be proved that he 
was involved in the commission of a serious crime involving violence.  A state patient can only be 
released once a judge in chambers makes an order to that effect.  An accused found unfit to stand 
trial but found to have been involved with the commission of a non-violent crime or that he did not 
commit the alleged crime at all, may be detained as an involuntary mental health care user in terms 
of the Mental Health Care Act.  The Constitutional court recently ordered that the option of 
conditional and unconditional release must also be available to such an accused if it is clear that 
treatment and rehabilitation is not required.  This amendment of section 77(6)(a)(ii) brought the 
options available to a court in respect of an accused with a mental illness who did not commit an 
offence, in line with the options available to a court in terms of section 78(6).  The De Vos judgment 




illness that he might have, does not affect his ability to follow the court proceedings.  
Persons who are found fit to stand trial include those with serious mental illnesses such as 
schizophrenia and major depression who do not always meet the criteria to be found unfit to 
stand trial.34  Therefore, a mentally ill accused person can proceed to trial after a fitness 
finding.35  This category of persons is fit to stand trial but mentally ill.36   
The majority of accused persons sent for fitness assessments in South Africa, Canada and 
the United States of America are found fit to stand trial.37  A large number of these accused 
may nonetheless suffer from mental illnesses varying in degrees of severity which does not 
necessarily affect their fitness to comprehend the proceedings against them but which 
nonetheless makes them a vulnerable group within the criminal justice system. 
                                                
34  Lurigio and Snowden 2009 The Justice System Journal 196 at 198 who specifically mention that 
persons with serious mental illness do not always meet the incompetence to stand trial criteria and 
are, consequently, found fit to stand trial and sent to prison.  See Slobogin C, Rai A and Reisner R 
Law and the Mental Health System Civil and Criminal Aspects 5th ed (Thomson West United States 
of America 2009) at 1020 where various studies that were conducted on the number of accused 
persons found unfit to stand trial, revealed that in approximately 30% of matters, those sent for 
observation are found fit to stand trial.  The authors indicate that the number may actually be lower 
since mental health professionals err on the side of caution with findings of fitness.  Concerns have 
been raised about possible unnecessary referrals.  The fitness tests vary between jurisdictions.  See 
chapters 3 to 5 of this research for detail on the various tests. 
35  Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 1026 where a view is expressed 
that this could possibly be viewed as a positive result since a person fount fit to stand trial is not 
subjected to the stigmatisation associated with unfitness and is spared the delays that is brought 
about by the processes associated with a finding of unfitness.  An opinion is also expressed that 
allowing marginally incompetent accused persons to stand trial ensures that the unfitness standard 
is applied and reserved for those with serious mental illnesses.  Also, see Marks LK, Dean RS, 
Dwyer M, Girese A and Yates JA New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure 2nd ed (Thomson West 
2007) at 543 who explain that an accused may for example suffer from a mental illness such as 
depression but may be found fit to stand trial. 
36  See Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 543 who explain that an accused with 
depression, or multiple personality disorder, or schizophrenia is not necessarily incompetent to stand 
trial as they may be able to, despite their mental illness, understand the proceedings and be able to 
follow it.  Also, see Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General Criminal Law Division Practice 
Memorandum:  Mentally Disordered/Developmentally Disabled Offenders: Diversion (Ontario 
Ministry of the Attorney General Ontario 2006) at 1 where it is acknowledged that persons with 
mental disorders and developmental disabilities are often found fit to stand trial necessitating 
consideration of alternatives to traditional prosecution practices.  
37  See Schutte T “’Single’ versus ‘panel’ appointed forensic mental observations:  Is the referral 
process ethically justifiable?”  2013 (6) South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 64-68 at 67 for 
the position in South Africa.  See O’Shaughnessy RJ “AAPL practice guideline for the forensic 
psychiatric evaluation of competence to stand trial:  Canadian legal perspective” 2007 (35) The 
Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 505-508 at 507 who explains that the 
majority of persons sent for fitness assessments in Canada is found fit to stand trial.  See the 
discussion thereof in chapter 4 of this research.  Lastly, see Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the 
Mental Health System 1020 who explain that most of the accused sent for fitness assessments in 





The latter group of accused persons, i.e. those fit for trial but mentally ill, form the focal 
point of this research. 
4  PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Why should a specialised solution be explored for mentally ill accused persons in the 
criminal justice system?  What is needed to address the unique problems that mentally ill 
accused persons bring to the criminal justice system?  These are the two main issues that 
the research will focus on in exploring Mental Health Courts as a therapeutic response to 
persons with mental illness in the South African criminal justice system.   The background 
to these two questions is discussed below. 
The above discussion implies that there is a third category of accused persons within the fit 
–unfit spectrum, namely, accused persons who are fit to stand trial but mentally ill.  The 
South African law does not provide for a mentally ill but fit accused person to be treated any 
differently than a mentally healthy accused.  No further consideration is given to the 
presence of a mental illness of this category of accused in criminal proceedings unless the 
fitness issue is raised again or unless the accused raises a lack of criminal responsibility as 
a defence.  The fact that the law does not provide alternative prosecution methods for fit but 
mentally ill accused persons may point to a disjoint between law and psychiatry in that the 
law does not recognise the significance of a mental illness in an accused that is fit to stand 
trial.   
Once found fit, after the fitness assessment as provided for in the Criminal Procedure Act 
51 of 1977, 38 these accused persons are sent back to prison to await trial.  Research 
shows that the incarceration of a person with mental illness causes deterioration in the 
mental condition of the detained person.39  Mental health care programmes in already 
overcrowded prisons are rare,40 and it is likely that the mentally ill do not receive adequate 
mental health care treatment in prison, including those awaiting psychiatric observation.41  
                                                
38  Hereinafter referred to as the “Criminal Procedure Act”. 
39  Odegaard 2007 North Dakota Law Review 225 at 234.  Also, see Slate Mental Health Courts 425.  
See further Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 145. 
40  Odegaard 2007 North Dakota Law Review 225 at 234 referring to the position in the United States of 
America.  Also see Department of Correctional Services:  “Strategic plan for 2015/2016-2019/202”  
http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/Strategic%20Plan%202015-2016%20-2019-2020_a.pdf 
(Date of use:  9 September 2016) at 20 where it is confirmed that overcrowding remains a problem in 
South African prisons. 




Mentally ill individuals in correctional settings are at a higher risk of behavioural 
disturbances if they do not receive treatment.42  Where proper treatment is withheld, the 
mentally ill person is very likely to re-offend or at the very least act inappropriately and be 
arrested, which perpetuates the so-called “revolving door” phenomenon.43  Re-offending 
poses a risk to the safety of society and is costly to the correctional authorities that have to 
house these accused persons every time they clash with the criminal justice system. 
Ignoring the mental illness of this accused person poses questions about the fairness and 
appropriateness of the criminal justice system for fit but mentally ill accused persons.  
Persons with mental illness pose unique challenges to the criminal justice system and, 
similarly, require a unique approach to address these challenges.  This research focuses on 
possible alternatives to traditional prosecution for this third category of accused persons 
who are fit to stand trial but nonetheless mentally ill.   
The question that arises from the brief concerns already highlighted is how the criminal 
justice system should respond to these individuals?  Criminal justice systems across the 
globe continuously struggle to meet the needs of mentally ill accused persons.44   
                                                                                                                                                   
the psychiatric observation in terms of section 77 or 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act has to take 
place.  Waiting periods for available beds are impacted by the fact that psychiatric hospitals only 
have a specific number of beds allocated to forensic observation patients.  See chapter 2 of this 
research for more detail.  The inadequate mental health care services in prisons, are pointed out by 
the Constitutional court in De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development CC case at 
[43].  A fact that was accepted by the Minister of Health in the court a quo. 
42  Lamberti JS and Weisman RL”Persons with severe mental disorders in the criminal justice system:  
Challenges and opportunities” 2004 (75) Psychiatr Q 151-164 at 160. 
43 See Denckla and Berman www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/rethinkingtherevolvingdoor.pdf  
(Date of use:  7 March 2011).  Also, see the information in Canadian Mental Health Association 
“Police and mental illness:  Increased interactions” http://www.cmha.bc.ca/files/policesheets_all.pdf  
(Date of use: 13 March 2015) at 4 where it is pointed out that persons with mental illnesses are more 
likely to be arrested and detained again after their release from a period of detention in the criminal 
justice setting.  See further Garner and Hafemeister 2003 Developments in Mental Health Law 1 at 4 
who point out that the fact that many persons with mental illness are homeless, adds to the revolving 
door problem. 
44  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 42.  A contentious issue that is also 
relevant in the South African context is the incarceration of the mentally ill found unfit to stand trial 
but found not to have committed a crime, who is “sentenced” to a psychiatric hospital for an indefinite 
period due to the fact that he is mentally ill.  It cannot be denied that the effect of this is that the 
illness and not the crime committed (or alleged crime) is punished.  The illness is therefore 
criminalised.  This issue has, however, been addressed by the Constitutional court by mending the 
options in terms of orders available to the court to make in respect of an accused found unfit to stand 
trial and found not to have committed the offence in question.  Such a person can now be released 
conditionally or unconditionally.  See in general the De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 




How is fitness to stand trial determined, and what is the impact of a fitness finding on the 
criminal charges against the accused?  How do South African courts approach cases of 
individuals with a mental illness or intellectual disability yet are fit to stand trial?  Do these 
accused persons become the responsibility of the mental health care system, or do they 
remain the responsibility of the criminal justice system?  These are just some of the 
questions that come to mind when first confronted with the position of the mentally ill in the 
criminal justice system.  What is evident, though, is that mentally ill accused persons should 
not be treated in the same manner as mentally healthy accused persons.  
This research concerns the adjectival processing of mentally ill individuals in the criminal 
justice system.  It suggests the introduction and development of Mental Health Courts, as 
an alternative to the current use, in South Africa, of criminal courts, in the processing of 
mentally ill accused persons.  Thus, it explores the idea of Mental Health Courts in South 
Africa to address the specific challenges that face the criminal justice system when having 
to process cases of mentally ill individuals.45  Although some Mental Health Courts assist 
with assessments of fitness to stand trial and miscellaneous issues (such as bail 
applications) for any accused person in respect of whom mental illness is at issue, only 
those found fit to stand trial qualify to be diverted away from the criminal justice system into 
the Mental Health Court treatment program.46  Mental Health Courts are a therapeutic 
response to mentally ill accused persons and apply therapeutic jurisprudence to achieve 
this goal. 
To avoid the revolving door phenomenon, the adjectival approach of the criminal justice 
system towards mentally ill accused persons requires reflection.  Part of this reflection is 
applying therapeutic jurisprudence in cases where mentally ill accused persons are 
involved.47  A specialised approach to mentally ill accused persons in the South African 
criminal justice system is needed.  One such specialised approach is found in Mental 
Health Courts, and this research suggests that Mental Health Courts should be 
incorporated into the South African criminal justice system. 
 It is submitted that Mental Health Courts can best serve the interests of society and the 
mentally ill individual in conflict with the law.  The Mental Health Court movement aims to 
                                                
45  As detailed later, issues pertinent to criminal law, and proof of capacity, are thus incidental to the 
research. 
46  Frailing 2009 C.S.L.R 145 at 145. 




build a bridge and fill the gap between the criminal justice system and the mental health 
care system in which mentally ill individuals often find themselves.  It is further submitted 
that the criminal justice system can benefit from the implementation of these courts in that 
the number of cases processed through the South African criminal courts will be reduced, 
as those accused in respect of whom mental illness is an issue will be diverted away from 
the traditional criminal justice system.  This, in turn, will reduce the number of awaiting trial 
prisoners in already overcrowded prisons.  Society can benefit from the implementation of 
Mental Health Courts as they have proved 48 to reduce recidivism, resulting in a safer 
society.  
Before addressing the research parameters and the limitations of the research, certain key 
concepts referred to throughout this research are clarified below.  
5  CONCEPTUALISATION 
 The relevant concepts for this research are drawn from the legal field and the mental health 
field.  By virtue of the different focus areas of these two fields, there are differences in the 
understanding and/or importance attached to certain concepts, depending on the field 
drawn from.  Only key concepts are explored below.  Concepts that form the basis of further 
discussion in this research are crystallised below for the reader's convenience.  
5.1  Mental illness or mental disorder 
Opinions differ in the legal field, on the one hand, and the mental health field on the other, 
on what exactly is to be understood under the term “mental illness”.  What may be 
considered a mental illness in the psychiatric setting may not necessarily be considered so 
in the legal setting.49  This may indicate a disjoint between law and psychiatry that leaves a 
gap to be filled.  
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 50 used for psychiatric diagnosis does not refer to 
                                                
48  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 36. 
49  The person might be diagnosed with a mental illness or with mental retardation by a mental health 
care practitioner but if the mental illness or mental retardation does not have an impact on the 
accused’s fitness to stand trial or criminal capacity, it will not be relevant for legal purposes as it will 
not have an effect on the criminal procedure as is the case when the mental illness or mental 
retardation is said to affect the accused’s ability to follow the proceedings against him or if the illness 
affected his criminal capacity at the time of commission of the alleged offence.  




“mental illness” but rather to “mental disorder”, the definition of which reads as follows:    
 A mental disorder is a syndrome characterized by clinically significant disturbance in an 
individual’s cognition, emotion regulation, or behavior that reflects a dysfunction in the 
psychological, biological, or developmental processes underlying mental functioning. Mental 
disorders are usually associated with significant distress or disability in social, occupational, 
or other important activities. An expectable or culturally approved response to a common 
stressor or loss, such as the death of a loved one, is not a mental disorder. Socially deviant 
behavior (e.g., political, religious, or sexual) and conflicts that are primarily between the 
individual and society are not mental disorders unless the deviance or conflict results from a 
dysfunction in the individual, as described above.51 
                                                                                                                                                   
Various editions of the DSM have been published and reference will be made to specific editions 
throughout this research where relevant. 
51  American Psychiatric Association DSM-V (American Psychiatric Association Washington D C 2014) 
at 20.  The definition of mental disorder in the DSM-IV reads as follows:  “A clinically significant 
behavioural or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in an individual and that is  associated 
with present distress (e.g. a painful symptom) or disability (i.e. impairment in one or more important 
areas of functioning) or with a significantly increased risk of suffering death, pain, disability or an 
important loss of freedom”.  The DSM-IV makes use of a Multiaxial Evaluation system to measure 
different aspects of a patient’s condition on 5 axes.  Sadock BJ and Sadock VA Kaplan and 
Sadock’s Synopsis of Psychiatry:  Behavioral Sciences / Clinical Psychiatry 10th ed (Wolters Kluwer/ 
Lippincott Williams and Williams Philadelphia 2007) at 306.  A report form is provided in the DSM-IV 
where findings per Axis can be indicated.  Clinicians who do not wish to use the multiaxial format of 
reporting, may merely list the diagnosis, with the principle diagnosis being listed first.  (Sadock and 
Sadock Kaplan and Sadock’s Synopsis of Psychiatry at 307).  A short explanation of each Axis 
follows as this is relevant for purposes of the selection criteria for those wishing to participate in 
Mental Health Court programmes as will be elaborated on later in this research.  Axis 1 = Consists of 
clinical disorders and conditions that may be a focus of clinical attention.  These include conditions 
usually diagnosed in infancy, childhood or adolescence.  Mental retardation is however excluded and 
falls on Axis II.  Other conditions that fall on this Axis, are delirium, dementia and other cognitive 
disorders, substance related disorders, Schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders, mood 
disorders, anxiety disorders, sexual and gender identity disorders, eating disorders, adjustment 
disorders and sleep disorders.  See DSM-IV Table 9.1-5 and Sadock and Sadock Kaplan and 
Sadock’s Synopsis of Psychiatry at 306 for a comprehensive list of clinical conditions that fall on Axis 
I of the DSM-IV.  Axis II = Personality disorders and mental retardation.  Ten personality disorders 
are listed on this Axis, namely paranoid personality disorder, schizoid personality disorder, 
schizotypal personality disorder, antisocial personality disorder, borderline personality disorder, 
histrionic personality disorder, narcissistic personality disorder, avoidant personality disorder, 
Dependent personality disorder, obsessive-compulsive personality disorder.  Axis II also includes 
Personality disorders not otherwise specified and Mental Retardation.  (See DSM-IV Table 9.1-6 and 
Sadock and Sadock Kaplan and Sadock’s Synopsis of Psychiatry.at 306).  Axis III = Physical 
disorder or general medical condition that is present over and above the mental disorder.  The 
physical condition can be present because of the mental disorder, for example alcogestritis, which 
was caused by alcohol dependence.  The mental disorder can similarly be the result of a physical 
condition, for example where kidney failure causes delirium.  It is also possible that the physical 
condition is not related to the mental disorder at all.  If a physical condition is linked to the mental 
disorder, that physical condition is mentioned on both Axis I and Axis III, for example, where 
hypothyroidism is the direct cause of major depression, Axis I will indicate that there is a mood 
disorder present due to hypothyroidism with depressive features.  Physical conditions that will fall on 
Axis III are inter alia injury and poisoning, diseases of the nervous system and sense organs, 
diseases of the digestive-, circulatory-, and respiratory systems, infectious and parasitic diseases 





Depending on the symptoms exhibited and the intensity, a mental disorder can be mild,52 
severe, 53 or moderate.54 
It appears that the wording in the DSM has been adjusted to avoid labelling those who have 
a mental illness.  For example, in the case of schizophrenia, the person who has 
schizophrenia was previously referred to as “a schizophrenic”. The DSM now refers to “an 
individual with schizophrenia”.55  This contributes to the de-stigmatisation of the mentally ill 
as a clear attempt is made to separate the illness from the individual so that the illness is 
classified and not the individual. 
The DSM cautions against using the manual as the only and final authority on mental 
disorders in a forensic setting.56  More information about the particular individual’s 
                                                                                                                                                   
Sadock Kaplan and Sadock’s Synopsis of Psychiatry at 306).  Axis IV = Psychosocial and 
environmental factors that contribute to the development or exacerbation of the mental disorder.  
These stressors are events/ facts that cause the individual stress beyond that which a person would 
normally experience.  Consideration is given to the manner in which the stressor changes the 
patient’s life and the extent to which he is in control of the event.  Positive stressors are for example 
a job promotion, whilst negative stressors are for example, the death of a loved one, problems with 
housing, problems related to interaction with crime and economic problems.  The information on this 
Axis is particularly important in compiling a treatment plan where either the stressor can be removed 
if possible or the patient can be assisted in dealing with the particular stressors.  (See DSM-IV Table 
9.1-8 and Sadock and Sadock Kaplan and Sadock’s Synopsis of Psychiatry at 306, 307 for a 
comprehensive list of what may qualify as psychosocial and environmental stressors.  Axis V = 
Global assessment of functioning.  The assessment considers the persons social, occupational and 
psychological functioning over for example the previous couple of months.  A patient who had a high 
level of functionality before an episode has a better prognosis of recovery than a patient who had low 
levels of functioning.  (See DSM-IV Table 9.1-9 and Sadock and Sadock Kaplan and Sadock’s 
Synopsis of Psychiatry at 307).  The scale on which the global assessment of function (GAF) is a 
100-point scale, with 100 being the highest possible level of functioning.  The DSM-V significantly 
changed the system from a multiaxial system to a more gradual approach.  See American 
Psychiatric Association DSM-V at 16.  Even though the DSM-V is the current diagnostic manual, 
most of the research material consulted for purposes of this research, still refers to and used the 
DSM-IV, as diagnostic manual, hence, most of the references in this research to the DSM, will be to 
the DSM-IV (TR) rather than the DSM-V. 
52  The minimum symptoms required for the diagnosis is present with no or few additional symptoms.  
Symptoms only result in minor impairment in social and occupational functioning.  See Sadock and 
Sadock Kaplan and Sadock’s Synopsis of Psychiatry at 307. 
53  Symptoms over and above those required for the diagnosis is present, or several very severe 
symptoms are present, or the symptoms result in serious impairment of social or occupational 
functioning.  Sadock and Sadock Kaplan and Sadock’s Synopsis of Psychiatry at 307. 
54  Presence of symptoms or functional impairment between the “mild’ and “severe” category.  Sadock 
and Sadock Kaplan and Sadock’s Synopsis of Psychiatry at 307. 
55 American Psychiatric Association DSM – IV at xxii.  Also see American Psychiatric Association DSM-
V at 100, 101. 




functional impairments may, for example, be required to determine the extent and nature of 
his disorder.57  The DSM also cautions that the fact that a person’s behaviour matches a 
particular description of a mental disorder in the DSM does not imply anything with regard 
to the person’s control or lack of control over the behaviour that is associated with the 
identified mental disorder at a given point in time.58  The legal representative of the mentally 
ill accused can therefore not rely exclusively on a diagnosis made by a psychiatrist; it will 
have to be interpreted and analysed, having regard to the individual's specific 
circumstances, personality, behaviour and physical impairments, if any. 
Clinicians often use the terms mental illness and mental defect interchangeably as 
synonyms of one another.59  The terms “mental illness” and “mental defect” 60 are also used 
interchangeably in the South African Criminal Procedure Act.61  No definitions of these 
terms are included in the Criminal Procedure Act.62  The use of the term “mental defect” is 
likely to cause confusion as it is also occasionally used as a synonym for mental 
retardation.63 
In the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002,64 mental illness is defined as: 
 A positive diagnosis of mental health-related illness in terms of accepted diagnostic criteria 
                                                                                                                                                   
setting, it is generally referred to as the forensic setting.  See American Psychiatric Association 
DSM-V at 25 that contains a cautionary note on the use of the DSM in the forensic setting. 
57 American Psychiatric Association DSM-IV at xxiii.  Also see American Psychiatric Association DSM-
V at 25. 
58 American Psychiatric Association DSM-IV at xxiii.  Also see American Psychiatric Association DSM-
V at 25. 
59  Kaliski 2012 Afr J Psychiatry 83 at 85. 
60  This term is discussed later in this chapter under the discussion of the term “mental retardation”. 
61  See in particular s78 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  
62  Le Roux and Stevens 2012 SACJ 44 at 49. 
63  Le Roux and Stevens 2012 SACJ 44 at 50.  Also see Burchell South African Criminal Law and 
Procedure 284, 289 who defines mental defect as a mental state characterised by an abnormally low 
intellect and as a result whereof, the individual is deprived of normal cognitive or conative functions.  
Burchell further explains that mental defects are usually permanent, are detectable and evident as 
from an early age, and hinder the development of the child in that they do not learn certain social or 
behavioural patterns.  This explanation shows striking similarities to the definition of mental 
retardation in the DSM as referred to later in this chapter and it is therefore safe to assume that 
mental defect refers to mental retardation.  See Tredoux C Foster D, Allan A, Cohen A and 
Wassenaar D Psychology and Law (Juta South Africa 2005) at 420, 421.  Also, see Africa A 
“Psychological evaluation of mental state in criminal cases” in Tredoux C, Foster D, Allan A, Cohen 
A and Wassenaar D Psychology and Law (Juta South Africa 2005) at 392.  She points out further 
that Mental retardation is a psychological concept.  Also see Pillay 2014 South African Journal of 
Psychology 48 at 49 where it is explained that mental defect is used to refer to mental retardation 
and other conditions such as dementia, which is characterised by cognitive deficits.  




made by a mental health care practitioner authorized to make such diagnoses.65 
 The definition of mental illness in the Mental Health Care Act is very wide and includes a 
range of diagnosis.  It is noteworthy that the definition does not require the illness to be 
severe or permanent in order to be considered a mental illness.  It is important to note that 
the fact that a person is a mental health care user in terms of the Mental Health Care Act 
does not automatically imply that the person is also mentally ill for purposes of section 77 
and/ or section 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act.66  It will, however, be taken into account 
when assessing the accused within the parameters of the Criminal Procedure Act.67  
There are inherent dangers in attempting to define the concept of mental illness in definitive 
terms for legal purposes.  Should the definition be couched in terms that are too wide, it 
could lead to a large number of persons being found unfit to stand trial and could make the 
so-called insanity defence available to accused persons who ought not to be able to rely on 
such a defence.  In turn, a very strict and narrow definition could result in persons being 
                                                
65  Section 1 of the Mental Health Care Act.  A mental health care practitioner for purposes of the South 
African Mental Health Care Act is a psychiatrist or medical practitioner (registered in terms of the 
Health Professions Act 56 of 1974) or a nurse, occupational therapist, psychologist or social worker 
with the necessary training.  Landman AA and Landman WJ A practitioner’s Guide to the Mental 
Health Care Act (Juta Cape Town 2014) at 12, however, submit that only a diagnosis by a 
psychiatrist or medical practitioner duly registered, will be acceptable in formal proceedings. 
66  The definition of mental illness is particularly relevant when having to determine the accused’s 
fitness to stand trial or criminal responsibility.  Sections 77 and 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act sets 
out the requirements for an accused to be found unfit to stand trial or not criminally responsible.  
These concepts and requirements will be discussed later in this chapter and further in chapter 3 of 
this research.  Also, see Le Roux and Stevens 2012 SACJ 44 at 50.  See further Kruger Heimstra 
Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 220.  From a legal perspective, and in particular for purposes of 
finding that the accused lacks criminal capacity, a mental illness is considered to be an illness only if 
the illness is a result of a disease (pathological);  and the illness is of internal origin (endogenous).  
Burchell South African Criminal Law and Procedure at 286 explains the importance and value of the 
mental illness having to be pathological, by comparing it to a physical illness.  He explains that a 
physical disease happens involuntarily and affects certain organs of the body.  This person cannot 
be blamed for contracting the disease.  Similarly, a mental illness affects the brain (as an organ) in 
the human body so that the sufferer of the illness cannot be held responsible for contracting the 
illness nor for the way the illness is causing him to act.  A condition brought about by external stimuli, 
such as the temporary psychosis caused by the excessive intake of a drug, will not qualify as a 
mental illness.  Whether an illness is in fact pathological or not, is not always simple to determine.  
See Le Roux and Stevens 2012 SACJ 44 at 46.  The authors highlight that one of the problems with 
the defence of pathological criminal incapacity, is that the disorders that could possibly constitute a 
mental illness or mental defect for purposes of this defence, are not specifically identified.  Also see 
in general S v Stellmacher 1983 (2) SA 181 (SWA) where it is reiterated that temporary impairment 
caused by external stimuli such as alcohol or drugs, does not constitute a mental illness or defect.  
See further Swanepoel M “Legal aspects with regard to mentally ill offenders in South Africa” 2015 
(18) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Review 3238-3258 at 3248, 3249.    





found fit to stand trial which ought not to be. In addition, a narrow definition could exclude 
from the insanity defence those accused that are suffering from a mental illness according 
to the mental health profession but who do not meet the legal requirements set in terms of 
such a strict or narrow interpretation of the concept of mental illness.68  
Since the term “mental illness” and not mental disorder appear in both the Criminal 
Procedure Act and the Mental Health Care Act, the term “mental illness” is used throughout 
the research to refer to all mental health issues other than intellectual disability.  Reference 
will, however, occasionally be made to a mental disorder where the source consulted 
particularly referred to this term.  It should be understood to mean mental illness.  
Personality disorders are further specifically excluded and only referred to specifically 
where relevant.69  
5.2 Mental retardation or intellectual disability 
Mental illness must be distinguished from mental retardation or intellectual disability.  The 
DSM-IV contained a definition of mental retardation, and the term was used throughout the 
DSM-IV.70  The newly released DSM-V refers to intellectual disability rather than mental 
retardation.71   
The DSM-V explains the term intellectual disability as follows: 
Intellectual disability (intellectual developmental disorder) is a disorder with onset during the 
developmental period that includes both intellectual and adaptive functioning deficits in 
conceptual, social, and practical domains. The following three criteria must be met: 
A. Deficits in intellectual functions, such as reasoning, problem-solving, planning, 
abstract thinking, judgment, academic learning, and learning from experience, 
confirmed by both clinical assessment and individualized, standardized intelligence     
testing. 
                                                
68  Le Roux and Stevens 2012 SACJ 44 at 54. 
69  Personality disorders belong to Axis II of the DSM-IV RT and are not labelled as mental illness.  
Mental  illnesses belong to Axis I.  Axis II conditions include personality disorders and mental 
retardation.  The drafters of the DSM-V are in the process of developing an alternative DSM-V model 
for personality disorders.  For detail on this, see American Psychiatric Association DSM-V at 761. 
70  See American Psychiatric Association DSM-IV-TR at 37 where mental retardation is defined as “is 
characterised by significantly sub-average intellectual functioning (an IQ of approximately 70 or 
below) with onset before age 18 years and concurrent deficits or impairments in adaptive 
functioning”. 
71  American Psychiatric Association DSM-V at 33.  Legislative changes in the United States dictate the 
use of the word “mental retardation” rather than intellectual disability.  Intellectual disability is also 




B.  Deficits in adaptive functioning that result in failure to meet developmental and  
  sociocultural standards for personal independence and social responsibility. Without 
  ongoing support, the adaptive deficits limit functioning in one or more activities of  
  daily life, such as communication, social participation, and independent living,  
  across multiple environments, such as home, school, work, and community. 
C.  Onset of intellectual and adaptive deficits during the developmental period.72 
Impairment in adaptive functioning is identified in at least two of certain skills areas, inter 
alia, communication, self-care, home living, self-direction, functional, academic skills, and 
use of community resources and safety.73  The condition is considered chronic with an 
onset in the developmental years.74  Examples of mental retardation / intellectual disability 
syndromes are Down Syndrome 75 Fragile X Syndrome 76 and Cat’s Cry Syndrome.77    
Mental retardation can range from mild (an IQ of between 50 and 70) to profound (an IQ 
below 20).78  The DSM-V places more focus on the severity of deficits in adaptive 
functioning and does not focus on IQ tests alone for purposes of diagnosis.79   
                                                
72  American Psychiatric Association DSM-V at 33.   
73 American Psychiatric Association DSM-IV at 39.  Also see Sadock and Sadock Kaplan and Sadock’s 
Synopsis of Psychiatry at 1138.  Also see Calitz FJW, van Rensburg PHJJ, de Jager PP, Olander 
ML, Thomas L, Venter R, Wessels GA “Psychiatric evaluation of intellectually disabled offenders 
referred to the Free-State Psychiatric Complex, 1993-2003” 2007 (13) SAJP 147-1520 at  147. 
74  American Psychiatric Association DSM-V at 33.  Also, see Landman and Landman The Mental 
Health Care Act 13.  Also see Calitz et al 2007 SAJP 147 at 148. 
75  Occurs in 1 out of every 700 births.  Down Syndrome is associated with a chromosomal abnormality 
but the exact cause of Down Syndrome is still unknown.  See Sadock and Sadock Kaplan and 
Sadock’s Synopsis of Psychiatry at 1141, 1142 for a detailed discussion of the syndrome. 
76  This is the second most common cause of mental retardation and results from a mutation on the X 
chromosome, at what is known as the “fragile site”.  It is present in 1 out of every 1000 males and 1 
out of every 2000 females.  See Sadock and Sadock Kaplan and Sadock’s Synopsis of Psychiatry at 
1142 for more information on this syndrome. 
77  Also known as “Cri-du-chat”.  Sufferers of this syndrome lack part of the 5th chromosome.  These 
children usually have severe mental retardation.  The cat-like cry of the child, caused by 
abnormalities of the larynx, disappears as the child ages.  Sadock and Sadock Kaplan and Sadock’s 
Synopsis of Psychiatry at 1142, 1143. 
78 Sadock and Sadock Kaplan and Sadock’s Synopsis of Psychiatry at 1138.  Also, see American 
Psychiatric Association DSM-IV at 40, 41 where profound mental retardation is classified as a 
person with an IQ of below 25 and not 20 as per the DSM-IV-TR.  See further this source at 1139-
1140 where it is pointed out that 85% of all individuals with mental retardation have mild mental 
retardation.  Those with moderate mental retardation (IQ of between 35 and 50) comprise 10% of 
those with mental retardation, whilst those with severe (IQ of between 20 and 35) and profound 
mental retardation, represent 4% and 1-2% of those with mental retardation respectively.  Mental 
retardation is approximately 1.5 times more common among men than among women.  See further 
Calitz et al 2007 SAJP at 147. 
79  American Psychiatric Association DSM-V at 33 where it is explained that IQ scores are less reliable 
in the “lower end of the IQ range”.  An IQ score is no longer the determining factor of a person’s 
abilities but has to be considered with the functioning levels of the relevant person.  Also, see 




On the legal front, the Criminal Procedure Act refers to these individuals as “intellectually 
disabled” and not as mentally retarded.80  The Mental Health Care Act uses the term 
intellectual disability rather than mental retardation.81 
The Mental Health Care Act distinguishes between “severe or profound intellectual 
disability” and “mental illness”.  Profound intellectual disability is defined in section 1 of the 
Mental Health Care Act as: 
A range of intellectual functioning, extending from partial self-maintenance under close 
supervision, together with limited self-protection skills in a controlled environment through 
limited self-care and requiring constant aid and supervision to severely restricted sensory 
and motor functioning and requiring nursing care.82 
As mentioned earlier, the term “mental defect” is sometimes considered synonymous with 
mental retardation.83  A distinction has, however, been drawn between “mental defect” and 
“mental disease”, where the latter has been described as a condition that can either 
deteriorate or improve, whereas a “mental defect” refers to a non-changing state which 
could be the result of mental disease or injury.84  The term mental defect can create 
                                                                                                                                                   
important in the forensic setting. 
80  See, for example, section 271B(b)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Act that deals with the expungement 
of a criminal record, section 335B(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act regarding medical examination 
on an intellectually disabled child in respect of whom it is alleged that a sexual offence has been 
committed and the schedules of offences to the Criminal Procedure Act.  Also see Africa 
Psychological evaluation of mental state in criminal cases at 392. 
81  See section 1 of the Mental Health Care Act which contains the following definition:  “severe or 
profound intellectual disability” means a range of intellectual functioning extending from partial self-
maintenance under close supervision, together with limited self-protection skills in a controlled 
environment through limited self-care and requiring constant aid and supervision, to severely 
restricted sensory and motor functioning and requiring nursing care.“ 
82  Section 1 of the Mental Health Care Act.  It would appear as if mental retardation as defined in the 
DSM-IV and profound intellectual disability, are synonyms, especially if regard is had to the focus of 
the definitions on the adaptive (motor and sensory) functioning.   
83  Le Roux and Stevens 2012 SACJ 44 at 50.  Also see Burchell South African Criminal Law and 
Procedure at 284, 289 who defines mental defect as a mental state characterised by an abnormally 
low intellect and as a result whereof, the individual is deprived of normal cognitive or conative 
functions.  Burchell further explains that mental defects are usually permanent and are detectable 
and evident as from an early age and hinder the development of the child in that they do not learn 
certain social or behavioural patterns.  This explanation shows striking similarities to the definition of 
mental retardation in the DSM-IV as referred to above, and it is therefore safe to assume that mental 
defect refers to mental retardation.  See Tredoux et al Psychology and Law at 420, 421.  Also, see 
Africa Psychological evaluation of mental state in criminal cases at 392 who points out that mental 
retardation is a psychological concept.  Lastly, see Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 
48 at 49 who confirms that the term “mental defect” is used to describe conditions characterised by 
cognitive deficits such as dementia and mental retardation. 
84  Durham v United States 214 F2d 862 (DC Cir 1954) at 875.  A mental disease has been explained 
by Fingarette with an analogy to a physical condition, as follows: “The ordinary physical disease 




confusion as it is often used to refer to mental illness rather than an intellectual disability.85 
For the sake of consistency, reference is made to intellectual disability rather than mental 
retardation or mental defect in this research.  The use of intellectual disability is in line with 
the terminology of the DSM-V, the Mental Health Care Act, and the Criminal Procedure Act, 
as discussed above. 
 Mental illness and intellectual disability are not mutually exclusive.  Up to two-thirds of 
persons with an intellectual disability usually have a comorbid mental disorder.86  Some 
mental illnesses are more common among individuals with intellectual disabilities than 
among other mental health care users.87  The distinction between mental illness and 
intellectual disability is, however, important as the therapeutic pathways for a person with 
mental illnesses differ from those for persons with intellectual disabilities.88 
                                                                                                                                                   
something in the person, or of something about the person’s makeup which is at least for the time a 
part of him.  Yet, although it exists within the person and may be said to be produced by him, it is 
produced involuntarily.  Not only is the symptoms produced involuntarily, but the condition which 
produces it, the disease, is itself present independently of the person’s will at the time”.  See 
Fingarette H “The concept of mental disease in criminal law insanity tests” 1966 (33) University of 
Chicago Law Review 229-248 at 245. 
85  Clinicians often use mental illness and mental defect interchangeably as synonyms of one another.  
The terms “mental illness” and “mental defect” are also used interchangeably in the South African 
Criminal Procedure Act even though no definitions of these terms can be found in this Act.  See 
Kaliski 2012 African Journal of Psychiatry 83 at 85.  Also see Le Roux and Stevens 2012 SACJ 44 at 
49.  See the interchangeable use of mental illness and mental defect in section 78(1) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act. 
86  Sadock and Sadock Kaplan and Sadock’s Synopsis of Psychiatry at 1140.  Also see Landman and 
Landman The Mental Health Care Act at 13. 
87 Up to two thirds of persons with mental retardation, usually have a comorbid mental disorder.  See 
Sadock and Sadock Kaplan and Sadock’s Synopsis of Psychiatry at 1140 who explain that the 
severity of the mental retardation also seems to be indicative of the probability of the person having 
a comorbid mental disorder.  Also, see Landman and Landman The Mental Health Care Act at 13 
where it is confirmed that it is common for intellectual disability to co-occur with another mental 
conditions such as autism spectrum disorders and depression.  Also see American Psychiatric 
Association DSM-IV at 42 and 43 that lists the most common associated mental disorders in a 
person that suffers from mental retardation.  To mention but a few:  attention deficit disorder 
(hyperactivity), mood disorders and mental disorders due to a general medical condition, such as 
dementia due to head trauma.  Down syndrome is a common example of someone with mental 
retardation.  Mental retardation is usually diagnosed in infancy childhood or adolescence.  
88  Persons with intellectual disabilities are cared for in care and rehabilitation centres as defined in 
section 1 of the Mental Health Care Act.  (v) “care and rehabilitation centres” means health 
establishments for the care, treatment and rehabilitation of people with intellectual disabilities”.  Also 
see section 6(7) of the Mental Health Care Act, which states, “(7) Care and rehabilitation centres 
may - (a) conduct assessments of intellectual abilities; and (b) provide care, treatment and 
rehabilitation services to persons with severe or profound intellectual disabilities, including assisted 
and involuntary mental health care users.”  Persons with mental illnesses are treated in psychiatric 




5.3 Mentally ill accused 
 This term is used throughout the research to refer to accused persons with either or both a 
 mental illness or intellectual disability.  Even though the therapeutic pathways of persons 
with mental illness differ from those for persons with intellectual disabilities, a distinction 
between these two conditions is not necessarily made during the arrest and pre-trial phase 
when the exact nature of the mental condition still has to be established.  Where specific 
attention needs to be drawn to the position of the intellectually disabled accused, rather 
than the mentally ill accused group as an all-inclusive term, this will be pointed out 
specifically. 
5.4 Fitness to stand trial 
Even though every jurisdiction has its own definition of what it entails to be fit to stand 
trial,89 the general principle is that a person must be able to follow the proceedings and 
instruct his legal representative in such a manner that he can conduct a proper defence.90  
An accused may not be tried whilst he is incapable of understanding the proceedings.91    
A fitness assessment concentrates on the current mental state of an accused to understand 
the proceedings and stands separate from the assessment to determine the criminal 
capacity of the accused at the time of the commission of the alleged offence, which 
                                                                                                                                                   
“psychiatric hospital” means a health establishment that provides care, treatment and rehabilitation 
services only for users with mental illness;”  Also see section 6(6) of the Act which states that: “(6) 
Psychiatric hospitals may admit, care for, treat and rehabilitate - (a) voluntary mental health care 
users in special programmes; (b) assisted mental health care users; (c) involuntary mental health 
care users; (d) State patients; (e) mentally ill prisoners; (f) persons referred by court for psychiatric 
observation in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act; and 11 (g) persons admitted for a long period as 
part of their care, treatment and rehabilitation.” 
89  See the jurisdiction specific chapters in this research for the explanation of the concept of fitness to 
stand trial, as it is understood in the respective jurisdictions.  Although the South African Criminal 
Procedure Act does not contain a definition of what is to be understood under fitness to stand trial, 
section 77(1) of the Act compels a court to refer an accused for observation if “(1) If it appears to the 
court at any stage of criminal proceedings that the accused is by reason of mental illness or mental 
defect not capable of understanding the proceedings so as to make a proper defence, the court shall 
direct that the matter be enquired into and be reported on in accordance with the provisions of 
section 79”.   
90 Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 225.  Also, see Kruger A Mental Health Law in 
South Africa (Butterworths 1980) at 162.  See further Du Toit E, De Jager, FJ, Paizes A, Skeen A St 
Q and Van der Merwe SE, Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act (Juta Cape Town 2012) at 
13-5. 




assessment is retrospective in nature.92 
Fitness to stand trial is a procedural issue, whereas criminal responsibility is a substantive 
issue that may render the accused not guilty.93  Since the focus of this research is 
procedural in nature, the concept of criminal responsibility and the consequences of the 
lack thereof are not canvased in detail.  The concept is merely explained for the sake of 
contextualisation and referred to occasionally throughout the research. 
5.5 Not criminally responsible 
The concept refers to an incapacity that is indicative of a person suffering from a mental 
illness or defect that manifests in a lack of capacity to control actions and an inability to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of actions.94  A person, who suffered from a mental illness or 
defect at the time of the commission of an act that normally constitutes an offence, will not 
be held criminally liable if the mental illness or defect affected his ability to distinguish 
between right and wrong or his ability to direct his will accordingly.95  The term “not 
criminally responsible” substitutes the term “insane”, which was previously used to refer to a 
mental illness or disorder.96   
Where the issue of mental illness for purposes of criminal capacity is raised, the accused is 
referred for psychiatric observation to determine his criminal capacity at the time of the 
commission of the act.97 
As alluded to earlier, the focus of this research falls on fitness issues rather than criminal 
                                                
92  Kaliski, Borchers and Williams 1997 SAMJ 1351 at 1354.  Also see Africa Psychological evaluation 
of mental state in criminal cases at 387.  See further Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 
164.  Also, see Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 221.  This is in contrast with the test 
for criminal capacity, which does not test the current state of mind of the accused, but is a 
retrospective test looking at the state of mind of the accused at the time of commission of the alleged 
offence.  Kruger points out, however, at 222 that the assessment for criminal capacity, which looks at 
the accused’s state of mind retrospectively, in many instances also answers the question pertaining 
to whether the accused is fit to stand trial.  Also see Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 
48 at 49. 
93  Slovenko R Psychiatry in Law / Law in Psychiatry 2nd ed (Routledge New York 2009) at 171. 
94  Burchell South African Criminal Law and Procedure at 280.  The term “not criminally responsible” 
includes both pathological and non-pathological criminal incapacity. 
95  Section 78(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
96  Burchell South African Criminal Law and Procedure at 69.  Also, see Parliamentary Information and 
Research Service Current issues in Mental Health in Canada: Mental Health and the Criminal 
Justice System (Library of Parliament Ottawa Canada 2013) at 1. 




capacity issues.  Substantive issues pertaining to criminal responsibility hence falls beyond 
the scope of this research. 
5.6 Fitness assessment 
The Criminal Procedure Act prescribes the procedure for an enquiry aimed at establishing 
an accused’s fitness to stand trial or criminal capacity.98  This research concerns the 
procedural aspects pertaining to such enquiry, and in particular, the assessment conducted 
to determine the accused’s fitness to stand trial, i.e. the fitness assessment.  For this 
reason, the term fitness assessment is used in this research to refer to the process where a 
mental health care practitioner assesses an accused to determine his fitness to stand trial 
and all processes associated therewith.   
The process is often alternatively referred to in the literature as psychiatric observation.  
Psychiatric observation could be understood to include both the fitness assessment and the 
criminal capacity assessment.  This term is occasionally used throughout the research 
when reference is made to the general psychiatric observation process where either or both 
fitness and/or criminal capacity is assessed. 
5.7 State patient 
This term refers to an individual classified as a state patient by a court in terms of section 
77(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act (accused found unfit to stand trial), or section 78(6) of 
the Criminal Procedure Act (accused found not criminally liable due to mental illness).99  
Detention as a state patient is the most restrictive category of mental health care, and 
rehabilitation in terms of the Mental Health Care Act as a state patient can only be released 
from such care by order of a judge in chambers.100  This term is relevant for purposes of 
                                                
98  The court may order an enquiry into fitness to stand trial in terms of section 77 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act and/or an enquiry into the criminal capacity of the accused in terms of section 78 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act.  The enquiry is conducted and reported on in accordance with section 
79 of the Criminal Procedure Act.  See the detailed discussion of the section 77 procedure in chapter 
3 of this research. 
99 The definition of state patient in the Mental Health Care Act read with section 19 of the Judicial 
Matters Amendment Act 55 of 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the “Judicial Matters Amendment 
Act”). 
100  It is rather difficult to secure the release of a state patient as opposed to, for example, an involuntary 
mental health care user.  A state patient can only be released by order of a judge in chambers 
whereas an involuntary mental health care user can be discharged if the head of the health 




this research when discussing the consequences of a finding of unfitness to stand trial. 
5.8 Involuntary mental health care user 
 This term refers to a person receiving involuntary mental health care treatment and 
rehabilitation services at a psychiatric facility in terms of the Mental Health Care Act.101  A 
criminal court may order that an accused person found unfit to stand trial be treated as an 
involuntary mental health care user in certain circumstances.102  The discharge process for 
an involuntary mental health care user is less complex than that applicable to a state 
patient.103 
5.9 Criminalising mental illness 
The criminalisation of the mentally ill occurs when a mentally ill person is cared for in the 
criminal justice system rather than the mental health care system.104  Suffering from a 
                                                                                                                                                   
are no longer required.  See S v Siko 2010 (2) SACR 406 (ECB) in this regard.  Also see section 47 
of the Mental Health Care Act.  The judge must inter alia be furnished with a report from the head of 
the health establishment where the state patient received treatment as well as reports from two 
mental health practitioners of which one must be a psychiatrist.  (See section 47(3)(a)(i) and (ii) of 
the Mental Health Care Act).  See further section 37 of the Mental Health Care Act with regard to the 
discharge of an involuntary mental health care user.  The decision to discharge an involuntary 
mental health care user lies with the head of the relevant health establishment which decision has to 
be confirmed by the Review Board.  (Section 37(5)(b)).  The Registrar of the High Court need only 
be informed of the decision to discharge (section 37(6)) and the decision need not be confirmed by a 
judge in chambers.   
101  Section 32 of the Mental Health Care Act provides for this category of mental health care, treatment 
and rehabilitation services. 
102  Section 77(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that a person found unfit to stand trial and who 
is charged with a non-violent crime or who, after the trial on the facts, was found not to have been 
involved in the violent crime that he is charged with, may be treated as an involuntary mental health 
care user.  Such a person’s mental health status is reviewed every six months and he may be 
discharged once it is determined that he no longer suffers from a mental illness.  The Registrar of the 
High Court must be informed of such a discharge.  See the detailed discussion of the categories of 
mental health care treatment and rehabilitation services as discussed in chapter 2 of this research.  
103  An involuntary mental health care user can be released upon a decision to this effect by the head of 
the health establishment.  The Registrar of the High Court must be informed of such discharge.  In 
the case of a state patient, release is only possible once a judge in chambers ordered such release.  
More detail on the discharge process is discussed in chapter 3 of this research. 
104  Dr Marc Abrahamson coined the term “criminalization of the mentally ill” after observing that there is 
a rapid increase in the number of mentally ill individuals being arrested in the United States of 
America for petty crimes.  He warned that the fact that the mental health care system at the time, 
due inter alia to changes in legislation, were forced to release mentally ill individuals prematurely 
could in turn, result in pressure on the criminal justice system to ensure that these individuals are 
deinstitutionalised.  See Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 40.  Also see Slate, 
Buffington-Vollum and Johnson Criminalization of Mental Illness at 43.  Also see Canadian Mental 
Health Association http://www.cmha.bc.ca/files/policesheets_all.pdf (Date of use 13 March 2015) at 




mental illness is, of course, not a crime.105  Historically, the mentally ill were removed from 
prisons and instead placed in-hospital care.106  The opposite seems to be true today, as the 
criminal justice system is expected to cater for the needs of the mentally ill who encounter 
the law because of their mental illness.107  The criminalisation of the mentally ill is, 
therefore, largely the result of a mental health care system that does not provide sufficiently 
for the needs of the mentally ill.108  Labelling a person who is mentally ill as a “mentally ill 
offender,” rather than a “patient”, is degrading to the individual and affects his dignity.109 
The criminalisation of mental illness is often blamed on deinstitutionalisation.110  It is 
submitted, however, that the criminalisation of the mentally ill seems to be an unintended 
consequence of the deinstitutionalisation movement.111 
It is submitted that the criminalisation of the mentally ill will continue until resources are 
made available to cater properly for the needs of the mentally ill who come in conflict with 
                                                                                                                                                   
medical response to behaviour related to mental illness.” and where it is explained that a person 
experiencing a mental health crisis, is likely to be scared, paranoid and confused and may act in an 
aggressive manner towards a person who is trying to help which in turn, often lead to charges of 
assault against such mentally ill person.  This illustrates clearly how behaviour that should have 
been addressed by the mental health care system, is addressed by the criminal justice system since 
the police are often the first responders to a mental health crisis as  the family or public calls the 
police in for help. 
105  Swanepoel M “Human rights that influence the mentally ill patient in South African medical law:  A 
discussion of section 9; 27; 30; and 31 of the Constitution” 2011 (14) Potchefstroom Electronic Law 
Review 127-261 at 138.  Also, see McLachlin 2010 Dalhousie Law Journal 15 at 31 who states it 
well:  “Mental illness is a disability.  It is neither a sin, nor a moral wrong”. 
106  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 37. 
107  This is evident from the large number of persons with mental illness that encounter the criminal 
justice system.  See Garner and Hafemeister 2003 Developments in Mental Health Law 1 at 4.  See 
chapter 2 of this research for more background information on the increase in the number of 
mentally ill persons in the criminal justice system. 
108  Seltzer T ““Mental health courts:  A misguided attempt to address the criminal justice system’s unfair 
treatment of people with mental illnesses” 2005 (11) Psychology, Public  Policy and Law 570-586 at 
580.  This is particularly so where the mentally ill person already has a criminal record or where he 
has difficult co-occurring conditions such as substance abuse. 
109  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts) at 37. 
110  Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 40. 
111  Denckla and Berman www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/rethinkingtherevolvingdoor.pdf  
(Date of use:  7 March 2011) at 3.  Also see Odegaard 2007 North Dakota Law Review 225 at 233 
where it is explained that, as part of the deinstitutionalisation movement, mentally ill persons who 
were not dangerous, were released from state psychiatric institutions for treatment in the community.  
The intention was for the community services to be in place to provide support for these persons but 
this was not the case, causing many mentally ill persons to relapse and clash with the criminal 
justice system.  See further the discussion of the deinstitutionalisation movement in the United 




the law because of their mental illness.112    
5.10 Diversion 
Diversion, in this context, aims to provide an alternative to traditional prosecution and 
directs mentally ill person away from the criminal justice system into the mental health care 
system, taking into consideration the safety of the public and the mentally ill accused.113  
The objective of diversion is to address the root causes of crime through early 
intervention.114  Diversion steers the mentally ill accused away from the criminal justice 
system towards treatment in an attempt to address the likely root of the mentally ill person’s 
criminal behaviour. 
5.11 Mental Health Courts 
These are specialised courts where mentally ill accused persons are dealt with in a 
separate docket, a collaborative team is used to make linkages to mental health treatment, 
availability of appropriate clinical placement is ensured, and programmes are monitored by 
the court with possible criminal sanctions for non-compliance.115 
These courts focus on rehabilitation of the mentally ill accused, reducing or avoiding time 
spent by the mentally ill accused in jail, as well as decriminalisation and reintegration of the 
mentally ill accused into the community.116    
Mental Health Courts are problem-solving courts where therapeutic jurisprudence is 
                                                
112  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 37. 
113  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 69. 
114  See Parliamentary Information and research service Current issues in Mental Health in Canada at 4. 
Also see Rieksts M “Mental health courts in Canada” LawNow 2008 (33) 31-34 at 32.  See further 
National Judicial Institute Problem-solving in Canada’s courtrooms.  A guide to therapeutic justice 
(National Judicial Institute Canada, 2011) at 9. 
115  This is the functional definition of the Mental Health Court as crafted by Steadman, Davidson and 
Brown.  See Steadman HJ, Davidson S and Brown C “Law and Psychiatry:  Mental health courts:  
Their promise and unanswered questions” 2001 (52) Psych Serv 457-458 at 458.  Also see Lurigio 
and Snowden 2009 The Justice System Journal  196 at 205 where the characteristics of Mental 
Health Courts are discussed.  These are in line with the definition of Mental Health Courts offered by 
Steadman, Davidson and Brown. 
116  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 85 advocate that these characteristics 
should be incorporated into the actual definition of a Mental Health Court and offers it as an 
alternative to the functional definition offered by Steadman, Davidson and Brown 2001 Psych Serv 




applied.117  As part of therapeutic jurisprudence, a collaborative and co-operative,118 rather 
than an adversarial approach is followed by the court.  
5.12 Therapeutic jurisprudence 
 This term emerged as a theory of mental health law and as a direct response to the 
criminalisation of the mentally ill.119   
 Bernstein and Seltzer 120 explain the underlying principles of the therapeutic approach 
within the context of Mental Health Courts as follows: 
From the Criminal Law perspective, two rationales underlie the therapeutic court approach: 
first, to protect the public by addressing the mental illness that contributed to the criminal act, 
thereby reducing recidivism, and second, to recognize that criminal sanctions, whether 
intended as punishment or deterrents, are neither effective nor morally appropriate when 
mental illness is a significant cause of the criminal act. 
Therapeutic jurisprudence proposes, “…the law should be restructured to better accomplish 
therapeutic goals.”121    
Therapeutic jurisprudence aims to address and alleviate underlying problems that may 
cause the particular individual to come into conflict with the law.122  In short, it entails that 
therapeutic goals should be incorporated in the application of the law.123  The aim is to 
rehabilitate the individual through applying therapeutic jurisprudence during the court 
process.   
The aim of therapeutic jurisprudence, as set out above, implies that there might be 
elements of the existing criminal justice system that create hurdles for the mentally ill 
                                                
117  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 39.  The concept of therapeutic 
jurisprudence will be explored later in this research.  Also see Stafford KP and Wygant DB “The role 
of competency to stand trial in mental health courts” 2005 (23) Behav.  Sci Law 245-258 at 246.  See 
further Odegaard 2007 North Dakota Law Review 225 at 228. 
118  Goldberg S Judging for the 21st Century:  A problem solving approach (National Judicial Institute 
Canada 2005) at 26.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 92. 
119  The term was coined by Professor David B Wexler.  See Heerema M “An introduction to the mental 
health court movement and its status in Canada” 2005 (50) Crim.L.Q 255-282 at 261.  Also see 
Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 43. 
120  Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 148. 
121  Wexler DR “Therapeutic jurisprudence and the Criminal Court” 1993 (35) Wm and Mary Law Review 
279-299 at 280.  Also see Kaliski, Borchers and Williams 1997 SAMJ 1351 at 1354 where it is stated 
“Mental illness should not be used to escape justice but should certainly be important in deciding on 
disposal.  i.e. treatment”. 
122  Steadman, Davidson and Brown 2001 Psych Serv 457 at 261. 




accused in the criminal justice system.124  It does not aim to replace or substitute the 
traditional goals of the criminal justice system, but rather aims to function within the 
parameters of these goals to achieve a benefit for the mentally ill accused 125 and society. 
5.13 Restorative justice 
In the context of this research, restorative justice aims to restore relationships tainted by 
criminal acts and to restore both the victim and the mentally ill accused as constructive 
contributing members of the community.126  It aims to identify problems, which must be 
addressed in order to avoid future offending.127  Restorative justice focusses on that which 
is required in order for the victim to be restored to a state of well-being and establishes 
ways to rehabilitate the transgressor and re-integrate him into the community.128 
Restorative justice measures involve, for example, meetings between the victim and the 
transgressor where the incident is discussed.129  Since it is often family members of the 
mentally ill person that fall victim to his criminal behaviour, these victims would arguably 
want the mentally ill person to be dealt with in a compassionate and humane manner 
because it is a relative and not a complete stranger who committed the crime.130   
                                                
124  Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at 261. 
125  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 43, 44. 
126  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 4.  Also see Garner and Hafemeister 2003 
Developments in Mental Health Law 1 at 1 where it is explained that the aim is for the accused / 
offender to admit what he has done and show remorse and for the victim of the crime to respond 
with forgiveness.  This principle is illustrated in, for example, Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division Practice Memorandum: Mentally Disordered/Developmentally Disabled 
Offenders: Diversion at 5 where provision is made for diversion of mentally ill accused persons to the 
Mental Health Court in Canada.   
127  Garner and Hafemeister 2003 Developments in Mental Health Law 1 at 6.  Restorative justice in the 
South African context is defined as “…a process very similar to diversion aimed at reducing the 
number of awaiting-trial detainees and the number of cases on court-rolls.”  For more detail on 
restorative justice in the South African context, see National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa 
“Awaiting Trial Detainee Guidelines”   http://www.lhr.org.za/sites/lhr.org.za/files/atd_guidelines_.pdf 
(Date of use:  17 August 2016) at 30. 
128  Garner and Hafemeister 2003 Developments in Mental Health Law 1 at 6, 7, 8 where it is stated that 
studies found that offenders experienced the restorative justice process involving meetings with the 
victim, as more fair that the traditional criminal justice system. 
129  Garner and Hafemeister 2003 Developments in Mental Health Law 1 at 7. 
130  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 4.  With regard to the application of 
restorative justice in the South African context, the principle of restorative justice has been 
prominently introduced into the South African criminal justice system with the enactment of the Child 
Justice Act 68 of 2008 which makes provision for restorative justice measures (for example a family 
conference where the offender is a small child) and it also provides for diversion of a child away from 




The application of restorative justice in the Mental Health Court setting is promoted for 
those accused of minor crimes.131  The fact that the accused may be suffering from a 
mental illness at the time of the intended meeting for purposes of restorative justice, could, 
however, make this method inappropriate and ineffective in some instances.132   
Restorative justice and therapeutic jurisprudence both aim to address the underlying cause 
of the criminal behaviour.  Therapeutic jurisprudence examines the therapeutic impact of 
the law on those in contact with the criminal justice system.  Restorative justice aims to 
restore the damage that has been done by the criminal act.   
Therapeutic jurisprudence, as applied in Mental Health Courts, can evidently be a powerful 
tool of restorative justice. 
6 RESEARCH PARAMETERS 
6.1 Research methodology 
An investigative and analytical approach is followed throughout this research.  Jurisdictions 
that make use of Mental Health Courts are included to investigate the operation of these 
courts.  The research does not aim to be a comparative study of jurisdictions but merely 
serves to explore the Mental Health Court model in each of the chosen jurisdictions with the 
view to include the most promising aspects thereof in a proposed South African model. 
Selected aspects from the fields of mental health law, criminal law, criminal procedural law, 
and constitutional law are incorporated to assist in evaluating Mental Health Courts as a 
therapeutic response to mentally ill accused persons in South Africa in line with restorative 
justice goals.  Selected aspects of psychiatry, mostly relating to diagnostic criteria and the 
                                                                                                                                                   
and concepts already introduced into the South African criminal justice system.  It will, however, 
focus on a different part of the population who, due to their mental illness, deserve both compassion 
and intervention. 
131  Garner and Hafemeister 2003 Developments in Mental Health Law 1 at 9 who explain that the 
exclusion of more serious offences is to ensure that the public approves of the restorative justice 
process.  Sexual offences are, for example, usually excluded from restorative justice programmes 
due to disapproval from the community. 
132  Garner and Hafemeister 2003 Developments in Mental Health Law 1 at 9 acknowledges the 
possibility that the presence of a mental illness at the time of the meeting with the victim could pose 
a problem as the accused will not be able to communicate or comprehend what the victim is 
conveying which will defeat the entire purpose of a restorative justice attempt.   See this source at 





role of psychiatry in Mental Health Courts, are discussed and this research is therefore, to a 
certain extent, interdisciplinary. 
6.2 Justification for choice of jurisdictions 
The main motivation for selecting Canada and the United States of America as the 
jurisdictions for inclusion in the research is founded on the fact that Mental Health Courts 
are well established in these jurisdictions.  Both are common law jurisdictions, which imply 
that an adversarial approach is used, as is the case in South Africa.  The fact that non-
common law jurisdictions, such as the Netherlands, have an inquisitorial system in place133 
arguably explains why so few European jurisdictions make use of Mental Health Courts as 
their current practices and procedures arguably already contain measures to deal with 
mentally ill accused persons appropriately. 
In addition, these two jurisdictions employ two very different models of a Mental Health 
Court, which enables the researcher to consider a wide spectrum of aspects associated 
with the Mental Health Court model.  In order to suggest an appropriate model for Mental 
Health Courts in South Africa, it is imperative to study models that differ from each other but 
that operate in jurisdictions where Mental Health Courts have been well established and 
operational for a number of years.  A considerable body of literature has been published 
about Mental Health Courts in these two jurisdictions, which contribute to the value of 
including these jurisdictions in the research. 
6.3 General scope of study 
The mentally ill accused person in conflict with the law, and in particular the adjectival 
criminal process, will be the focal point of this research.  The focus will fall on mentally ill 
accused persons, as opposed to mentally ill offenders, since the latter term implies that the 
person has already been convicted.  This research is mainly concerned with pre-trial issues 
and, in particular, the assessment for fitness to stand trial, rather than issues pertaining to 
expert evidence and proof of criminal capacity or the lack thereof.  The research considers 
alternatives to traditional prosecution for accused persons with mental illness, in particular 
Mental Health Courts, as a therapeutic response to mentally ill persons in the criminal 
justice system. 
                                                




A brief history of mental illness in society and mental illness in the criminal justice system is 
included to illustrate the evolution of the treatment of the mentally ill by society and the 
mental health care system.  The characteristics of mentally ill accused persons are 
explored in order to understand the unique challenges that these accused persons bring to 
the criminal justice system.  The type of offences typically committed, and the mental 
illnesses most frequently diagnosed are identified.  The role players in the forensic setting 
are explained, and current challenges with regard to facilities are pointed out.  The need for 
a fresh approach to the mentally ill accused in the criminal justice system is stressed, and 
therapeutic jurisprudence as the basis for such a new approach is introduced.  Mental 
Health Courts as the proposed alternative to traditional prosecution of the mentally ill 
accused are introduced.   
 Relevant legislative provisions pertaining to the mentally ill accused in the South African 
criminal justice system are considered to evaluate the position of the mentally ill accused in 
the South African criminal justice system, which does not currently make provision for a 
Mental Health Court.  Challenges with the current system are further identified.  Diversion in 
the South African context is considered and a need for an expansion thereof identified. 
The concept of a Mental Health Court, as it currently operates in Canada and the United 
States, is explored.  Therapeutic jurisprudence as the underlying principle of these courts is 
explained.  The functioning of these courts, the parties involved, and the selection criteria 
for participation in the diversion programmes of this court in each of the mentioned 
jurisdictions are some of the procedural aspects that are explored.  In considering Mental 
Health Courts for South Africa, the effectiveness, benefits, and challenges of Mental Health 
Courts in other jurisdictions are considered.  Finally, suggestions are made for a Mental 
Health Court model suitable for the South African context. 
Although not the primary aim of the research, consideration is given to the position of the 
unfit accused in the South African criminal justice system and suggestions are made to 
optimise the manner in which their cases are handled.   
The researcher aims through this research to offer a practical solution to the unique 
challenges that the criminal justice system faces when encountering accused persons with 
mental illness.  The research further aims to promote the rights of the mentally ill who come 




6.4 Limitations of study 
The research contained herein is up to date and correct as of June 2016. The new DSM-V 
134 was consulted for definitional purposes.  The DSM-V was published in 2014, and very 
little has been published about its impact.  Therefore, the majority of the literature relied 
upon for purposes of this research refers and relied upon the DSM-IV; hence, reference to 
diagnostic criteria and psychiatric admission criteria for purposes of the Mental Health Court 
treatment programmes mainly refer to the criteria as set out in the DSM-IV. 
The research does not explore the substantive criminal law pertaining to the mentally ill in 
the criminal justice system, although this research draws from selected principles and 
concepts from the substantive criminal law.  The focus falls on criminal procedural aspects. 
The research does not investigate or explain the phenomenon of special or problem-solving 
courts per se as these are not strange to the South African legal system.135  The benefits of 
a special court will only be elaborated upon in the context of Mental Health Courts. 
The position of the mentally ill in civil proceedings is not considered.  The focus is 
exclusively on the mentally ill accused within the criminal justice system. 
                                                
134  This abbreviation refers to the Diagnostic and Statistical manual of Mental Disorders.  This manual 
was developed by the American Psychiatric Association.  The DSM-IV was published in 1994 and 
revised in 2000.  The latter version is identified as DSM-IV–TR. This is the official psychiatric coding 
system used in the United States of America.  The diagnostic criteria used by mental health care 
practitioners to identify a mental illness, can be found in either the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (hereinafter referred to as “the DSM”) or the International Classification of 
Diseases and Related Health Problems (hereinafter referred to as “ICD-10” as published by the 
World Health Organisation).  The ICD-10 is the official classification system used in Europe.  (See 
Sadock and Sadock Kaplan and Sadock’s Synopsis of Psychiatry at 284).  Mental health care 
professionals seem to use either the one or the other diagnostic manual exclusively.  (See Spamers 
M A Critical Analysis of the Psycholegal Assessment of Suspected Criminally Incapacitated Accused 
Persons as Regulated by the Criminal Procedure Act (LL.M Dissertation University of Pretoria 2010) 
at 22, 23).  The first DSM was published in 1952.  The DSM V was recently published and brought 
about changes to the multi-axial system.  Kaliski warns that the introduction of the new DSM-V 
manual published in 2014, will pose its own set of challenges as new illnesses are introduced of 
which psychiatrists, forensic psychiatrists, lawyers and insurance companies who provide cover for 
disability, will have to take note.  See in general Kaliski S “Will forensic psychiatry survive DSM-5?”  
2012 (15) Afr J Psychiatry 13-15.  Also see Ogunwale A “Forensic psychiatry, DSM-V and legal 
insanity” 2012 (15) Afr J Psychiatry 91-91 at 91 who points out that, because the final decision as to 
if a person was “sane’ at the time of committing the act in question, is a legal one, new additions of 
for example illnesses in the DSM-V should not have a big impact on forensic psychiatry and the way 
that forensic observations are approached. 
135  Special courts such as Children’s courts, Equality courts, Divorce court and Domestic Violence 





The research does not specifically address the human rights issues pertaining to prisoners 
or remand detainees.  Selected human rights issues are, however, considered where it is 
relevant to the mentally ill accused who has to spend time in prison pending psychiatric 
observation in terms of sections 77, 78 and 79 of the Criminal Procedure Act.  
This research specifically excludes child offenders as this group constitutes a separate 
research study since child justice operates in a different legal framework to adult accused 
persons.136  This trend is observed globally, and indeed in some jurisdictions, Juvenile 
Mental Health Courts have been introduced to specifically deal with children in conflict with 
the law who suffer from a mental illness.     
The research does not aim to include an explanation of each mental illness that may be 
relevant in the criminal procedure context as this research is mainly concerned with the 
criminal procedural law affecting the mentally ill accused in the criminal justice system.  
Reference to mental illnesses, statistics about the prevalence of these illnesses and related 
information about the mental illness is included purely to show the prevalence and impact of 
mental illnesses in the criminal justice context.    
Assessment for criminal capacity, and the consequences of a finding of not criminally 
responsible, is specifically excluded because the assessment for fitness to stand trial forms 
the focus of the research as opposed to substantive criminal capacity concerns.  The 
reason for this is that fitness is a requirement in order to gain access to the Mental Health 
Court programme.  Further, most participants in the Mental Health Court programme exit 
the criminal justice system after completion of the programme; thus, the opportunity to raise 
the insanity defence never or rarely presents itself.  The purpose of Mental Health Courts is 
to divert mentally ill accused persons away from the criminal justice system and to expedite 
pre-trial issues such as a fitness assessment.  Fitness can be assessed and dealt with 
without the criminal proceedings having to continue, in order for the court to make a finding 
on it at the end of the proceedings, as is the case where mental illness is raised as a 
defence.  Since this research does not consider sentencing in the traditional sense of the 
word, and since mental illnesses that affect an accused’s criminal capacity are considered 
at the sentencing phase, it is not pertinently relevant to this research.  Reference will, 
however, be made thereto as and when it is prudent to do so, and suggestions are included 
                                                
136  This was brought about by the introduction of the Child Justice Act 68 of 2008 that establishes a 




on how the Mental Health Court could possibly assist these accused persons. 
7 STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH 
7.1 Chapter 1 
 This chapter introduces the focus area that forms the subject matter of this research.  
Chapter 1 further sets out the general scope and limitations of the research, the research 
methodology used as well as the structure of the thesis. 
 This chapter explains some of the key concepts that form the core of this research.  This 
chapter introduces the concept of a Mental Health Court through its purpose and nature.  
7.2 Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 contextualises the research problem.  The chapter contains a brief overview of 
the manner in which mentally ill persons were treated historically.  It further considers the 
reasons for mentally ill persons’ contact with the criminal justice system, the link between 
mental illness and criminal activity, and the general profile of the mentally ill accused in 
South Africa.  The chapter explores the interplay between law and psychiatry and 
introduces the typical role players in the South African forensic setting.  The chapter 
suggests that the challenges faced by the forensic system require a fresh approach to 
persons with mental illness in the criminal justice system and promotes Mental Health 
Courts as a therapeutic response to this group of persons.  The chapter expands on the 
introduction of Mental Health Courts in chapter 1 and explains the emergence of these 
courts in both Canada and the United States of America. 
7.3 Chapter 3 
 The focus of chapter 3 is exclusively on South African criminal procedure and, in particular, 
on procedural aspects relating to fitness to stand trial.  The relevant legislation is 
considered, and the impact thereof on the mentally ill accused is explored.  The 
assessment process is considered in considerable detail, and the consequences of a 
finding of fitness versus unfitness are explored. The reason for the in-depth analysis of 
largely doctrinal law is to set the tone for the researcher’s later suggestion of an alternative 
yet procedurally sound model for dealing with mentally ill offenders. Challenges within the 




Current diversion options for mentally ill accused persons are investigated, and the need for 
alternatives to traditional prosecution for the fit but mentally ill accused is stressed.  
7.4 Chapter 4 
 Chapter 4 explores the Mental Health Court model as it is implemented in Canada with a 
specific focus on the Mental Health Court in Toronto, Ontario.  It sets out the legal 
framework with relevant provisions from the Criminal Code and mental health legislation.  It 
explores the court structure in Canada, including the role of the Review Board in cases of 
persons with mental illness.  
The procedural aspects affecting the mentally ill accused in the Canadian criminal justice 
system are discussed with a specific focus on the assessment for fitness to stand trial and 
the consequences of a finding of fitness versus a finding of unfitness.  Diversion in the 
Canadian context is discussed before exploring the procedural dynamics of Canadian 
Mental Health Courts, including the admission criteria and the different phases in the 
Mental Health Court process. 
Successes and challenges of Mental Health Courts in Canada are discussed.  The chapter 
concludes with a brief comparison of the current South African and Canadian approaches 
to the mentally ill accused. 
7.5 Chapter 5 
Chapter 5 explores the Mental Health Court model employed in the United States of 
America and follows the same structure as chapter 4 with the appropriate adjustments for 
the particular jurisdiction.  This chapter focuses on the functioning of the Brooklyn Mental 
Health Court. 
The chapter concludes with a comparison between the Mental Health Court model in the 
United States of America and the criminal prosecution model in South Africa.  It further 
includes a brief comparison between the Canadian Mental Health Court model and the 
model used in the United States of America. 
7.6 Chapter 6 
 The concluding chapter proposes an appropriate Mental Health Court model for South 




of Mental Health Courts discussed in chapters 4 and 5 and within the unique context of the 
 South African criminal justice setting.  In essence, chapter 6 presents the researcher’s 
conclusions and recommendations. 
8 CONCLUSION 
Mental illness is an issue that poses unique challenges to a criminal justice system and one 
which is ripe for alternatives to traditional methods of criminal processing. Proposals for 
such alternatives, and continued research thereon, is not only necessary but also indeed 
urgent, considering the rapid increase in the number of mentally ill persons in criminal 
justice systems globally. 
The South African criminal justice system is faced with unprecedented caseloads, many of 
which involve mental health issues.  Overburdened criminal courts necessarily mean 
overfull prisons with awaiting trial prisoners, many of whom may suffer from a mental 
illness.  Resource strapped correctional facilities are ill-equipped to provide mental health 
services to mentally ill accused persons.   
Specialised skills are required to deal with cases involving mental illness effectively, skills 
that are not by default available in the traditional criminal justice system.  These skills 
should be introduced into the criminal justice system, and it is proposed that an effective 
way to do so would be to introduce a Mental Health Court that is tasked with dealing with 
cases involving mental illness. 
 The court recently acknowledged the need for change in the criminal justice system 
pertaining to the manner in which persons with mental illness are dealt with.  Griesel J 
stated: 
 
 …the whole situation concerning persons with mental illness or mental defects may well 
require a more thorough overhaul… 137 
 Mental Health Courts in the South African criminal justice system might be the first step 
towards such overhaul.   
                                                
137  De Vos N.O and Another v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others; InRe: 
Snyders and Another v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others 2015 (1) 




Chapter 2 contextualises the unique issues that mental illness brings to the criminal justice 
system.  The South African forensic setting is introduced, and current challenges therein 
highlighted.  Diversion as such in a criminal justice setting is investigated.  Therapeutic 
jurisprudence is explained, and the Mental Health Court as a therapeutic response to 
mentally ill accused persons is explored.  Chapter 2 serves to give the general background 










 CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXTUALISATION 
1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a historical background to the manner in which mentally ill persons 
were treated in the past, with a specific focus on mentally ill persons in conflict with the law.  
This chapter further highlights the unique challenges that mentally ill accused persons bring 
to the criminal justice system.   
The background is explained by way of a brief overview of the history of mental illness in 
society and the mentally ill person in conflict with the law.  The possible reasons for the 
mentally ill person’s contact with the criminal justice system are explored.  The question of 
whether or not there is a link between mental illness and criminal behaviour is considered.  
The role players in the South African forensic setting are introduced, the interplay between 
law and psychology/psychiatry in the criminal justice system is explored, and the need for 
specialised mental health skills in the criminal justice system is emphasised. 
Due to the unique challenges that mental illness brings to the criminal justice system, a 
different approach to mentally ill accused persons is needed  An encounter with the criminal 
justice system can have a detrimental effect on the mentally ill person’s mental state, 
regardless of the seriousness of the mental illness.  Incarceration of a mentally ill accused 
person should ideally be avoided.  To this end, diversion options for mentally ill accused 
persons are investigated.  The South African criminal justice system does not currently 
make provision for the formal diversion of mentally ill accused persons way from the 
criminal justice system.  This chapter introduces the concept of a Mental Health Court as a 
viable diversion option for mentally ill accused persons. 
Mental Health Courts create an opportunity for the application of therapeutic jurisprudence.  
The application of therapeutic jurisprudence is explained with a particular focus on its role in 
the Mental Health Court.  Jurisdictions across the globe have discovered the benefits of 
therapeutic jurisprudence as a tool to evaluate the impact of the criminal justice system on 
a mentally ill accused and to find ways to improve the situation. 




of Mental Health Courts in Canada and the United States of America is explored to illustrate 
the circumstances that led to the establishment of these courts.    
This chapter provides the non-procedural backdrop against which the proposal of a Mental 
Health Court for South Africa should be considered. 
2  BACKGROUND TO THE TREATMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL OVER THE AGES 
2.1 Introduction  
A brief look at the way in which mentally ill persons were treated in the past will assist in 
appreciating the advances that have been made to date and may serve to highlight the 
further improvements that are required.  This section is not jurisdiction-specific but rather 
serves to give a general overview of the treatment of mentally ill persons in society over 
time.  Specific reference will, however, be made to South Africa later in the discussion.  
2.2 Background 
In the earliest times, the cause of the mental illness was considered to be evil spirits.1   
Persons who showed signs of mental illness were regarded as deviants, often believed to 
be a witch or sorcerer, and thus subjected to exorcism.2      
                                                
1  Slate RN, Buffington-Vollum JK and Johnson WW The Criminalization of Mental Illness:  Crisis and 
Opportunity for the Justice System 2nd ed (Carolina Academic Press North Carolina 2013) at 20, 21.  
Those affected by mental illness had to be cared for by their families.  Some of the treatment 
administered by the families in an attempt to get rid of the evil spirits included removing a part of the 
skull so that the evil spirit could escape.  Since mentally ill persons could not contribute to the 
wellbeing of the clan in the stone age, they were often banished, which often meant death for the 
mentally ill person.  During the middle ages as churches and governments often became intertwined, 
mental illness was known as something caused by demons or the devil himself.  The rituals for 
getting rid of the demonic spirits varied from religion to religion and ranged from pulling the hair of 
the mentally ill person to beating the individual.  Mentally ill persons were often believed to be 
witches and burned at the stake as punishment.  See McLachlin B “Medicine and the law:  The 
challenges of mental illness” 2010 (33) Dalhousie Law Journal 15-33 at 18.  See further Kruger A 
Mental Health Law in South Africa (Butterworths 1980) at 9.  Also, see Gillis L “The historical 
development of psychiatry in South Africa since 1652” 2012 (18) South African Journal of Psychiatry 
78-82 at 78. 
2  Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 9, 146 who elaborates further to indicate that even 
epileptic convulsions at the time were seen as the entry or exit of the devil from the affected person’s 
body.  Also, see McLachlin 2010 Dalhousie Law Journal 15 at 18 who points out that mental illness 
were mostly regarded as a religious matter that was generally ignored by the law, unless someone 
proved to be a danger in which case the law could be employed to “get rid” of him or her.  The 
Greeks and the Romans, later believed that mental illness came from the body and not the brain and 




Historically mentally ill persons were deemed the responsibility of the family 3 until the 
Renaissance (1300 – 1600), when asylums were established as places of segregation 
where the mentally ill were kept as outcasts. 4   There was no known treatment for mental 
illness at the time, and mentally ill persons were detained merely because of the belief that 
they might be dangerous and thus required segregation for their own safety and the safety 
of others.5  In most instances, conditions in detention were inhumane and mentally ill 
persons were, in some cases, subjected to torture.6  In South Africa, persons with mental 
illness were segregated and confined since 1652, when Jan Van Riebeeck arrived in the 
Cape.7  It was not unusual during this time for a mentally ill person to be detained with 
convicted criminals.8 
The concept of mental illness as a disease only emerged in the 18th century.9  During the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the scientific fact about mental illness was 
finally acknowledged, namely that it is not caused by the devil or other such entity, but that 
it is a sickness.10     
The conditions of treatment improved during the age of enlightenment as philosophies 
about the self and the co-existence of one’s body and soul emerged.11  Initially, no 
distinction was made between types of mental illnesses and all mental illnesses were 
                                                                                                                                                   
confirmed by the fact that a curator was appointed to ensure that the mentally ill persons’ property 
was protected which decisions were guided by the wishes of the mentally ill person.  The mentally ill 
person’s wishes as expressed during lucid moments were the guiding principle of the curator’s 
actions.  See Slate, Buffington-Vollum and Johnson Criminalization of Mental Illness at 20 where the 
manner in which mentally ill persons were treated in ancient civilisations is discussed.  The views of 
the early writers such as Plato and Hippocrates are also considered there.   
3  This is the case from Roman times.  See Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 1.  Also see 
Slate, Buffington-Vollum and Johnson Criminalization of Mental Illness at 20, 21. 
4  Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 9, 10. 
5  Gillis 2012 South African Journal of Psychiatry 78 at 78.  Also, see McLachlin 2010 Dalhousie Law 
Journal 15 at 18.  Treatments for mental conditions were few and far between at the time. 
6  Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 9.  See this source at 7 where the case of Hendryntje 
Cract is discusses who was kept in a cage and had to endure beatings.  Also see McLachlin 2010 
Dalhousie Law Journal 15 at 18 who opines that mentally ill persons were generally seen as sub-
standard humans. 
7  Gillis 2012 South African Journal of Psychiatry 78 at 78. 
8  Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 8 for details of the conditions at places of detention for 
mentally ill persons shortly after South Africa became a Union. 
9  Gillis 2012 South African Journal of Psychiatry 78 at 78 where it is also pointed out that the term 
“psychiatry” was coined by a French physician in 1808. 
10  McLachlin 2010 Dalhousie Law Journal 15 at 18. 
11  Slate, Buffington-Vollum and Johnson Criminalization of Mental Illness at 22 where it is explained 




considered curable.12        
2.3 South Africa 
In South Africa, all persons suffering from a mental illness were classified as furiosi and 
considered dangerous.13  Under Roman-Dutch Law, a mentally ill person could be confined 
if he was “dangerously insane”.14  There were no guidelines on or control over the 
conditions of confinement of the mentally ill, which often led to a shocking disregard for the 
rights and dignity of the mentally ill in confinement.15  The establishment of dedicated 
psychiatric hospitals would change this state of affairs. 
Mentally ill persons were first treated in a section of Somerset Hospital that opened in 1818 
until these mental health patients were moved to Robben Island in the early to mid-nineteen 
hundreds.16  Valkenberg hospital opened on 20 February 1891 and could accommodate 36 
mentally ill persons who were moved back from Robben Island at this time.17  A number of 
                                                
12  Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 4. 
13  Furiosi referred more specifically to those whose disease manifested through violent behaviour.  
Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 4.  Also see Gillis 2012 South African Journal of 
Psychiatry 78 at 78 who explains that mentally ill persons were often referred to as “lunatics” as 
mental illness were at some point regarded to be linked to some effect of the moon. 
14  Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 4, 5, 6, 27.  An application for an order for confinement 
could and was usually brought by friends or family of the mentally ill person.  A curator could be 
appointed for a mentally ill person under Roman-Dutch Law.  Such appointment was not automatic 
and was only done on application to the court.  Where such an order was made, at least some 
consideration was given to the rights of the mentally ill person in that the affected person could 
approach the court himself for an amendment of the order placing him under curatorship if he felt 
aggrieved by the order.  Prior to the Roman Dutch Law regulating the appointment of a curator, the 
mentally ill person would, for the duration of his incapacity, automatically be under the care and 
control of a curator.  The rights of the mentally ill person received no consideration in this context. 
15  Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 7, 27 refers to the case of Hendryntje Cract who was a 
mentally ill woman charged with infanticide.  Hendryntjie’s mother applied for an order to have her 
confined which order was granted on 8 November 1723.  She was absolved of the charges against 
her because of her mental condition, but was ordered to be confined for the rest of her life.  Her 
confinement entailed being kept in a cage at the premises of Jeroen van Soelen who was paid to 
take care of her.  It is reported that van Soelen had to beat Hendryntje until she got scared of him in 
order to control her.  She was kept at his premises for a year and a half until her mother took her 
back because of the costs of the confinement at Van Soelen’s premises.  Also see Gillis 2012 South 
African Journal of Psychiatry 78 at 79 who explains that the mentally ill were often chained to iron 
rings and kept in dark cells. 
16  Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 11 who indicates that such transfer occurred in 1846.  
Also see Gillis 2012 South African Journal of Psychiatry 78 at 79 who indicates that such transfer 
happened a decade earlier in 1836 and discusses the detention of mentally ill persons in other 
facilities prior to the opening of Somerset Hospital in the Cape that had allocated beds for mentally ill 
persons. 
17  Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 11.  Also see Gillis 2012 South African Journal of 




psychiatric hospitals opened across South Africa in the late 19th and early 20th century 18 , 
including Weskoppies Hospital in 1892 (or the Krankzinnigengesticht as it was known at the 
time).19  
Each province had its own legislation regulating the detention of the mentally ill.20  Control 
of mental institutions was centralised with the Mental Disorders Act 38 of 1916 21 that 
served to consolidate all provincial legislation governing the detention and treatment of 
mentally disordered persons.22  The Mental Disorders Act governed the position until the 
Mental Health Act 18 of 1973 came into operation.23  Responsibility for mental health was 
placed back with each province in 1987.24  The Mental Health Act dealt with seven 
categories of mentally ill persons using terminology such as “idiot”,25 “imbecile”,26 and 
“feeble-minded person”.27  A person suffering from epilepsy referred to as an “an epileptic”, 
was also deemed to be a mentally ill or a mentally defective person.28  A person with a 
mental illness who belonged to any of the classes set out above could be detained in a 
                                                                                                                                                   
patients were transferred there.  It happened over time until the psychiatric facility on Robben Island 
was finally closed down in 1920. 
18  See Gillis 2012 South African Journal of Psychiatry 78 at 78, 79 who lists the psychiatric hospitals 
that opened across South Africa during the 19th and early 20th century.  To name a few:  Fort 
England Hospital in Grahamstown opened in 1876, Fort Beaufort in the Eastern Cape in 1897, 
Oranje Hospital in Bloemfontein (1883) and Townhill Hospital in Pietermaritzburg in 1882.  In the 20th 
century Komani Hospital in Queenstown opened in 1922 followed by Stikland Hospital in Bellville 
(1963) and Lentegeur Hospital on the Cape Flats in 1974.  Witrand Institute catered for persons with 
mental retardation in Potchefstroom and the Alexandra Care and Rehabilitation Centre was 
established in Cape Town. 
19  Weskoppies Hospital got its name in 1947.  Prior to this it was known as Pretoria Mental Hospital 
and prior to that the Pretoria Lunatic Asylum.  The first patient was admitted to Weskoppies hospital 
on 27 January 1892.  See Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 11. 
20  See Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 12-21 for a summary of the various legislative 
provisions that existed in the Cape, Natal, Transvaal and the Orange Free State prior to South Africa 
becoming a Union.   
21  Hereinafter referred to as the “Mental Disorders Act”. 
22  Gillis 2012 South African Journal of Psychiatry 78 at 78, 79.  Also see Kruger Mental Health Law in 
South Africa at 21.  The Mental Disorders Act was assented to on 10 June 1916. 
23  Hereinafter referred to as the “Mental Health Act”.  The Act came into operation on 27 March 1975.  
Also see Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 21. 
24  Gillis 2012 South African Journal of Psychiatry 78 at 78, 79. 
25  Referring to a person so deeply defective in mind from birth or from an early age as to be unable to 
guard himself against common physical dangers.  These persons fall under class 3 of the Mental 
Health Act.  Also, see Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 22. 
26  This referred to mental deficiency not amounting to idiocy and formed class 4 of the Mental Health 
Act.  Also, see Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 22. 
27  A person mentally defective to such an extent that he cannot compete on equal terms with his 
“normal” fellows.  See Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 22. 
28 Those with epilepsy formed the seventh class in the Mental Health Act.  See Kruger Mental Health 
Law in South Africa at 22.  Also, see this source at 9 where it is explained that epileptic convulsions 




mental institution by order of the court.29  The initial period of detention in accordance with a 
reception order could not exceed six weeks.30  A judge in chambers had to decide on the 
release or further detention of a person who was initially detained by way of a reception 
order.31 
In the 20th century, more understanding about the physiological processes in the brain 
emerged, and a large number of medications were developed in response thereto.32  New 
medication made custodial treatment less essential, and mentally ill persons could be 
treated in the community with medication control.33  Advances in medicine show that many 
mental illnesses may be successfully treated, and for this reason, the needs and potential 
of the mentally ill cannot be ignored by simply removing them from society by way of 
detention.34 
It is evident that the field of mental health care has evolved over time and is still rapidly 
developing.  These developments aside, individuals with a mental illness are one of the 
most marginalised groups in society today.35  Mental illness goes hand in hand with 
stigmatisation,36 shame, fear, and uncertainty 37 for the individual suffering from the mental 
                                                
29  Section 4 of the Mental Health Act.  These orders were referred to as “reception orders”.  See Kruger 
Mental Health Law in South Africa at 22, 23. 
30  Section 16(1) of the Mental Health Act.  See Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 23. 
31  Section 18 of the Mental Health Act.  Also see Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 23. 
32  Gillis 2012 South African Journal of Psychiatry 78 at 78, 79. 
33  Gillis 2012 South African Journal of Psychiatry 78 at 78, 79. 
34  McLachlin 2010 Dalhousie Law Journal 15 at 32. 
35 Johnstone MJ “Stigma, social justice and the rights of the mentally ill:  Challenging the status quo” 
2001 (10) Aust N Z J Mental Health Nurs 200-209 at 200.  Also see in general Swanepoel M “Human 
rights that influence the mentally ill patient in South African medical law:  A discussion of section 9; 
27; 30; and 31 of the Constitution” 2011 (14) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Review 127-261.  See 
further Simpson B and Chipps J “Mental health legislation: Does it protect the rights of people with 
mental health problems?”  2012 (48) Social Work 47-57 at 47. 
36  Schutte T “’Single’ versus ‘panel’ appointed forensic mental observations:  Is the referral process 
ethically justifiable?”  2013 (6) South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 64-68 at 68 since the 
mentally ill person in conflict with the law is often depicted as “crazed killers”.  Also see Swanepoel 
2011 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Review 127-261 for a general discussion of stigmatisation 
amongst other issues that the mentally ill person has to face. 
37 Johnstone 2001 Australian and New Zeeland Journal of Mental Health Nursing 200 at 201.  The 
mentally ill often find themselves in a position where the general course of their lives, are heading for 
the ground because of their condition.  There are many examples of brilliant men and women, who 
found themselves hopelessly lost in a reality, which they did not create.  For example John Nash 
who won the Nobel prize for Economics who passed away in May 2015, suffered from Schizophrenia 
which greatly impacts on his ability to make further contributions to the field of Mathematics.  Another 
example is Cantor, a great mathematician who contributed to the development of set theory, spent 
the last days of his life in an asylum suffering from a severe mental illness.  See Schneider RD, 




illness and for those that encounter them.  The uncertainty is not limited to those suffering 
from the mental illness or those involved in personal relationships with them but is also 
apparent in professional settings, such as the criminal justice system, where the vastly 
different fields of law and psychiatry meet.    
3  MENTAL ILLNESS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
3.1 Historical view of the mentally ill persons accused of committing a crime 
When a mentally ill person was charged with an offence, the person was generally locked 
away with little consideration of what he has actually done wrong.38  He was held 
accountable for the consequences of the action, regardless of his mental condition at the 
time of committing the offence.39    
Later, under Roman law, the mentally ill person was seen in the same light as a child who 
could not be held liable for murder due to his “inherent misfortune”.40  Under Roman-Dutch 
Law,41 sanity was regarded as a prerequisite for punishment.42  Reasons raised for not 
punishing the mentally ill person included that the mentally ill person should be regarded as 
dead for all intents and purposes, that such person should be compared to a child in 
matters involving crime and that insanity in itself is already punishment enough for the 
                                                                                                                                                   
2007) at 36 who explain that mentally ill men and women’s potential are often stolen from them by 
the onset of a mental illness. 
38  Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 146. 
39  Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 148.  In the earliest times, no consideration was given 
to the question if the accused actually had the necessary mental capacity to form the intent to 
commit a crime or not. 
40  Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 148 at footnote 11 where reference is made to the 
Digest 48.8.12 with reference to the infans and the furiosus. 
41  The provisions pertaining to the mentally ill accused person in Roman Dutch Law, was contained in 
various sources such as the Constitutio Criminalis Caroli (1532), - although according to Kruger 
Mental Health Law in South Africa at 149, footnote 12 this was not part of the Roman Dutch Law, but 
the Roman Dutch Law was seriously influenced by it as many Roman Dutch writers referred to it in 
their writings.  A further source was the work on criminal law by Carpzovious (1559-1666) who was a 
German writer but whose work on Criminal Law was held as the authoritative work in Criminal Law in 
the Netherlands for longer than it was regarded as such in Germany.  See Kruger Mental Health Law 
in South Africa at 149 footnote 13.  Further sources were the writings of D van der Wolf (in particular 
his opinion dated 1649),  Van Leeuwen (1626-1682), Van der Linden (1756-1835) and others the 
details of which can be found in Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 149-151. 
42  Section 179 of the Constitutionem Criminalem Carolinam (1774) as referred to in Kruger Mental 
Health Law in South Africa at 149.  Also see van Leeuwen Censura Forencis (1741) at 5.1.18 as 
referred to in Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 150 who expressed the view that mentally 




mentally ill person.43  Under Roman-Dutch Law, mentally ill persons were regarded to have 
no will.44 
The portrayal of mentally ill persons under Roman-Dutch Law speaks of a disregard for the 
humanity and dignity of a mentally ill person, in particular the stance that the person should 
be regarded as dead for all intents and purposes as referred to above. 
Under early colonial South African law, a person who was discovered under the 
circumstances indicative of “derangement of the mind” and who intended to, or had 
committed an indictable offence, could be detained in an institution.45   
No express provisions were made for dealing with a person who was unfit to stand trial due 
to mental illness.  It appears that, initially, no distinction was made between a mental illness 
that affects fitness and mental illness that influences the criminal capacity of an accused.  It 
appears that an accused, who lacks criminal capacity, was automatically considered unfit to 
stand trial.46 
The South African law, as it currently stands, distinguishes between a mental illness that 
affects a person’s ability to follow proceedings and a mental illness that influenced the 
                                                
43  See Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 149 where an extract from the writings of 
Carpzovious (1559-1666) appears.  Also see Verhandelinge over de misdaden en der selver 
straffen; vervolgt en ten einde gebragt door Johan Jacob Hasselt (1764)2.14, 2.15 as referred to in 
Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 151 footnote 23 who reiterates that the mental state of 
the accused is sufficient punishment for the accused. 
44  Van Leeuwen Censura Forencis (1741) at 5.1.18 as referred to in Kruger Mental Health Law in 
South Africa at 150 who expressed the view that mentally ill persons should not be punished for they 
have no judgment and no will.  Also see the opinion of Joannes van der Linden Rechtgeleerd 
Practicaal en Koopmans Handboek (1806) 2.1.5 as referred to in Kruger Mental Health Law in South 
Africa at 151 footnote 24 who opined that mentally ill persons had no will and no understanding and 
should therefore not be punished.  Snyman CR Strafreg 5th ed (LexisNexis Durban 2008) at 116 
points out that, due to the lack of knowledge in the field of psychiatry and psychology in the time that 
our Roman writers produced their scripts, their writings and opinions on this topic, cannot serve as 
strong guidance anymore.    
45  This was in accordance with the provincial legislation of certain provinces at the time for example the 
Cape (Act 20 of 1879) and Natal (Act 1 of 1868).  See Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 
155. 
46  Kaliski SZ, Borcherds M and Williams F “Defendants are clueless – the 30-day psychiatric 
observation” 1997 (87) SAMJ 1351-1355 at 1352 where it is stated that the practice at the time was 
that most psychiatrists would indicate that an accused is unfit to stand trial where a mental illness or 
defect has been diagnosed as there were no clear guidelines on how the assessment for fitness to 
stand trial should be conducted.  The Mental Disorders Act 38 of 1916 later contained separate 




accused’s criminal capacity at the time of committing the offence.47    
3.2 The link between mental illness and criminal activity 
Various schools of thought exist on this issue ranging from the notion that those with a 
mental illness are more prone to violence to the view that mental illness reduces the risk of 
violence.48  In the latter part of the 20th century, it was finally agreed that individuals 
suffering from serious mental illnesses are at an increased risk of violent behaviour.49  
There is consensus that there is at the very least a link between some types of mental 
disorders and some types of crimes.50  A study in Finland,51 for example, found that men 
with mental illnesses are four times more likely, and women up to 27 times more likely, to 
commit violent crime.52      
Mentally ill individuals in conflict with the law because of their mental illness are mostly 
charged with minor offences.53  Yet, there is a general misconception that persons with 
mental illnesses are dangerous and cannot make decisions or grant consent regarding 
issues affecting them.  Ignorance about mental illness can partly be blamed for such 
misconceptions.54   
                                                
47  Section 77 and 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (hereinafter referred to as the “Criminal 
Procedure Act”).  See chapter 3 of this research for a more detailed discussion of these sections. 
48  Schutte 2013 South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 64 at 64. 
49  Kaliski SZ and De Clercq HG “When coercion meets hope:  Can forensic psychiatry adopt the 
recovery model?”  2012 (15) Afr J Psychiatry 162-166 at 162. 
50  Peay J Mental Health and Crime (Routledge New York 2011) at 33.  Also see Calitz FJW, van 
Rensburg PHJJ, Fourie C, Liebenberg E, van den Berg C, Joubert G “Psychiatric evaluation of 
offenders referred to the Free State Psychiatric Complex according to sections 77 and 78 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act” 2006 (12) SAJP  47-50 at 17 who accept that there is a link between mental 
illness and crime. 
51 Calitz et al 2006 SAJP 47 at 47.  Also see in general Van Rensburg PHJJ ‘n Retrospektiewe Studie 
oor Observasie Pasiënte Gedurende ‘n Twee Jaar Periode met Ondersoek na die Verband Tussen 
die Tipe Misdaad, die Ssiekte-diagnose en die Ras van die Pasiënt.  (LL.M Dissertation, University 
of the Free State 1979).    
52  Calitz et al 2006 SAJP 47 at 47.  Also see in general Van Rensburg Retrospektiewe studie oor 
observasie pasiënte.   
53  Schutte 2013 South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 64 at 68.  Also, see Garner SG and 
Hafemeister TL “Restorative justice, therapeutic jurisprudence and mental health courts:  Finding a 
better means to respond to offenders with a mental disorder” 2003 (22) Developments in Mental 
Health Law 1-15 at 9.  See further Canadian Mental Health Association “Police and mental illness:  
Increased interactions” http://www.cmha.bc.ca/files/policesheets_all.pdf (Date of use:  13 March 
2015) at 3 where it is pointed out that mentally ill persons are mostly charged with for example minor 
theft, mischief or failure to appear in court which is either directly or indirectly linked to the mental 
illness.    




Schizophrenia is the mental illness most often diagnosed in mentally ill accused persons.55   
Some studies suggest that men with schizophrenia are seven times more likely to commit a 
violent crime, more in particular murder, whereas the risk factor rises to 15 times in the 
case of women with schizophrenia.56  A divergent view, however, also exists that most 
people with schizophrenia are not violent.57 
Apart from linking violent behaviour with crimes already committed, what remains a problem 
in the forensic setting is an accurate risk assessment to determine if the patient is likely to 
resort to violent behaviour in future.58  Psychiatrists in the forensic setting tend to be overly 
cautious when it comes to future risk assessment and often opt not to discharge patients for 
the fear that they might exhibit violent behaviour and thereby put society at risk.59  The 
hesitation to release patients out of concern for public safety causes an increase in the 
number of inpatients.60  Room for entry of new patients into the system for treatment is 
                                                                                                                                                   
13 March 2015) at 5 states that the myth that all persons with mental illnesses are dangerous are 
caused by factors such as the way the media portrays person with mental illnesses.  This report 
points out that the chances of a mentally ill person being violent are increased by factors such as 
drug abuse, such a person is then 7 times more likely to commit a crime where as a person without a 
mental illness will be twice as likely to commit a crime.  The report submits that the risk of a mentally 
ill person behaving violently can mostly be managed by medication.  It is only a selected small group 
of persons with certain type of mental illnesses that really pose risk of violent behaviour. 
55  Calitz FJW, van Rensburg PH, Oosthuizen H and Verschoor T. “Criteria for fitness to stand criminal 
trial” 1996 (86) SAMJ 734-737 at 734.  Also see Gagiano CA, Van Rensburg PHJ and Verschoor T 
“Unnecessary committals for forensic observation:  Section 77 and 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act 
51 of 1977” 1991 (108) SALJ 714-718 at 716 and further Strydom N, Pienaar C, van der Merwe L, 
Jansen van Rensburg B, Calitz FWJ, van der Merwe LM, Joubert G “Profile of forensic psychiatric 
inpatients referred to the Free State Psychiatric Complex, 2004 – 2008” 2011 SAJP 40-43 at 40.  
Also see Calitz et al 2006 SAJP 47 at 48 who report that the mental illness most often diagnosed 
during court ordered psychiatric observation, is schizophrenia, followed by mental retardation and 
epilepsy. 
56  Schutte 2013 South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 64 at 64 who mentions that most studies 
that considered the link between schizophrenia and the risk of committing murder found that the 
person with schizophrenia is between 10 and 20 times more likely to commit a violent crime than 
expected in the general population.  He explains further that the chances of the person with 
schizophrenia committing murder are even greater if other factors such as a longstanding duration of 
psychosis.  It was also found that men suffering from schizophrenia are often married with children.  
Kaliski SZ and Zabow T “Violence, sensation seeking, and impulsivity in Schizophrenics found unfit 
to stand trial” 1995 (23) Bulletin of the American Academy of Psychiatry and Law 147-155 at 152.  
Also, see Calitz et al 2006 SAJP 47 at 48. 
57  Kaliski and Zabow 1995 Bulletin of the American Academy of Psychiatry and Law 147 at 147.  Also 
see Schutte 2013 South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 64 at 67 where it is shown that this is 
in line with a study conducted by Taylor and Gunn who found that serious personal and life-
threatening violence was mostly committed by psychiatrically “normal” persons and that only about 
one third of murder accused, have a mental illness. 
58  Kaliski and De Clercq 2012 African Journal of Psychiatry 162 at 162. 
59  Kaliski and De Clercq 2012 African Journal of Psychiatry 162 at 164. 




limited by this practice, as limited resources are available as it is.      
3.3 Reasons for contact with the criminal justice system 
Research on the reasons for the contact of mentally ill persons with the South African 
criminal justice system is scarce.  Similarly, little has been written about the reasons for the 
increase in the number of mentally ill persons in the criminal justice system.  Those reasons 
that have been identified are discussed below, in addition to reasons that contribute to the 
increased contact of mentally ill accused persons with the criminal justice system in other 
jurisdictions. 
The approach of the South African police service towards people with mental illnesses is 
identified as a possible reason for the increased number of mentally ill individuals in the 
criminal justice system.61  Persons who show signs of mental illness who have encounters 
with the police are more likely to be arrested and, if incarcerated, seem to spend more time 
detained than those not exhibiting signs of mental illness.62  The fact that it is much faster 
for the police to process an arrest than to link a person with the relevant mental health care 
services 63 further explains the increased number of persons with mental illness in the 
criminal justice system.  Mercy bookings 64 by the police service, particularly in the case of 
minor crimes, in an attempt to help the mentally ill person by ensuring that he receives 
treatment (even though it is in prison), contributes to the higher number of mentally ill 
                                                
61  Schutte 2013 South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 64 at 67. 
62 Watson A, Hanrahan P, Luchins D and Lurigio A “Mental health courts and the complex issue of 
mentally ill offenders” April 2001 (52) 4 Psych Serv 477-481 at 478.  Also see Seltzer T ““Mental 
health courts:  A misguided attempt to address the criminal justice system’s unfair treatment of 
people with mental illnesses” 2005 (11) Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570-586 at 573 where it 
is confirmed that individuals suffering from a mental illness is often arrested for minor offences for 
which those not suffering from a mental illness, is not usually arrested.  Also see Canadian Mental 
Health Association http://www.cmha.bc.ca/files/policesheets_all.pdf  (Date of use: 13 March 2015) at 
3 where it is pointed out that a mentally ill person is more likely to be arrested for a minor offence 
than a person not suffering from a mental illness. 
63  Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 573.  Should the police officer elect to take 
the mentally ill individual to a mental health facility, this often requires the police officer to wait at the 
said facility until the person is admitted which is obviously very time consuming for the police officer. 
64  Torrey EF, Stieber J, Ezekiel J, Wolfe SM, Sharfstein J, Noble JH and Flynn LM Criminalizing the 
Seriously Mentally Ill.  The Abuse of Jails as Mental Hospitals (Public Citizen’s Health Research 
Group and the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill 1992) at 46.  This is also true in the South African 
context as confirmed by Schutte 2013 South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 64 at 67.  Also 
see Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 573 who explains that law enforcement 
are often of the view that they are helping the mentally ill person by arresting him as it ensures that 




persons encountering the criminal justice system.65  Some mentally ill individuals, especially 
those that are homeless, initialise these mercy bookings in order to secure shelter and a 
meal.66  Even when mentally ill persons are arrested with the motive to help them, the fact 
remains that many people with serious mental illnesses are unnecessarily arrested.67  The 
negative effect of incarceration on the mentally ill is alluded to above.  
The “revolving door” phenomenon 68 where those with mental illnesses are more likely to 
re-offend and encounter the criminal justice system repeatedly, especially where the mental 
illness is not treated, contributes to the high number of mentally ill persons in the criminal 
justice system.69  A recent study in South Africa found that a large number of accused 
persons sent for observation had previous offences, confirming that the revolving door 
                                                
65  Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 573. 
66  Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 47, 49.  A police official described these types 
of bookings as a “crisis intervention” and stated, “You get people who are hallucinating, who haven’t 
eating for days.  It is a massive clean-up effort.  They get shelter, food, you get them back on their 
medication…  It’s crisis intervention”.  Tobar H “When jail is a mental institution” 1991 Los Angeles 
Times August 25-26 at 25-26.  Also see Garner and Hafemeister 2003 Developments in Mental 
Health Law 1 at 3,4 where it is explained that many homeless persons suffer from a mental illness as 
they might have been released from a psychiatric hospital as part of the deinstitutionalisation 
movement without proper community care services being in place to support them.   
67  Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 573.  28 to 52% of persons with serious 
mental illnesses in the United States of America have been arrested at least once.  See Sirotich F 
“The criminal justice outcomes of jail diversion programs for persons with mental illness:  A review of 
the evidence” 2009 (37) J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry Law 461-472 at 462.  Also see in general Fisher 
WH, Roy-Bujnowski KM, Grudzinskas AJ, Jonathan C, Clayfield MA, Banks SM and Wolff N 
”Patterns and prevalence of arrest in a statewide cohort of mental health care consumers” 2006 (57) 
Psychiatric Service 1623-1628.  Also see Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 40 
where the details of a study of 500 mentally ill persons who have been arrested are discussed.  The 
finding of this study was that these 500 individuals had on average 3 prior convictions.  A further 
interesting finding was that 94% of this group was not receiving treatment at the time that they 
committed the alleged crime.  For more detail on the number of mentally ill persons being arrested in 
the United States of America, see in general Lamb HR and Grant AW “The mentally ill in an urban 
county jail” 1982 (39) Archives of General Psychiatry 17-34 and Lamb HR and Grant AW “The 
mentally ill in a county jail” 1983 (40) Archives of General Psychiatry 363-368.  Also see Slate, 
Buffington-Vollum and Johnson Criminalization of Mental Illness.at 7 where it is indicated that half of 
all persons with mental illness have been arrested at least once. 
68  Persons with mental illnesses are more likely to be arrested and detained again after their release 
from a period of detention in the criminal justice setting.  Their movement in and out of the criminal 
justice system is often referred to as the “revolving door” phenomenon.  
69  Canadian Mental Health Association http://www.cmha.bc.ca/files/policesheets_all.pdf  (Date of use: 
13 March 2015) at 4 where it is stated that mentally ill persons are more likely to be arrested and 
detained again after release.  This is referred to as the revolving door phenomenon.  Also, see 
Odegaard AM “Therapeutic jurisprudence:  The impact of mental health courts on the criminal justice 
system” 2007 (83) North Dakota Law Review 225-259 at 231 who states that the revolving door 
phenomenon is one of the motivations for establishing the Mental Health Court as a problem solving 
court.  Also see this source at 234 where it is stressed that the failure to treat a mental illness can 




phenomenon also presents itself in South Africa.70  
Limited mental health care services available in the community contributes to the mentally 
ill coming into frequent contact with the criminal justice system.71  Mental illnesses are often 
only diagnosed after a person’s arrest.  This could be because the person simply did not 
seek psychiatric assistance prior to arrest or because the needed services were not 
available to him.72 
Where mental conditions go untreated, those with mental illnesses become vulnerable, and 
the risk of clashing with the criminal justice system increases as they may be apprehended 
when they appear disorientated on the street or commit petty crimes.73  The revolving door 
phenomenon often starts with the commission of a petty crime such as urinating in public or 
shoplifting.74  Some families press charges against their mentally ill family members in order 
to have them arrested as a means to ensure that they get psychiatric treatment, as 
psychiatric services out of prison/jail are often difficult to obtain.75   
                                                
70  Calitz et al 2006 SAJP 47 at 49 indicate that approximately half of the accused that formed part of 
the study had previous convictions, indicating that it is worrying because it seems that those with 
previous convictions seem more likely to commit crime again. 
71  Watson et al 2001 Psychiatric Services 477 at 478.  Also see Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously 
Mentally Ill at 50 who points out that in the United States of America, failure of the public mental 
health care system is identified as an underlying reason for the increased number of mentally ill 
persons in the criminal justice system.  Also see Odegaard 2007 North Dakota Law Review 225 at 
234 who states that the fact that persons with mental illness are overrepresented in the criminal 
justice system, is proof that the mental health care system is either not accessible to persons with 
mental illness outside prisons or it is accessible but inadequate. 
72  Calitz et al 2006 SAJP 47 at 50 confirms that many accused are only diagnosed with mental illness 
after arrest.  Calitz explains that this could be because many with psychotic illnesses do not seek 
help from the mental health care system prior to arrest.  This, according to Calitz, confirms the 
importance of developing a comprehensive community care service. 
73  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 46.  Also see Frailing K “The genesis of 
mental health courts in the United States and their possible applicability for the United Kingdom” 
2008 C.S.L.R 63-73 at 69 and further Frailing K “Issues affecting outcomes for mental health court 
participants” 2009 C.S.L.R 145-157 at 148.  See further in general Read A “Psychiatric 
deinstitutionalisation in BC: Negative consequences and possible solutions” 2009 (1) University of 
British Columbia Medical Journal 25-26.  It has been established that individuals from certain 
vulnerable groups such as the poor, the homeless and individuals suffering from HIV/AIDS, are more 
susceptible to develop a mental illness.  This by implication also puts these groups at higher risk of 
coming into conflict with the law because of their higher risk of developing a mental illness. 
74  Odegaard 2007 North Dakota Law Review 225 at 234.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema 
Mental Health Courts at 46. 
75  Some families even reported having been encouraged by the Police or Mental Health services to 
press charges.  Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 47, 50.  Also see  Fine M J and 
Acker C “Hoping that the law will find an answer” September 1989 Philadelphia Inquirer 1-1 at 1  




3.4 Profile of a mentally ill accused person in South Africa 
The exact percentage of persons with mental illness in the South African criminal justice 
system is unknown.76    
Most accused persons sent for psychiatric observation by the court in criminal proceedings 
are charged with minor crimes, although most accused persons who are eventually found 
unfit to stand trial are generally charged with offences that are more serious.77   
The majority of the accused persons referred for observation to various psychiatric facilities 
in South Africa are found fit to stand trial.78      
                                                                                                                                                   
in order to get him mental health care.  The child needed mental help but refused to be admitted and 
psychiatrists refused to have him admitted, as they did not believe that he is a threat to himself or 
others.  The parents eventually forbade him access to their home and when he “trespassed” they 
had him arrested.  The boy was offered a choice between jail and hospital and chose the latter.  He 
eventually received much needed treatment. 
76  The reason for this might be because the mentally ill remand detainees are often detained without 
any reference to mental health, even for those known to have a mental illness and those who should 
be receiving medication for their mental health challenges.  See Department of Correctional Services 
“Discussion Document on Management of Remand Detainees in South Africa” 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/Discussion%20Document%20preceding%20Draft%20White%20
Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention_1.pdf (Date of use: 17 August 2016).at 84.  16.5% of the 
adult population in South Africa suffers from a mental illness according to Landman AA and 
Landman WJ A practitioner’s Guide to the Mental Health Care Act (Juta Cape Town 2014) at 4.  This 
figure excludes the number of children and adolescents that may be suffering from a mental illness.  
In some provinces as many as 17.1% of youth suffer from a mental illness. 
77  Calitz et al 2006 SAJP 47 at 47 report that the offences for which the accused persons sent for 
observation have been arrested were: theft 27.8%, murder 18.9%, assault 18.1%, rape 16.2%.  The 
remainder of the accused were arrested for a variety of offences such as drunken driving, vandalism 
and fraud at 19%.  Also see Strydom et al 2011 SAJP 40 at 42, who reports that in their study 
conducted of state patients (those found not fit to stand trial or not criminally responsible and 
detained in terms of section 42 of the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002) in the Free state, the 
majority of crimes were crimes against the person.  The offences that these individuals were 
accused of were mainly offences against the person, with rape being at the top of the list, followed 
by assault, murder, attempted rape and sexual offences other than rape.  Of the offences committed 
against property, vandalism topped the list, followed by theft, burglary, robbery and arson.  See, 
however, Schutte 2013 South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 64 at 68.  They conclude that 
according to their study conducted at Sterkfontein hospital in 2010, the more serious crimes were 
committed by those who were eventually found fit to stand trial and criminally responsible.  The non-
violent and less serious charges were brought against those who were eventually found not fit to 
stand trial or not criminally responsible in this study.   
78  In a study conducted by Kaliski, Borchers and Williams 1997 SAMJ 1351 at 1351 only 3 of the 80 
accused that were referred for psychiatric observation, were found unfit to stand trial (at 1353).  The 
authors however expressed concern about the fact that, many of those referred for observation to 
the Valkenberg Hospital, had poor knowledge about the different roles of the court officials which 
they submit is an indication that most of these individuals, especially if they do not have legal 
representation, will have difficulty following the court procedure.  This highlights the importance of 




Accused persons sent for observation, are often known psychiatric patients living on 
disability grants from the state.79  Many of the accused persons sent for observation 
received mental health care at some point prior to the arrest, and a large number were non-
compliant with regard to taking their medication.80  This suggests, had these individuals 
been properly monitored in respect of medication, that these crimes could possibly have 
been prevented.81  Many, however, are only diagnosed with a mental illness after their 
arrest, and they were thus not known to the mental health care system prior to the arrest.82    
In South Africa, approximately half of accused persons sent for psychiatric observations 
have previous convictions.83  This trend indicates that these accused persons sent for 
                                                                                                                                                   
Oosthuizen H and Verschoor T. “Criteria for fitness to stand criminal trial” 1996 (86) SAMJ 734-737 
where a study conducted at Oranje Hospital in Bloemfontein, South Africa, showed that the majority 
of the accused referred for observation were found fit to stand trial.  In the study at Oranje Hospital in 
Bloemfontein in 1990, 52% of those referred for observation, were found to be “sane”.  Also see 
Gagiano, Van Rensburg and Verschoor 1991 SALJ 714-718.  See further Schutte 2013 South 
African Journal of Bioethics and Law 64 at 67 who found that most of the accused persons sent for 
observation because they allegedly had trouble communicating with their legal representatives, were 
found fit to stand trial.  The study found that most of those with a history of psychiatric treatment 
were, however, found unfit to stand trial.  Also see Calitz et al 2006 SAJP 47 at 49 where it is 
indicated that 48% of the accused persons sent for observation in the particular study was found 
triable, in fact, a large number was found not to have a mental illness at all.  See, however, Strydom 
et al 2011 SAJP 40 at 43 who reports that the majority of the group studied were found not fit to 
stand trial and not criminally responsible.  Charges against 17.3% of the offenders were withdrawn 
with the understanding or upon the condition, that the hospital would further manage these 
individuals.   
79  Strydom et al 2011 SAJP 40 at 42 found that the majority of persons sent for psychiatric observation 
receive disability grants from the state.  See further Calitz et al 2006 SAJP 47 at 49 who confirms 
this.  In a study conducted at Sterkfontein hospital in 2010, it was found that the majority of those 
referred for fitness evaluations that had a history of psychiatric treatment, were found unfit to stand 
trial.  See Schutte 2013 South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 64 at 67.   
80 Strydom et al 2011 SAJP 40 at 43.  58% of the participants received mental health care prior to the 
offence and 63% of the participants were non-compliant with regard to taking their medication. 
81 Strydom et al 2011 SAJP 40 at 43. 
82  Schutte 2013 South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 64 at 67 points out that the South African 
mental health care system is “resource-scares” and lacks the capacity to provide services to all 
those in need thereof.  Also see Calitz et al 2006 SAJP 47 at 50 who confirms that many accused 
are only diagnosed with mental illness after arrest.  Calitz explains that this could be because many 
with psychotic illnesses do not seek help from the mental health care system prior to arrest.  This, 
according to Calitz, confirms the importance of developing a comprehensive community care 
service. 
83  Calitz et al 2006 SAJP 47 at 49.  The offences for which these accused have been arrested were: 
theft 27.8%, murder 18.9%, assault 18.1%, and rape 16.2%.  The balances of the accused were 
arrested for a variety of offences such as drunken driving, vandalism and fraud at 19%.  Also see 
Kaliski, Borchers and Williams 1997 SAMJ 1351 at 1353 who report that in their study at the 
Valkenberg Hospital, found that 54.5% of those referred for psychiatric observation, and had 
previous convictions.  25% of the group had previous convictions for violent crimes.  This is 
consistent with the trend in the United States of America as is evident from studies conducted that 




observation for fitness to stand trial were either found fit to stand trial on a previous 
occasion, or the mental illness was not raised during the previous criminal proceedings 
since he was convicted.84  This further confirms the revolving door phenomenon where 
those with mental illnesses come into contact with the criminal justice system on an 
ongoing basis. 
It is not uncommon for accused persons who are eventually sent for observation to have 
been under the influence of alcohol or cannabis at the time of the arrest.85  Strydom et al 86 
suggest that substance abuse rehabilitation should go hand in hand with the forensic 
programme in an attempt to prevent the violent behaviour of those with mental illnesses.      
Schizophrenia is the most prevalent mental illness in the forensic setting.87  Calitz et al 88 
found that the prevalence of schizophrenia was lower among those accused of murder than 
among those accused of sexual crimes and assault.  A small number of accused persons 
are diagnosed with mental retardation.89  The majority of accused persons sent for 
                                                                                                                                                   
Gagiano, Van Rensburg and Verschoor 1991 SALJ 714 at 716 who found that most accused 
persons sent for observation in South Africa had previous convictions for mostly petty crimes.  
Lastly, see Strydom et al 2011 SAJP 40 at 41 who reports that a large number of accused persons 
sent for observation in various studies discussed by Calitz et al, had previous convictions. 
84  Where mental illness is raised with regard to fitness and an accused is found unfit to stand trial, he 
cannot be convicted.  Similarly, if an accused raises mental illness as a defence to a criminal charge 
and it is found that the accused indeed suffered from a mental illness at the time of commission of 
the offence, such an accused must be found not guilty.  The fact that an accused thus has a 
previous conviction indicates that mental illness was either not raised or, if it was raised, it was found 
not to have an impact on the accused’s fitness to stand trial or criminal capacity. 
85 Calitz et al 2006 SAJP 47 at 47.  Also see this source at 50 where it is stressed that substance 
abuse issues needs to be addressed with urgency. 
86 Strydom et al 2011 SAJP 40 at 42, 43.  He further promotes a well-developed system to monitor 
state patients in psychiatric hospitals as well as those receiving community care to ensure that 
patients who relapsed are treated immediately to avoid further possible criminal activity.  A surprising 
finding that this study revealed was that 80% of the state patients reported that they have friends or 
family willing to accommodate them should they be discharged.  This is surprising because state 
patients rarely have someone to go to after their discharge, which is often one of the factors 
contributing to them not being discharged when they could be.   
87 Gagiano, Van Rensburg and Verschoor 1991 SALJ 714 at 716 where they indicate that their study at 
the Oranje Hospital in Bloemfontein revealed that Schizophrenia was the most diagnosed condition 
followed by temporary mental disorders, mental retardation, schitzo-affective disorder, psychosis, 
dementia, organic brain syndromes and lastly, major depression with melancholia.  Also see 
Strydom et al 2011 SAJP 40 at 42 who reported that Schizophrenia was the mental illness mostly 
diagnosed in the group sent for observation followed by mental retardation (10%), bipolar mood 
disorder, psychosis due to a general medical condition, psychosis due to epilepsy, psychosis due to 
substance abuse and delirium.  Calitz et al 2006 SAJP 47 at 49 reports that schizophrenia was the 
most prominent diagnosis amongst persons accused of theft. 
88 Calitz et al 2006 SAJP 47 at 50. 




observation are male 90 , with a large number of them being unemployed.91 
The fact that the majority of accused persons sent for observation are found fit to stand trial 
raises questions about the 30-day observation system and reasons for referral.   
Fitness assessments mostly occur at psychiatric hospitals that form part of the South 
African forensic setting.  The setting and the most prominent role players therein are 
discussed below. 
4  THE SOUTH AFRICAN FORENSIC SETTING 
4.1 Introduction 
 The forensic setting is the environment in which law and psychiatry meet.92  The case of a 
person with a mental illness necessarily requires the involvement of professionals from the 
legal field as well as the mental health field.93  The involvement of mental health care 
practitioners in the legal system assists in shaping the interpretation and application of laws 
relating to the mentally ill in the criminal justice system.94  Literature on forensic mental 
health, especially in South Africa, is, however, scarce.95   
4.2 Interplay between law and psychiatry in the forensic setting  
The different philosophies, structures, languages and objectives of the criminal justice 
system on the one hand and those of the mental health care system on the other create 
barriers for individuals with mental illnesses in conflict with the law.  The criminal justice 
                                                
90 Strydom et al 2011 SAJP 40 at 40 reports on a study conducted to determine the profile of forensic 
psychiatric inpatients referred to the Free State Psychiatric Complex between 2004 and 2008.  
95.8% of the group were male of ages ranging from 14 to 66, the average age being 32.5.  Contrast 
this with the findings of Kaliski, Borchers and Williams 1997 SAMJ 1351 at 1354.  Their study at the 
Valkenberg Hospital in 1996 revealed that psychiatric observation patients are between the ages of 
22 and 38, male, single literate and unemployed.  
91  Kaliski, Borchers and Williams 1997 SAMJ 1351 at 1354.  Also see Strydom et al 2011 SAJP 40 at 
42 who reports that as much as 81.5% of the group that was sent for observation was unemployed. 
92  Swanepoel M “Legal aspects with regard to mentally ill offenders in South Africa” 2015 (18) 
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Review 3238-3258 at 3258 where forensic psychiatry is defined.  The 
term “forensic mental health” is also used that seems to include a broader field than pure psychiatry. 
93  Odegaard 2007 North Dakota Law Review 225 at 237.  This is also a very necessary component of 
a successful Mental Health Court as will be discussed later when the multidisciplinary team of the 
Mental Health Court is discussed. 
94  Kaliski S (Ed) Psychological Assessment in South Africa (Oxford University Press South Africa Cape 
Town 2006) at 1. 




system aims to promote public safety and justice whilst the mental health care system 
promotes health.96  Expertise from both these systems is required to eradicate such 
barriers.97 Court models that involve both these systems in a harmonious manner can 
succeed in providing the mentally ill in conflict with the criminal justice system with much-
needed treatment rather than incarceration.98  These models are typically embodied in the 
form of diversion programmes such as Mental Health Courts.   
A mentally ill accused person will, after being arrested by the police, most often be exposed 
to the criminal court, a correctional facility and a psychiatric institution.  A brief overview of 
the involvement of these role players in the forensic setting follows. 
4.3 Law enforcement and the criminal court 
The mentally ill accused’s first contact with the criminal justice system is with the police 
upon arrest.99  The accused is usually kept in police custody until his first court 
appearance.100   
Where police officers are of the view that a person has a mental illness and needs 
treatment, they need not necessarily make an arrest.  The Mental Health Care Act 17 of 
2002101 provides that the police may use the necessary constraining measures to 
apprehend such a person 102 and take him to hospital for psychiatric attention.103     
                                                
96  Lamberti JS and Weisman RL ”Persons with severe mental disorders in the criminal justice system:  
Challenges and opportunities” 2004 (75) Psychiatr Q 151-164 at 162. 
97  Lamberti and Weisman 2004 Psychiatr Q 151 at 162. 
98  Lamberti and Weisman 2004 Psychiatr Q 151 at 162.  The authors are however mindful of the 
criticism that diversion programmes often face, namely fear that mentally ill accused will receive 
preferential access to treatment at the expense of those not in the criminal justice system.  They are 
also mindful of concerns that such diversion programmes may add to the stigmatisation of the 
mentally ill.  
99  See the discussion under paragraph 3.3 earlier in this chapter where the treatment of mentally ill 
persons by the South African police service is discussed. 
100  Unless of course bail was granted at the police station pending the accused’s first court appearance.  
101  Hereinafter referred to as the “Mental Health Care Act”. 
102  Section 40 of the Mental Health Care Act.  See in particular section 40(8), which provides that:  “A 
member of the South African Police Service may use such constraining measures as may be 
necessary and proportionate in the circumstances when apprehending a person or performing any 
function in terms of this section.”  This raises potential concerns about the treatment of mentally ill 
accused persons by the police, especially if there is a lack of understanding from the side of the 
police regarding the symptoms of some mental illnesses. 
103  A form MHCA 22 is used for this purposes as prescribed by the Mental Health Care Act.  The Head 
of the Health Establishment where the Police decides to take the individual to, has to approve the 




If arrested, the accused will appear in the criminal court within the prescribed time and in 
accordance with standard criminal court procedures.  The criminal court may then order a 
fitness assessment if mental illness is raised as a concern with regard to fitness.  This may 
be done at various junctures in the proceedings that will be explained in more detail in 
chapter 3 of this research.  The assessment is usually conducted at a psychiatric institution.  
Accused persons are often detained in a correctional facility awaiting psychiatric 
observation at the relevant psychiatric institution.104 
4.4 Prison and psychiatric institutions 
4.4.1 Introduction 
Mentally ill accused persons often move between prison and psychiatric institutions for 
purposes of the fitness assessment.  They stay in prison awaiting availability of assessment 
facilities at the psychiatric institution, and once the assessment is completed are sent back 
to prison to await an appearance in court for the fitness finding. 
The current state of South African prisons and psychiatric institutions and their resources 
are discussed below.  Concerns about the facilities and resources are highlighted during 
the discussion. 
4.4.2 Prisons 
 South Africa has the highest number of prisoners on the African continent and the ninth 
highest prison population in the world.105  African prisons are overcrowded.  In 2004, South 
African prisons were 163.7% overcrowded.106  Gauteng’s prisons were almost 200% 
                                                
104  See in this regard Department of Correctional Services:  “Strategic plan for 2015/2016-2019/202”  
http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/Strategic%20Plan%202015-2016%20- 2019-2020_a.pdf 
(Date of use:  9 September 2016) at 17, 18 where persons in remand detention awaiting observation 
is included under remand detainees.  State patients being declared as such in terms of the Mental 
Health Care Act awaiting placement in a mental institution, are also included under the number of 
remand detainees and thus forms part of this group of detained persons.  The Department of 
Correctional Services must make special provision for detained persons with a mental illness as 
stipulated in their policy documents.  See further in general Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/Discussion%20Document%20preceding%20Draft%20White%20
Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention_1.pdf (Date of use: 17 August 2016).    
105  Department of Correctional Services “White Paper on Remand Detention Management in South 
Africa” 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/White%20Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention%20Manage
ment%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf (Date of use:  22 August 2016) at 53. 




overcrowded at the time.107  In 2012 there were 152 981 prisoners in South African prisons 
108 , and in 2013 this number grew slightly to 155 708.109  
Overcrowding presents a huge problem to correctional facilities and has serious cost 
implications for the state.  At the rate of 187 903 prisoners in 2004, it cost the Government 
R7 818 645 830.00 per year to keep these prisoners in prison.110  This figure has no doubt 
escalated if inflation over the last decade is taken into consideration, as well as the rising 
                                                                                                                                                   
187 903 prisoners at the time, translating into prisons being 163.7% overcrowded at the time.  The 
number remained more or less the same for 2005.  See Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/White%20Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention%20Manage
ment%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf (Date of use:  22 August 2016) at 53 where it is reported that 
occupancy levels reached 63.9% in South African prisons in 2003.  See in general the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ rights “Report of the Special Rapporteur on Prisons and 
Conditions of Detention in Africa Mission to the Republic of South Africa 14 – 30 June 2004”  
http://www.achpr.org/states/south-africa/missions/prisons-2004/  (Date of use:  28 August 2011).  
Also, see in general Bateman C “The insanity of a criminal justice system” 2005 (95) SAMJ 208-
212..   
107 In the Gauteng province there were 26 prisons with capacity for 26 709 prisoners.  The sentenced 
prisoners alone, a total of 31 516 exceeded the capacity of these prisons.  The total awaiting trial 
prisoners in the province were 19 393.  With a total prison population of 50 909, Gauteng’s prisons 
were almost 200% overcrowded.  See African Commission on Human and Peoples’ rights 
http://www.achpr.org/states/south-africa/missions/prisons-2004/ (Date of use:  28 August 2011) at 14 
where it is explained that Gauteng’s prisons were the most overcrowded, followed by the prisons in 
the Eastern Cape Province.  It was reported that the Western Cape had a total of 43 prisons with a 
total capacity for 19 396 prisoners.  The prison had 30 929 inmates.  This amounted to a figure of 
overcrowding of 155.34%.  Bateman 2005 SAMJ 208 at 208-2012 reported that the Pollsmoor prison 
facility in Cape Town was 247% overcrowded.  The total number of detainees was 4050 in a facility 
designed for 1872 detainees.  Of the 4050 detainees, 1509 were serving their sentences whilst 2509 
were awaiting trial.  Communal cells designed to hold 19 people, contained 30 and those built to 
house 30 had up to 70, more than double its capacity.     
108  The specific figures of overcrowding per province are set out in Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/White%20Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention%20Manage
ment%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf (Date of use:  22 August 2016) at 53.  For more detail on the 
figures of overcrowding in South African prisons, see Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/Discussion%20Document%20preceding%20Draft%20White%20
Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention_1.pdf (Date of use: 17 August 2016) at 16 where the 
number of prisoners in 2009 is indicated as 163 892.    
109  For the categories of inmates included in this figure, see Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/Strategic%20Plan%202015-2016%20-2019-2020_a.pdf 
(Date of use:  9 September 2016) at 19 (See table 1 on this page for the detail of the prison 
population in 2012/2013 and 2013/2014).  The number of youth offenders was excluded from the 
number of inmates indicated in the text above.  They constitute a further 27 507 detainees. 
110 In 2004, it was reported that it costs the South African Government approximately R114.00 per 
prisoner per day, a total of approximately R41 610 per prisoner per year.  See African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ rights http://www.achpr.org/states/south-africa/missions/prisons-2004/ (Date 
of use:  28 August 2011) at 15.  Also see Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/White%20Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention%20Manage
ment%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf (Date of use:  22 August 2016) at 53 where it is reported that 
the prison population in 2004 was at its peak.  The White paper gives the figure of prisoners at the 




costs of food, education, medical treatment and other goods that the state has to provide to 
detained persons as per the South African Constitution.111  
 One of the drivers of prison overcrowding across the globe is pre-trial detention.112  The 
number of remand detainees in South African prisons in 2012 was 48 910.00 113 , and in 
2013 this number went down slightly to 44 702.114  Remand detainees constitute roughly a 
third of the prison population 115 although, some estimate that remand detainees comprise 
approximately half of the prison population.116  Among these accused persons are those 
awaiting psychiatric observation for fitness to stand trial.    
 A large number, over 70%, of remand detainees are denied the option of bail, contributing 
                                                
111  Section 35 of the Constitution provides for the rights of detained persons, which includes the right to 
be provided with inter alia reading material and medical treatment. 
112  Pre-trial detention of accused persons is specifically identified as a reason contributing to the huge 
problem of overcrowding in South African prisons.  See Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/White%20Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention%20Manage
ment%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf (Date of use:  22 August 2016) at 53.  Another driver behind the 
increase is the increase in serious crimes in general.  See Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/Discussion%20Document%20preceding%20Draft%20White%20
Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention_1.pdf (Date of use: 17 August 2016) at 16. 
113  Details of these numbers are contained in a white paper by Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/White%20Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention%20Manage
ment%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf (Date of use:  22 August 2016) at 53.  In 2000 the number 
reached its peak at 57 811 remand detainees in prisons.  Also see the discussion document on 
remand detention management in South Africa by Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/Discussion%20Document%20preceding%20Draft%20White%20
Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention_1.pdf (Date of use: 17 August 2016) at 19 for the shift in 
numbers between 1999 and 2009 of remand detainees and sentenced prisoners.  See, however, the 
strategic plan of the Department of Correctional Services for 2015/206 Department of Correctional 
Serviceshttp://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/Strategic%20Plan%202015-2016%20-
20192020_a.pdf (Date of use:  9 September 2016) at 19 that indicates the remand detainees during 
the 2012/2013 period to be slightly less at 46 090.  The statistics in the Department’s own 
documents do not add up. 
114  For more detail on this, see the strategic plan for 2015/2016 of the Department of Correctional 
Serviceshttp://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/Strategic%20Plan%202015-2016%20-
20192020_a.pdf (Date of use:  9 September 2016) at 19. 
115  As at 2009, remand detainees constituted approximately 30% of the prison population.  This is 
confirmed in the discussion document by the Department of Correctional Services, 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/Discussion%20Document%20preceding%20Draft%20White%20
Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention_1.pdf (Date of use: 17 August 2016) at 16.  See 
Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/Strategic%20Plan%202015-2016%20-20192020_a.pdf 
(Date of use:  9 September 2016) at 19. 
116  Lawyers for Human Rights “Penal Reform programme”   http://www.lhr.org.za/programme/penal-
reform-programme/information (Date of use:  11 September 2016).  The level of remand detention is 




to the challenge of reducing the number of remand detainees in jail.117  Delay in finalising 
court cases is also identified as a challenge in reducing the number of remand detainees in 
detention.118  The number of remand detainees who spend more than two years in prison 
awaiting trial has gradually been increasing.119   
 Delays in fitness assessments also contribute to the high number of remand detainees in 
prison.  Most accused persons referred for psychiatric observation remain in prison awaiting 
psychiatric observation.120  Accused persons awaiting court-ordered psychiatric observation 
121 should ideally be kept separate from convicted prisoners, although, due to overcrowding, 
this is not always the case.122    
The mental health needs of remand detainees in South African prisons are unknown.123  
                                                
117  It is reported that between 2009 to 2012 the number of remand detainees denied the option of bail 
was between 75 and 80%.  For more detail on these figures, see Department of Correctional 
Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/White%20Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention%20Manage
ment%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf (Date of use:  22 August 2016) at 54.  For confirmation of these 
figures and more information on this subject, see further Department of Correctional Services, 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/Discussion%20Document%20preceding%20Draft%20White%20
Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention_1.pdf (Date of use: 17 August 2016) at 18. 
118  Other factors also contribute to the delays in court cases.  See Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/White%20Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention%20Manage
ment%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf (Date of use:  22 August 2016) at 54.  Also see Pillay AL 
“Competency to stand trial and criminal responsibility examinations: are there solutions to the 
extensive waiting list?”  2014 (44) South African Journal of Psychology 48-59 at 48 who points out 
that there is a backlog of cases involving 30-day observation periods and that this adds to the 
pressure on the courts and the mental health care system. 
119  Remand detainees often spend long periods in jail.  See Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/White%20Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention%20Manage
ment%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf (Date of use:  22 August 2016) at 54.  In 2009 the figure was 
standing at 3.6% and grew to just under  6% in 2012. 
120  National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa “Awaiting Trial Detainee Guidelines”   
http://www.lhr.org.za/sites/lhr.org.za/files/atd_guidelines_.pdf (Date of use:  17 August 2016) at 37.    
121  Psychiatric observation can be ordered to determine a person’s fitness to stand trial in terms of 
section 77 of the Criminal Procedure Act or to determine if the accused had the required criminal 
capacity at the time of commission of the offence in terms of section 78 of the Criminal Procedure 
Act.  These sections will be analysed in chapter 3 of this research. 
122  Bateman 2005 SAMJ 208 at 209 reports that the staff at the Pollsmoor prison in Cape Town reported 
that the “unstable” prisoners often mix with the other prisoners during a day at the prison.  Also see 
Department of Correctional Services “Draft White Paper on Remand Detention Management in 
South Africa” 
 http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/White%20paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention%20in%20SA
%20Draft%20Final.pdf (Date of use:  26 August 2016) at 73 where the protocol on procedure to be 
followed in the case of mental enquiries in respect of accused persons is discussed.  The protocol 
provides for detention in separate cells from the general prison population.  The protocol further 
states that persons awaiting assessment should be kept in close proximity to psychiatric hospital. 




The reason for this might be that mentally ill remand detainees are often detained without 
any reference to mental health.124  Upon admission to prison, a general health assessment 
is undertaken, but this is not comprehensive due to a shortage of nurses to conduct such 
assessments, and, as a result, mental illness often goes undetected.125    
Even where mental health needs are detected, mental health care programmes in already 
overcrowded prisons are scarce 126 , and it is likely that awaiting trial prisoners do not have 
access to adequate mental health care treatment in prison.127  Failure to treat the mental 
illness as soon as possible causes deterioration in the mental health of the mentally ill and 
makes eventual treatment more difficult, if not impossible.128  It is therefore imperative that 
the appropriate treatment is given at the soonest possible opportunity.  Recidivism amongst 
the mentally ill accused is a real risk if the mentally ill accused person’s mental illness and 
other challenges are not addressed adequately during his incarceration.129  Proper 
treatment programmes for the mentally ill have to be implemented, and proper community 
care structures have to be in place to support them upon release from detention.130     
                                                                                                                                                   
illness-alarming-in-prisons/  (Date of use:  11 September 2016). 
124  Remand detainees with existing mental illnesses in need of treatment or medication, consequently 
do not receive much needed mental health care services.  See Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/Discussion%20Document%20preceding%20Draft%20White%20
Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention_1.pdf (Date of use: 17 August 2016).at 84. 
125  Some correctional facilities admit between 200 and 400 prisoners daily.  This high number of 
admissions combined with a shortage of nursing staff makes it almost impossible to detect mental 
illnesses in those suffering from them, especially since these conditions are not always “visible” at 
first glance and are often only detected after further investigation.  Department of Correctional 
Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/Discussion%20Document%20preceding%20Draft%20White%20
Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention_1.pdf (Date of use: 17 August 2016) at 87.       
126  Odegaard 2007 North Dakota Law Review 225 at 234 referring to the position in the United States of 
America.  Also see Department of Correctional Services:  “Strategic plan for 2015/2016-2019/202”  
http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/Strategic%20Plan%202015-2016%20-2019-2020_a.pdf 
(Date of use:  9 September 2016) at 20 where it is confirmed that overcrowding remains a problem in 
South African prisons. 
127  Accused persons often have to wait in prison for an available bed in a psychiatric institution where 
the psychiatric observation in terms of section 77 or 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act has to take 
place.  Waiting periods for available beds are impacted by the fact that psychiatric hospitals only 
have a specific number of beds allocated to forensic observation patients.  The inadequate mental 
health care services in prisons, are pointed out by the Constitutional court in De Vos v Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Development CC case at [43].  A fact that was accepted by the Minister of 
Health in the court a quo. 
128  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 45.  Also see Rich WJ “The path of 
mentally ill offenders” 2009 (89) Fordham Urban Law Journal 89-119 at 115. 
129  Rich 2009 Fordham Urban Law Journal 89 at 116. 
130  Rich 2009 Fordham Urban Law Journal 89 at 116.  Also see Frailing 2009 C.S.L.R 145 at 148 where 




This is not a situation unique to South Africa as is most prominently illustrated by the 
position in the United States of America.131  American studies 132 reveal that those arrested 
who showed signs of mental illness were less likely to be successful with a bail application 
and spend on average more pre-trial time in jail.  It was also found that mentally ill state 
prison inmates who were found fit to stand trial received on average sentences that are 12 
months longer than those of other offenders.133   The movement of the mentally ill accused 
between jail and psychiatric institutions amounts to them spending more time incarcerated 
than would have been the case had they pleaded guilty to the charge.134     
The time that an accused person spends in prison awaiting psychiatric observation can vary 
depending on the availability of a bed at the relevant psychiatric institution.135 
4.4.3 Psychiatric institutions 
Snyman 136 states that the detention of the mentally ill in institutions should not be seen as 
a punishment but rather a measure in the interest of society. This view seems to suggest 
that all persons with mental illness necessarily pose a danger to society.  This is not 
necessarily the case as recently pointed out by the court per Griesel J:137 
It is equally well-recognised, however, that not every person with a mental illness or mental 
defect is a danger to society or requires to be detained in an institution. This is so because 
there are varying degrees of mental illness and various types of mental disability, and 
institutionalisation is not invariably required or indeed appropriate 
                                                                                                                                                   
drugs to cope with social difficulties which self-medicating means often go hand in hand with 
offending and re-offending. 
131  See chapter 5 of this research for a discussion of the position in the United States of America. 
132 Watson et al 2001 Psychiatric Services 477 at 478. 
133 Ditton PM Mental Health and Treatment of Inmates and Probationers:  Special Report (US 
Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics 1999).  Also, see Sirotich 2009 J. Am. Acad. 
Psychiatry Law 461 at 462 who confirms that those with serious mental illness spend a 
disproportionate amount of time in jail compared to those individuals without mental illnesses. 
134  Frailing 2009 C.S.L.R 145 at 146. 
135  Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 48 at 48 points out that there are waiting lists at 
psychiatric facilities for the 30-day observation period since limited resources for such observations 
is available.  Also see De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development CC case at [44] 
where the shortage of beds in psychiatric hospitals is accepted as a fact. 
136 Snyman J “The declaration of a patient as a state president's patient” 1988 Acta Juridica 128-168 at 
148, 149.  Also see Du Toit E, De Jager, FJ, Paizes A, Skeen A St Q and Van der Merwe SE, 
Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act (Juta Cape Town 2012) at 13-7.  The Courts support 
this view as is evident from the judgment in S v Mahlinza 1967 (1) SA 408 (A) 415 at 416C-D.  Also 
see in general S v Ramokoka 2006 (2) SACR 57 (W). 
137  De Vos N.O and Another v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others; InRe: 
Snyders and Another v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others 2015 (1) 




The mentally ill accused himself, no doubt, sees incarceration in a high-security facility as a 
punishment rather than treatment.138  This is especially so if regard is had to the poor 
conditions at some psychiatric hospitals.139   
The two major challenges in the South African forensic setting, according to Bateman,140 is 
the proper training of psychiatrists in the field of forensic psychiatry and the lack of beds 
available at psychiatric hospitals for purposes of observation.  These two issues are 
canvassed below. 
The lack of trained forensic psychiatrists is not surprising, considering that psychiatry only 
emerged as a science in the nineteenth century.141  In 2013 there were 769 registered 
psychiatrists who had to serve a population of 50 million South Africans.142  What 
contributed to the shortage is that psychiatry has been identified as the medical speciality 
hardest hit by the “brain drain” in South Africa, as Britain, Australia and New Zealand 
                                                
138  Kaliski and De Clercq 2012 African Journal of Psychiatry 162 at 164. 
139  Bateman 2005 SAMJ 208 at 212 reports that on 21 June [2004], defence advocate JC Marais told 
Cape High Court Justice Selwyn Hockey that conditions at Valkenberg hospital were so ‘horrific’ that 
anyone admitted to Valkenberg ‘will go insane’.    
140 Bateman 2005 SAMJ 208 at 2012.  At the time of writing the article, only 25 beds were available at 
Valkenberg for patients who have been referred for observation in terms of the Criminal Procedure 
Act. 
141  Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 47.  Also see Gillis 2012 South African Journal of 
Psychiatry 78 at 78 who explains that the term psychiatry was coined in 1808.  In 1970, there were 
approximately 100 qualified psychiatrists in South Africa, that is a ratio of 1 for each 100 000 of the 
population.  The World Health Organization's recommended ratio at the time, was 1 for each 20 000 
of the population.  In 1990, there were only 309 psychiatrists registered at the Medical and Dental 
Council who had to serve 35 million South Africans.  Gagiano, Van Rensburg and Verschoor 1991 
SALJ 714 at 715.  This situation was exacerbated by the fact that there was only one school where 
black South African's could study psychiatry.  The same applied to coloured members of society as 
well as Indians.  See Minde M “History of mental health services in South Africa,  Part XV.  The 
future of mental health services” April 1977 SAMJ 549-553 at 550.  Similarly, the recommendation of 
the World Health Organisation at the time with regard to clinical psychologists was that there should 
be 6 clinical psychologists for each psychiatrist; South Africa had 70 clinical psychologists in total. 
Cheetham 1970 SAMJ 1371 at 1371.  Also see Pillay AL “Could S v Pistorius influence reform in the 
traditional forensic mental health evaluation format?”  2014 (44) South African Journal of Psychology 
377-380 at 378 where it is pointed out that there are very few psychiatrists in South-Africa as it is 
and the number of those specialising in forensic mental health is as a result, very small.  Also see 
this source at 379 where it is mentioned that there are approximately four times more clinical 
psychologists than psychiatrists in South Africa.  Even so, we do not meet the ration recommended 
by the World Health Organisation as referred to above. 
142  Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 48 at 56.  Only one psychiatrist had a registered 
sub-speciality of forensic psychiatry.  Also see Gillis 2012 South African Journal of Psychiatry 78 at 
81 reports that in 2012 there were just under 400 psychiatrists registered with the Health Professions 




actively recruited South African psychiatrists.143 
When it comes to psychiatrists who are trained in forensic psychiatry, the problem is 
augmented.  For a mental health care practitioner to be considered a forensic expert, he 
can only rely on his experience in an academic forensic facility as it was not initially 
recognised as a field of speciality.144  The Health Professions Council recognised forensic 
psychiatry as a field of sub-speciality when the College of Psychiatry introduced a Diploma 
in Forensic Psychiatry with an assessment component.145 
The suggestion has been made that the involvement of clinical psychologist in the forensic 
setting should be more prominently considered, bearing in mind that they are trained in 
forensic mental health, and the Criminal Procedure Act allows for these professionals to be 
appointed to conduct forensic assessments.146  This could alleviate the strain on resources 
in the South African forensic setting, especially if regard is had to the fact that there are 
almost four times more clinical psychologists than psychiatrists in South Africa.147 
Availability of beds in mental hospitals has long been a problem.148  There are only ten 
                                                
143 Bateman 2005 SAMJ 208 at 212. 
144  Kaliski S Psychological Assessment in South Africa at 3.  Forensic psychiatry was not as at April 
2005, a field of speciality recognised by the Health Professions Council of South Africa.  Suggestions 
were made to introduce a further 18 month specialisation period after which psychiatrists will be well 
versed in the field of forensic psychiatry and able to do observations as requested by the courts.  
See Bateman 2005 SAMJ 208. 
145  Ogunlesi AO, Ogunwale A, De Wet P, Roos L and Kaliski S “Forensic psychiatry in Africa:  prospects 
and challenges” 2012 (15) Afr J Psychiatry 3-7 at 5. 
146  Section 79(1)(b)(iv) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  Also see Pillay 2014 South African Journal of 
Psychology 377 at 379 who points out that the training of clinical psychologists include training on 
forensic mental health and that they are indeed competent and skilled to conduct such assessments. 
147  Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 377 at 379.  Also see Pillay 2014 South African 
Journal of Psychology 48 at 56 where it is stated that in 2013 there were 2725 clinical psychologists 
registered with the Health Professions Council and only 769 psychiatrists were registered at the 
time. 
148 Minde 1997 SAMJ 549 at 550.  Availability of beds has been a problem since before South Africa 
became a Republic.  To alleviate the burden of overcrowding of mental health facilities in South 
Africa, a partnership was formed with a private company that provided accommodation in vacant 
mine compounds.  This initiative had a positive effect on the reduction of the number of mentally ill 
patients that had to be treated in mental hospitals.  The possible human rights violations of being 
treated in a vacant mine compound cannot be ignored.  The partnership was formed by Dr A M 
Lamont, the Commissioner for Mental Health from 1961 to 1970 and a private concern called Smith, 
Mitchell and Co.  The accommodation was initially only made available to black South African’s but 
eventually other races were also accommodated in these alternative facilities.  Treatment in these 
alternative facilities, resulted in cost saving and a reduced number of persons being treated in 
mental health institutions.  See Minde 16 April 1970 SAMJ 549 at 551.  See also Gillis 2012 South 




facilities across South Africa that are able to conduct court ordered forensic 
assessments.149  Patients are often added to waiting lists as entry into a mental hospital is 
almost only possible once another patient has been discharged.150 Transfer of some 
patients to community care centres and old age homes lightened the load of overcrowding 
in psychiatric hospitals.151  Patients with schizophrenia became a particular group of 
patients for whom more facilities were needed, and it was suggested that general hospitals 
could assist in this regard.152      
Mental health care professionals have been urged to aim to increase the turnover of 
patients in psychiatric hospitals and to treat more patients extramurally, especially since 
new drugs are available that make this possible.153  This is even more relevant today, as 
significant progress has been made in the field of psychiatric medication and treatment 
methods since the turn of the century.154       
The shortage of facilities at psychiatric institutions arguably contributes to human rights 
violations of accused persons awaiting assessment as they might be detained in prison for 
unreasonable periods of time, sometimes two years, awaiting availability of a bed in a 
psychiatric hospital.155  The shortage of facilities causes delays in the finalisation of the 
                                                                                                                                                   
earmarked for black citizens, but that the majority of the group transferred, happened to be black.  
The author also adds that the conditions at the compound later received the stamp of approval from 
the psychiatric association.  Bed shortages in psychiatric facilities is not a problem unique to South 
Africa and was particularly mentioned in the Canadian context.  See McLachlin 2010 Dalhousie Law 
Journal 15 at 23. 
149  Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 48 at 51.  This number was as at 2012. 
150 Minde 1997 SAMJ 549 at 550. 
151 Minde 1997 SAMJ 549 at 551.  A factor contributing to the problem is that groups of patients, such 
as senile patients often occupy beds in mental hospitals for years as these conditions continue to 
exist until death. 
152 Minde 1997 SAMJ 549 at 549, 550.  The opening of Tara Hospital in Johannesburg in 1946 was a 
step in the right direction to treat another large group of patients found in mental hospitals, namely 
those with schizophrenia.  Schizophrenia is one of the most common mental illnesses diagnosed 
among those sent for psychiatric observation in terms fo the Criminal Procedure Act.  See the 
discussion of the profile of mentally ill accused persons earlier in this chapter.  
153  Minde 1970 SAMJ 549 at 553. 
154  McLachlin 2010 Dalhousie Law Journal 15 at 20.  Also see Gillis 2012 South African Journal of 
Psychiatry 78 at 78, 79. 
155  McLachlin 2010 Dalhousie Law Journal 15 at 23, 24.  Also see Pillay 2014 South African Journal of 
Psychology 48 at 48 who points out that there are often long waiting lists at psychiatric institutions 
that can accommodate accused persons for 30-day observations.  For more detail on the delays 
pertaining to assessments at psychiatric hospitals, see Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/White%20paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention%20in%20SA
%20Draft%20Final.pdf (Date of use:  26 August 2016) at 74.  To illustrate the delays experienced in 




accused’s case.  These shortages also have the effect that accused persons charged with 
minor crimes who would normally not be incarcerated are now detained in prison awaiting 
psychiatric assessment.156  This situation has led to unfortunate results – for example, there 
are known cases where a person awaiting psychiatric assessment in prison has died.157  It 
is not unthinkable that especially where someone has been charged with a minor crime, the 
waiting period for assessment may exceed the period for which the individual may be 
sentenced in the event that he is found guilty.158  
In the Western Cape, for example, accused persons referred for observation to Valkenberg 
Hospital often remain in prison for unreasonable periods of time awaiting assessment as 
this hospital, like many others, does not have the capacity to assess all those sent for 
observation.159  Of the approximately 24 cases in which referrals are ordered every month, 
Valkenberg can only take in up to 15 of these referrals per month as they only have 15 
beds available for patients who are referred for assessments.160  This situation results in 
delays with assessments.  Due to the shortage of trained staff and beds in the few 
psychiatric institutions authorised to conduct forensic assessments, there is usually a huge 
                                                                                                                                                   
wait for many months before a bed for observation became available at Valkenberg hospital.  In the 
unreported judgment of S v Vika (14519) [2014] ZAWCHC 155 (14 October 2014) at [5-6] the 
accused had to wait 11 months for a bed to become available at Valkenberg hospital.  In another 
unreported judgment of S v Dlali (3/2015) [2015] ZAECBHC 2 (27 February 2015) at [3-6] the 
accused had to wait approximately 7 months before a bed at the Fort England psychiatric hospital 
became available.      
156  McLachlin 2010 Dalhousie Law Journal 15 at 24, 25 where it is reported that an accused charged 
with a minor offence, had to wait in prison for six months before being transferred for observation. 
157  McLachlin 2010 Dalhousie Law Journal 15 at 25. 
158  Kruger A Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses 7th ed (LexisNexis 2010) at 226 confirms that referral 
for fitness to stand trial can be much harsher on an accused who has been charged with a minor 
offence.  This accused will probably spend more time awaiting and undergoing the assessment, than 
the time he would have spent in prison had he been found guilty and had the issue of fitness to stand 
trial not been raised.  
159 Bateman 2005 SAMJ 208 at 2010.  This article further reports that at the time when the article was 
written, it was established that, in Pollsmoor prison alone, a suspected rapist had been waiting 14 
months to be admitted to Valkenberg hospital for observation, a grievous assault suspect 10 months, 
a serious assault suspect 8 months, a murder suspect 7 months and 6 other suspects of violent 
crimes for between 2 and 3 months.  Also see Kaliski, Borchers and Williams 1997 SAMJ 1351 at 
1351, 1352 who points out that observation patients were received at Valkenberg hospital from the 
Western Cape, Northern Cape as well as the Eastern Cape.  Also see Pillay 2014 South African 
Journal of Psychology 48 at 48. 
160 Bateman 2005 SAMJ 208 at 2011.  See further Kaliski, Borchers and Williams 1997 SAMJ 1351 at 
1352 where it is reported that Valkenberg at the time (January to June 1996) received between 25 to 
40 male observation patients each month.  In 2005, it was reported that the high security wing of 





backlog of cases and lengthy waiting periods for beds to become available.161  Accused 
persons can spend undue periods of time in the criminal justice system as a result of this. 
Accused persons sent for observation to Valkenberg hospital are not kept separate from the 
state patients during their assessments.162  The staff at Valkenberg reported that some of 
those admitted for observation carefully study the state patients and imitate their behaviour 
in an attempt to manipulate the psychiatrist into finding him either unfit to stand trial or not 
criminally responsible so that he can avoid prison.163 
The problem of delays in the observation process is exacerbated, it seems, by the poor 
prison administration.  Pollsmoor Prison authorities, for instance, could not confirm the 
number of detainees who had to be assessed at the Valkenberg hospital.164  In one 
instance, a man has been waiting for transfer to the Valkenberg hospital for an assessment 
for 14 months.165  There is no system in place to officially determine which accused persons 
in detention have to be sent for observation.  This leads to delays in the process as 
psychiatrists who consult with accused persons in prisons often have to postpone these 
appointments as the relevant accused cannot be located for the consultation at the given 
time.166   
A lack of policy provisions pertaining to those placed for observation has been identified as 
a service delivery obstacle in the correctional setting.167   A fundamental logistical issue 
such as transport of the accused to the facility where the forensic assessment must be 
done creates a lack of commitment and resultantly confusion about the roles of those 
involved in the forensic setting.168 
                                                
161  This contributes to the delay in finalising court cases.  See National Prosecuting Authority of South 
Africa  http://www.lhr.org.za/sites/lhr.org.za/files/atd_guidelines_.pdf (Date of use:  17 August 2016). 
162 Bateman 2005 SAMJ 208 at 209. 
163 Bateman 2005 SAMJ 208 at 209. 
164 Bateman 2005 SAMJ 208 at 209. 
165 Bateman 2005 SAMJ 208 at 2010. 
166  This challenge has specifically been identified by the Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/Discussion%20Document%20preceding%20Draft%20White%20
Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention_1.pdf (Date of use: 17 August 2016) at 85.    
167  Service delivery to the mentally ill accused is addressed by Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/Discussion%20Document%20preceding%20Draft%20White%20
Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention_1.pdf (Date of use: 17 August 2016) at 90, 131.   
168  This and other challenges are highlighted in bot the White Paper ad the Draft white paper that deals 





It is clear that psychiatric hospitals are facing a number of challenges and that creative 
solutions have to be sought to solve them.  The need for psychiatric institutions such as 
Valkenberg, Sterkfontein and Tara is, however,  paramount.  In 1998, an attempt was made 
to close Valkenberg hospital down in its entirety in light of the move towards community 
rehabilitation.169  Objections were raised against releasing all those treated at Valkenberg, 
raising public safety as a major concern since at least ten state patients that were released 
previously committed murder during the first five years of release.170   
The use of institutions such as Valkenberg should be reserved for those in serious need of 
mental health care treatment and should not be overloaded by referrals from the criminal 
justice system.  Outpatient care should be utilised where possible.  It will also assist if 
assessments could be done on an outpatient basis.171    
4.5 Conclusion 
 From the above discussion, it is apparent that mentally ill accused persons in the criminal 
justice system were treated less than desirably in the past.  The current forensic system 
and facilities therein can be labelled as inadequate as it is plagued with a shortage of 
facilities and trained staff, which in turn results in delays in the assessment process and, 
ultimately, a delay in justice for the accused and the victims involved.  The current 
                                                                                                                                                   
ment%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf (Date of use:  22 August 2016) at 19.  Logistical issues have 
been highlighted as a challenge by Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/Discussion%20Document%20preceding%20Draft%20White%20
Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention_1.pdf (Date of use: 17 August 2016) at 83 where it is 
pointed out that it is assumed that the Department of Corrections will transport the accused to the 
forensic setting for assessment but it is not explicitly stated as the SAPS may also assist with such 
transport.  The uncertainty and confusion is confirmed if one considers Department of Correctional 
Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/White%20paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention%20in%20SA
%20Draft%20Final.pdf (Date of use:  26 August 2016) at 52 where it is stated that the SAPS are 
responsible for transport from prison to the psychiatric institution for purposes of the assessment 
since they have to produce a form J188 with the name of the facility and the type of assessment 
required so that the detention centre can register the release as a temporary one. 
169  This is in line with the general move to “deinstitutionalise” the mentally ill.  The negative effect and 
unintended consequences of this movement is clear from the discussion of in particular the position 
in the United States of America where the closure of hospitals resulted in those in need of treatment, 
ending up on the streets.  See Garner and Hafemeister 2003 Developments in Mental Health Law 1 
at 3.    
170 Bateman 2005 SAMJ 208 at 212. 
171  Outpatient basis assessment has recently been ordered in respect of assessment for criminal 
capacity.  This was done in the case of Oscar Pistorius where he attended Weskoppies hospital on 
an outpatient basis for his criminal capacity to be assessed.  See S v Pistorius (CC113/2013) [2014] 




challenges in the South African criminal justice system with regard to the procedure are 
explored in chapter 3 and add to the challenges experienced in the forensic setting. 
 This state of affairs creates an opportunity to explore alternatives to the current system in 
an attempt to alleviate at least some of the identified problems.  Diversion as an alternative 
to traditional prosecution processes is considered below. 
5 DIVERSION OF THE MENTALLY ILL ACCUSED AWAY FROM THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 
5.1 Introduction 
 Some initiatives aimed at providing a specialised solution to the mentally ill accused in the 
criminal justice system emerged in South Africa and in other jurisdictions.  This is typically 
incorporated by way of a diversion programme.  There are various types of diversion that 
can occur at various stages of the criminal proceedings.  The diversion options differ from 
one jurisdiction to the next. 
 The efforts towards incorporating diversion into the South African criminal justice system 
are discussed in chapter 3 of this research, where the procedural dynamics of the South 
African criminal justice system are discussed. 
 Mental Health Courts have been established in Canada and the United States of America 
as an initiative to divert the mentally ill accused away from the criminal justice system into 
the mental health care system. Research suggests that Mental Health Courts are more 
effective than traditional courts in connecting mentally ill persons in the criminal justice 
system with mental health care services.172  There is a monetary benefit in providing proper 
community-based programmes for the mentally ill rather than treating them in prison.  
Studies in this regard have shown a good return on investment in the long run, including 
breaking the costly cycle of crime and punishment.173  Alternatives to traditional 
                                                
172  Almquist L and Dodd E Mental Health Courts:  A Guide to Research-informed Policy and Practice 
(Council of State Governments Justice Centre New York 2009) at vi. 
173  Rich 2009 Fordham Urban Law Journal 89 at 116, 117.  Also, see Almquist and Dodd Mental Health 
Courts at vi.  See further Frailing 2009 C.S.L.R 145 at 148.  This has especially been the case in the 
Unites States of America.  Treatment instead of incarceration results in cost saving for the criminal 
justice system.  Also see Frailing 2008 C.S.L.R 63 at 67.  Treatment also prevents future 
hospitalisation which contributes to a long-term cost saving.  See Torrey et al Criminalizing the 




prosecutions such as the Mental Health Court, which has a diversion component attached 
to it, further assist in solving the problem of overcrowding in prisons.174  
 The main types of diversion are discussed below, including Mental Health Courts, which is 
not necessarily a diversion programme in itself, but usually has a diversion component 
attached to it. 
5.2 Types of diversion  
 Diversion programmes can generally be divided into four broad categories.  These 
categories are derived from various jurisdictions and serve to explain the nature of diversion 
in its various forms.   
 Firstly, there are crime prevention diversion programmes aimed at diverting the mentally ill 
accused away from the criminal justice system prior to police intervention.175  Diversion at 
the crime prevention stage is the earliest juncture at which diversion programmes can 
operate.  At this stage, high-risk individuals, who may encounter the law because of their 
mental illness, are identified and assisted with medication or social assistance in order to 
prevent formal interaction with the criminal justice system.176  Prior to these programmes, 
the arrest of a mentally ill person was seen as a positive development as this would ensure 
that they received mental health care treatment that they could not necessarily have 
accessed prior to their contact with the criminal justice system.177  This type of diversion 
programme deserves serious consideration as it eliminates the mentally ill person’s contact 
with the criminal justice system altogether.  This is imperative, having regard to the negative 
effect that incarceration and the correctional services environment have on an individual 
suffering from a mental illness.178 
Secondly, there are pre-booking diversion programmes.  Here, the individual is diverted to 
the mental health care system before a criminal charge is filed.  Pre-booking diversion 
                                                
174  Sirotich 2009 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry Law 461 at 461. 
175  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 70. 
176  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 70. 
177  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 70. 
178  Canadian Mental Health Association http://www.cmha.bc.ca/files/policesheets_all.pdf  (Date of use: 
13 March 2015) at 4 where it is pointed out that incarceration is especially problematic for persons 
with mental illness as they would often exhibit disruptive behaviour caused by the mental illness.  
They would then be punished for the disruption by being placed in solitary confinement for example 
which could be very traumatic for the mentally ill person, leading to psychosis or a complete 




programmes entail that a police officer as the first responder to a case involving a mentally 
ill person may exercise his discretion in deciding if the person will be charged or not.  If the 
decision is taken not to file charges against the individual, the particular diversion model will 
determine how the officer is to deal with the individual.  He may, for example, accompany 
him to the hospital for emergency psychiatric assessment.179   
Thirdly, there are post-booking diversion programmes aimed at diverting the mentally ill 
accused person away from the criminal justice system subsequent to arrest and after 
charges are filed against him.180  Post-booking diversion programmes include jail-based 
diversion, court-based diversion and specialised Mental Health Courts.181  Jail based 
diversions entail that the accused is diverted from custody to community-based mental 
health care with the consent of the prosecutor, judge, and defence attorney.  This is done 
after assessment by jail-based mental health staff and liaison with this staff and community 
based mental health care workers.182  Court based diversions entail that a mental health 
care professional is present in court.183  The health care professional screens the records 
for known mental health care users and also does an assessment of the accused, and 
recommends a treatment plan.  He is involved in negotiations with the judge, prosecutor, 
and defence attorney to grant the mentally ill individual bail on the condition that he attends 
a mental health programme.  There is, however, no separate docket for an accused that is 
                                                
179  Sirotich 2009 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry Law 461 at 462.  Also see Canadian Mental Health 
Association http://www.cmha.bc.ca/files/policesheets_all.pdf  (Date of use: 13 March 2015) at 7, 8 
where examples of pre-booking diversion programmes are discussed.  These include a Police 
Mental Health Team where mental health care professionals are employed by the police to respond 
to cases where mentally ill persons are involved.  A further example is police reception centres 
where persons with mental illness who have been apprehended by the police can be assessed and 
channelled to the correct services if needed.  See further Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental 
Health Courts at 72-74 for a discussion on the pre-charge diversion programmes available in 
Canada. 
180  Sirotich 2009 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry Law 461 at 462.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema 
Mental Health Courts at 72 where they refer to pre-booking diversion programmes as “pre charge 
diversion” and to post booking diversion programmes as “post charge diversion”. 
181  Sirotich 2009 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry Law 461 at 463.  Also see generally Lattimore PK, Sherman 
R, Frisman L and Shafer MS “A comparison of prebooking and postbooking diversion programs for 
mentally ill substance-using individuals with justice involvement” 2003 (19) Journal of Contemporary 
Criminal Justice 30-64   Also see Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 575 who 
refers to Mental Health Court programmes as “pre-trial” diversion programmes. 
182  Sirotich 2009 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry Law 461 at 463. 
183  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 76 point out that mental health care 
workers, mostly from community agencies, often assist the court on an ad hoc basis as and when 
the Crown requires their assistance with screening and placement at an appropriate agency.  The 
mental health workers are therefore not employed by the court in these types of diversion 




so referred.  The charges are often withdrawn after such diversion, alternatively the person 
will be convicted but receive probation with special conditions rather than a custodial 
sentence.184 
What sets specialised Mental Health Courts apart from other post-booking diversion 
programmes is that they have a dedicated docket 185 for the mentally ill accused, and the 
participation in the Mental Health Court programme is voluntary.186  It is a speciality criminal 
court for the mentally ill accused.187  The personnel that work at these courts, including the 
judge and prosecutor, have special training in working with mentally ill accused persons.188  
The mentally ill accused person’s progress in the treatment programme is monitored by the 
court, and incentives for completion include avoidance of incarceration and dismissal of 
charges.189  This research is concerned with Mental Health Courts as a post-booking 
diversion programme.    
Lastly, post-sentence diversion programmes.  These programmes are aimed at enhancing 
the accused’s chances of success after incarceration.190   
Diversion in South Africa is not clearly divided into the above categories.  A discussion of 
diversion in the South African context follows in chapter 3.  
An underlying principle of diversion is therapeutic jurisprudence.  Therapeutic jurisprudence 
as the underlying principle of a Mental Health Court as the proposed alternative to 
                                                
184  Sirotich 2009 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry Law 461 at 463. 
185  Stafford KP and Wygant DB “The role of competency to stand trial in mental health courts” 2005 (23) 
Behav.  Sci Law 245-258 at 246.  Also see Christy A, Poythress NG, Boothroyd RA, Petrila J and 
Mehra S “Evaluating the efficiency and community safety goals of the Broward County mental health 
court” 2005 (23) Behav.  Sci Law 227-243 at 229.  See further Redlich AD, Steadman HJ, Monahan 
J, Robbins PC and Petrila J. “Patterns of practice in mental health courts:  A national survey” 2006 
(30)  Law and Human Behaviour 347-362 at 347. 
186  Sirotich 2009 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry Law 461 at 463. 
187  Redlich et al 2006 Law and Human Behaviour 347 at 347. 
188  Sirotich 2009 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry Law 461 at 463.  Also see Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public 
Policy and Law 570 at 576 who stress the importance of proper training for the defence attorney to 
ensure that he can provide meaningful support to his client which training should include ethics 
training so that the defence attorney can be mindful of his obligations towards his mentally ill client. 
189  Sirotich 2009 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry Law 461 at 463.  Also see Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public 
Policy and Law 570 at 576 where it is highlighted that such dismissal of charges does not happen 
automatically in all Mental Health Courts and that the mentally ill accused is often required to request 
such dismissal of charges that is a complicated process in itself. 
190  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 78.  These programmes usually involve 
correctional services staff and mental health care workers creating a programme in the community 
for the mentally ill accused to enhance his chances of success as a community member.  




traditional prosecution for mentally ill accused persons in South Africa is explored below. 
6  THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE IN PRACTICE 
6.1 Introduction 
 The fact that both the law and psychiatry is involved in the forensic setting could cause 
confusion 191 and frustration because of the different philosophies that these vastly different 
fields subscribe to.  The challenge in finding suitable alternatives to the current system is to 
find an approach that will have the support of both the legal and the mental health fields. 
 One philosophy or theory that is supported by both the legal and psychiatric fields is 
therapeutic jurisprudence.  Therapeutic jurisprudence introduces a fresh approach to 
unique groups of accused persons such as mentally ill accused persons and seeks to 
employ the law and legal principles to eradicate the anti-therapeutic impact that the law 
may sometimes have on an accused person.  It focuses on the possible underlying cause 
of the criminal behaviour, in this case, the mental illness, rather than on the crime 
committed, which is often a symptom of an untreated mental illness.192 
The background to the development of this theory and how it came to be used in the mental 
health care context is explored below, followed by an exposition of the nature and aim of 
therapeutic jurisprudence.  The implementation of this philosophy in the criminal justice 
system is explained, followed by a discussion of selected points of criticism levied against 
therapeutic jurisprudence.  
6.2 Background 
Therapeutic jurisprudence emerged as a theory of mental health law but was first applied in 
drug courts in the United States of America.193  The success of drug courts and Mental 
                                                
191  Swanepoel 2015 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Review 3238 at 3238 who adds that ethical 
dilemmas can also arise at the interface between law and psychiatry. 
192  Odegaard 2007 North Dakota Law Review 225 at 227. 
193  Lurigio RJ and Snowden J “Putting therapeutic jurisprudence into practice: The growth, operations, 
and effectiveness of mental health courts” 2009 (2) The Justice System Journal 196-218 at 199, 201.  
Also see Odegaard 2007 North Dakota Law Review 225 at 231.  These courts aim to divert 
substance addicted accused persons away from the criminal justice system into a drug rehabilitation 
programme with the aim to reduce the probability of re-offending.  Drug courts are very successful 
and are the basis upon which Mental Health Courts were started.  See Frailing 2009 C.S.L.R 145 at 




Health Courts motivated the establishment of other problem solving courts such as teen 
courts.194  Problem-solving courts focus on achieving positive solutions for victims, 
defendants and the community.195    
Therapeutic jurisprudence is applied in most problem-solving courts across Canada and the 
United States of America, such as the drug courts, prostitution courts, domestic violence 
courts, Juvenile Mental Health Courts, handgun courts and homeless courts.196  
Therapeutic jurisprudence has been applied in various fields of the law, including criminal 
procedure, criminal law, labour arbitration and personal injury law.197 
6.3 Nature of therapeutic jurisprudence 
  Therapeutic jurisprudence is defined as “the study of the role of the law as a therapeutic 
agent” and demands an interdisciplinary approach as it brings insights from the mental 
                                                                                                                                                   
Their promise and unanswered questions” 2001 (52) Psych Serv 457-458 at 458.  The first drug 
court was established in Florida, United States of America in 1989 see Schneider, Bloom and 
Heerema Mental Health Courts at 41.  The drug courts were a very successful product of the 
therapeutic jurisprudence movement.  As at 2007, there were reportedly over 1000 drug courts in 
North America alone.  Also see Lurigio and Snowden 2009 The Justice System Journal 196 at 198 
who confirms that therapeutic jurisprudence was developed in the context of mental health law. 
194  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 41.  These courts deal with teen “bullies” 
and the sentence imposed upon them for committing minor offences, is to act as an advocate for a 
victim of youth violence in front of teen jurors.  These are problem solving court aimed at handing 
down tailor made “sentences” and ordering participation in rehabilitation programmes to address the 
needs of a specific group within society.  The positive result of these courts is that teens learn 
empathy and learn to accept responsibility for the consequences of their actions.  As at 2008, there 
were over 2000 problem solving courts in the United States of America with every state having at 
least one problem solving court.  Frailing 2008 C.S.L.R 63 at 67.  Also see National Drug Court 
Institute Painting the Current Picture:  National Report Card on Drug Courts and Other Problem 
Solving Court Programs in the United States (Bureau of Justice Assistance and National Drug Court 
Institute 2011) at 40 for details of the number of problem solving court in every state as at 31 
December 2009. 
195 Fisher C “Building Trust and managing risk:  a look at a felony mental health Court” (Centre for Court 
Innovation) 
http://www.courtinnovation.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.ViewPageandPageID=603andcurrentTop 
Tier2=true (Date of use:  7 March 2011).  Also see Frailing 2008 C.S.L.R 63 at 67 for the 
characteristics of problem solving courts and for the types of problem solving courts in existence 
across the United States of America.  One such example Is “community courts” where those found 
guilty of lifestyle crimes, such as prostitution and vandalism, are “sentenced” to community service to 
“pay back” the community instead of spending time in jail.  Also see Welch C and Fuller JR American 
Criminal Courts.  Legal Process and Social Context (Elsevier Amsterdam 2014) at 449 where it is 
explained that problem solving courts aim to provide a less costly and more efficient way of dealing 
with offenders. 
196  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 40.  Also see Frailing 2008 C.S.L.R 63 at 
67 who adds “community courts” to the list of problem solving courts. 
197  Wexler, DR “Therapeutic jurisprudence in a comparative law context” 1997 (15) Behav.  Sci Law 




health sciences into the development of the law.198  Therapeutic jurisprudence demands a 
holistic approach and an optimistic one as it proclaims that there are therapeutic 
opportunities in all aspects of the law’s functioning.199  
  Therapeutic jurisprudence is based on the principle that the law is not neutral.  In other 
words, an accused that is exposed to the criminal justice system is affected by the law in 
some way or the other; thus, his experience is not neutral.200    
Therapeutic jurisprudence views the law as a process rather than a set of rules and 
regulations.201  Therapeutic jurisprudence suggests that the criminal justice system must 
seek understanding and gather input from other disciplines 202 such as mental health 
professionals to apply to the benefit of the criminal justice system and those in contact with 
it.  Therapeutic jurisprudence demands a multi-disciplinary approach as it brings together 
fields that were traditionally thought not to have much to do with each other, such as law 
and mental health.203  
 A further underlying principle upon which therapeutic jurisprudence is based is that 
punishment should be reserved for those who deserve it.204  This is not a concept unique to 
therapeutic jurisprudence, but it reiterates the importance of the application of this concept 
to the mentally ill accused.205  Many of the offences committed by the mentally ill accused 
are minor offences such as shoplifting and public intoxication.206  These crimes are often 
                                                
198  Wexler 1997 Behavioral Sciences and the Law 233 at 233.  Also see Odegaard 2007 North Dakota 
Law Review 225 at 227. 
199  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 45.  Also see Garner and Hafemeister 2003 
Developments in Mental Health Law 1 at 6.  It is pointed out here that restorative justice requires a 
similarly holistic approach. 
200  Wexler 1997 Behavioral Sciences and the Law 233 at 233.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and 
Heerema Mental Health Courts at 44.  Also see Lurigio and Snowden 2009 The Justice System 
Journal 196 at 199 who explains that the justice system can either have a therapeutic or anti-
therapeutic effect on those involved in it.  This confirms that the experience is not neutral. 
201  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 50, 51.  Also see Wexler 1997 Behavioral 
Sciences and the Law 233 at 245 where it is stated that therapeutic jurisprudence is interested in the 
“law in action” rather than just legal doctrine. 
202  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 51.  Also see Wexler 1997 Behavioral 
Sciences and the Law 233 at 234 who explains that therapeutic jurisprudence brings fields together 
that were traditionally thought not to have much to do with each other.   
203  Wexler 1997 Behavioral Sciences and the Law 233 at 245. 
204  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 46. 
205  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 46. 
206  Frailing 2008 C.S.L.R 63 at 69 and further see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health 
Courts at 46.  Also see Frailing 2009 C.S.L.R 145 at 148.  Drug and alcohol abuse is often a 




not committed with criminal intent, but are the result of an underlying condition that has little 
to do with criminal intent.207   
 Important to note, however, is that therapeutic jurisprudence does not discard the 
importance of the individual taking responsibility for his actions,208 it merely shifts the focus 
from what the person did to the underlying cause or reason for what he did.  The focus is 
shifted from the “what” to the “why”. 
6.4 Aim of therapeutic jurisprudence. 
 Therapeutic jurisprudence is aimed at addressing the underlying factor that caused the 
individual to clash with the law.209  In the case of a mentally ill accused person, the 
underlying factor to be addressed is a mental illness.210   
Therapeutic jurisprudence promotes the treatment of mental illness at the first possible 
opportunity.211  For the mentally disordered accused, an encounter with the criminal justice 
system is mostly anti-therapeutic as they are often subjected to abuse and generally 
experience a lack of meaningful treatment.212  Arrest and incarceration per se can be 
debilitating to a mentally ill accused 213 , and consequently, they do not cope well in the 
                                                                                                                                                   
individuals are arrested by the police who believe that they are using drugs and/or alcohol because 
of their bizarre behaviour, when in fact they are not.  See Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously 
Mentally Ill at 46.     
207  Odegaard 2007 North Dakota Law Review 225 at 251.  Therapeutic jurisprudence advocates that 
the decision of a mentally ill accused to partake in criminal activity is no longer a matter of free 
choice.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 46.   
208  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 46, 47.  Also see Garner and Hafemeister 
2003 Developments in Mental Health Law 1 at 5 where the Mental Health Court as a product of 
therapeutic jurisprudence is discussed and where it is specifically stated that these initiatives do not 
sacrifice the idea of criminal responsibility.  Many Mental Health Courts in the American model 
actually requires an accused to plead guilty in order to gain access to the Mental Health Court 
programme which confirms the focus placed on accepting responsibility for actions. 
209  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 3.  Also see Garner and Hafemeister 2003 
Developments in Mental Health Law 1 at 5. 
210  This is a particular focus of the Mental Health Court.  See Odegaard 2007 North Dakota Law Review 
225 at 250. 
211  Addressing the mental illness at first instance is also done with the aim to reduce recidivism and in 
turn, ensure a safer society.  See Rich 2009 Fordham Urban Law Journal 89 at 115.  Also see 
Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 45. 
212  Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 59, 60 where the abuse, assault and rape of 
mentally inmates in United States jails and prisons are discussed.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and 
Heerema Mental Health Courts at 45.   
213  Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 572 who confirms that contact with the 
criminal justice system has a negative consequences for anyone who is arrested and/or incarcerated 




criminal justice system.214    
Therapeutic jurisprudence seeks a solution that will benefit society as well as the accused 
and promotes creative treatment programmes such as job training that might be 
undertaken, together with the mental health care treatment,215 to enable the person to be 
self-supporting and empowered when they complete the Mental Health Court programme. 
6.5 Implementation of therapeutic jurisprudence 
Therapeutic jurisprudence is largely based on common sense.216  The implementation 
thereof should likewise be guided by common sense.  A holistic approach is necessary 
during the implementation of therapeutic jurisprudence 217 in the criminal justice system.  Its 
implementation requires that consideration be given to the possible therapeutic or anti-
therapeutic impact of the law and how certain psychological literature can be incorporated 
into the legal system 218 to remedy the possible anti-therapeutic effect thereof. 
                                                                                                                                                   
Heerema Mental Health Courts at 116.   Also see the view expressed in Ministry of Health and Long-
term Care A Program Framework for: Mental Health Diversion/ Court support services (2006)  
http://www.health.gov.on.ca/en/common/ministry/publications/reports/mentalhealth/framework.pdf   
(Date of use: 26 August 2015) at 4 where it is pointed out that persons with mental illness that are 
kept in a correctional setting are at higher risk of experiencing more severe symptoms of mental 
illness and are at higher risk of homelessness once they are released.  These accused persons are 
further often isolated from mental health care for as long as they are kept in the correctional facility – 
arguably because of resource constraints in such facilities.  See further Odegaard 2007 North 
Dakota Law Review 225 at 234 who points out that the mental condition of the accused often 
deteriorates during incarceration.  See further Phuneuf v Ontario 2010 ONCA 901 at [28].   
214  Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 573.  Also see Canadian Mental Health 
Association http://www.cmha.bc.ca/files/policesheets_all.pdf  (Date of use: 13 March 2015) at 4 
where it is pointed out that persons with mental illness often exhibit disruptive behaviour whilst 
incarcerated.  Such disruptive behaviour is often caused by the mental illness.  The punishment for 
such disruptive behaviour may in some instances include solitary confinement, which could be very 
traumatic for a mentally ill person and could lead to psychosis or a complete breakdown.  Also see 
Peay Mental Health and Crime 36 and 37.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health 
Courts at 45.  See further Read 2009 UBCMJ 25 at 26.  Also see Parliamentary Information and 
Research Service Current issues in Mental Health in Canada: Mental Health and the Criminal 
Justice System (Library of Parliament Ottawa Canada 2013) at 4.         
215  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 4. 
216  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 43. 
217  Garner and Hafemeister 2003 Developments in Mental Health Law 1 at 6.  It is pointed out here that 
restorative justice requires a similarly holistic approach.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema 
Mental Health Courts at 60.   
218  Wexler 1997 Behavioral Sciences and the Law 233 at 234 explains that there are two methods of 
applying therapeutic jurisprudence, namely: the law based approach (“LBA”) and the psychology 
based approach (“PBA”).  The LBA looks at a particular law and  analyses its possible therapeutic or 
anti-therapeutic impact.  The PBA looks at the legal system and contemplates how certain 




The implementation of therapeutic jurisprudence can be challenging.  The following three-
phased approach is suggested by Schneider et al.219  Firstly, the trends, characteristic and 
challenges of mentally ill accused persons, both before they enter the criminal justice 
system and thereafter, should be identified.220  Based on the information gathered during 
the first phase, ways to address the specific challenges should be identified during the 
second phase of implementation.  One of these initiatives, after investigating the needs of 
mentally disordered accused, is the establishment of Mental Health Courts.  The third and 
final phase entails evaluating the therapeutic initiatives put in place during the second 
phase.221   
Four main factors warrant specific consideration during the implementation of therapeutic 
jurisprudence.222  The current substantive law is the first factor for consideration.223  The 
reform of the substantive law can be an effective way of bringing about therapeutic 
results.224   
Procedural rules, as the second factor for consideration, are a major focus of therapeutic 
jurisprudence.225  The procedural rules within the criminal justice system dictate the 
movement of the accused within the criminal justice system and are evaluated through 
therapeutic jurisprudence to determine their impact on the individual, in particular, if he was 
treated fairly and with respect.226   
                                                                                                                                                   
explanation of the application of these two approaches, see this source at 234-237 in particular. 
219  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 57, 61. 
220  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 57. 
221  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 60, 93.  Measuring the success of 
therapeutic initiatives such as the Mental Health Court, poses unique challenges.  It is difficult to 
measure the success of Mental Health Courts because they are a very new phenomenon.  The fact 
that therapeutic programmes are individualised and administered in a very informal manner makes 
research on the effectiveness of the court difficult, as studies are mostly only possible by way of 
case studies.  Also see this source at 93, 94 for suggestions on how the effectiveness of 
rehabilitation programmes can be measured and the aspects that should be focussed on in 
measuring the effectiveness of these programmes. 
222  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 52. 
223  This constitutes the legislation and regulations that form the framework of the legal system.  In South 
Africa this will include, inter alia, the Constitution, the Criminal Procedure Act and the Mental Health 
Care Act. 
224  It is usually the Government taking the decision to change the legislation and the implementation 
thereof is filtered down from there.  See Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 52. 
225  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 52. 
226  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 52.  In the context of a Mental Health Court 
it would be important for procedures to be put in place to ensure that a fair balance is struck between 




Thirdly, the roles of those involved in the criminal justice system should be assessed to 
establish the therapeutic impact that the particular role has.227  Therapeutic jurisprudence is 
practised by specially trained judges in Mental Health Courts by, for example, listening 
actively to the participant, avoiding paternalistic speech and responding to the participants 
with dignity and respect that translates into a more informal atmosphere.228  Judges and 
lawyers working in these courts are also specially trained in the field of mental health law.229   
Lastly, and very importantly, therapeutic jurisprudence requires a multi-disciplinary 
approach.  Therapeutic jurisprudence acknowledges that the law and, in particular, the 
practice of law in the criminal justice framework can be enriched by input from other 
disciplines such as psychology, sociology and nursing.230  This will, in turn, arm the criminal 
justice system with the knowledge on how to better address the challenges posed by 
mentally ill accused persons.  The Mental Health Courts have a Mental Health Court team 
on-site consisting of specially trained lawyers, psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, 
nurses and case managers.231  Mental Health Courts function within the criminal justice 
system but aim to incorporate advances made in other fields of specialisation such as 
psychology.232  This methodology of therapeutic jurisprudence naturally broadens the scope 
                                                                                                                                                   
health on the other hand.  Also see Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 574 who 
points out that concern was raised with regard to the varying nature of the procedures followed 
across Mental Health Courts since there is no single model of a Mental Health Court. 
227  Training might be necessary to ensure that the officer has a deep understanding of how he can 
contribute to the therapeutic outcome of the process.  See Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental 
Health Courts at 53.  No specific training course might be available for Mental Health Practitioners 
who wish to work in the Mental Health Court.  These practitioners are mostly only required to show 
an understanding of the relevant psycho-legal aspects involved in processing a case of a mentally ill 
accused through the Mental Health Court.  See this source at 115, 116.  The authors do however 
suggest a list of topics on which mental health practitioners, lawyers and judges should receive 
training for purposes of fulfilling their role in the Mental Health Court effectively.  See 122-125 of this 
source. 
228  Frailing K “How mental health courts function:  Outcomes and observations” 2010 (33) Int J Law 
Psychiat 207-213 at 207.  Processes in the Mental Health Court are conducted more informally and 
in a conversational tone.  See Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 53.  Also see 
Lurigio and Snowden 2009 The Justice System Journal 196 at 208 where it is explained that Judges 
often have conversations with participants that contributes to the more informal atmosphere.  Also 
see Odegaard 2007 North Dakota Law Review 225 at 240 who explains that Mental Health Courts 
where therapeutic jurisprudence is practiced has a less adversarial approach. 
229  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 55.    
230  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 54. 
231  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 55.  Judges and lawyers working in these 
courts are also specially trained in the field of mental health law.  Also see Lurigio and Snowden 
2009 The Justice System Journal 196 at 211 where it is further pointed out that court staff is most 
productive when they are “cross-trained” in each other’s fields, for instance, lawyers are trained in 
mental health and psychiatrists are trained in law. 




of the law.  
Despite the potential that the therapeutic jurisprudence movement holds, concerns have 
been raised about therapeutic jurisprudence.  These are highlighted below. 
6.6 Criticism against Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
 The first concern raised is that it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of initiatives such 
as Mental Health Courts, which are grounded in therapeutic jurisprudence.233  Measuring 
the success of therapeutic initiatives, such as the Mental Health Court, poses unique 
challenges because they are a very new phenomenon.234  The fact that therapeutic 
programmes are individualised and administered in a very informal manner makes research 
on the effectiveness even more difficult as research is mostly only possible by way of case 
studies.235  The logical response to this criticism is that more studies, even though they 
might only be case studies, will prove the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of Mental Health 
Courts as instruments of therapeutic jurisprudence.  The Mental Health Court movement is 
still new, and research about its success and outcomes for its participants are scarce, albeit 
steadily increasing.236  The true effectiveness of it will only be established after the passage 
of some time.   
 Secondly, therapeutic jurisprudence has been criticised for threatening the very nature of 
the criminal justice system and what it stands for.  Some hold the view that the purpose of 
the criminal justice system is to punish the rule breakers and to protect society by doing 
so.237  Since one of the primary goals of criminal law is to prevent persons from taking the 
law into their own hands, society must have a sense of restoration after the criminal 
process against an accused that has committed a wrong is concluded.238  Alternatives to 
traditional prosecution may seem to be in conflict with this principle if the accused is never 
                                                
233  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 60.  Also see Lurigio and Snowden 2009 
The Justice System Journal 196 at 208. 
234  Almquist and Dodd Mental Health Courts at v.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental 
Health Courts at 60, 93. 
235  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 60.  Also see 93, 94 of this source for 
suggestions on how the effectiveness of rehabilitation programmes can be measured and the 
aspects that should be focussed on in measuring the effectiveness of these programmes.  See 
further Lurigio and Snowden 2009 The Justice System Journal 196 at 208. 
236  Almquist and Dodd Mental health Courts at v. 
237  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 62. 




“punished”.239  In the traditional criminal justice setting, judges are impartial and lawyers are 
on opposite side of a “fight”.  Where therapeutic jurisprudence is applied, for example, in 
Mental Health Court, judges take an interest in the accused, and lawyers work together to 
seek the best possible solution for the accused, which is viewed as not in line with the 
traditional goals of the criminal justice system.240  In response to this criticism, it is reiterated 
that it was never intended for therapeutic jurisprudence to “override” the criminal justice 
system.241  The fact that those that support the therapeutic jurisprudence movement are not 
advocating for the abolishment of prisons (the epiphany of an anti-therapeutic setting) 
proves that the intention is rather for the theory to function alongside existing criminal 
justice processes.242  It seeks to integrate therapeutic goals without detracting from the 
mandate of the criminal justice system to ensure accountability for past wrongs.243   
Therapeutic jurisprudence does not discard the importance of the individual taking 
responsibility for his actions;244 it merely shifts the focus from what the person did to the 
underlying cause or reason for what he did.  The shift of focus to therapeutic outcomes is 
based on one of the central pillars upon which this theory stands, namely, that it is morally 
unacceptable to punish individuals whose behaviour can be attributed to factors beyond 
their control.245   This approach is followed in the Mental Health Court.246   
                                                
239  Van der Wolf et al 2010 International Journal of Forensic Mental Health 245 at 250 points out that 
this is particularly the case where the crime is serious, a greater need for restoration exists then.  
The author, however, points out that in the event of minor crimes this objection fades and 
alternatives outside of the criminal law should be sought for accused persons with mental illness.  
240  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 61, 62.  Also see Odegaard 2007 North 
Dakota Law Review 225 at 230, 240 who point out that this is the approach in all problem solving 
courts.  Those involved in the court process work together to find the most suitable solution to the 
accused’s problem.   
241  Wexler 1997 Behavioral Sciences and the Law 233 at 234. 
242  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 62. 
243  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 62.  The authors give a good example of 
how the theory envisages to do this; If a person is sentenced, followed by a period of parole for 
example, those in support of therapeutic jurisprudence will attempt to implement this sentence in as 
therapeutic a way as possible (for example by offering rehabilitative programmes or mental health 
care treatment) with the aim of preparing the individual for optimal functioning in the community upon 
his/her release.  Also see Frailing 2009 C.S.L.R 145 at 146, 147 for the approaches of Hart and 
Morris to sentencing where mental illness is imposed which, if followed, those approaches result in 
“sentences” in the form of court monitored treatment programmes as utilised in the Mental Health 
Courts. 
244  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 46, 47. 
245  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 63.  There are the supporters of the theory 
that suggests that the punitive aspect in the pursuit of justice should be abandoned in its entirety, 
especially where the criminal act was a manifestation of an inadequate community care and social 




 The third point of criticism is based on the reality that there are limited mental health 
resources available.247  The fear is that the implementation of therapeutic jurisprudence will 
push those in the criminal justice system to the front of the line for mental health care 
services, whilst law-abiding citizens must patiently await their turn.248  It is not difficult to see 
how this can create a feeling of unfairness.  Schneider Bloom and Heerema 249 put a 
different perspective on this issue and state that the criticism is misguided as the critique is 
not so much against therapeutic jurisprudence as such, but rather a criticism of the scarcity 
of resources in society.  The problem is thus a lack of services and not the attempt to 
connect mentally ill accused in the criminal justice system with the mental health care 
system.250  Those who advocate for therapeutic jurisprudence by implication also advocate 
for increased mental health care services as the success of the therapeutic programmes 
which therapeutic jurisprudence sets out to achieve is dependent on sufficient mental health 
care resources.251  Therapeutic jurisprudence, therefore, promotes the availability of mental 
health care services to both the mentally ill in the criminal justice system and those outside 
of it.252  Increasing mental health resources can ensure the availability of these services to 
all in need thereof, in which case this ground of criticism becomes irrelevant.  
7  MENTAL HEALTH COURT:  A THERAPEUTIC RESPONSE 
7.1 Introduction 
Mental Health Courts are alternatives to traditional prosecutions that are aimed at diverting 
the mentally ill accused away from the criminal justice system into the mental health care 
system.253  Part of the reason why diversion programmes such as Mental Health Courts 
                                                                                                                                                   
246  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 63.  The authors recommend this approach 
as they submit that fault, in certain circumstances, does not lie with the accused. 
247  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 64. 
248  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 64.  This concern was also raised by 
Steadman, Davidson and Brown 2001 Psych Serv 457 at 458.  Also see Lurigio and Snowden 2009 
The Justice System Journal 196 at 212. 
249  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 64. 
250  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 64.  Also see Bazelon Centre for Mental 
Health Law “Criminalization of people with mental illness:  The role of mental health courts in system 
reform” http://www.bazelon.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=xQf5_1grKcI%3D&tabid=104  (Date of use:  
17 March 2013) at 3 where the concern is expressed that limited resources may become unavailable 
to those not in contact with the criminal justice system.  The criminal justice system will be a 
“gateway” to mental health services. 
251  Lurigio and Snowden 2009 The Justice System Journal 196 at 211.   
252  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 64. 




came into being is because it was observed that people with mental illnesses are 
overrepresented in the criminal justice- and correctional system.254  This seems to be a 
worldwide phenomenon.255   
The two different models of Mental Health Courts as they operate in Canada and the United 
States of America will be studied in this research.256    
7.2 The Mental Health Court Model 
There is no single model of a Mental Health Court as each jurisdiction creates its own 
model based on the needs of its community.257  This makes finding an exact universal 
definition for a Mental Health Court problematic.  Steadman et al 258 offer a functional 
definition of Mental Health Courts as courts where mentally ill offenders are dealt with in a 
separate docket, a collaborative team is used to make linkages to treatment, availability of 
appropriate clinical placement is ensured, and the programmes are monitored by the court 
with possible criminal sanctions for non-compliance.  Schneider et al,259 however, criticise 
this definition and instead suggest a definition that focusses on the characteristics of a 
Mental Health Court, namely rehabilitation of the mentally ill accused, reducing or avoiding 
time spent by the mentally ill accused in jail, a collaborative and co-operative 260 rather than 
an adversarial approach, decriminalisation of the mentally ill and reintegration of the 
mentally ill accused into the community.  What is true about all Mental Health Courts is that 
they are “problem-solving courts” and that the underlying theory applied in all of these 
                                                
254  Sirotich 2009 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry Law 461 at 461, 462. 
255  In the United States of America for example, the number of mentally ill persons being held in jails 
and prisons, increases by 10% per annum.  See Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health 
Courts at 22.  This is the same percentage as in Canada.  See chapter 4 of this research for more 
detail on the Canadian statistics.  Also see Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 9 
where it is explained that the first mental health survey that was done in 1880 during which survey it 
was found that persons with serious mental illnesses comprise 0.7% of the prison population.  This 
number grew to 7.2% in a survey done in 1992.  See further Parliamentary Information and 
Research Service Current Issues in Mental Health in Canada at 1. 
256  See chapter 4 of this research for a discussion of Mental Health Courts in Canada and chapter 5 for 
a discussion of Mental Health Courts in the United States of America. 
257  Watson et al 2001 Psych Serv 477 at 477.  Also see Lurigio and Snowden 2009 The Justice System 
Journal 196 at 205. 
258 Steadman, Davidson and Brown 2001 Psych Serv 457 at 458.  Also see Lurigio and Snowden 2009 
The Justice System Journal 196 at 205 where the characteristics of Mental Health Courts are 
discussed.  These are in line with the definition of Mental Health Courts offered by Steadman. 
259  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 85. 
260  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 92.  Also see Goldberg S Judging for the 




courts is therapeutic jurisprudence.261  
What a Mental Health Court is or what it should be determined within the framework of the 
particular jurisdiction.  The inefficiencies of the relevant mental health care system are 
identified, and they are addressed according to the priorities of the particular community 
and the available resources that can be employed to address these inefficiencies.262  
Mental Health Court models vary with regard to their eligibility criteria, processes, as well as 
sanctions employed for non-compliance.263 
Two Mental Health Court model are explored in this research.  Chapter 4 explores the 
Mental Health Court model employed in Canada, whilst chapter 5 investigates the Mental 
Health Court model employed in the United States of America. 
7.3 Goals and objectives of a Mental Health Court 
Each Mental Health Court has its own unique and specific goals, and these will be 
discussed in more detail in chapters 4 and 5 when the specific Mental Health Court models 
are discussed.  The discussion that follows is an overview of the objectives of Mental 
Health Courts in general and is not jurisdiction-specific.  
Mental Health Courts are aimed at diverting the mentally ill accused persons charged with 
minor to moderately serious criminal offence away from the criminal justice system and 
offering them an alternative to traditional prosecution in the criminal court.264 
                                                
261  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 39.  Also see Stafford and Wygant 2005 
Behavioral Sciences and the Law 245 at 246.  See further Odegaard 2007 North Dakota Law 
Review 225 at 228. 
262  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 85. 
263  See chapter 4 for a discussion of the Canadian model and chapter 5 for a discussion of the model 
employed in the Unites States of America where the differences in eligibility criteria, processes and 
sanctions are discussed. 
264  Some Mental Health Courts, such as the Brooklyn Mental Health Court, expanded their jurisdiction to 
process cases of violent crimes.  See a discussion of the functionality of this court in chapter 5 of this 
research.  Also see Sirotich 2009 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry Law 461 at 461.  See further Garner and 
Hafemeister 2003 Developments in Mental Health Law 1 at 5.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and 
Heerema Mental Health Courts at 2.  See further Lurigio and Snowden 2009 The Justice System 
Journal 196 at 205 where it is explained that the eligibility criteria of Mental Health Courts may differ 
depending on the jurisdiction that they are functioning in.  Some accommodate those with Axis 1 
disorders (according to the DSM-V) only and exclude those with Axis 11 diagnosis (mental 
retardation and personality disorders) where the latter is their only diagnosis.  Some Mental Health 
Courts only take accused persons into their programmes if their conditions are treatable by proven 




Mental Health Courts further aim to streamline the process involving assessment for fitness 
to stand trial in order to ensure the more effective use of criminal justice resources.265  
Mental Health Courts aim to alleviate overburdened criminal courts 266 so that criminal 
courts can deal with other serious offences not relating to mental illness.267  These courts 
further aim, through diversion programmes, to reduce overcrowding of prisons as well as 
improve the quality of life of mentally ill persons in conflict with the law.268   
Mental Health Courts aim to alleviate the burden that was placed on the criminal justice 
system because of the deinstitutionalisation movement.  One of the consequences of 
deinstitutionalisation was that mental health care services became less available to those in 
need of them 269 as a result, whereof these service-deprived individuals often clash with the 
law.  The criminal justice system is then expected to somehow address the mental health 
needs of these persons.270  Of course, the criminal justice system was never designed for 
this 271 , and the Mental Health Courts aim to equip the criminal justice system for the new 
responsibility that it has been tasked with.  Mental Health Courts aim to help with this new 
                                                                                                                                                   
abuse or a crime involving the use of a firearm. 
265  Mental Health Courts aim to expedite the assessment for fitness to stand trial.  Schneider, Bloom 
and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 2, 86.  The delays with fitness assessments in the South 
African context contributes to problems with overcrowding as those awaiting fitness assessments are 
housed in correctional facilities.  See the discussion of fitness proceeding in South Africa in chapter 
3 of this research.    
266  Sirotich 2009 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry Law 461 at 461.  Also, see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema 
Mental Health Courts at 2.  See further Odegaard 2007 North Dakota Law Review 225 at 230 where 
it is acknowledged that persons with mental illness are currently contributing to the overload of the 
criminal justice system due to the fact that they are coming into contact with the criminal justice 
system more frequently. 
267  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 86. 
268  Frailing 2010 Int J Law Psychiat 207 at 207.  Also see Sirotich 2009 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry Law 
461 at 461.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 86.  See further 
Odegaard 2007 North Dakota Law Review 225 at 237 where it is stated that Mental Health Courts 
were established to address overcrowding, recidivism and strained resources. 
269  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 2.  Also see in general Prins SJ “Does 
transinstitutionalisation explain overrepresentation of people with serious mental illnesses in the 
criminal justice system?  2011 (47) Community Mental Health Journal 716-722 for a discussion on 
the debates in response to the question of whether re-institutionalisation will solve the problem of 
over-representation of people with serious mental illnesses in the criminal justice system or not.  
Also see Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 40 where deinstitutionalisation has 
been identified as a phenomenon that can put pressure on the criminal justice system to re-
institutionalise the mentally ill individual. 
270  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 1.  Also see Odegaard 2007 North Dakota 
Law Review 225 at 229 where it is highlighted that judges in traditional courts faced huge challenges 
in processing cases of persons with mental illness before problem solving courts were introduced.  
South Africa is currently experiencing huge case backlogs in respect of cases involving 30-day 
observation periods.  See Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 48 at 48. 




responsibility of the criminal justice system by providing court-mandated treatment 
programmes aimed at the treatment of the accused’s operative mental illness.272   
Mental Health Courts aim to slow down the “revolving door” phenomenon by preventing or 
limiting re-offending.273  Re-offending is curbed by providing mentally ill accused persons 
with critical mental health care services.274  Once the mental illness is treated, the 
probability of re-offending decrease.  Reducing recidivism, in turn, reduces crime, which 
contributes to public safety.275   
Mental Health Courts aim through its processes to place the responsibility for mental health 
care back with the mental health care system 276 where the expertise for treating mental 
illnesses should naturally be expected to reside.  It has been stressed that the focus should 
remain on reducing recidivism and successfully integrating mentally ill individuals into the 
community.277  This can only be achieved if community services are enhanced.   
Every court that carries the label of a Mental Health Court attempts to offer a rehabilitative 
response that is treatment based, as opposed to criminal sanctions.278  The philosophy 
behind the Mental Health Court movement and its rehabilitative approach is that the 
traditional approach to deviant behaviour (punishment and incarceration), where it is 
predominantly the product of a mental disorder, is not only inappropriate but also ineffective 
in its nature.279  There is an understanding in these courts that a rehabilitative approach will 
                                                
272  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 2.  Also see Lurigio and Snowden 2009 
The Justice System Journal 196 at 205 and 212 who stress the importance of availability of 
resources for purposes of Mental Health Court treatment programmes. 
273  Frailing 2009 C.S.L.R 145 at 146.  This is done by providing the mentally ill accused an entrance into 
community based mental health care.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health 
Courts at 2. 
274 Watson et al 2001 Psychiatric Services 477.  Also see Stafford and Wygant 2005 Behavioral 
Sciences and the Law 245 at 246.  Also see Odegaard 2007 North Dakota Law Review 225 at 228 
who points out that this is a goal of most problem solving courts. 
275  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 86.  Also see Odegaard 2007 North Dakota 
Law Review 225 at 228. 
276  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 2. 
277  Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 583, 584.  The author also cautions against 
the use of practices that impact negatively on the mentally ill offender’s chances of reintegration, for 
example requiring a guilty plea in order to participate in the Mental Health Court programmes.  This 
will result in the mentally ill person having a criminal record that could complicate reintegration for 
him in various ways. 
278  Sirotich 2009 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry Law 461 at 461.  Schneider Bloom and Heerema Mental 
Health Courts at 3. 
279  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 3.  See further Lurigio and Snowden 2009 




best serve the interests of the public and the wellbeing of the mentally ill accused.280 
One of the main characteristics of Mental Health Courts is that it aims to decriminalise 
mental illness.  Rich 281 opines that inadequate community based mental health care has 
progressively contributed to the criminalisation of mental illness.  The Mental Health Court 
movement aims to work closely with communities to provide mental health care treatment 
and will assist in decriminalising mental illness by implementing and maintaining effective 
community mental health programmes. 
Since expertise from both the legal and mental health fields is required to deal with cases of 
mentally ill persons effectively, a multidisciplinary approach is followed in these courts.282  
Each Mental Health Court programme is designed with input from this multidisciplinary 
team to meet the needs of the particular individual in question 283 , and the therapeutic 
programmes at the court are not a “one size fits all” initiative.  In order for a therapeutic 
programme to be successful, it needs support from the community from which the 
resources to make these programmes a reality will be drawn.284   
Although initiatives such as special courts are created to cater for a specific group within 
the criminal justice system, the circumstances of the particular individual are always 
considered.285 This is evident from the tailor-made treatment programme that is drafted by 
the multidisciplinary team referred to above.  Ignoring the unique circumstances of each 
accused person will defeat the therapeutic aim of the Mental Health Court initiative because 
what is considered therapeutic for one person is not necessarily therapeutic for the next 
person.   
As mentioned above, the goals and objectives of Mental Health Courts are determined by 
the jurisdiction that they aim to serve.  For this reason, Mental Health Courts function 
differently from each other and may have been established due to different reasons.  The 
                                                                                                                                                   
treatment programmes are criticised, as it is often not helpful for the mentally ill accused to receive 
jail time.  Also see Odegaard 2007 North Dakota Law Review 225 at 250 who shares the view that it 
is more appropriate to process cases of persons with mental illness through a specialised court 
rather than through the traditional criminal justice system. 
280  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 93. 
281  Rich 2009 Fordham Urban Law Journal 89 at 119. 
282  Odegaard 2007 North Dakota Law Review 225.at 238 who also discuss the unique way in which 
each role player contributes to the Mental Health Court atmosphere and functioning. 
283  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 58. 
284  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 58. 




reasons behind the emergence of Mental Health Courts in Canada and the United States of 
America are discussed below. 
7.4 The emergence of Mental Health Courts in Canada   
A discussion of the emergence of Mental Health Courts is included to elucidate the 
circumstances that motivated the establishment of these specialised courts.  Some of the 
reasons behind the establishment of a Mental Health Court in a particular jurisdiction, as 
discussed below, may also find application in the South African context and could similarly 
be the impetus behind the establishment of a Mental Health Court in South Africa. 
The establishment of Mental Health Courts in Canada is an acknowledgement of the fact 
that the traditional criminal justice system is not always equipped to identify and address 
the mental health issues of accused persons.286  The criminal justice system in Canada was 
not designed to address the needs of mentally ill accused persons in the first place.287  
Traditional criminal courts are often overburdened with caseloads making it difficult for them 
to adequately deal with mentally ill accused persons.288   Besides the fact that criminal 
courts are often inept to deal with cases of persons with mental illness, some specific 
reasons or considerations can be cited as the impetus behind the establishment of the 
specialised Mental Health Courts in Canada.  These are discussed below. 
                                                
286  Barret and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 1-29 who points out that the 
criminal justice system is generally ineffective in as far as it pertains to mentally ill accused persons.  
Also, see Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at 256.  Also see Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 at 31.  See 
further Hartford, Carey and Mendonca 2007 Journal of Behavioral Health Services and Research 
198 at 199.  Also see Slinger and Roesch 2010 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 258 at 
259.  Also see National Judicial Institute Problem-solving in Canada’s courtrooms.  A guide to 
therapeutic justice (National Judicial Institute Canada, 2011) at 9. 
287  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 1.  Also see Centre for Addiction and 
Mental Health v Al-Sherevadi 2011 ONSC 2272 (Ont S.C J) at {13} where the court stated that “As 
may be apparent from my endorsement, whatever problems there may be with continuing to hold 
persons with mental health issues in detention facilities as opposed to proper medical facilities, they 
pale in comparison with the problems associated with holding such persons in a police division.  Not 
only are the police not properly equipped to deal with these people, it is not the role of the Toronto 
police service, or any other police service, to house these people.  It is also not appropriate to foist 
the burden of this problem onto the police or to saddle them with the fallout from this conflict”.  See 
further Barret and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 2-31-2-33.  Also see Byrick 
K and Walker-Renshaw B A Practical Guide to Mental Health and the Law in Ontario (Ontario 
Hospital Association Toronto 2012) at 75 where the point is made that the criminal justice system 
has been struggling to overcome the challenges that accused persons with mental illness bring to it.  
Also see Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 at 31. 
288  Mental Health Courts aim to alleviate the burden on criminal courts.  See Toronto Mental Health 
Court “Overview of the Court”  http://www.mentalhealthcourt.ca/pages/2/Overview.htm (Date of 




Firstly, the deinstitutionalisation movement during the latter part of the 20th century, resulted 
in the release of patients from government managed psychiatric facilities into the 
community.289  Resources were lacking within the community to cater for the needs of the 
individuals that were released from the psychiatric institutions.290  Mentally ill persons 
consequently failed to reintegrate successfully into their communities due to the lack of 
available mental health services that resulted in the homelessness of many mentally ill 
persons.291  These individuals would often encounter the criminal justice system when they 
either committed petty crimes or were picked up by the police for disorderly behaviour.292  
Deinstitutionalisation contributed to the criminalisation of mental illness.293   
                                                
289  There was limited availability of mental health care services in the community for those released 
from these psychiatric hospitals.  See Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 1.  
Also see McLachlin 2010 Dalhousie Law Journal 15 at 20.  Also see Rieksts M “Mental health courts 
in Canada” LawNow 2008 (33) 31-34 at 31 where the deinstitutionalisation movement is identified as 
a contributing factor to the increased number of mentally ill persons in the criminal justice system.  
See further Canadian Mental Health Association http://www.cmha.bc.ca/files/policesheets_all.pdf  
(Date of use: 13 March 2015).  Also see Slinger E and Roesch R “Problem-solving courts in Canada:   
A review and a call for empirically-based evaluation methods” 2010 (33) International Journal of Law 
and Psychiatry 258-264 at 259. 
290  Canadian Mental Health Association http://www.cmha.bc.ca/files/policesheets_all.pdf  (Date of use: 
13 March 2015) at 1.  Also see Read 2009 UBCMJ 25 at 25.   
291  McLachlin 2010 Dalhousie Law Journal 15 at 20 who adds that many of these individuals stopped 
taking their medication and deteriorated substantially as a result.  Research shows that 30% to 50% 
of homeless people suffer from a serious mental illness.  See Heerema M “An introduction to the 
mental health court movement and its status in Canada” 2005 (50) Crim.L.Q 255-282 at 257.  
Although these figures are drawn from the American population, it has been suggested that the 
figures pertaining to Canada should be in the same region.  Also see Read 2009 UBCMJ 25 at 25 
where it is pointed out that between 30 to 35% of the homeless population in Canada is mentally ill.  
292  Canadian Mental Health Association http://www.cmha.bc.ca/files/policesheets_all.pdf  (Date of use: 
13 March 2015) at 1 where it is pointed out that at least 30% of persons with serious mental illnesses 
had contact with the police while trying to make contact with the mental health care system.  Also 
see this source at 3 where criminalisation of mental illness is discussed and where it is pointed out 
that those released as part of the deinstitutionalisation movement experienced a different type of 
institutionalisation afterwards in that they would be kept in prison or jail instead of the hospital from 
which they were released as part of the deinstitutionalisation movement.  These persons are often 
arrested when they have a mental health crisis.  If they are arrested in this time, they then act 
aggressively towards the police during arrest, as they may be paranoid or suffering from 
hallucinations.  Lack of medication can also be the cause of such behaviour.  See, however, 
Parliamentary Information and Research Service Current Issues in Mental Health in Canada at 1 
where the view is held that most persons with mental illnesses do not come into contact with the 
criminal justice system during their lifetime.  Also see Luther G and Mela M ”The top ten issues in 
law and psychiatry” Sask L Rev 2006 (69) 401-440 at 423 where trans-institutionalisation is 
discussed as a factor that contributes to mentally ill persons, who would have been treated in the 
civil mental health system now being treated in the criminal justice system as a result of 
deinstitutionalisation which entailed that they were released from psychiatric institutions into the 
community which generally lacked support services for these persons. 
293  Hartford K, Carey R and Mendonca J “Pretrial court diversion of people with mental illness” 2007 




Secondly, the lack of funding for mental health care services in the community 294 
contributed to the decision to establish specialised Mental Health Courts.  The lack of 
funding added to the devastating effects of deinstitutionalisation, such as homelessness 295 
and increased contact of mentally ill persons with the criminal justice system, as explained 
above.296  Due to the increased contact with the criminal justice system, mentally ill persons 
were often housed in the criminal justice system after arrest from where they could access 
mental health care.297  This state of affairs contributed to the criminalisation of the mentally 
ill as it leads to the inappropriate incarceration of persons with mental illness in the criminal 
justice system. 298 
The overrepresentation of people with mental disabilities in the criminal justice system 299 
                                                                                                                                                   
from mental facilities into the community increased their contact with the criminal justice system.  
Clinicians who subscribe to the belief that deinstitutionalisation contributed to the criminalisation of 
the mentally ill, often promote diversion.  See Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts 
at 36.  Diversion, and more particularly Mental Health Court’s form part of the Mental Health Strategy 
of Canada.  See Mental Health Commission of Canada Changing Directions, Changing Lives: The 
Mental Health  Strategy for Canada (Mental Health Commission of Canada Alberta 2012) at 36. 
294  Little provision was made for funding for these health care services.  See Read 2009 UBCMJ 25 at 
25.  Also see Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at 258. 
295  Read 2009 UBCMJ 25 at 25.  This is especially the case where persons have been released from a 
psychiatric institution but not sufficient provision is made for support services for that person’s 
treatment in the community. 
296  O’Shaughnessy RJ “AAPL practice guideline for the forensic psychiatric evaluation of competence to 
stand trial:  Canadian legal perspective” 2007 (35) The Journal of the American Academy of 
Psychiatry and the Law 505-508 at 506.  Also see Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 at 31 that states that the 
general decline of mental health services to persons in Canada lead to the increase of persons with 
mental illness in the Canadian criminal justice system. 
297  Barrett J and Shandler R Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law (Carswell Toronto 2006) at 1-30 
who confirms that many mentally ill persons encounter the mental health care system for the first 
time when they are arrested.  The families of these mentally ill persons also often believe that the 
only way to secure treatment for this accused is through having him arrested and for the court to 
order such treatment. 
298  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 121.  Also, see Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 at 
31.  In the Canadian context, the inappropriate incarceration of mentally ill accused persons is 
specifically addressed by the health care authorities.  See Ministry of Health and Long-term Care  
http://www.health.gov.on.ca/en/common/ministry/publications/reports/mentalhealth/framework.pdf   
(Date of use: 26 August 2015). 
299  Between 15 to 40% of jail inmates suffer from a mental illness that is disproportionate to the 
prevalence of mental illness in the general population.  See Canadian Mental Health Association 
http://www.cmha.bc.ca/files/policesheets_all.pdf  (Date of use: 13 March 2015) at 3.  Also see Read 
2009 UBCMJ 25 at 26.  See further Parliamentary Information and Research Service Current Issues 
in Mental Health in Canada at 1.  Also see Mental Health Commission of Canada The Mental Health 
Strategy for Canada at 36.  See further Barret and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal 
Law at 1-30 who confirms that a significant percentage of incarcerated persons in Canada suffer 
from a mental illness.  Lastly, see Slinger and Roesch 2010 International Journal of Law and 
Psychiatry 258 at 259 who confirm the overrepresentation of mentally ill accused persons in the 




was a third motivation for establishing Mental Health Courts in Canada.  Since 2000, the 
figure of mentally ill accused persons in the Canadian criminal justice system had been 
increasing by approximately 10 percent per annum.300  The majority of mentally ill accused 
persons commit minor offences such as trespassing, fraud in obtaining transport, minor 
assault, public intoxication, and mischief.301  These arrests are mostly initiated by reports 
from the public rather than intervention by the police.302  Schneider et al 303 caution that this 
increase in figures must be investigated to determine, for example, if it is not due to an 
increase in arrests in general considered with population growth amongst other things.  
Upon investigation, it was found not to be the case and that arrests, in fact, decreased over 
the relevant period. 304 
                                                                                                                                                   
Am. Acad. Psychiatry Law 461 at 462 who reports that the prevalence of persons with mental illness 
in prison is estimated at a bit more conservative rate, at between 5 and 10%. 
300  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 21.  Also see Schneider RD Annotated 
Ontario Mental Health Statutes 4th ed (Irwin Law Toronto 2007) at 407.  See further R J 
O’Shaughnessy 2007 The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 505 at 507.  
Also see Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 at 31 where it is confirmed that there has been an increase in the 
number of mentally ill persons in the Canadian criminal justice system.  See further Mental Health 
Commission of Canada The Mental Health Strategy for Canada at 36.  See Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 
255 at 258 who discusses the results of studies that revealed that a person in a prison population is 
5 times more likely to have a mental illness than someone living in a non-incarcerated population.  
Also see Bakht N “Problem solving courts as agents of change” 2005 (50) Criminal Law Quarterly 
224-254 at 245 where it is stated that the increase in the number of mentally ill persons in the 
criminal justice system is of particular concern if one considers the fact that the criminal justice 
system aims to protect the public from persons who intentionally commit crimes, those with mental 
illnesses are often not able to form such intention.  Also see Ministry of Health and Long-term Care  
http://www.health.gov.on.ca/en/common/ministry/publications/reports/mentalhealth/framework.pdf   
(Date of use: 26 August 2015) at 4.    
301  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 30.  Also see Canadian Mental Health 
Association http://www.cmha.bc.ca/files/policesheets_all.pdf  (Date of use: 13 March 2015).at 3 
where it is stated that the most common crimes amongst those arrested with mental illness is 
causing a disturbance, minor theft, mischief and failure to appear in court. 
302  Canadian Mental Health Association http://www.cmha.bc.ca/files/policesheets_all.pdf  (Date of use: 
13 March 2015) at 3. 
303  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 22.  Also see Schneider Annotated Ontario 
Mental Health Statutes at 408. 
304  Many reasons have been tendered for the increase of the number of mentally ill persons that come 
into contact with the Canadian criminal justice system.  See Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental 
Health Courts at 1 who point out that deinstitutionalisation has been blamed for this phenomenon, so 
has the lack of available mental health care programmes out of prisons, suggesting that those in 
need of care commit a crime in order to be incarcerated and receive treatment.  Also see Canadian 
Mental Health Association http://www.cmha.bc.ca/files/policesheets_all.pdf  (Date of use: 13 March 
2015) at 3, 4 where the following reasons for the increased number of mentally ill persons in the 
criminal justice system are listed and discussed:  Lack of sufficient community support, including 
housing, income (lack of employment) and mental health services;  High rate of substance abuse 
among persons with mental illness (approximately 50%) which makes treating the mental illness 




The fourth consideration that motivated the establishment of a Mental Health Court in 
Canada is the fact that the criminal justice system has a generally negative effect on 
persons with mental disabilities.  It appears that the mentally ill are trapped in the criminal 
justice system and have difficulty escaping it for good.  This has become known as the 
revolving door phenomenon.305  Mentally ill persons are negatively affected by the criminal 
justice system in that fellow inmates often subject them to verbal and physical abuse.306  
Although this cannot be said to be unique to mentally ill accused persons, the effect of such 
abuse on mentally ill accused persons are severe, as their mental state is likely to 
deteriorate in such conditions.307 
                                                                                                                                                   
treatment to persons accused of crimes due to fear of their dangerousness for example;  Problems 
with treatment such as the side-effects of medication;  Lack of cross-training for both criminal justice 
and mental health care professionals;  Lack of timely access to mental health care services caused 
by the fact that access to early intervention or preventative programmes are not always easy.  See 
Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at 259 who discusses the view that this phenomenon is a product of 
discrimination against those with a mental illness in the criminal justice system.  Prisons housing 
these mentally ill persons have been described as the surrogate mental health care provider of 
today.  (See Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 2).  Also, Court JMP, Simpson 
AIF and Webster CD ”Contesting mad versus bad:  The evolution of forensic mental health services 
and law at Toronto” 2014 (22) Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 918-936 at 932, 933 who discuss the 
rise in numbers of persons found not criminally responsible on account of mental illness, despite 
crime statistics going down and arrest rates falling.  This, according to these authors shows that 
there is a weak link in the criminal justice system. 
305  Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at 259.  This refers to the situation where an accused is arrested again 
soon after release.  This pattern of arrest shortly after release continues and is especially prevalent 
amongst those with mental illnesses.  Also see Canadian Mental Health Association 
http://www.cmha.bc.ca/files/policesheets_all.pdf  (Date of use: 13 March 2015) at 4.  See further 
Parliamentary Information and Research Service Current Issues in Mental Health in Canada at 5, 6. 
306  Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at 260.  Also see Canadian Mental Health Association 
http://www.cmha.bc.ca/files/policesheets_all.pdf  (Date of use: 13 March 2015) at 4 where it is 
pointed out that mentally ill persons are more likely to be victimised by others.  See further Read 
2009 UBCMJ 25 at 26.  Also see Mental Health Commission of Canada The Mental Health Strategy 
for Canada at 36 where the view is expressed that a person with a mental illness is more likely to be 
victim of crime than the perpetrator thereof. 
307  In Phuneuf v Ontario 2010 ONCA 901 at {28} the Ontario Court of Appeal stated that “There can be 
no doubt that the incarceration of mentally ill persons in a jail setting risks further deterioration of 
their mental state and potentially places them at real risk of physical harm.“  Mentally ill persons who 
are incarcerated often exhibit disruptive behaviour as a symptom of their mental illness as a result 
whereof they encounter sanctions such as solitary confinement that can be very traumatic for 
persons with mental illnesses causing psychosis or a breakdown of the mentally ill person.  This is 
clearly deterioration in the mental state of the accused.  Also see Read 2009 UBCMJ 25 at 26.  Also 
see Bakht 2005 Criminal Law Quarterly 224 at 245 where it is stated that prisons are not always 
equipped to deal with the needs of mentally ill accused persons as they lack persons with the 
necessary training.  See further Parliamentary Information and Research Service Current Issues in 
Mental Health in Canada at 4.  Lastly, see Ministry of Health and Long-term Care  
http://www.health.gov.on.ca/en/common/ministry/publications/reports/mentalhealth/framework.pdf   
(Date of use: 26 August 2015) at 4.  See in general Canadian Mental Health Association 




The fifth consideration for establishing Mental Health Courts is the view held by most 
advocates of the Mental Health Court movement that most mental illnesses are treatable 
conditions.308  This view is supported by the expectation that the state should assume 
responsibility for providing treatment and facilities for such treatment.309  If mental illness 
was not viewed as treatable, alternatives to incarceration for the mentally ill accused would 
serve no therapeutic purpose.310  
The last and very important factor that contributed to the establishment of specialised 
Mental Health Courts was the tremendous delays in the criminal justice system in sorting 
out pre-trial issues such as fitness to stand trial and treatment orders.311  What was 
concerning was the impact of the delays on the accused’s rights as he was detained in a 
correctional facility awaiting assessment.   
7.5 Emergence of Mental Health Courts in the United States of America    
Various reasons for the establishment of Mental Health Courts in the United States of 
America have been put forward and are discussed below.  Some of these overlap with 
those mentioned in the Canadian context but are mentioned specifically in the American 
                                                
308  Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at 262. 
309  Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at 262. 
310  Closely related to the belief that mental illnesses are treatable conditions, is the provision for hospital 
orders in the initial provisions of Bill C-30.  Bill C-30 lead to the amendments of the parts of the 
Criminal Code dealing with the treatment of mentally ill accused persons.  These hospital orders 
were applicable to persons who were fount fit to stand trial, but still suffer from a mental illness.  
These persons were often found guilty on the charges against them, but do not meet the criteria of 
the “not criminally responsible on account of mental illness” defence and would face the normal 
criminal trial process and sanctions.  A hospital order would entail that such a person could serve the 
first 60 days of his sentence in a psychiatric hospital in order for him to get the necessary treatment 
for his mental condition after which he can be transferred to the relevant prison.  A hospital order 
would only be possible with the consent of the accused and the relevant treatment facility.  The 
provisions of Bill C-30 envisaged that the treatment should last for a maximum of 60 days.  These 
provisions never made it into the promulgated version of the legislation, mainly because of concerns 
regarding logistics of executing the orders.  Barret and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian 
Criminal Law at 1-13.   
311  These delays were attributed to the constant shortage of resources within the forensic mental health 
system.  See Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 106.  Also, see Barret and 
Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 1-31 where it is pointed out that a lack of 
resources impacts all orders made under part XX.I of the Criminal Code and not only assessment 
orders.  Also see Van de Veen SL “Some Canadian Problem Solving Court Processes” paper 
presented at the Canadian Association of Provincial Court Judges Pre-Institute Conference, 
September 2003, St John’s, Newfoundland National Judicial Institute 2003.  Available at 
http://www.aija.org.au/TherapJurisp06/Papers/VandeVeen2D.pdf at 19 where it is indicated that the 
delay in resolving pre-trial issues was one of the particular reasons behind the establishment of the 




context as well to illustrate that similar considerations for the establishment of Mental 
Health Courts apply across jurisdictions.   
Firstly, the increase in the number of mentally ill persons in the criminal justice system 
necessitated initiatives such as Mental Health Courts.  Deinstitutionalisation contributed to 
the increase in the number of mentally ill persons in the American criminal justice system 
312  because the policies for community care of mentally ill persons were not properly 
implemented.313  The deinstitutionalisation movement increased pressure on the criminal 
justice system to process cases of the mentally ill accused, often with the aim of having 
these individuals re-institutionalised.314   Studies in the United States of America found that 
                                                
312  Rogers R and Shuman DW Fundamentals of Forensic Practice:  Mental Health and Criminal Law 
(Springer USA 2005) at 88.  As a result, overcrowded jails and prisons experienced huge challenges 
to cater for the needs of mentally ill inmates.  The overcrowded prisons and jails have been 
attributed to the conservative orientation of the criminal justice system, which focussed on 
punishment for all offences.  It is this conservatism that was in part the impetus for the development 
of speciality courts.  See Frailing 2008 C.S.L.R 63 at 67.  Also see Rossman SB, Willison JB, Mallik-
Kane K, Kim K, Debus-Sherrill S and Downey PM Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with 
Mental Illness: Evaluation of Mental Health Courts in Bronx and Brooklyn, New York (USA National 
Institute of Justice 2012) at 1. 
313  Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 52-55.  Prior to 1960, states had the sole fiscal 
responsibility for its mentally ill citizens.  When a mentally ill person is discharged from a state 
hospital, the fiscal responsibility is shifted to the federal government in that the mentally ill person 
qualifies for all the above mentioned federal program.  This, unfortunately served as an incentive to 
discharge mentally ill patients as soon as possible, without much concern for their wellbeing after 
they have been discharged – since they do qualify for federal benefits after all.  If the mentally ill 
person then defaulted on his medication and landed up in the criminal justice system, the fiscal 
responsibility could shift from the Department of Health to the Department of Corrections.  The 
manner, in which the funding of the correctional facilities is managed, also plays a part here.  Some 
jails (such as the New Orleans Parish Community Corrections Centre) receive their funding, based 
on the number of inmates it has on any given day.  When the number of inmates decreases, the 
funding consequently diminishes and some believe that the police would then go out onto the streets 
and arrest the homeless, of which a large number would be mentally ill, and charge them with 
misdemeanours in order to get the number of inmates higher in order to get more funding.  The jail 
received $18 per inmate per day.  Fortunately, this position in New Orleans is the exception rather 
than the rule.  For most jails there is therefore not an incentive to fill their sells with mentally ill 
individuals.  The possibility of unnecessary arrests increases rapidly if each incarceration following 
upon an arrest is “rewarded” with funding.  This model is for obvious reasons, not recommended.  
The responsibility for the care of the mentally ill thus shifted from the Federal government to the local 
authorities.  See Slate, Buffington-Vollum and Johnson Criminalization of Mental Illness at 38.  The 
authors explain that the idea behind institutionalisation was to move the care of the mentally ill back 
to the community since it allowed the mentally ill to be reintegrated into the community and 
community mental health care was more cost effective than institutionalisation.  Funding was made 
available for the local authorities to make community mental health services available but this was 
not optimally implemented. 
314  Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 40.  The manner in which the police deal with 
the mentally ill accused could also be seen as a reason for increased number of mentally ill persons 
in the criminal justice system.  Police as the first responders to incidents involving persons with 




the number of people with mental illness in prison is disproportionately large compared to 
the general population.315  Between 1980 and 1992, the number of inmates with mental 
illnesses in the United States of America grew by 154%.316  In 2009, the prevalence of 
people with mental illness in jails and prisons in the United States of America varied 
between 6 and 18%, depending on the definition of mental illness that was used for the 
particular study.317    
Secondly, Mental Health Courts were established because mental health treatment options 
at hospitals were less because of deinstitutionalisation, and community treatment options 
were not as accessible as they should have been.318  The requirements for admission for 
involuntary mental health care treatment at a psychiatric facility became stricter than 
before.319  The primary focus for admission to a psychiatric hospital was on the 
dangerousness of the individual.320  The effect was that non-dangerous mentally ill persons 
                                                                                                                                                   
informally by referring them to community treatment facilities.  As referred to above, these treatment 
facilities were not as accessible as it should or could have been making it difficult to deal with these 
cases informally.  The police thus often ended up arresting mentally ill persons and processing their 
cases through the criminal justice system.  Slate, Buffington-Vollum and Johnson Criminalization of 
Mental Illness at 44 where it is pointed out that persons with mental illnesses were more often 
arrested than persons without mental illness in the same circumstances were.  Persons with mental 
illnesses were arrested in 47% of the cases whereas persons in the same circumstances without a 
mental illness, were only arrested in 28% of the cases. 
315  Watson et al 2001 Psychiatric Services 477 at 477.  Also see Sirotich 2009 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry 
Law 461 at 462 who reports that prevalence of serious mental illness in jails and prisons are 
estimated to be 2 to 5 times higher than in the general population.  10 to 15% of jail inmates were 
found to be mentally ill whilst only 2% of the general population were found to be mentally ill 
316  Watson et al 2001 Psychiatric Services 477 at 478  In 1992, for example, 3 300 of the 21 000.00 
inmates in the Los Angeles County Jail required daily mental health care services. 
317  Sirotich 2009 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry Law 461 at 462. 
318  Garner and Hafemeister 2003 Developments in Mental Health Law at 1, 3, 4.  See further Denckla D 
and Berman G “Rethinking the revolving door” 2001 Centre for Court innovation, New York.  
www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/rethinkingtherevolvingdoor.pdf (Date of use:  7 March 
2011) at 3.  Also see Odegaard 2007 North Dakota Law Review 225 at 322. 
319  Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 40.  Also see in general Sosowsky L “Crime 
and violence among mental patients reconsidered in view of the legal relationship between state and 
mentally ill” 1978 (135) American Journal of Psychiatry 33-42.  Also see Slate, Buffington-Vollum 
and Johnson Criminalization of Mental Illness at 34 where it is explained that the disability rights 
movement fought for the rights of the mentally ill.  One of their main objectives was to limit 
involuntary commitment to cases where it was absolutely necessary.  Also see Rossman et al 
Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 1 where it is stated that these 
stricter requirements for involuntary care contributed to the rising number of persons with mental 
illness in the criminal justice system. 
320  See Frailing 2008 C.S.L.R 63 at 64 who discusses the case of Alberta Lessard from MIwaukee 
Wisconsin, who challenged her involuntary admission in court and succeeded.  This resulted in 
legislative changes in the 1970’s across many states in America to the effect that the main criteria for 
involuntary psychiatric treatment, was dangerousness, not only to oneself, but to others as well.  A 




did not qualify for involuntary mental health treatment.  As it became more difficult to have a 
person admitted for mental health treatment, persons with mental illness seem to have 
entered the criminal justice system more frequently.321  A direct link between strict 
requirements for civil commitment and an increase in the number of the mentally ill accused 
in the criminal justice system emerged.322  What compounded the problem was that many 
community mental health clinics refused to accept responsibility for seriously mentally ill 
individuals, choosing to focus on individuals with less serious problems.323  Since it became 
more difficult to have a person admitted for involuntary care, research emerged that proved 
that almost half of the cases of mentally ill persons who are arrested had evidence of a 
                                                
321  Slate, Buffington-Vollum and Johnson Criminalization of Mental Illness at 43.  Also see Rossman et 
al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 1 who mentions the difficulty of 
having a person admitted for involuntary care as one of the reasons for the increase of persons with 
mental illness in the criminal justice system.  See further Odegaard 2007 North Dakota Law Review 
225 at 231 who elaborates and the fact that it became more difficult in the 1970’s to have someone 
admitted to a psychiatric institution, this was a consequence of the deinstitutionalisation movement. 
322  In California for example, after legislative changes in 1968 that made it more difficult to have a 
person committed involuntarily for psychiatric treatment, the number of mentally ill persons in the 
criminal justice system doubled in the first two years after the changes, and increased five-fold in a 
period of 8 years.  See Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 40.  Also see in general 
Sosowsky L “Crime and violence among mental patients reconsidered in view of the legal 
relationship between state and mentally ill” 1978 (135) American Journal of Psychiatry 33-42.  Also 
see Slate, Buffington-Vollum and Johnson Criminalization of Mental Illness at 45 where it is 
explained that mentally ill persons in California after being discharged from state hospitals, were 
three times more likely to be arrested and those with an arrest history, were 8 times more likely to 
get arrested.  This confirms the increased contact with the criminal justice system by the mentally ill 
as a result of deinstitutionalisation.  The same trend was present in San Francisco where an 
increase in the number of mentally ill prisoners was reported in the early 1970’s.  See Torrey et al 
Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 40, 41.  Also see Hemmens C, Brody DC and Spohn CC 
Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary Perspective (Sage Los Angelas 2013) at 438 explain that prison 
populations doubled across the United States of America and continued to increase which 
phenomenon necessitated the investigation into more effective ways to deal with mentally ill 
offenders in the criminal justice system.  Between 1974 and 1979, mental illness related incidents 
that came to the attention of the Police in Philadelphia, increased with 228 percent.  Between 1976 
and 1985 in New York City, the number of persons who were picked up by the police for being 
“mentally disturbed” and taken to a hospital for psychiatric evaluation, increased 16 fold in this 9 year 
period, from 1000 to 18500.  See Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 41.  Also see 
Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary Perspective at 454 where it is 
confirmed that the number of mentally ill persons in prisons increased rapidly over time.  See Slate 
RN “Mental Health Courts” in Mays LG and Gregware PR Court and Justice 3rd ed (Waveland Press 
Inc Long Grove Illinois 2004) at 426.  Also see Slate, Buffington-Vollum and Johnson Criminalization 
of Mental Illness at 38 where a dramatic drop in the number of persons in mental institutions is 
discussed.  The drop in numbers constitutes almost 400 000.00 persons released from these 
hospitals during the deinstitutionalisation movement between 1955 and 1980.  State hospitals have 
been accused of deinstitutionalising mentally ill persons by simply “dumping” mentally ill people in 
the community trusting that community treatment programmes will be developed to address their 
mental health needs. 




failed admission as an involuntary user at a hospital prior to their arrest.324  Prior to the 
establishment of Mental Health Courts, the officials at correctional facilities complained that 
they are not getting cooperation from state psychiatric institutions to admit mentally ill 
persons and that the admission requirements were very strict in that not all mentally ill 
individuals “qualified” to be treated there.325 This supports the criminalisation argument in 
that the failure of the mental health care system to provide sufficient support to the 
seriously mentally ill results in the increased involvement of the mentally ill in the criminal 
justice system.326 
Thirdly, the recidivism rates combined with the trend of medication non-compliance 
amongst mentally ill accused persons motivated the establishment of Mental Health Courts 
in the United States of America.  In a study conducted in 2007, it was found that 92% of 
inmates suffering from a serious mental illness have a history of medication non-
compliance, and many of these have a lengthy history of minor offences.327  The study 
found that most of these minor offences were committed during the time that the individuals 
were not receiving adequate treatment.  Patients often stopped taking medication when the 
side effects became unbearable.328    
Lastly, the consequences of untreated mental illness, due to lack of resources, motivated 
the establishment of Mental Health Courts.  Research shows that with serious crimes 
committed by the mentally ill, the crime is very often a direct result of an untreated mental 
illness.329  The most common offences committed by those with serious mental illnesses 
                                                
324  See generally McFarland BH, Faulkner LR, Bloom JD, Hallaux R and Bray JD.  “Chronic mental 
illness and the criminal justice system” 1989 (40) Hospital and Community Psychiatry 718-723.  Also 
see Torrey et al Criminalizing the seriously mentally ill 53.  Also see Rossman et al Criminal Justice 
Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 1 who mentions the difficulty of having someone 
admitted for involuntary care as one of the reasons behind the increase in persons with mental 
illness in the criminal justice system. 
325  Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 51. 
326 Slate, Buffington-Vollum and Johnson Criminalization of Mental Illness at 43. 
327  Lamb RH, Weinberger LE and Marsh BH “Treatment prospects for persons with severe mental 
illness in an urban county jail” 2007 (58) Psych Serv 782-786 at 782. 
328  McLachlin 2010 Dalhousie Law Journal 15 at 20.  Also see Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously 
Mentally Ill at 20, see in particular Table 2.4 that lists the circumstances under which and behaviour 
for which the mentally ill was arrested and kept in jail without any criminal charges having been filed 
against them. 
329  Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 48.  Serious crimes such as homicide are 
especially tragic then because it is a direct result of “inadequate or non-existent treatment of the 
person’s mental illness”.  See the source further at 50, 52 where some of the mentally ill individuals 
who landed up in prison due to inadequate mental health treatment, give their account of events.  




are assault and battery, followed by theft, disorderly conduct, drug and alcohol related 
crime and lastly, trespassing.330  Persons with mental illness often enter the criminal justice 
system because of disruptive behaviour.331  Mentally ill individuals were often arrested for 
not taking their medication, for being suicidal and for not being able to take care of 
themselves.332  Such arrests are often made by police with the belief that they are helping 
                                                                                                                                                   
is stated that the Brooklyn Mental Health Court operates on the assumption that criminal behaviour 
is a result of untreated, or ineffective treatment of the accused’s mental illness.  See further 
Odegaard 2007 North Dakota Law Review 225 at 251 where it is pointed out that proponents of 
Mental Health Courts agree that criminal behaviour is often the result of an underlying mental illness 
rather than criminal intent. 
330  Individuals with paranoid schizophrenia are more likely to be arrested for assault, as they often 
believe that someone is following them or is trying to hurt them and may hurt that person to “protect” 
themselves.  See Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 46.  Also see Whitmer G 
“From hospitals to jails – The fate of California’s deinstitutionalized mentally ill” 1980 (50) American 
Journal of Orthopsychiatry 65-75 at 67 who describes the case of a mentally ill man who struck a 
random women he was passing by in the street since he believed that she was aiming a laser beam 
at his testicles rendering him sterile.  The most common form of theft committed by mentally ill 
individuals can be described as “dine and dash”.  This is where a person will have a meal in a 
restaurant and then run away because he does not have the money to pay for the meal.  See Torrey 
et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 46.  Also see Whitmer G 1980 American Journal of 
Orthopsychiatry 65 at 68 who confirms this and explains with reference to a case where a mentally ill 
women refused to pay for her restaurant bill because she believed she was “the reincarnation of 
Jesus Christ”.  The phenomenon of a mentally ill person eating at a restaurant and then not paying 
for it, was also observed in Madison Wisconsin.  Often used as a ground to arrest a mentally ill 
person where no other charge is available.  See Torrey et al Criminalizing the seriously mentally ill 
46 where examples are given of mentally ill persons who have been arrested for simply trying to 
speak to “normal people” or for playing their music too loud.  Also see Whitmer G 1980 American 
Journal of Orthopsychiatry 65 at 69 where a case is discussed where a man harassed two men who 
he believed was CIA agents who he believed had “kidnapped his benefactress”.  Drug and alcohol 
abuse is often a secondary problem amongst those with mental illnesses.  Sometimes, however, 
mentally ill individuals are arrested by the police who believe that they are using drugs and/or alcohol 
because of their bizarre behaviour, when in fact they are not.  See Torrey et al Criminalizing the 
Seriously Mentally Ill at 46.  Disorderly conduct was also one of the most common offences for which 
the mentally ill is arrested in Madison, Wisconsin.  The extract from the survey that explains how a 
man with schizophrenia ended up in jail on a charge of trespassing, illustrates the lack of 
understanding that both the mental health care system and criminal justice system has for the 
practical difficulties faced by mentally ill individuals.  In this instance, a man suffering from 
schizophrenia, had to be transferred to an adult foster care home the next day – he was living in a 
supervised flat at the time.  He became confused by this fact and went to the clinic for assistance.  
He was told there that he cannot be helped and that he should leave.  He told them that he had 
nowhere to go so he remained at the clinic.  The Police was called to remove him and he was locked 
up in prison on charges of trespassing.  The mentally ill man reported that for him, the only way he 
could get out was to be “flushed down the toilet”.  The man was fundamentally confused and his 
dignity so affected that this is what he believed of himself and his life.  Also see Frailing 2009 
C.S.L.R 145 at 148.  Also see Frailing 2008 C.S.L.R 63 at 69. 
331  Lamberti and Weisman 2004 Psychiatr Q 151 at 153.  An estimated 7% of all Police contact with the 
public involves mentally ill individuals.  Family members of severely mentally ill offenders often feel 
that contacting the police for assistance, is their last resort and hope for getting treatment for the 
mentally ill family member.  See Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 47 and 50.     
332  Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 20, see in particular Table 2.4 that lists the 




the mentally ill individual, so-called “mercy bookings”.333  Such arrests, however well-
intended, are not promoting public interests and are, in fact, detrimental to the accused in 
need of mental health care who, instead, is now exposed to the criminal justice system.334  
Serious crimes such as homicide and assault with a deadly weapon are not crimes 
frequently committed by the mentally ill, but due to the bizarre nature of these crimes, they 
receive a lot of publicity.335    
8  CONCLUSION 
It is evident that those with mental illness were treated harshly in the past.  New knowledge 
about mental illness and the development of new treatments and drugs will no doubt 
improve the treatment and quality of life of those with mental illness in society. 
The impact of mental illness on the criminal justice system cannot be defined or established 
in concrete terms, save to say that it creates unique challenges for the criminal justice 
                                                                                                                                                   
without any criminal charges having been filed against them.  See further this source at 40 where a 
study found that 94% of a group that formed part of the study, was not receiving any treatment at the 
time that they committed the relevant crimes.  See also generally Whitmer G 1980 American Journal 
of Orthopsychiatry 65 at 65. 
333  Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 46, 48, 49.  Also see Slate, Buffington-Vollum 
and Johnson Criminalization of Mental Illness at 45 where it is explained that Police would often 
charge mentally ill persons with “bogus” charges in order to save them from a life on the streets.  
Also see Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 160 who cautions against these types of 
arrests as it brings the mentally ill in contact with the criminal justice system that should ideally be 
avoided. 
334  Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 160 reminds the readers that exposure to the 
criminal justice system can lead to deterioration of the mental state of an already mentally ill 
accused. See Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 49 where it is reported that a 
captain of the Los Angeles Police Department stated that mentally ill persons are often arrested and 
jailed for their own protection.  He phrased it as follows:  “You arrest somebody for a crime because 
you know at least they’ll be put in some kind of facility where they’ll get food and shelter.  You don’t 
invent a crime, but it’s a discretionary decision.  You might not arrest everybody or it, but you know 
that way they’ll be safe and fed”.  Another police official described these types of bookings as a 
“crisis intervention” and stated that:  “You get people who are hallucinating, who haven’t eating for 
days.  It’s a massive clean-up effort.  They get shelter, food, you get them back on their 
medication…  It’s crisis intervention.” 
335  Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 48.  One such example is of a man suffering 
from schizophrenia who killed a woman because the “voices” told him that she was the devil.  
Another case that received a lot of publicity, is that of Sylvia Seegrist who went on a shooting spree 
in a shopping centre in Philadelphia in 1985, killing three and injuring seven people.  She suffered 
from Schizophrenia that was not adequately treated.  This shooting could possibly have been 
prevented had Sylvia received adequate treatment.  During the 10 years prior to the incident, Sylvia 
was hospitalised 12 times, had 6 encounters with the police and served a sentence for a 
misdemeanour in the year prior to the shooting incident.  Another example is a case reported in 
Rochester of a man who robbed a bank using his pointed finger as a “gun” in his pocket.  He took 




system that will have to be addressed.  The criminal justice system has to join forces with 
those in the mental health care system in order to adequately address the challenges of 
cases involving mental illness. 
The South African forensic setting, where the fields of law and psychiatry meet, faces huge 
challenges in terms of resources.  Lack of resources in the forensic setting translates into 
delays in the finalisation of cases involving mental illness.  Such delays also contribute to 
the overcrowding of correctional facilities, where accused persons are often kept awaiting 
assessment.  Creative ways of addressing these problems have to be sought. 
Some jurisdictions, such as Canada and the United States of America, rely on Mental 
Health Courts to address the unique challenges that mentally ill accused persons bring to 
the criminal justice system.  Mental Health Courts are aimed at diverting the mentally ill 
accused away from the criminal justice system into treatment programmes where mental 
health knowledge can be drawn from the mental health care system.  These courts aim to, 
inter alia,  reduce delays caused by forensic assessments, relieve overburdened criminal 
courts from cases involving mental illness and relieve overcrowding of correctional facilities 
by channelling mentally ill accused persons into the mental health care system.  These 
courts also aim to reduce recidivism, which in turn leads to a safer society. 
Therapeutic jurisprudence as the underlying principle of Mental Health Courts can be 
employed to address mental health issues in the criminal justice system as it seeks to 
incorporate elements from other disciplines, such as mental health, into the criminal justice 
system with due regard to the substantive and procedural framework of the criminal justice 
system.  Through the implementation of therapeutic jurisprudence, mental illness as the 
underlying cause of criminal behaviour can be targeted.  Procedure is a major focus of 
therapeutic jurisprudence 336 since therapeutic jurisprudence looks at how the procedures 
impact the particular individual and if the particular individual was treated fairly and with 
respect.337   
The procedural aspects as they pertain to mentally ill accused persons in the South African 
criminal justice system are explored in chapter 3, and challenges in the system highlighted.  
The procedural challenges form the backdrop against which the suggestion of a Mental 
                                                
336  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 52. 




Health Court for South Africa is considered.  Mental Health Courts were established in 
Canada and the United States of America in response to the increase in the number of 
mentally ill persons entering the criminal justice system and the lack of community mental 
health care services.  South Africa is not immune to these realities, and the reasons cited 
for establishing Mental Health Courts in these two jurisdictions may very well apply to South 
Arica as well.  The possibility of a Mental Health Court for South Africa is briefly explored in 






SOUTH AFRICAN ADJECTIVAL LAW AND THE POSITION 
OF THE MENTALLY ILL ACCUSED 
1  INTRODUCTION 
Since the purpose of this research is to consider the possible establishment of a Mental 
Health Court as an alternative to traditional prosecution for the mentally ill accused in South 
Africa, a contextual overview of the current practices relating to the assessment of fitness to 
stand trial in South Africa is required.   
Consideration is given to the legal framework within which the above processes operate.  
International treaties pertaining to the treatment of persons with mental illness, the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 1 as well as other relevant legislation and 
selected substantive law issues that affect the position of the mentally ill accused in the 
South African criminal justice system are discussed.  The focus of the research, however, 
remains procedural in nature.  
The Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 2 sets out the procedural framework within which 
these assessments take place, but the nature of the assessments is not set out in the Act.  
This chapter examines the order made for and the purpose of a fitness assessment, the 
test employed during such assessment, the actual assessment and the orders to be made 
after the assessment, depending on the findings made. The consequences of an order of fit 
to stand trial versus unfit to stand trial are examined.  Challenges posed by the current 
system are highlighted. 
The chapter considers the concept of diversion in its various forms in the South African 
context.  It examines initiatives that have been put in place to address the unique 
challenges that mentally ill accused persons bring to the criminal justice system.  Brief 
consideration is given to the possibility of a Mental Health Court for South Africa against the 
backdrop of the procedural challenges highlighted.  Chapter 6 proposes the South African 
Mental Health Court model in more detail.              
 
                                                
1  Hereinafter referred to as the “Constitution”). 
2  Hereinafter referred to as the “Criminal Procedure Act”. 
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2  LEGAL FRAMEWORK PERTAINING TO THE MENTALLY ILL ACCUSED IN SOUTH 
AFRICA  
2.1 Background 
The rights of persons with mental illness have not received the attention they deserved in 
the past.3  In the early 1960's, however, there was a worldwide focus on the promotion of 
positive mental health.4  
 South Africa's attention was drawn to its mental health care legislation in the 1960's, but not 
necessarily in response to the worldwide move towards the promotion of positive mental 
health as referred to above.  It was rather prompted by the assassination of Dr H F 
Verwoerd on 6 September 1966, by Demitrio Tsafendas, an individual with schizophrenia.5  
This prompted the establishment of a commission of inquiry into the criminal responsibility 
of mentally deranged persons in South Africa.6  Later the Mental Disorders Act 38 of 1916 7 
was revised to include all aspects of mental health.8  During the enquiry to revise the 
                                                
3  See Landman AA and Landman WJ A Practitioner’s Guide to the Mental Health Care Act (Juta Cape 
Town 2014) at 4, 10 who opine that mental health is still a low priority and service delivery is 
hindered by lack of resources.  The increase in numbers of those in South Africa suffering from 
HIV/AIDS have forced those in charge of the health care system in South Africa to reassess its 
position in terms of its mental health care services.  The reason for this is because there is a parallel 
relationship in numbers that exists between those suffering from HIV and those suffering from a 
mental illness as mental illness sets inn in the latter phases of HIV/AIDS because of, for example, a 
viral brain infection or psychiatric side effects of anti-retroviral treatment.  43% of persons living with 
HIV/AIDS suffer from a mental illness.  Those suffering from a mental illness are, in turn, more at risk 
of contracting HIV/AIDS.  See in general Freeman and Kelly Mental Health and HIV/AIDS series.  
Prior to the interim Constitution of 1993 and the Constitution, the rights of the mentally ill were 
overshadowed by arbitrary decision-making about their fate.  Due to the fact that the number of 
mentally ill individuals in South Africa is increasing, authorities had to develop initiatives to ensure 
the protection of those affected by mental illness-a once neglected population.  See Freeman M and 
Kelly K Mental health and HIV/AIDS series (World Health Organisation, Johannesburg)  
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2005/9241593040_eng.pdf (Date of use:  15 March 2011) at 2 
for more information on the link between HIV and mental illness. 
4 Cheetham RWS “Commission of inquiry into the Mental Disorders Act in relation to the problems of 
today” December 1970 SAMJ 1371-1372 at 1371.  
5  Kruger A Mental Health Law in South Africa (Butterworths 1980) at 24.  Also see Strydom N, Pienaar 
C, van der Merwe L, Jansen van Rensburg B, Calitz FWJ, van der Merwe LM and Joubert G “Profile 
of forensic psychiatric inpatients referred to the Free State Psychiatric Complex, 2004-2008” 2011 
SAJP 40-43 at 40. 
6  The Commission was under the chairmanship of Mr Justice F Rumpff and was established in 
December 1966.  See Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 25. 
7  Hereinafter referred to as the “Mental Disorders Act”. 
8  The inquiry by the Rumpff Commission led to the appointment by the President of the Van Wyk 
Commission of inquiry for revision of the Mental Disorders Act 38.  The Commission of Inquiry was a 
one-man commission, consisting of Mr Justice J. T van Wyk.  See Strydom et al 2011 SAJP 40 at 
40.  Also see Louw R “Principles of criminal law:  Pathological and non-pathological criminal 
incapacity” in Kaliski S (ed) Psycholegal Assessment in South Africa (Oxford University Press Cape 
Town South Africa 2006) at 25.  The report by the Van Wyk Commission of inquiry contained draft 
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Mental Disorders Act, the Commission commented that: 
It is today generally recognized that persons suffering from mental illness should as far as 
possible be admitted to mental hospitals in the same way as any other person suffering from 
an illness is admitted to an ordinary hospital.9 
 This illustrates that the focus was shifting from pure custodial measures to the concept of 
treatment.10     
 The manner in which the mentally ill person in the South African criminal justice system is 
dealt with is affected by the legislative framework within which the system functions.  The 
Constitution, as the supreme law of the land, bestows rights on all citizens, and the most 
relevant for purposes of the mentally ill accused are discussed below.  Once in the criminal 
justice system, the manner in which the accused person is dealt with is regulated by the 
Criminal Procedure Act.  Procedural issues surrounding fitness to stand trial forms the focal 
point of the discussion of the Criminal Procedure Act here.  Relevant provisions of the 
Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002 11 are canvassed, and specific attention is paid to the 
different categories of mental health care treatment and rehabilitation services provided for 
in the Mental Health Care Act since the criminal court may order that a mentally ill accused 
be provided with a certain category of mental health care treatment and rehabilitation 
services in terms of the Mental Health Care Act.  
 Before the relevant domestic legislation is discussed, obligations in terms of international 
instruments are briefly explored. 
2.2 International instruments 
The United Nations passed the resolution relating to the Principles for the Protection of 
Persons with Mental Illness and for the Improvement of Mental Health Care in 1991.12  
                                                                                                                                                   
legislation that resulted in the Mental Health Act 18 of 1973.  See also Cheetham 1970 SAMJ 1371 
at 1372.  Cheetham reports that a Commission of Inquiry was also established to investigate the 
problems that psychopathy presents.  Similarly, a Commission was established to investigate drug 
and alcohol abuse, all of these findings were to be considered when drafting the Mental Health Act of 
1973.  it is noteworthy that the then Department of Prisons, were also represented on the 
Commission as it was acknowledged that many afflicted with a mental illness, were confined in 
prison. 
9  Commission of Inquiry into the Mental Disorders Act 38 of 1916 and Related Matters under Mr 
Justice NJ van Wyk, RP 80/1972 at 3.8.2. 
10  Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 24, 26, 27.  This is further evidenced by the move to 
hand the administration of mental health legislation over from the Department of the Interior to the 
Department of Health as early as 1944.   
11  Hereinafter referred to as the “Mental Health Care Act”. 
12  United Nations General Assembly resolution 46/119, Principles for the Protection of Persons with 
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These principles apply to mentally ill accused persons and to the process of establishing 
whether the accused, in fact, has a mental illness or not.13 
These principles prohibit discrimination on the ground of mental illness.14  Discrimination in 
the context of mentally ill detained persons refers to a distinction, preference, or exclusion 
that causes a hindrance to the general enjoyment of rights.15  This international instrument 
makes it clear that special measures taken with the sole view to protect the rights or secure 
the advancement of persons with mental illness shall not be deemed discriminatory.16  
These principles further confirm the authority of a court to order mental health treatment in 
line with the provisions of the domestic laws of the country.17  
These principles should be considered with the provisions contained in the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities that is specifically made applicable to 
persons with mental illness.18  South Africa, as a signatory to both these international 
instruments, incorporated many of the principles into domestic legislation and, more 
particularly, the Mental Health Care Act, which is discussed later in this chapter.19 
The relevant provisions of the Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic of South 
Africa are discussed below, followed by other relevant national domestic legislation.  
                                                                                                                                                   
Mental Illness and for the Improvement of Mental Health Care A/RES/46/119 (17 December 1991) 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/46/a46r119.htm  (Date of use: 13 August 2016). 
13  See in particular principle 20 of the United Nations Principles for the Protection of Persons with 
Mental Illness.  Principle 20.1 reads as follows:  “The present Principle applies to persons serving 
sentences of imprisonment for criminal offences, or who are otherwise detained in the course of 
criminal proceedings or investigations against them, and who are determined to have a mental 
illness or who it is believed may have such an illness.”  
14  Principle 1.4 of the United Nations Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness. 
15  Principle 1.4 of the United Nations Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness.   
16  Principle 1.4 of the United Nations Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness.  
Discrimination does not include any distinction, exclusion or preference undertaken in accordance 
with the provisions of the present Principles and necessary to protect the human rights of a person 
with a mental illness or of other individuals. 
17  See in particular principle 20.3 of the United Nations Principles for the Protection of Persons with 
Mental Illness.  Principle 20.3 reads as follows, “Domestic law may authorize a court or other 
competent authority, acting on the basis of competent and independent medical advice, to order that 
such persons be admitted to a mental health facility.”  In the South African context, these domestic 
laws would be the Criminal Procedure Act and the Mental Health Care Act.  The relevant provisions 
of these pieces of legislation as they pertain to the mentally ill accused are discussed later in this 
chapter. 
18  See article 1 of the United Nations General Assembly resolution number 61/106 Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities A/RES/61/106 (13 December 2006) 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/45f973632.html  (Date of use:  13 August 2016).  The article reads as 
follows, “Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or 
sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective 
participation in society on an equal basis with others.” 
19 Chapter 3 of the Mental Health Care Act contains a patient charter that is based on these 
international Conventions.    
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2.3 The Constitution 
The most relevant Constitutional rights as they pertain to the mentally ill accused person 
are highlighted in the discussion below. 
 The focus on equality before the law that is stressed in the international instruments 
discussed above is echoed in section 9 of the South African Constitution, which embodies 
the right to equality.20  This right guarantees that everyone is equal before the law and that 
everyone has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law, including equal enjoyment 
of all rights and freedoms.21  The state may not unfairly discriminate against anyone on the 
ground of disability.22  Disability includes mental illness and intellectual disability.23  Mentally 
ill persons are often discriminated against on the basis of their mental illness, thus violating 
their right to equality.24       
                                                
20  Section 9 of the Constitution. 
21  Section 9(1) and (2) of the Constitution. 
22  Section 9(3) of the Constitution.  Discrimination on any of the grounds listed in section 9((3) will 
automatically be unfair discrimination unless it can be proven that the discrimination is fair.  These 
grounds are race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual 
orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. 
23  In the case of De Vos N.O and Another v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and 
Others; InRe: Snyders and Another v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others 
2015 (1) SACR 18 (WCC) (hereinafter referred to as De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development WCC case) at [33] it was argued that section 77(6) violates the mentally ill accused’s 
right to equality since the mentally ill person found unfit to stand trial cannot be released conditionally 
or unconditionally, whereas those found not criminally responsible on account of mental illness can 
be so released.  Section 77(6) was found unconstitutional with an order to amend the relevant 
section to bring it in line with section 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act.  The case was forwarded to 
the Constitutional court for confirmation of the invalidity of section 77(6).  See De Vos N.O and 
Others v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others 2015 (2) SACR 217 (CC) 
(hereinafter referred to as the “De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development CC 
case”).  This judgment is discussed later in this chapter. 
24 Kruger A “Mental Health and the Bill of Rights” in Lexus Nexus Constitutional (Lexis Nexis 2009) at 
3EB1.  Also see Landman and Landman The Mental Health Care Act at 11 where it is pointed out 
that the Mental Health Care Act supports the Constitutional prohibition of discrimination on any 
ground, including mental illness and other disabilities.  Discrimination is often the result of ignorance 
about mental illness.  Societies need to be educated on issues of mental illness, as this will diminish 
victimisation of and discrimination against persons on the ground of their mental illness.  See 
McLachlin B “Medicine and the law:  The challenges of mental illness” 2010 (33) Dalhousie Law 
Journal 15-33 at 26.  Also see Read, A “Psychiatric Deinstitutionalization in BC: Negative 
Consequences and Possible Solutions” 2009 (1) University of British Columbia Medical Journal 25-
26 at 26 who points out that mentally ill persons are more likely to be victimised by others than those 
that are not mentally ill.  The author points out that society need to know more about mental illness in 
order to avoid the mentally ill being victimised.  See further Parliamentary Information and Research 
Service Current issues in Mental Health in Canada: Mental Health and the Criminal Justice System 
(Library of Parliament Ottawa Canada 2013) at 1 where the view is held that mentally ill persons are 
more often the victim than the offender.  This view is shared by the Mental Health Commission of 
Canada Changing Directions, Changing Lives: The Mental Health Strategy for Canada (Mental 
Health Commission of Canada Alberta 2012) at 36.  Also see De Vos v Minister of Justice and 
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 In order to achieve equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance 
categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.25  Mentally ill 
persons in conflict with the law is such a group of persons who have been discriminated 
against in the past and in respect of whom measures should be taken to achieve equality.26 
Possible discrimination against the mentally ill accused can be identified at bail hearings 
because accused persons who are referred for fitness assessments are rarely granted 
bail.27  An opinion exists that bail is refused because the person has a mental illness and 
not because of the seriousness of the charges against the accused.28  This indicates that 
courts are reluctant to release persons with mental illness out on bail even where he is 
charged with a minor offence.29   
 Section 35 of the Constitution is specifically applicable to arrested, detained and accused 
persons.30  Section 35 rights are also applicable to persons detained in prison awaiting 
                                                                                                                                                   
Constitutional Development WCC case where it was argued that persons with mental illness are 
being discriminated against by the legislature through section 77(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act.    
25  Section 9(2) of the Constitution.  This is in line with Principle 1.4 of the United Nations Principles for 
the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness.  This principle states that special measures taken to 
advance the rights of the mentally ill will not be seen as discrimination. 
26  See the discussion of the past treatment of persons with mental illness in the criminal justice system 
in chapter 2 of this research that illustrates the injustices they suffered and the prejudice towards 
accused persons with mental illness.  Also see De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development CC case at [46] where the court confirms that persons with mental illnesses have been 
discriminated against in the past in such a manner that their dignity were affected.  The court states 
that, “Further, accused persons with mental illnesses or intellectual disabilities have been historically 
disadvantaged and unfairly discriminated against.  The use of prisons to “house” these vulnerable 
members of our society perpetuates hurtful and dangerous stereotypes.  The right to dignity is not 
only a basic tenet of our Constitution; it is a value that is central to the interpretation of the section 12 
right to freedom and security of the person.  Imprisonment reinforces the stigma and marginalisation 
that people, like the accused in this matter, are subjected to on a routine basis.  This impairs the 
human dignity of persons with mental illnesses or intellectual disabilities.  The tenets of our 
Constitution dictate that accused persons, who are not considered dangerous, should not have their 
freedom curtailed in a manner that is tantamount to inhuman and degrading punishment in a way 
that impinges on their dignity and breaches their right not to be deprived of their freedom without just 
cause.” 
27  According to Schutte T “’Single’ versus ‘panel’ appointed forensic mental observations:  Is the 
referral process ethically justifiable?”  2013 (6) South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 64-68 at 
67 most accused who are found unfit to stand trial, was refused bail prior to them being sent to the 
psychiatric institution for observation. 
28  Schutte 2013 South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 64 at 67. 
29  Schutte 2013 South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 64 at 67 discusses the findings of a study 
done at Sterkfontein hospital which indicates that the majority of accused persons who were 
eventually found unfit to stand trial, was denied bail and that the presence of a mental illness rather 
than the seriousness of the charges against the accused, appeared to be the deciding factor as to if 
bail should be granted or not. 
30  Section 35 of the Constitution is headed:  “Arrested, detained and accused persons”.  Also see 
Department of Correctional Services “White Paper on Remand Detention Management in South 
Africa” 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/White%20Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention%20Manage
ment%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf (Date of use:  22 August 2016) at 11 where it is pointed out that 
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psychiatric observation and those undergoing such observations in psychiatric institutions.31  
In terms of section 35, detained persons are entitled to conditions of detention that are 
consistent with human dignity, including at least the provision, at state expense, of 
adequate accommodation, nutrition, reading material and medical treatment.32  These 
persons are completely dependant on the state for the fulfilment of their basic needs whilst 
they are detained, and strong Constitutional protection is provided to them due to their 
vulnerability whilst so detained.33 
The rights of detained persons specifically include the right to a fair trial.34  The accused’s 
right to a fair trial may be affected where the fitness issue is not raised in cases where there 
are reasonable grounds to request an assessment.35  The right to a fair trial includes the 
right to have one’s trial take place without undue delay.36  Where an accused is referred for 
                                                                                                                                                   
those persons in police custody are also entitled to the rights of detained persons.    
31  This is confirmed by the South African Department of Correctional Services in Department of 
Correctional Services “Discussion Document on Management of Remand Detainees in South Africa” 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/Discussion%20Document%20preceding%20Draft%20White%20
Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention_1.pdf (Date of use: 17 August 2016) at 84 where the group 
of persons awaiting observation is specifically mentioned as part of the remand detainees group.  
Also see National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa “Awaiting Trial Detainee Guidelines”   
http://www.lhr.org.za/sites/lhr.org.za/files/atd_guidelines_.pdf (Date of use:  17 August 2016) at 37.  
Section 35 (2)(e) of the Constitution states that detained persons are entitled to conditions of 
detention that are consistent with human dignity.  The section is also applicable to persons detained 
in terms of the Mental Health Care Act.  See Liebenberg S Socio-Economic Rights (Juta Claremont 
2010) at 256, 257. 
32  Section 35(2)(e) of the Constitution.  “(2) Everyone who is detained, including every sentenced 
prisoner, has the right— 
 (e) to conditions of detention that are consistent with human dignity, including at least exercise and 
the provision, at state expense, of adequate accommodation, nutrition, reading material and medical 
treatment;   See further section 35(2(f)(iv) that states that “(2) Everyone who is detained, including 
every sentenced prisoner, has the right—(f) to communicate with, and be visited by, that person’s—
(iv) chosen medical practitioner.”  Also see Landman and Landman The Mental Health Care Act at 6.   
33  Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights at 257, 258 where it is pointed out that the conditions in mental 
institutions in South Africa, are generally poor and this is even the more reason why Constitutional 
rights of these detained persons need strong protection.  Mentally ill in detention is identified as a 
vulnerable group (see this source at 11, 39).  Also see Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/Discussion%20Document%20preceding%20Draft%20White%20
Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention_1.pdf (Date of use: 17 August 2016) at 40.   
34 Section 35(3) of the Constitution.  This right includes the right to have one’s trial take place as soon 
as possible with no undue delays (section 35(3)(d)).  Also see section 34 that guarantees each 
citizen access to court. 
35  Cassim F “The accused person’s competency to stand trial – a comparative perspective” 2004 (45) 
Codicillus 17-27 at 20 who opines that the court will be forsaking its duty if it did not raise the fitness 
issue when reasonable grounds exist and that such failure could impact on the accused right to a fair 
trial.  Also see section 77 of the Criminal Procedure Act where an express duty is placed on the court 
to order an enquiry into the mental state of the accused if there are any doubts about the accused’s 
fitness.  The order for assessment and the grounds upon which it can be based, are discussed later 
in this chapter.  
36  Section 35(3)(d) states that every accused person has the right to a fair trial, which includes the right 
“(d) to have their trial begin and conclude without unreasonable delay;”. 
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a fitness assessment because he cannot communicate properly with his attorney (it is 
obviously the attorney that makes this claim), suspicions have been raised that such a 
referral is sometimes merely a tactical move by the defence to delay matters.37  This is 
supported by the findings of a study at Sterkfontein hospital that found that the majority of 
those accused who were referred for fitness due to being unable to instruct counsel were 
eventually found fit to stand trial.38   Delays in the criminal justice process due to challenges 
in the forensic system39 may contribute to delays in the trial process and possibly infringe 
the accused right to a speedy trial. 
Section 35 refers to the right to dignity in respect of conditions of detention.40  The right to 
inherent dignity is specifically and separately provided for in section 10 of the Constitution 
and includes the right to have such dignity respected and protected.41  Closely linked to this 
right is the right to freedom and security of the person provided for in section 12 of the 
Constitution, which pertains to bodily and psychological integrity and includes the right not 
to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause.42  This right is particularly 
important in the context of mentally ill accused persons who are detained in prison awaiting 
psychiatric observation.43  These persons are deprived of their liberty when they are 
                                                
37  Schutte 2013 South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 64 at 67. 
38  Schutte 2013 South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 64 at 67.  The study also found that in 
most of these referral cases the accused had no history of psychiatric treatment, meaning that they 
did not encounter the mental health care system or acquire psychiatric services prior to being sent 
for observation.  The study found that most of those with a history of psychiatric treatment were 
found unfit to stand trial. 
39  Pillay AL “Competency to stand trial and criminal responsibility examinations: are there solutions to 
the extensive waiting list?”  2014 (44) South African Journal of Psychology 48-59 at 48 points out 
that there are waiting lists at most psychiatric institutions where 30-day observation periods can be 
conducted.  He further points out that a criminal trial cannot continue until these assessments have 
been conducted which in itself causes delays in the trial.   
40  Section 35(2)(e) of the Constitution states that:  “to conditions of detention that are consistent with 
human dignity, including at least exercise and the provision, at state expense, of adequate 
accommodation, nutrition, reading material and medical treatment;”. 
41  Section 10 of the Constitution states that, “Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their 
dignity respected and protected”.  Also see De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development WCC case at [33] where the provisions of section 77(6) were attacked on inter alia the 
ground of the mentally ill accused’s right to dignity. 
42  Section 12 (1)(a) of the Constitution.  It states that, “(1) Everyone has the right to freedom and 
security of the person, which includes the right— (a) not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or 
without just cause.”  Section 12(1)(b) states that a person has the right to not be detained without 
trial. 
43  Due to a lack of resources in the sense of available beds for psychiatric observation, mentally ill 
persons in respect of whom their fitness to stand trial is at issue, often spend long periods of time in 
jail awaiting psychiatric assessment, impacting on their right not to be deprived of freedom.  See 
Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 48 at 48 who explains that the waiting period to be 
transferred to a psychiatric hospital often extends over several months.  See further National 
Prosecuting Authority of South Africa  http://www.lhr.org.za/sites/lhr.org.za/files/atd_guidelines_.pdf 
(Date of use:  17 August 2016) at 37.    
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detained pending psychiatric observation and during such observation.  Detention must be 
justifiable, failing which it could be seen as arbitrary decision-making about the fate of the 
mentally ill accused persons and can lead to an infringement of this right, and courts have 
to intervene to correct the injustice.44  This right to bodily integrity also entails that a person 
shall not be detained without trial.45 
The rights in the Bill of Rights must be interpreted by South African courts having due 
regard to international law,46 including the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities referred to above.47  This will ensure that the rights of mentally ill 
accused persons are protected to the utmost. 
The above rights must be respected within the criminal justice system. The latter is mainly 
regulated by the Criminal Procedure Act.  The most relevant aspects for the purposes of 
this research are discussed below.  
2.4 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 
2.4.1 Introduction 
The focus of the discussion of the Criminal Procedure Act is on sections 77, 78 and 79, 
which are most relevant for purposes of mentally ill accused persons. 
The Criminal Procedure Act contains specific provisions regarding psychiatric observation 
of accused persons who may suffer from a mental illness to determine their fitness to stand 
                                                
44  See De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development WCC case at [33], [38], [52] where 
the fate of mentally ill accused persons found unfit to stand trial was said to be arbitrary as the 
Criminal Procedure Act did not make provision for the court to exercise discretion but only provided 
for two judgments to be made, namely, to order that the accused be detained as a state patient or as 
an involuntary mental health care user.  This type of detention has serious consequences for a 
person’s right to freedom and security of the person.  Also see De Vos v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development CC case at [20] where the Constitutional court states that “Accused 
persons dealt with under section 77(6)(a) require the protections guaranteed by section 12 of the 
Constitution because any possible institutionalisation or detention does not flow from the 
determination of their guilt by a court of law.” 
45  Section 12 (1)(b) of the Constitution. 
46  Section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution states that:  “(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, 
tribunal or forum— 
 (a)  must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human  
 dignity, equality and freedom; 
 (b)  must consider international law; and 
 (c)  may consider foreign law.” 
47  See De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development CC case at [29] where the court 
referred to its obligation to consider, inter alia, United Nations Conventions when interpreting the Bill 
of Rights.  In this case, the provisions of section 12 of the Constitution was considered with due 
regard to the content of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 
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trial and/or, if they had, the criminal capacity required to be found guilty of a crime.48  
Psychiatric observation of the mentally ill accused contributes to the delivery of justice for 
these individuals in the courts.49 
A brief overview of the background to the development of the current Criminal Procedure 
Act is included below before the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act are 
discussed.  This background serves to show the progress that has been made regarding 
the processing of cases involving accused persons with mental illness.  
2.4.2 Background to the Criminal Procedure Act 
Prior to the Criminal Procedure Act, the provisions of the Mental Disorders Act regulated 
the position of mentally ill persons in conflict with the law.  The Mental Disorders Act 
referred to an accused person with a mental illness as “mentally disordered or defective”.50  
Under the Mental Disorders Act, where, prior to arraignment or sentence, a suspicion arose 
that a person was unfit to stand trial due to a mental illness, the magistrate could request a 
medical practitioner to examine the accused.51    
If the magistrate, after receiving the medical practitioner's report, had any doubt about the 
mental state of the accused, he could order that the accused be detained in an institution 
for observation purposes.52  The superintendent of such institution had to, as soon as 
practicable, submit a report to the magistrate on the mental state of the accused.53  The 
Mental Disorders Act provided for the continued detention of a mentally ill accused provided 
that reports be rendered on the mental state of the accused until such time as the 
magistrate was convinced about the mental state of the accused.54   No time limits were 
placed on the period of detention for purposes of ascertaining an accused person’s mental 
                                                
48 Section 77 of the Criminal Procedure Act contains provisions regarding fitness to stand trial and 78 
contain provisions regarding assessment for criminal capacity.  
49  Kaliski Psychological Assessment in South Africa at 1.  Justice is served in that the section 77 
procedure for instance is employed to ensure that where an accused is unable to follow the 
proceedings he will not be tried.  It would be an injustice to put a person on trial who is incapable to 
follow the proceedings. 
50  See for example the provisions of section 27 of the Mental Disorders Act. 
51  Section 27(2) of the Mental Disorders Act.  This section states that two medical practitioners should 
examine the accused but the section specifically states that only one medical practitioner may 
conduct the examination if two are not available.   
52  Section 27(4) of the Mental Disorders Act. 
53  Section 27(5) of the Mental Disorders Act.    
54  Section 27(7) of the Mental Disorders Act.  The Mental Disorders Act did not limit the amount of time 
that the accused could spend in the institution for observation purposes and in fact provided for a 
further period of detention if the magistrate was not convinced about the mental state of the accused, 
even after receipt of the report from the superintendent.   
  
112 
state.   The medical practitioner could certify that the accused was mentally ill and the 
magistrate could accept such certification if he had no further doubts about the mental state 
of the accused.55  The consequence of accepting such certification was that the magistrate 
had to direct that such person be kept in custody in jail or an institution pending the 
signification of the then Governor-General's decision.56  Where the accused was found unfit 
to stand trial,57  the accused was similarly detained in a gaol or institution pending the 
signification of the Governor-General's decision.58  The Mental Disorders Act contained 
separate provisions pertaining to the proof that the person was mentally ill at the time of 
committing the said offence.59    
These provisions of the Mental Disorders Act and in particular the fact that no limit was 
placed on the time period for psychiatric observation, and no provision was made for the 
formal review of the mental state of the accused once detained, exposed the mentally ill 
accused to the risk of unreasonably long periods of detention for observation purposes.   
The Mental Health Act that governed the position of mentally ill persons after the Mental 
Disorders Act contained a provision in terms whereof a person being detained in a 
psychiatric institution could apply to the court for an enquiry as to the reasons for his 
detention if he believed that he ought not to be detained.60 
The Criminal Procedure Act 61 addressed some of the concerns raised above in sections 77 
to 79 thereof that contain the relevant provisions pertaining to psychiatric observation 
during criminal proceedings. 
 
                                                
55  Section 27(2) read with section 27(3) of the Mental Disorders Act. 
56  Section 27(3) of the Mental Disorders Act. 
57  Section 27 and 28 of the Mental Disorders Act. 
58  Section 28(2) and 29(2) of the Mental Disorders Act.  Similar provisions were contained in 
Legislation of the Cape, Section 13 Act 35 of 1891, the predecessor of the Mental Disorders Act.  
Also see Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 155. 
59  Section 29 of the Mental Disorders Act.  The court would render a special verdict finding the accused 
guilty of the offence but state that he suffered from a mental illness at the time.  Section 29(1) of the 
Mental Disorders Act.  Similar provisions were contained in Legislation of the Cape, Section 12 of 
Act 35 of 1891, the predecessor of the Mental Disorders Act.  Also see Kruger Mental Health Law in 
South Africa at 155.  The consequence was that the presiding judicial officer had to order the 
accused to be kept in custody in jail pending the signification of the then Governor-General's 
decision.  (Section 29(2) of the Mental Disorders Act).  The Mental Disorders Act did not provide for 
the review of the mental state of the accused so detained at any point in time, but did provide for the 
withdrawal or abandonment of charges against an accused prior to an order for observation.  As 
provided for in section 28(2) and 29(1) of the Mental Disorders Act.  Section 29bis makes it possible 
for the prosecuting authority to withdraw the charges. 
60  Section 20 of the Mental Health Act 18 of 1973.  Also see Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa 
at 76. 
61  The Act came into operation on 27 July 1977. 
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2.4.3 Fitness to stand trial in the Criminal Procedure Act 
The Criminal Procedure Act acknowledges that an accused might, due to mental illness, be 
unable to follow the proceedings. 
Section 77(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act states that: 
(1) If it appears to the court at any stage of criminal proceedings that the accused is by 
reason of mental illness or mental defect not capable of understanding the proceedings so 
as to make a proper defence, the court shall direct that the matter be enquired into and be 
reported on in accordance with the provisions of section 79.  
The court is obliged to refer an accused for an assessment of fitness to stand trial (fitness 
assessment) once the issue is raised.62  Section 79 sets out the procedure to be followed 
when a court orders an enquiry in terms of section 77 or 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act.63 
Failure to invoke the section 79 procedure for purposes of a fitness assessment in cases 
where it ought to have been pursued can, if the accused is found guilty, lead to the setting 
aside of the conviction and sentence by an appeal court.64 
The purpose of this provision and the rationale behind this obligation to order an enquiry 
into an accused’s fitness once the issue is raised is to ensure that the court does not have 
to make a finding on a specialised area such as mental illness, without having obtained 
expert opinion thereon.65   
There is no explicit presumption of “fitness” in the Criminal Procedure Act.66   It appears, 
however, that an accused person’s fitness to stand trial is presumed unless the contrary is 
                                                
62  Note the word “shall” in section 77(1).  Also see Du Toit E, De Jager, FJ, Paizes A, Skeen A St Q 
and Van der Merwe SE, Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act (Juta Cape Town 2012) at 13-3 
where it is stated that the court “must” order an investigation into the mental state of the accused and 
cause a report on this issue to be lodged with the court subsequent to the said investigation.  Also 
see this source at 13-4 where it is emphasised that the court has an obligation to refer an accused 
for observation once a reasonable possibility exists that the accused is not fit to stand trial.  Also see 
S v Tom and Others 1991 (2) SACR 249 (B) 250H-251C where it is confirmed that the court is 
obliged to refer an accused for observation where his fitness to stand trial is uncertain.  See further 
Kruger A Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses 7th ed (LexisNexis 2010) at 249. 
63  Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act at 13-1.  Also see Strydom et al 2011 SAJP 
40 at 40.  The procedures set out in sections 77 to 79 of the Criminal Procedure Act have been 
amended to its current state by inter alia the Criminal Matters Amendment Act 68 of 1998. 
64  This was the case in S v Kleinhans 1991 (1) SACR 252 (Nm) where the accused was charged with 
murder.  The issue of fitness to stand trial was not invoked in respect of the co-accused in this case 
and it was found on appeal that the conviction and sentence handed down on the court a quo should 
be set aside.  Also see Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act at 13-5. 
65  Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act at 13-5. 
66  Compare this to the explicit presumption of “sanity” as provided for in section 78(1A) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act.  
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proven.67  The Criminal Procedure Act further does not indicate what the burden of proof is 
should an accused person’s fitness to stand trial be in question.  It appears, however, that 
the state shoulders the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt 68 that the accused 
does, in fact, have the capacity to follow the court proceedings.69  This is the position 
regardless of who raises the issue of triability.70 
Should an accused be found unfit to stand trial, the court may, depending on the 
seriousness of the crime 71 and the evidence on whether or not the accused was involved 
therein,72 either order that the accused be treated as a state patient 73 or an involuntary 
mental health care user in terms of the Mental Health Care Act.74  These orders and how 
they are arrived at will be discussed in more detail later in this research. 
Where an accused is found unfit to stand trial, the trial is suspended.  Such an accused is 
not convicted nor acquitted at this point in time.75  The trial may, however, proceed should 
                                                
67  Some jurisdictions, such as Canada, have legislation that provides for an explicit presumption of 
fitness.  The presumption stands until the contrary is proven.  See the discussion of the Canadian 
Criminal Code in chapter 4 of this research. 
68  Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 166. 
69  Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses 228.  Also see R v Mashimbi 1958 (1) SA 390 (T) at 
392D-H and further S v Ebrahim 1973 (1) SA 868 (A) 871F.  Also see Cassim 2004 Codicillus 17 at 
20.  In S v Ebrahim 1973 (1) SA 868 (A) at 871 Mr Justice Van Blerk indicated that it would be 
unreasonable to place the burden of proving triability on the accused merely because he alleges 
non-triability.  See further Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 166.  Also see Du Toit et al 
Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act at 13-6 who confirms that the fact that an accused 
person is fit to stand trial must however be proved beyond reasonable doubt by the state.   
70  Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 166 footnote 90 where he points out that this differs 
from the position in England where the Prosecution has the burden of proving triability and the 
defence has the burden of proving non-triability depending on who raises the issue. 
71  Only those accused persons who are found unfit to stand trial and who were charged with crimes 
involving serious violence such as murder, culpable homicide and rape, and who, on the evidence 
before the court, committed the offence may be detained as state patient.  See section 77(6)(i) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
72  Section 77(6) contains a provision in terms whereof the court has to consider on the facts before it if 
the accused was in fact involved in the crime or not before a finding on the accused’s fitness to stand 
trial can be made. 
73  Section 77(6)(a)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  The treatment of state patients is regulated by 
section 42 and 47 of the Mental Health Care Act.  State patients are detained in a psychiatric 
institution until a judge in chambers orders his release. 
74  Section 77(6)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that, where a person is found to have been 
involved in a crime of a non-violent nature or where it is found that the person did not commit any 
crime at all (regardless of if the charges against him was of a serious nature) but such person is 
found not fit to stand trial, such person will be treated as an involuntary mental health care user in 
terms of the Mental Health Care Act.  The mental state of an involuntary user is subject to period 
review and the person will be discharged once the person has recovered the ability to take informed 
decisions regarding his need for mental health care treatment and rehabilitation service. 
75  Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 226.  Also see Du Toit et al Commentary on the 
Criminal Procedure Act at 13-7.  See further S v Pedro 2015 (1) SACR 41 (WCC) at [81]. 
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the accused regain his ability to stand trial.76  The decision to proceed with the prosecution 
is taken by the Director of Public Prosecutions, having regard to the particular 
circumstances of the case.77 
The criminal trial continues for a person found fit to stand trial, regardless of the fact that a 
mental illness may be present.  As long as such mental illness does not affect his fitness to 
stand trial, no further consideration is given thereto during the criminal proceedings unless 
the fitness issue is raised again later in the proceedings or unless the lack of criminal 
responsibility is raised as a defence.  
2.4.4 Not criminally responsible in the Criminal Procedure Act    
A presumption of sanity operates in South African law as confirmed by section 78(1A) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act. 
 (1A) Every person is presumed not to suffer from a mental illness or mental defect so as not 
to be criminally responsible in terms of section 78 (1) until the contrary is proved on a 
 balance of probabilities. 
Where a person’s criminal capacity is, however, in question section 78(2) applies.  Section 
78(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act states that: 
 (2) If it is alleged at criminal proceedings that the accused is by reason of mental illness or 
mental defect or for any other reason not criminally responsible for the offence charged, or if 
it appears to the court at criminal proceedings that the accused might for such a reason not 
be so responsible, the court shall in the case of an allegation or appearance of mental illness 
or mental defect, and may, in any other case, direct that the matter be enquired into and be 
reported on in accordance with the provisions of section 79.  
A person shall not be held responsible for an act committed by him if he suffered from a 
mental illness or mental defect at the time of the commission of the offence, provided that 
the mental condition rendered him incapable of appreciating the wrongfulness of his actions 
and/or incapable of acting in accordance with an appreciation of wrongfulness.78  An 
accused who had a mental illness at the time of committing the offence can, depending on 
                                                
76  Section 77(7) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  Also see Louw in Psycholegal Assessment in South 
Africa at 43.  Also see Cassim 2004 Codicillus 17 at 20.  See further Du Toit et al Commentary on 
the Criminal Procedure Act at 13-3 who adds that this does however not happen often. 
77  Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act at 13-7.  Also see this source at 13.3 where 
it is indicated that prosecution is rarely continued after a person was declared a state patient and 
when he regains his ability to understand the proceedings. 
78  Section 78(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  To determine which disorders may constitute “insanity” 
and might result in criminal incapacity, disorders can be classified into certain categories as provided 
for in the DSM-IV.  See Spamers M A Critical Analysis of the Psycholegal Assessment of Suspected 
Criminally Incapacitated Accused Persons as Regulated by the Criminal Procedure Act (LL.M 
Dissertation University of Pretoria 2010) at 24, 25. 
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the seriousness of the offence, be detained as a state patient 79 or as an involuntary mental 
health care user 80 and may further be released conditionally 81 or unconditionally.82  Where 
the accused’s condition does not meet the criteria of a mental illness as set out in section 
78(1), but his capacity to act in accordance with his understanding of what is right and 
wrong was diminished at the relevant point in time, his diminished capacity may be taken 
into account during sentencing.83 
The provisions of the Mental Health Care Act may be relevant in certain instances where a 
mentally ill person comes into contact with the law.  An overview of the Act and the relevant 
provisions are set out below. 
2.5 Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002 
2.5.1 Introduction 
 Since sections 77 and 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act contain references to the 
 Mental Health Care Act 84 and provide for detention in terms of the Mental Health Care Act, 
the appropriate provisions of the Act become relevant.  The discussion below includes a 
brief discussion of the background to and overview of the Mental Health Care Act with 
specific attention to the new additions to the Act, such as the 72 hour assessment period.  
The categories of mental health care treatment and rehabilitation services are set out 
before the discussion concludes with a discussion of Review Boards as they have been 
established in terms of the Mental Health Care Act. 
2.5.2 Background to and overview of the Mental Health Care Act  
 The Mental Health Act 85 was repealed in its entirety by the Mental Health Care Act, which 
                                                
79  Section 78(6)(b)(i)(aa) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
80  Section 78(6)(b)(i)(bb) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
81  Section 78(6)(b)(i)(dd) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
82  Section 78(6)(b)(i)(ee) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  In contrast, an accused found unfit to stand 
trial cannot be released unconditionally.  The Criminal Procedure Act does not provide this option.  
Only two orders can be made where a person is found unfit to stand trial.  It can be ordered that he 
be detained as a state patient or an involuntary mental health care user.  
83  Section 78(7) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  A mentally ill accused person found unfit to stand trial, 
does not have the benefit of his mental illness being considered further in the process as with an 
accused who does not quite meet the not criminally responsible standard.  
84  In particular to section 32 and 37 that provides for involuntary mental health care treatment and 
rehabilitation services and section 42 and 47 that deals with the admission and discharge of a state 
patient. 
85  The Mental Health Act 18 of 1973, prior to its repeal, was amended by the Mentally Ill persons’ Legal 
Interests Amendment Act, which came into force on 13 July 1990.  (GN 1610 GG 12630 of 13 July 
1990).  This amendment came about after a report by the Law Reform Commission on enduring 
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came into force in December 2004.   As soon as a person receives treatment, care and 
rehabilitation at a mental health care institution, such services are primarily regulated by the 
Mental Health Care Act. 
 The Mental Health Care Act contains a patient charter that is aimed at empowering mental 
health care users with knowledge of their rights. 86   This patient charter in the South African 
Mental Health Care Act is partially based on a United Nations Resolution of 1991 on the 
Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and for the improvement of Mental Health Care.87  
There is a duty on health care workers to ensure that the mental health care user is aware 
of his rights in terms of this Act.88 
The Mental Health Care Act introduced a rapid shift in focus from arbitrary decision making 
about the treatment of the mentally ill to patient autonomy.89  The Mental Health Care Act 
                                                                                                                                                   
powers of attorney.  The amendment mainly concerned the managing of the estate of a mentally ill 
person.  This amendment made it possible for the Master, or a judge in chambers to appoint a 
curator to a mentally ill person other than a President’s patient and whose assets or income fell 
below a certain amount.  The initial Act only provided for this if the mentally ill person was declared a 
State President’s patient or if the person was a mentally ill prisoner.  This left other mentally ill 
persons who were for example cared for at home, with a very expensive alternative of having to 
apply to the High Court for an order for the appointment of a curator.  This procedure was beyond 
the reach of most as it is a very costly process in that the High Court first has to be approached for a 
curator ad litem to be appointed to assess the mental capacity of the individual.  Only thereafter is 
the curator to the person appointed.  The amendment to the Act introduced a simplified and more 
cost effective procedure accessible to those who are not mentally ill prisoners or State President’s 
patients.  Any person over the age of 18 could now approach the Master of the High Court with a 
request to be appointed or to appoint a curator to the mentally ill person.  This could be done only if 
the property value of the person was less than R100 000.00 or if the income of the person was less 
than R24 000.00 per annum.  Those not meeting the monetary requirements had to bring the 
application through the High Court via the previously utilised process.  This amendment seem to 
have brought some equality between the mentally ill prisoners and State President’s patients on the 
one hand and patients suffering from a mental illness not detained in prison or as State President’s 
patients on the other, as the same – more cost effective process is now accessible to all these 
persons.  
86  See chapter 3 of the Mental Health Care Act.  This patient charter is partially based on the United 
Nations Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness.  South Africa was only the 
second country to include these provisions into its mental health care legislation.  See Freeman M 
“New mental health legislation in South Africa - principles and practicalities: A view from the 
Department of Health” August 2002 South Afr Psych Rev 4-8 at 4 footnote “a”.  The first country to 
do so was Jamaica.  The new Mental Health Care Act is further based on the World Health 
Organisation.  Guidelines for the Promotion of Human Rights of Persons with Mental Disorders 
http://www.who.int/mental_health/policy/legislation/guidelines_promotion.pdf  (Date of use:  29 May 
2014).  Also see Landman and Landman The Mental Health Care Act at 3.  See further World Health 
Organisation World Health Report: Mental Health: New Understanding, New Hope.  
http://www.who.int/whr/2001/en/whr01_en.pdf (Date of use:  29 May 2014).   
87 United Nations Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness. 
88  This obligation is contained in section 17 of the Mental Health Care Act.  The only exception to the 
rule is where the user is admitted in an emergency in accordance with section 9(1)(c) of the Mental 
Health Care Act.  Also see Landman and Landman The Mental Health Care Act at 7. 
89  Simpson B and Chipps J “Mental health legislation: Does it protect the rights of people with mental 
health problems?”  2012 (48) Social Work 47-57 at 47 who points out that the new Mental Health 
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focuses very much on patient autonomy and provision of the least restrictive method of 
treatment, as is most evident from the provisions that regulate electroconvulsive therapy 
and psychosurgery.90  The Act states further that mechanical restraint may only be used for 
short periods of time and only if chemical restraint seems to be inadequate.91  The focus on 
the least restrictive manner of treatment is emphasised by the provision in the Act that 
allows for an involuntary user to be reclassified as an assisted or voluntary user if the user 
regains the ability to provide informed consent to mental health care treatment and 
rehabilitation services.92  The protection of the mental health care user’s privacy is 
emphasised in the Mental Health Care Act.93  It also contains a prohibition against unfair 
discrimination against the mental health care user on the ground of mental health status.94  
                                                                                                                                                   
Care Act has shifted its focus from custodial care to human rights.  This paradigm shift poses 
questions regarding consent to mental health care treatment and rehabilitation services and issues 
related thereto, such as access to the health records of mental health care users.  The purpose and 
scope of this research does not allow for the investigation of these questions.    
90  Regulations 35 and 36 of the General Regulations to the Act published in Government Gazette 
number 24384, (Regulation Gazette number 7578) notice number 233 of 14 February 2003.  Further 
provisions to ensure the least restrictive treatment is that the regulations prohibit sleep therapy and 
provide that a mental health care user has to consent to electro convulsive therapy.  See Regulation 
35(3) of the General Regulations to the Mental Health Care Act re electro convulsive therapy and 
regulation 36 that prohibits the use of sleep therapy.  Also see Landman and Landman The Mental 
Health Care Act at 12.      
91  Section 1 of the Mental Health Care Act defines “mechanical restraint” as “…the use of any 
instrument or appliance whereby the movements of the body or any of the limbs of a user are 
restrained or impeded”.  Regulation 38 regulates restraining and states in sub regulation (3) that this 
type of restraint must be monitored every 30 minutes.  The use of mechnical restraing must be 
recorded in a register (sub regulation (4) which has to be provided to the relevant Review Board on a 
form Mental Health Care Act 48 (sub regulation (5)). 
92  Section 37(5) of the Mental Health Care Act for example provides for a user to be discharged if the 
Review Board finds that involuntary care is no longer needed.  The user may also be treated 
forthwith as a voluntary or assisted user, provided the user gives consent (or in the case of an 
assisted user he does not refuse consent) to the treatment.  Also see Landman and Landman The 
Mental Health Care Act 5 where it is pointed out that the mechanism of periodic reviews that was 
incorporated into the Act, supports the ideal of providing the least restrictive manner of treatment as 
a user may be reclassified after such a periodic review which may result in less restrictive treatment 
– for example if an assisted user is reclassified as a voluntary user the user may be discharged at 
his request. 
93  Section 13(1) of the Mental Health Care Act prohibits the disclosure of information, which the mental 
health care user is entitled to keep confidential in terms of any law.  This duty may only be breached 
if non-disclosure will seriously prejudice the health of the mental health care user or third parties 
(section 13(2)).  Section 13(3) gives limited recognition to therapeutic privilege in that the mental 
health care provider may temporarily withhold information about the mental health care users’ health 
status, if the mental health care provider believes that disclosure will seriously prejudice the user or 
will cause the user to conduct himself in a manner that will be prejudicial to the mental health care 
user or the health of third parties.  Section 37(2)(c) of the Mental Health Care Act which provides for 
the periodic review of involuntary mental health care users, states as one of the factors that has to 
be considered during the review, whether there are other services that are less restrictive and 
intrusive on the mental health care user’s right to privacy, dignity and movement.  Also see 
Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights at 262. 
94  Section 10 of the Mental Health Care Act prohibits the unfair discrimination against a mental health 
care user based on his mental health status. 
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This could be seen as an extension of the protection of equality as provided for in section 9 
of the Constitution.95 
 In further support of ensuring that the mental health care user receives the least-restrictive 
means of treatment, a 72-hour assessment period was introduced into this Act.96  This is 
only applicable where an application for involuntary treatment is lodged.97  After admission, 
a 72-hour assessment period follows to determine if the person should continue to be 
treated on an involuntary basis.98  One of the advantages, amongst others, of this 72-hour 
assessment period is that this period of time is long enough to exclude the possibility that 
the person might suffer from medical conditions other than a mental illness such as 
meningitis or epilepsy delirium.99  Only if it is confirmed during this 72-hour assessment that 
the person requires further involuntary care shall the person forthwith be treated as such by 
the relevant mental health care establishment.100  The applicability of the 72-hour 
assessment period on accused persons ordered to receive involuntary care in terms of the 
Criminal Procedure Act is discussed later in this chapter.  
Mental health care treatment and rehabilitation services are divided into five categories in 
the Mental Health Care Act.  A brief description of each of these categories follows. 
                                                
95  Section 9(3) of the Constitution prohibits unfair discrimination on specific grounds that include race, 
gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, 
disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.  With the focus on patient rights in 
the new legislation, health care workers might fear that they will clash with the law for merely doing 
their job.  A former Director of Mental Health and substance abuse at the National Department of 
Health in South Africa, puts the minds of healthcare workers at ease by stating that:  “The legislation 
is not intended to scare health workers and have them fearing their every move, but given past 
abuses of people with mental disabilities, legislated rights were seen as a necessity”.  Mr Freeman 
was the Head of Mental Health and Substance abuse at the National Department of Health during 
2002.  See Freeman 2002 South Afr Psych Rev 4 at 5.  Also see Simpson and Chipps 2012 Social 
Work 47 at 47 where the past discrimination against persons with mental illness is confirmed. 
96  Section 34 of the Mental Health Care Act. 
97  Section 34(1)(b) of the Mental Health Care Act. 
98  Section 34 of the Mental Health Care Act sets out the procedure that has to be followed to determine 
if further care, treatment and rehabilitation on an involuntary basis are necessary.  This inter alia 
entails assessment by two physicians, one of whom must be a mental health care worker. 
99 Other advantages of the 72 hour assessment period include identifying patients who might be HIV 
positive who might have presented with symptoms that could possibly be confused for a mental 
illness.  It further allows for quick recovery of the patient, especially if there is substance abuse 
involved.  It avoids the stigma of unnecessary psychiatric hospitalisation in the event that the cause 
of the symptoms thought to be as a result of mental illness, was in fact caused by a condition other 
than a mental illness.  This 72-hour assessment period adds to the aim of integrating mental health 
care services into other health services and thus contributes to the move towards decentralisation of 
mental health care services. 
100  Section 34(3) and (4) of the Mental Health Care Act.  The head of the health establishment may also 
authorise Involuntary mental health care treatment and rehabilitation services on an outpatient basis 




2.5.3 Categories of mental health care treatment and rehabilitation services in the Mental 
Health Care Act 
The Act distinguishes between 5 categories of mental health care treatment and 
rehabilitation services.  The most relevant for purposes of this research is involuntary 
mental health care, and state patients as a court may order that an accused be detained as 
such.101 All the categories will be canvassed briefly in order to explain the restrictions 
applicable to each category of treatment.    
The least restrictive category of mental health care treatment and rehabilitation services is 
voluntary mental health care treatment and rehabilitation services.102  These are the mental 
health care users who are capable of making an informed decision pertaining to the need 
for mental health care treatment and rehabilitation services, who can consent thereto and 
who understand the implications of the treatment.103  These users can be discharged on 
request.   
Assisted mental health care treatment and rehabilitation services 104 are for those users 
who are not able to make informed decisions about their need for mental health care 
treatment and rehabilitation services but require it for their own safety or the safety of 
others.  These users are not opposed to receiving mental health care treatment.  These 
users will be discharged once they have regained their ability to make decisions regarding 
the need for mental health care treatment and rehabilitation services.105 
The third category that is very relevant for the purposes of this research is involuntary 
mental health care treatment and rehabilitation services.106  These mental health care users 
are incapable of making an informed decision about the need for treatment and 
rehabilitation services but require it for their own safety or the safety of others or to prevent 
                                                
101  Section 77 and 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides for the court to order that an accused 
person be detained as a state patient where the person is found either unfit to stand trial or not 
criminally responsible and such person was involved in a crime with serious violence, such as 
murder, rape or culpable homicide.  The court may also order that an accused be detained as an 
involuntary mental health care user where the person is found not to have committed the crime or 
that he committed a crime not involving serious violence. 
102  Section 25 of the Mental Health Care Act. 
103  These users for example suffer from depression after a traumatic event and seek mental health care 
treatment at a mental health care establishment for a limited period. 
104  Section 26 of the Mental Health Care Act. 
105  Section 31(3) of the Mental Health Care Act.  If the head of the health establishment is of the view 
that the person is capable of taking an informed decision about treatment and the user expresses a 
need for further treatment, the user may forthwith be treated as a voluntary mental health care user 
in terms of section 25 of the Mental Health Care Act. 
106  Section 32 of the Mental Health Care Act. 
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financial loss or further damage to the user’s reputation.  These users refuse to receive 
treatment and are thus treated against their will.107  A 72-hour assessment is conducted to 
determine if involuntary care should be continued. 
A criminal court may order a mentally ill accused person to be treated as an involuntary 
mental health care user.108  Those who are found not criminally responsible and who 
committed non-violent crimes can be “sentenced” to be treated as an involuntary mental 
health care user.109  Those found unfit to stand trial and who committed a non-violent crime 
or who did not commit the crime at all may similarly be treated as an involuntary user.110  It 
is unclear whether the 72-hour assessment period applies to persons ordered by a criminal 
court to receive involuntary mental health care treatment and rehabilitation services.   
Section 37 of the Mental Health Care Act specifically deals with the review of the 
involuntary mental health care user’s status as such by the head of the health 
establishment and provides for review six months after admission and thereafter every 12 
months.111  During the said review, consideration must be given to the ability of the user to 
express the need for further treatment, the possibility of the user inflicting harm on himself 
or others, whether there are less restrictive services to be rendered that will have less of an 
impact on the user’s privacy, dignity and movement and lastly, a plan for future treatment 
should be indicated.112  The report is sent to the Review Board for consideration 113 , and 
the Review Board decides if further involuntary treatment is warranted or not.114  If not, all 
involuntary care must be stopped, and the user must be discharged unless he consents to 
further treatment.115  Where a user is discharged, the Registrar of the High Court must be 
informed of the discharge.116  There is no indication in the Mental Health Care Act that 
                                                
107  Section 32 states that these users must be provided with treatment against their will – provided the 
criterion as set out in paragraphs (a) to (c) of section 32 is met. 
108  In terms of section 77 and/or 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act.  Such treatment takes place under 
section 32 and 37 of the Mental Health Care Act. 
109  In terms of section 37 of the Mental Health Care Act.  The criminal court may also make an order 
that these persons may also be released upon conditions, or released unconditionally as provided 
for in section 78(6)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
110  Section 77 of the Criminal Procedure Act.  These persons cannot be released unconditionally.  See 
however the discussion of the De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development WCC 
case later in this chapter.  The court found that the lack of a provision for conditional and 
unconditional discharge for persons found not fit to stand trial, is unconstitutional and ordered that 
the situation be remedied by Government through the amendment of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
111  Section 37(1) of the Mental Health Care Act. 
112  Section 37(2) of the Mental Health Care Act. 
113  Section 37(3) of the Mental Health Care Act. 
114  Section 37(4) of the Mental Health Care Act. 
115  Section 37(5) of the Mental Health Care Act. 
116  Section 37(6) of the Mental Health Care Act.  Also consider section 36 that prescribes that any 
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indicates if the position is different for a mentally ill accused person who received 
involuntary care by order of the court in terms of section 77(6).117  Where an unfit accused 
is discharged from involuntary care, it can arguably be assumed that the accused regained 
his fitness to stand trial, and the trial against the accused may resume depending on the 
circumstances of the case.118 
Mentally ill prisoners, as a fourth category, are persons, whether convicted or not, who are 
detained in custody in any prison or who are being transferred in custody or are en route 
from one prison to another prison.119  This category may include persons who are awaiting 
psychiatric assessment to determine fitness to stand trial or criminal capacity. The Mental 
Health Care Act, however, only provides for convicted prisoners in this category to receive 
mental health care treatment and rehabilitation services on an outpatient basis.120  Those 
not yet convicted seem to be excluded from outpatient care.  The position of the convicted 
prisoner who developed a mental illness is not considered in this research as it is primarily 
concerned with mentally ill accused persons prior to acquittal or conviction and sentencing. 
The final category of mental health care user that is very relevant in this research is the 
state patient.  State patients are individuals who were found unfit to stand trial or not 
                                                                                                                                                   
decision by a Review Board to continue involuntary care treatment and rehabilitation services must 
be sent for judicial review to the High Court.  The High Court must then order the further treatment of 
a mental health care user as an involuntary user, or must order the immediate discharge of the user.  
In the case where a criminal court orders the detention of a mentally ill accused person as an 
involuntary user, judicial review is not employed, but the order by the criminal court in terms of 
section 77 or 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act may arguably serve the purpose intended for the high 
court to confirm further involuntary care as provided for in section 36 of the Mental Health Care Act.  
Questions about the 72 hour assessment period as provided for in the Mental Health Care Act are 
also raised. 
117  The court considered this same question in S v Pedro 2015 (1) SACR 41 (WCC) [112-113] and 
seems to agree that court ordered involuntary users could be discharged in terms of the Mental 
Health Care Act.  The court did not find it necessary to decide whether such a discharge should be in 
terms of section 37 (discharge after periodic review) or 38 (discharge upon recovery) of the Mental 
Health Care Act.  The court found it strange that there is no mechanism in place to keep the Director 
of Public Prosecutions updated on the mental state of those ordered by the court to be treated as 
involuntary users or state patients and suggested that a relevant protocol be developed to achieve 
this.  In this particular case, the accused was released about a month after the detention order was 
made, presumably in terms of section 38 of the Mental Health Care Act.  
118  Section 77(7) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  Also see Louw in Psycholegal Assessment in South 
Africa at 43.  Also see Cassim 2004 Codicillus 17 at 20.  See further Du Toit et al Commentary on 
the Criminal Procedure Act at 13-7 where the discretion of the prosecution in this regard is 
confirmed.  Also see this source at 13-3 where it is indicated, however, that prosecution is rarely 
continued after a person was declared a state patient and when he regains his ability to understand 
the proceedings. 
119  Section 1 of the Mental Health Care Act.  Chapter VII of the Mental Health Care Act contains 
provisions relevant to mentally ill prisoners.  The definition of prisoner is also contained in section 1 
of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998. 
120  Section 52 of the Mental Health Care Act. 
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criminally responsible due to mental illness – and who have been charged with and found to 
have been involved in murder, culpable homicide, rape or any other act involving serious 
violence.121  These accused persons are treated as state patients in terms of the Mental 
Health Care Act 122 , which entails treatment in a psychiatric institution until such time as a 
judge in chambers orders his release.123 
2.5.4 Review Boards 
Mental Health Review Boards 124 are established in terms of the Mental Health Care Act, 
which serves as monitoring bodies over the human rights of the mental health care users in 
mental health care establishments.125  The past treatment of people with mental disabilities 
126 was a strong motivation for the establishment of Mental Health Review Boards.127     
                                                
121  The criminal court may order that a person be treated as a state patient in terms of section 77 and 
78 of the Criminal Procedure Act.  Section 78(6)(i)(aa) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that a 
person may be declared a state patient where he is charged with murder, culpable homicide or rape 
or any other charge involving serious violence and where the court finds on the facts before it that 
the person committed the offence.  Also see Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure 
Act at 13-1.  Section 77(6)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides for a person to be treated as a 
state patient if the person has been found unfit to stand trial and section 78(6)(i)(aa) contains a 
similar provision but pertaining to a person having been found to lack criminal capacity.  Section 
77(6)(a)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that a person may be declared a state patient 
where he is charged with murder, culpable homicide or rape or any other charge involving serious 
violence and where the court finds on the facts before it that the person committed the offence.  
Section 78(6)(i)(aa) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that a person may be declared a state 
patient where he is charged with murder, culpable homicide or rape or any other charge involving 
serious violence and where the court finds on the facts before it that the person committed the 
offence.  Also see Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act at 13-1. 
122  Section 42 and 47 of the Mental Health Care Act.  Sections 77 and 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act 
contains a reference to section 47 of the Mental Health Care Act in terms whereof patients are 
treated as state patients until a judge in Chambers recommends their release.  Chapter VI of the 
Mental Health Care Act contain provisions pertaining to a state patient.  (Sections 41-48). 
123  Section 47 of the Mental Health Care Act and more in particular section 47(6) sets out the orders 
that a judge in chambers may make when an application for the discharge of state patient is brought 
before him.  He may order that the state patient continues to be treated as such, be reclassified as 
an involuntary, assisted or voluntary user, or be discharged conditionally or unconditionally.  Section 
45 provides for leave of absence to be provided to the state patient for a limited period of time and 
subject to certain conditions in the time that he is detained a state patient.  An application for 
discharge as state patient, may only be brought to a judge in chambers once in a 12 month period.  
(Section 47(4)(a)).  Also see S v Pedro 2015 (1) SACR 41 (WCC) at [85]. 
124 Section 18 of the Mental Health Care Act. 
125  These Boards serve as a “watch dog” for the human rights of the mental health care users, ensures 
that they are not unnecessarily detained and not detained for unnecessarily long periods.  The 
legislature introduced periodic reviews of the mental health status of the mental health care users to 
ensure that they are not detained in mental institutions for longer than necessary.  Also see 
Landman and Landman The Mental Health Care Act at 8. 
126  Freeman 2002 South Afr Psych Rev 4 at 5.  See further in general Simpson and Chipps 2012 Social 
Work 47 – 57. 
127 Chapter 4 of the Mental Health Care Act, sections 18 to 24 establishes Mental Health Review 
Boards and sets out the powers and functions of the Review Boards. 
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Review Boards follow a multidisciplinary approach as it consists of members from the 
community as well as members from the medical and the legal professions.128  The 
introduction of Mental Health Review Boards is labelled as one of the most important 
changes that the Mental Health Care Act brought about.129  
The powers of the Board are set out in the Mental Health Care Act.130  These Boards review 
the decision by the head of the health establishment to treat a person as an assisted or 
involuntary mental health care user.131   Complaints of exploitation and /or abuse are to be 
lodged with the Review Board.132  The Review Board is obliged to investigate such a 
complaint.133  The Review Board thus provides the accountability mechanism for the South 
African mental health framework. 
These Review Boards, however, have very little involvement in the criminal justice system.  
Its only official involvement, according to the Mental Health Care Act, is the periodic review 
of the mental state of a mentally ill prisoner.134  Review Boards are not vested with the 
                                                
128  Section 20(1) and (2) of the Mental Health Care Act.  A Review Board consists of a multi-disciplinary 
team comprising of a lawyer, psychologist or psychiatrist and community member. 
129 Freeman August 2002 South African Psychiatry Review 4 at 5-7 also indicates that the introduction 
of involuntary outpatient care is another significant change that the Mental Health Care Act brought 
about.  Also see Zabow T “The Mental Health Care Act (Act 17 of 2002)” in Kaliski S (ed) 
Psycholegal Assessment  in South Africa (Oxford University Press Cape Town South Africa 2006) at 
138 where the introduction of the 72-hour assessment period and the new definition of “mental 
health care practitioner” are also identified as important developments in the new Act.  He points out 
further that the new title of the Act as well as the managing of the property of a mental health care 
user, are unique and important developments in the new Act.  He adds that the inclusion of the 
chapter in the Act on patient rights is an important development as well as the shortening of the 
period of review for involuntary and assisted mental health care users, as well as state patients and 
prisoners with mental illness  
130  Section 19 of the Mental Health Care Act states the powers to be:  (1) ‘The Review Board must 
 a) consider appeals against decisions of the head of a health establishment; 
 b) take decisions with regard to assisted or involuntary mental health care, treatment and   
 rehabilitation services.  
 c) consider reviews and make decisions on assisted or involuntary mental health care users. 
 d) consider 72-hours assessment made by the head of the health establishment and make  
 decisions to provide further involuntary care, treatment and rehabilitation 
 e) consider applications for transfer of mental health care users to maximum security facilities; 
 and 
 f) consider periodic reports of the mental health status of mentally ill prisoners. 
131  Section 19(b) and (c) of the Mental Health Care Act.  They must also consider 72-hours assessment 
made by the head of the health establishment and make decisions to provide further involuntary 
care, treatment and rehabilitation (sub paragraph (d)). 
132  Section 11 of the Mental Health Care Act and the forms published in the general Regulation to the 
Mental Health Care Act.  The complaint is lodged by completing form MHCA 02.  Also see the 
amended regulations published in Gazette number 38182 on 6 November 2014. 
133  Section 11 of the Mental Health Care Act. 
134  Section 19(1)(f) of the Mental Health Care Act.  In the case of a mentally ill prisoner who is treated 
outside of prison, the mental health care status is reviewed every six months and upon recovery 
from the mental illness, the prisoner is transferred back to prison. 
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authorty to review a fitness finding by a court, nor are they involved in determining the 
appropriate way to deal with a person in the criminal justice system who suffers from a 
mental illness.135  A suggestion is made later in this research that the involvement of the 
Review Boards in the criminal justice system should be expanded as part of a therapeutic 
response to persons with mental illness in the criminal justice system.136 
2.6 Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998 137 
Reference is made to this piece of legislation since mentally ill accused persons awaiting 
psychiatric observation are often detained in a correctional facility awaiting transfer to a 
psychiatric hospital for purposes of assessment.  Mentally ill remand detainees have been 
identified as a special group of accused persons for whom special provisions for care 
should be made.138 
Section 49D of the Correctional Services Act makes provision for the treatment of mentally 
ill persons in remand detention.139  Provision is further made for the detention of a person 
suspected to have a mental illness in a single cell for purposes of observation.140  The 
correctional facility must provide health services to the mentally ill accused within its 
available means.141  The regulations require a nurse to attend to mentally ill remand 
detainees as often as is required but at least once a day.142  Having regards to the resource 
                                                
135  See the discussion of the Canadian Review Boards in chapter 4 of this research where their powers 
have been extended substantially to include these functions.  Canadian Review Boards from an 
integral part of the Canadian criminal justice system. 
136  See chapter 6 of this research where this suggestion is made. 
137  Hereinafter referred to as the “Correctional Services Act”. 
138  See the discussion of remand detainees in chapter 2 of this research. 
139  Section 49 of the Correctional Services Act.  Also see Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/White%20Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention%20Manage
ment%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf (Date of use:  22 August 2016) at 44.    
140  Section 49D (1) of the Correctional Services Act.  It is, however, not compulsory to detain an 
accused that is suspected to be mentally ill in a single sell as the legislation reads that such a person 
“may” detain such a person in a single cell. This presumably refers to observation of the accused 
person’s general health including his mental health and does not refer to the forensic assessment, 
as that has to be done by a psychiatrist or psychologist for purposes of drafting the report in terms of 
section 79 of the Act.  Due to the overcrowding problem as pointed out in chapter 2 of this research, 
it is doubtful whether accused persons showing signs of mental illness are detained in single cells.  
141  Section 49D of the Correctional Services Act states that:   
 “Mentally ill remand detainees.—(1) The National Commissioner may detain a person suspected to 
be mentally ill, in terms of section 77 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act or a person showing signs of 
mental health care problems, in a single cell or correctional health facility for purposes of observation 
by a medical practitioner. 
  (2) The Department must provide, within its available resources, adequate health care services for 
the prescribed care and treatment of the mentally ill remand detainee. 
  (3) The Department must, within its available resources, provide social and psychological services 
in order to support mentally ill remand detainees and promote their mental health.” 
142  Regulation 7 (4) states that:  “( 4) A registered nurse must attend to all sick sentenced offenders and 
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challenges in correctional settings, combined with overcrowding of these facilities as 
discussed in chapter 2, it is unlikely that mentally ill remand detainees receive adequate 
mental health care in prison.143 
The above concludes the discussion of relevant legislation per se.  The remainder of this 
chapter will focus on the procedural issues as they pertain to the mentally ill accused. The 
discussion will further be limited to pre-trial issues, and in particular, fitness to stand trial. 
3  FITNESS TO STAND TRIAL 
3.1 Introduction 
The procedure pertaining to the fitness assessment is discussed in some detail below to 
illustrate the technical nature of the current process.  Challenges in the current process are 
alluded to throughout this discussion.144    
3.2 Purpose of assessment for fitness to stand trial 
The fitness assessment ensures the delivery of justice to the accused as it embodies the 
fundamental principle of South African law that the accused must have the ability, firstly, to 
follow the court proceedings and, secondly, to communicate constructively with one's legal 
representative in order to conduct a proper defence.145    
A further fundamental principle of South African law is that an accused must be present at 
his trial.146  This presence has been accepted to mean both physical and 
                                                                                                                                                   
remand detainees, which shall include pregnant women and the mentally ill, as often as is 
necessary, but at least once a day.”  [Sub-regulation (4) substituted by clause 6 (a) of Gazette No. 
35032 of 27 February 2012]. 
143  See De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development CC case at ]43] where it is stated 
that:  “It should be noted that the Correctional Services Act behoves the Department of Correctional 
Services to provide psychological services to detainees with mental illnesses or intellectual 
disabilities.  However, the uncontested evidence presented by Cape Mental Health is that prisons do 
not have the facilities to provide appropriate treatment and care.  This evidence appears to have 
been accepted by the Minister of Health before the High Court.”  (footnotes omitted). 
144  The procedure regarding fitness to stand trial in chapters 4 (Canada) and 5 (United States of 
America) are not covered in as much detail since those jurisdictions make use of a Mental Health 
Court to assist with mental health issues in the criminal justice system and each Mental Health Court 
determine its own procedures.  The detailed discussion of the South African procedure serves to 
illustrate the challenges and to promote the establishment of a Mental Health Court in South Africa to 
address these exact challenges.    
145  Louw in Psycholegal Assessment in South Africa at 42.  Also see Kruger Mental Health Law in South 
Africa at 162, 165.  See further Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses 225.  See further Du 
Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act at 13-5. 
146  Section 35(3)(e) of the Constitution gives every arrested person the right to be present when he is 
tried.  Section 158 of the Criminal Procedure Act.  Also see Stevens P “Re-establishing triability by 
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psychological/mental presence.147  The psychological/mental presence refers to the 
accused's ability to follow the proceedings.  A mental illness may have an impact on this 
ability. 
The mere fact that an accused is suffering from a mental illness will, however, not in itself 
render him unfit to stand trial.148  An accused will only be unfit to stand trial if it is clear that 
the symptoms of the mental illness impair the functioning of the individual to such an extent 
that he is not able to understand the court proceedings or is incapable of giving proper 
instructions to his legal representative.149    
Fitness to stand trial refers to the current mental capacity of an accused to understand the 
proceedings at the time when the trial is underway 150 and is not concerned with the mental 
state of the accused retrospectively.151  Since the mere presence of a mental illness does 
                                                                                                                                                   
means of psychotropic medication:  An analysis” 2013 (76) THRHR 252-260 at 252.  See further 
Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 227.  Also see Du Toit et al Commentary on the 
Criminal Procedure Act at 13-1.  Also see Snyman J “The declaration of a patient as a state 
president's patient” 1988 Acta Juridica 128-168 at 128. 
147  Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 225.  Also see in general Snyman 1988 Acta 
Juridica 128-168.  See further Pachcourie v Additional Magistrate, Ladysmith 1978 (3) SA 986 (N) 
991A-H.  Also see Cassim 2004 Codicillus 17 at 19, 22.  See also Stevens 2013 THRHR 252 at 262 
who confirms this.  See further Burchell J South African Criminal Law and Procedure 4th ed (Juta 
Cape Town 2001) at 282, footnote 14.  
148  Africa A “Psychological evaluation of mental state in criminal cases” in Tredoux C, Foster D, Allan A, 
Cohen A and Wassenaar D Psychology and Law (Juta South Africa 2005) at 389.  Also see Kaliski 
SZ, Borcherds M and Williams F “Defendants are clueless – the 30-day psychiatric observation” 
1997 (87) SAMJ 1351-1355 at 1352.  Also see Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 220 
who points out that the court may take the fact that a person is receiving treatment in a psychiatric 
institution in terms of the Mental Health Care Act into consideration when judging an accused’s 
fitness to stand trial.  The author points out that it is indeed possible for a court to find that an 
accused is fit to stand trial, despite the fact that he is receiving mental health care treatment and 
rehabilitation services in terms of the Mental Health Care Act.  Also see Kruger Mental Health Law in 
South Africa at 168 for the position prior to the Mental Health Care Act and where he indicates that 
an abnormality does not necessarily affect triability. 
149  Africa in Psychology and Law at 389. 
150  Kaliski, Borcherds and Williams 1997 SAMJ 1351 at 1354.  Also see Africa in Psychology and Law 
at 387.  See further Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 164 and further S v Mabena 2007 
(1) SACR 482 (SCA) at [12] as well as De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
WCC case.at {7} where it is stated that “‘The accused is suffering from a mental illness the effect of 
which is that he or she cannot be put on trial: section 77 – the “now” question.  In the adjudication of 
this question the condition of the accused when the conduct in question was committed is not 
considered.”  Also see Pillay AL “Could S v Pistorius influence reform in the traditional forensic 
mental health evaluation format?”  2014 (44) South African Journal of Psychology 377-380 at 378. 
151  Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 221.  This is in contrast with the test for criminal 
capacity which does not test the current state of mind of the accused, but is a retrospective test, 
looking at the state of mind of the accused at the time of commission of the alleged offence.  Kruger 
points out, however, at 222 that the assessment for criminal capacity, which looks at the accused’s 
state of mind retrospectively, will in many instances also answer the question pertaining to whether 
the accused is fit to stand trial.  Note, however, that lack of criminal capacity does not presuppose 
lack of fitness to stand trial.  Also se Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 48 at 50 where 
it is confirmed that the assessment for criminal capacity is a retrospective one. 
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not presuppose unfitness, determining the current level of functioning of the accused is 
crucial.  It is not impossible for an accused with a serious mental illness to have the ability 
and capacity to understand court proceedings and give coherent instructions to his legal 
representative.152    
The determination of the accused’s fitness to stand trial is a preliminary issue that has to be 
determined before the criminal responsibility of the accused for the act committed can be 
investigated.153  The inquiry into a person’s fitness to stand trial has no bearing on the 
inquiry into whether or not he should be held accountable for the act committed.154  The 
capacities that are relevant with the assessment for triability on the one hand and for 
criminal responsibility on the other are vastly different.155  It follows that non-triability does 
not presuppose non-responsibility and visa versa.156   
The fact that fitness to stand trial is determined first before regard is had to the criminal 
responsibility of the accused could have the unfortunate result that the court finds the 
accused unfit and orders his detention in a psychiatric hospital before the prosecution 
                                                
152  Africa in Psychology and Law at 389.  Persons found fit to stand trial include those with serious 
mental illnesses such as schizophrenia and major depression who do not always meet the criteria to 
be found unfit to stand trial.  Also see Lurigio RJ and Snowden J “Putting therapeutic jurisprudence 
into practice: The growth, operations, and effectiveness of mental health courts” 2009 (2) The 
Justice System Journal 196-218 at 198 who specifically mention that persons with serious mental 
illness do not always meet the incompetence to stand trial criteria and are, consequently, found fit to 
stand trial, found guilty and sent to prison.  See also Slobogin C, Rai A and Reisner R Law and the 
Mental Health System Civil and Criminal Aspects 5th ed (Thomson West United States of America 
2009) at 1020 where various studies revealed that in approximately 30% of matters, those with 
serious mental illnesses sent for observation are found fit to stand trial.    
153  Burchell South African Criminal Law and Procedure at 283.  Also see Kruger Heimstra Suid-
Afrikaanse Strafproses at 243.  See further Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 48 at 
51.  Also see S v Pedro 2015 (1) SACR 41 (WCC) at [81] where Rogers J explained that:  “Where, 
by contrast, an accused is not capable of understanding proceedings as contemplated in s 77, he 
cannot in the nature of things enter a plea and the question of his criminal responsibility at the time 
of the alleged offence cannot be judicially determined in accordance with s 78.  An accused who by 
reason of mental illness or mental defect is not capable of understanding the proceedings may or 
may not also have lacked criminal responsibility at the time he perpetrated the alleged offence; either 
way, he must be dealt with in accordance with s 77, not s 78.  This means that he can be found 
neither guilty nor not guilty; no verdict is entered, and instead a direction must be made in 
accordance with either sub-para (i) or (ii) of s 77(6)(a).” 
154 Fitness thus stands separately from the inquiry into guilt.  See Africa A “Insanity and Diminished 
Capacity Before the Courts” https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/17210882/insanitypdf# 
(Date of use: 10 March 2015) at 3. 
155 Snyman 1988 Acta Juridica 128 at 153. 
156  See, however, the findings of Kaliski, Borcherds and Williams 1997 SAMJ 1351 at 1354 where all 
those in the study that were found unfit to stand trial, was also found to lack criminal capacity.  
Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 222 states that the assessment for criminal 
capacity, which looks at the accused’s state of mind retrospectively, will in many instances, however, 
also answer the question pertaining to whether the accused is fit to stand trial.  Note, however, that 
lack of criminal capacity does not presuppose lack of fitness to stand trial.  Also se Pillay 2014 South 
African Journal of Psychology 48 at 50. 
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proved its case against the accused and more importantly, before any defence that the 
accused might have, has been heard.157  This means that the accused could be detained 
without any evidence that he committed a crime.  This position possibly violates the 
accused’s right to a fair trial and the right not to be detained arbitrarily.158 
In an attempt to address this concern, the South Africa legislature affected amendments to 
section 77 of the Criminal Procedure Act through the Criminal Matters Amendment Act 68 
of 1998.159  The current position is that the court may, after a finding of unfitness, consider 
evidence in a trial of the facts so as to determine whether the accused actually committed 
the act in question 160 before ordering his detention.  The burden of proof for purposes of 
this inquiry is on a balance of probabilities and not beyond a reasonable doubt.161  The trial 
of the facts serves as a procedural safeguard for the mentally ill accused against arbitrary 
                                                
157  If the accused is found unfit to stand trial, the court may order this accused to be detained as a state 
patient in a psychiatric hospital until such time as he regains his ability to stand trial.  If this ability is 
not regained, the accused remains detained as a state patient until a Judge orders his release. 
Burchell South African Criminal Law and Procedure at 283 and see Snyman 1988 Acta Juridica 128 
at 139-142.  Also see Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 168 who points out that this was a 
lacuna in the Criminal Procedure Act at the time.  Kruger also indicates that England addressed the 
issue by allowing for a trial on the facts prior to the person being declared a state patient in order for 
a verdict of not guilty to be rendered if it is shown that the accused was not involved in the act under 
investigation.  This recommendation was made by the Butler Commission.  At the time, the Rumpff 
Commission in South Africa was not in favour of such a procedure as they were of the view that, if 
the accused cannot participate in the trial due to mental illness or defect, he also negates his 
elementary rights.  See the Rumpff Commission report at 10.33. 
158  This situation is a perfect example of how mental illness has been criminalised in the South African 
criminal justice system.  Mentally ill accused persons were detained for the mere fact that they are 
mentally ill without due regard to their guilt or innocence. In English law, this exact problem was 
addressed by adjustments made to legislation.  The effect of this was that the psychiatric inquiry 
could be postponed in selected cases till at least after the state has presented its case.  This 
amendment enabled the defence to apply for the charges to be dropped if it appears that the state 
does not have enough evidence to build a prima facie case against the accused.  If the charges are 
dropped, this means that the fitness issue will not be raised in the particular case.  Snyman 1988 
Acta Juridica 128 at 141, 142.  This adjustment was possibly because of the recommendations 
made by the Butler Commission as referred to above.  The practice of detaining an accused due to 
the mere fact that he suffers from a disability (mental illness in this case) is in direct contravention of 
article 14 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.  Also see De 
Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development CC case at [29] where it is stated that a 
disability may not be used to deprive a person of his liberty.  The accused in this case suffered from 
mental retardation. 
159  Hereinafter referred to as the “Criminal Matters Amendment Act”.   
160  Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 219 points out that this amendment was brought 
about by amending section 77(6)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act by making provision for a trial on 
the facts of the matter which does not constitute an official trial for purposes of finding the accused 
guilty or not guilty.  Also see Louw in Psycholegal Assessment in South Africa at 43 who explains 
that the burden of proof in these inquiries is on a balance of probabilities and not beyond reasonable 
doubt as the usual burden of proof in a criminal case is.  Louw warns that this could lead to an 
“innocent” person being found to have committed the act in question as the court will not have all the 
evidence before it.  See the discussion on the trial on the facts later in this chapter. 
161  Section 77(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  Also see Louw in Psycholegal Assessment in South 




There has been a rapid increase in the number of accused persons referred for fitness 
assessments by order of the criminal court.163  The order for a fitness assessment is 
discussed below. 
3.3 Order for assessment of fitness to stand trial 
Section 77(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 164 states that the matter of fitness should be 
“enquired into”.  Section 79 of the Criminal Procedure Act sets out the procedure to follow 
for purposes of the relevant enquiry. The stage in the process at which point a fitness 
assessment order may be made, grounds upon which such an order may be made, the 
content of the order and the jurisdiction of the court to grant such an order are canvassed 
below. 
3.3.1 Stage in the criminal proceedings when the order may be made 
The issue of fitness to stand trial can be raised at any point during the proceedings 165 prior 
to sentencing.166  Where a fitness assessment is ordered, the trial is postponed pending the 
                                                
162  De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development CC case at [39].where it is pointed out 
that these safeguards are put in place to protect the accused’s right to freedom and prevent unfair 
depravation of his freedom. 
163  There has been a rapid increase in referrals for fitness to stand trial since the Mental Health Care 
Act came into force.  This is according to data from Sterkfontein hospital as reported on by Schutte 
2013 South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 64 at 67.  The reasons for the increase in referrals 
are not clear.  
164  Section 77(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act reads as follows:   “If it appears to the court at any stage 
of criminal proceedings that the accused is by reason of mental illness or mental defect not capable 
of understanding the proceedings so as to make a proper defence, the court shall direct that the 
matter be enquired into and be reported on in accordance with the provisions of section 79.” 
165  Section 77(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  Also see Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal 
Procedure Act at 13-1.  Also see Louw in Psycholegal Assessment in South Africa at 42.  Similar 
provisions were contained in Legislation of the Cape, Act 35 of 1891, the predecessor of the Mental 
Disorders Act.  Also see Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 159 who indicates that this was 
the case even on the earliest versions of the Criminal Procedure Act and further points out at 163 
that the wording of the section leaves no doubt that the legislature foresaw that the issue of fitness 
may arise later in the court proceedings as is evident from the use of the words “at any stage of 
criminal proceedings”.  The issue may be raised prior to entering a plea or subsequent thereto as 
long as it is done before sentencing.  See Africa in Psychology and Law at 387. 
166  The possibility that an accused has a mental illness that may have affected his ability to follow the 
court proceedings, may even be raised after the accused has been found guilty.  See Louw in 
Psycholegal Assessment in South Africa at 42.  Also see Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse 
Strafproses at 225.  If the issue of fitness to stand trial is raised after the accused was found guilty, 
the conviction must be set aside and if the accused is found unfit to stand trial after the necessary 
observation, be declared a state patient.  See further S v Gouws 2004 (2) SACR 512 (W) at 517A-D.  
If the accused entered a guilty plea and he is found guilty but the court finds that the accused is unfit 
to stand trial, the matter must be dealt with as if a plea of not guilty was entered.  See, however, 
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fitness assessment.167  If the accused pleads guilty and the fitness issue is raised after 
conviction, but before sentencing, he shall be deemed to have pleaded not guilty.168    
 
The issue of fitness to stand trial can be raised by the prosecutor,169 the defence 170 or the 
court itself.171  If the issue is raised by the defence, it is usually raised before the 
commencement of the trial.172  The accused’s legal representative may inform the court if it 
                                                                                                                                                   
Joubert JJ (Ed) Geldenhuys T, Swanepoel JP, Terblanche SS and van der Merwe SE 
Strafprosesreg 11th ed (Juta Cape Town, 2014) at 284 who contends that the issue of fitness to 
stand trial may even be raised after sentencing. 
167  Stevens 2013 THRHR 252 at 252.  Also see Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure 
Act at 13-5. 
168  Section 77(6)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  See Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 
231.  See further Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act at 13-7.  Also see Joubert 
et al Strafprosesreg 11th ed at 279, 284.  Such an accused shall not be entitled to an acquittal or 
conviction in respect of the charges brought against him.  See section 106(4) read with section 77(6) 
of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
169  Also referred to as “the state” as the state prosecutes in criminal matters.  See Kruger Mental Health 
Law in South Africa at 162.  Also see Louw in Psycholegal Assessment in South Africa at 42.  See 
further Cassim 2004 Codicillus 17 at 20.  See further S v Morake 1979 (1) SA 121 (B).  Only a small 
percentage of referrals are requested by prosecutors.  According to the study conducted by Kaliski, 
Borcherds and Williams 1997 SAMJ 1351 at 1353, only 8% of all referrals to the Valkenberg 
Hospital, were requested by the prosecutor.  Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 230 
points out that the right of the state, through the prosecutor, to raise the issue of fitness to stand trial 
of the accused, may be contrary to the Constitutional values of dignity and the right to freedom of the 
person.     
170  Louw in Psycholegal Assessment in South Africa at 42.  Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 
162 states that the issue of fitness is usually raised by the defence or by the accused himself if the 
latter is unrepresented.  The position seemed to have changed as according to the study conducted 
by Kaliski, Borcherds and Williams 1997 SAMJ 1351 at 1353, only about 18% of all referrals were 
requested by the defence.  The accused himself may also request a referral although this rarely 
happens and it only happened in 5.7% of the cases considered by Kaliski, Borcherds and Williams.  
Schutte 2013 South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 64 at 66, 67 in their study conducted at 
Sterkfontein hospital, found that all of the accused persons in their study who raised the issue of 
fitness themselves, were in the end found fit to stand trial.  Schutte submits that an accused’s own 
account of his mental illness should not be regarded as sufficient grounds for referral for observation 
for fitness to stand trial (at 67). 
171  Louw in Psycholegal Assessment in South Africa at 42.  Also see Kruger Mental Health Law in South 
Africa at 162.  See however Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 226 who cautions that 
the implications of referral for fitness to stand trial should be considered carefully before a court 
orders such referral.  There could be implications for the accused in the sense that he may spend 
significantly more time in the criminal justice system if he is referred for a fitness assessment  where 
he is accused of a minor offence, as opposed to the time he would have spent in the criminal justice 
system had the issue of fitness to stand trial not been raised.  Kruger also points out that there are 
cost considerations as a fitness assessment in 2005 cost the community approximately R80 000.00.  
Also see Burchell South African Criminal Law and Procedure at 283.  See, however, Cassim 2004 
Codicillus 17 at 20 who opines that the court will be forsaking it’s duty if it did not raise the fitness 
issue when reasonable grounds exist and that such failure could impact on the accused right to a fair 
trial.  According to Kaliski, Borcherds and Williams 1997 SAMJ 1351 at 1353, 1354, 21.6% of 
referrals to the Valkenberg Hospital are initiated by Magistrates but that many of the accused 
referred to observation did not know who actually requested the assessment.  In this particular study, 
only eight accused were referred for observation because their behaviour in court seemed 
disordered.  Of these eight accused, only two were found to have a mental illness.     
172  Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 162.  Also see Du Toit et al Commentary on the 
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is not possible to consult with the accused due to his suspected mental state.173  In such an 
instance, the court can order that the accused be assessed for fitness to stand trial.174  No 
provision is made for a special plea of “non-triability”, but the issue of triability may also be 
raised by the legal representative of the accused at the stage when the accused is asked to 
enter his plea.175 
Referral for a fitness assessment can further occur by agreement between the prosecutor 
and the legal representative of the accused, where the latter approach the prosecutor with 
the suggestion that a joint application is lodged for the accused to be assessed for 
fitness.176      
As indicated above, fitness assessments can also be ordered by the court of its own 
accord.  Although magistrates are capable of identifying an accused in need of a fitness 
assessment, they often neglect to explain the process to the accused.177  Research shows 
that some accused sent for fitness assessments are unaware of why they have been sent 
to a psychiatric hospital.178  Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Act addressed this 
concern and introduced measures to ensure legal representation for any accused who is 
subjected to the procedures in terms of section 77 and 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act if 
the lack of such representation could be detrimental to the accused.179  The legal 
representative could then assist in explaining the process and the reason for referral to a 
                                                                                                                                                   
Criminal Procedure Act at 13-3.   
173  Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 225.  Where an accused is referred for a fitness  
assessment because he cannot communicate property with his attorney (it is obviously the attorney 
that makes this claim) suspicions have been raised that such a referral is sometimes merely a 
tactical move by the defence to delay matters.  See Schutte 2013 South African Journal of Bioethics 
and Law 64 at 67. 
174  In terms of section 77 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
175  Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 163. 
176  Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 225 where it is explained that this approach can 
assist the court a great deal in that it eliminates the necessity of calling witnesses at this point and no 
trial preparation is required. 
177  This is particularly concerning, bearing in mind that a large number of those sent for fitness 
assessments in the past, did not have legal representation to explain the proceedings or purpose of 
the assessment to him.  See Kaliski, Borcherds and Williams 1997 SAMJ 1351 at 1354 where 60% 
of those sent for observation to the Valkenberg Hospital in this particular study, did not have legal 
representation.  It was also found however, that legal representation did not result in greater 
awareness or knowledge of the reason for the observation on the part of the accused. 
178  Kaliski, Borcherds and Williams 1997 SAMJ 1351 at 1354. 
179  Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 223 explains that section 7 of the Criminal Matters 
Amendment Act 68 of 1998 provides that legal representation at the expense of the state has to be 
provided to an accused who is subjected to the procedures under section 77(1) and 78(1) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 if the lack of legal representation will cause gross injustice.  Also 
see Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act at 13-6 who points out that legal 




psychiatric hospital to the accused. 
The accused has to be given an opportunity to be heard prior to referring him for a fitness 
assessment.180  Resultantly, an order for a fitness assessment may not be made in the 
absence of the accused.181 
3.3.2 Grounds for ordering a fitness assessment 
The court must base its decision to refer an accused for a fitness assessment on a factual 
or medical basis, indicating that the accused may suffer from a condition that renders him 
incapable of understanding the proceedings.182  There must be a mental illness or mental 
defect present.183      
When the court considers whether an accused should be referred for observation in terms 
of section 77, the court does not apply a strict test.184  If there is any doubt about the 
accused’s fitness to stand trial, such an accused must be sent for a fitness assessment.185  
There is no onus of proof on the accused at this point to prove that he has a mental illness 
                                                
180  Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 226.  Also see S v Kahita 1983 (4) SA 618 (C) at 
620E.  Also see S v Malcolm 1998 (1) SASV 577 (OK) at 581G-J.   
181  S v Kahita 1983 (4) SA 618 (K) and S v Eyden 1982 (4) SA 141 (T).  Also see Kruger Heimstra Suid-
Afrikaanse Strafproses at 248. 
182  S v Dlali (3/2015) [2015] ZAECBHC 2 (27 February 2015) at [18] where it is stated that: Before a 
court can refer an accused for observation whether in terms of section 77 (1) or 78 (2), it must be 
satisfied as to the existence of a factual or medical basis for the allegations of lack of fitness to stand 
trial and or of criminal incapacity.”  See Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 226.  The 
author is of the opinion that the court will opt for a psychiatric observation of the accused where 
there is “gegronde twyfel” about the accused’s ability to follow the proceedings.  Also see Du Toit et 
al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act at 13-4.  Also see in general S v Mogorosi 1979 (2) 
SA 938 (A) 941H-942A, R v Mfuduka 1960 (4) SA 770 (C);  S v Makoka 1979 (2) SA 933 (A) 937G.  
Also see S v Mabena 2007 (1) SACR 482 (SCA) at [16].  See however Kruger Mental Health Law in 
South Africa at 163 who opines that the court need not obtain medical evidence before referring an 
accused for observation, but that in practice, the district surgeon or other medical practitioner would 
usually have examined the accused by the time the court has to make a decision as to if a person 
will be referred for observation or not.   
183  Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 226.  This requirement can be distinguished from 
the requirements to refer an accused for psychiatric observation for purposes of determining his 
criminal capacity in terms of section 78(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act in that, for referral in terms 
of section 78(1), a mental illness or defect need not be present and referral can be done for “any 
other reason” which according to Kruger may include the averment of automatism at the time of 
commission of the alleged offence.  
184  Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 249. 
185  Joubert et al Strafprosesreg 11th ed 251 who stress that such a person should in particular be 
referred for observation where there is doubt about his mental capacities and such a person is not 
legally represented.  Also see Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 249.  Also see Kruger 
Mental Health Law in South Africa at 164. 
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that renders him unfit to stand trial.186 
Some accused are simply referred for observation because of previous contact with the 
mental health care system.187  Past contact with the mental health care system does not 
imply that the accused is suffering from a mental illness at the present time.  This is 
particularly concerning if it is considered that the assessment for fitness to stand trial 
specifically focuses on the current ability of the accused to understand the proceedings and 
is not a retrospective inquiry.188  On the other hand, if such previous contact with the mental 
health care system creates doubt with the presiding officer about the accused’s fitness, it 
can be argued that he will be obliged to order a fitness assessment.  A reasonable 
possibility that the accused may be suffering from a mental illness or defect is sufficient for 
the obligation of referral to arise.189   
Once the issue of the accused’s fitness is raised, the court is obliged to order a fitness 
assessment of the accused.  There is no discretion in this regard, as is apparent from the 
wording of section 77(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act.190  The content of the order is 
discussed below.  
3.3.3 Content of order for a fitness assessment 
The court must ensure that the order contains clear directions pertaining to if the accused 
has to be assessed for fitness to stand trial in terms of section 77 or for criminal capacity in 
terms of section 78, or for both.191  In practice, the trend seems to be to request an 
                                                
186  Joubert et al Strafprosesreg 11th ed at 284. 
187  Kaliski, Borcherds and Williams 1997 SAMJ 1351 at 1354. 
188  Kaliski, Borcherds and Williams 1997 SAMJ 1351 at 1354.  Also see Africa in Psychology and Law   
at 387.  See further Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 164 and see Pillay 2014 South 
African Journal of Psychology 377 at 378. 
189  Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 163.  Also see Du Toit et al Commentary on the 
Criminal Procedure Act at 13-4.  Also see S v Tom and Others 1991 (2) SACR 249 (B) 250H-251C. 
190  The relevant part of section 77(1) reads that “…the court shall direct that the matter be enquired into 
and be reported on…”  [my emphasis and underlining].  Also see Du Toit et al Commentary on the 
Criminal Procedure Act at 13-3 where it is stated that the court “must” order an investigation into the 
mental state of the accused and cause a report on this issue to be lodged with the court subsequent 
to the said investigation.  See further this source at 13-5.  Also see Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse 
Strafproses at 249. 
191  Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 226.  Also see Kruger Mental Health Law in South 
Africa at 164.  See further section 79(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act that sets out the detail that 
should be in the report eventually drafted by the mental health care practitioner which includes a 
finding on if the accused is fit to stand trial or not.  The court ordering such a referral has to complete 
a form J138A that constitutes a warrant, indicating the names of the psychiatrists who should 
conduct the assessment for fitness and/or criminal capacity.  The form is attached at the end of this 
research as Annexure A. 
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assessment in terms of both these sections rather than just one or the other.192  Even 
though criminal capacity, or the lack thereof, is irrelevant once an accused is found unfit to 
stand trial, an accused may regain his fitness, at which point the trial will commence, and 
criminal capacity may then become relevant.  The practice to conduct both assessments 
simultaneously probably emerged as a cost- and time-saving initiative.193    
The place where the assessment should take place should be named or, the nature of the 
place where the relevant assessment should take place should be clearly described.194  
Where psychiatric observation of an accused is ordered, a warrant is issued together 
therewith for the transfer of the accused to the psychiatric hospital.195 
It should be noted that section 79(2)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act, which creates the 
mechanism for referral for the fitness assessment, states: 
a “court may [my emphasis]. for the purposes of the relevant enquiry into the accused’s 
fitness commit the accused to a psychiatric hospital or to any other place designated by the 
court, for such periods, not exceeding thirty days at a time. 196  
                                                
192  Calitz FJW, van Rensburg PHJJ, Fourie C, Liebenberg E, van den Berg C and Joubert G 
“Psychiatric evaluation of offenders referred to the Free State Psychiatric Complex according to 
sections 77 and 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act” 2006 (12) SAJP  47-50 at 49 explain that in this 
study, only 5.3% of the referrals were for fitness assessments only.  The majority of the referrals 
were in terms of both section 77 and 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act.  The reason for this is 
probably because it is convenient for the presiding officer to have the assessment conducted in 
respect of both sections simultaneously.  Also see Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 
377 at 378. 
193  The practice to refer the accused to be assessed in terms of both section 77 and 78 possibly 
emerged because it is impossible for the court as a non-expert in mental health, to establish if the 
suspected illness might have an impact on fitness alone or on criminal capacity as well.  The 
assessment for criminal capacity should further probably not be postponed since this inquiry is 
retrospective and a passage of time may eradicate chances of determining with accuracy what the 
accused’s state of mind was at the time of commission of the alleged offence.  Pillay 2014 South 
African Journal of Psychology 48 at 50 confirms that the assessment for criminal capacity becomes 
more complex the longer time lapses between the alleged offence committed and the assessment. 
194  Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 226.  The assessment should take place at a 
psychiatric institution unless such institution is not available.  It is not clear what the cost effective 
alternatives to an assessment for fitness to stand trial that takes place at a psychiatric institution are.  
Also see S v Pedro 2015 (1) SACR 41 (WCC) at [71] where it is stated that the name of the 
psychiatric institution should be indicated on the J138A form (See Annexure A at the end of this 
research).  The superintendent of this institution shall conduct or appoint someone to conduct the 
observation on behalf of the court.  The form also provides for two names of psychiatrists to be 
inserted – presumably those that should be appointed for the accused and the one appointed for the 
state.  
195  S v Pedro 2015 (1) SACR 41 (WCC) [71].  A form J138A is used for these purposes.  This form is 
not issued as part of regulations to the Criminal Procedure Act but was developed by the 
Department of Justice over time to ensure compliance with the prescripts of the Criminal Procedure 
Act.  This form has dedicated spaces where the names of the psychiatrists that must perform the 
assessment has to be filled in.  See Annexure A at the end of this research. 
196  Section 79(2)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
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It is clear from the wording of the Act that there is scope for an accused’s fitness 
assessment to be conducted at a place other than a psychiatric hospital.197  In practice, 
however, it seems to be the default position to refer an accused to a psychiatric institution 
for a fitness assessment.  This practice contributes to delays in assessments since there 
are only ten facilities across South Africa where court-ordered psychiatric observations are 
conducted.198 
The order must further state the duration of the initial assessment period, which may not 
exceed 30 days.199   The initial assessment period may be extended by another 30 days 200 
in the absence of the accused unless the accused or his legal representative requests that 
the accused be present.201  The accused has to be present for any further extensions of the 
assessment period.202 
Since criminal proceedings are conducted in both the magistrate’s court and the high court, 
a question that arises is if a court conducting such criminal proceedings automatically has 
jurisdiction to order a fitness assessment if and when the issue of fitness arises in such 
court?  This issue is briefly considered below. 
3.3.4 Jurisdiction of court to make an order for a fitness assessment 
In Siko, it was held that if a court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the particular offence, the 
court similarly lacks jurisdiction to refer the accused for psychiatric observation.203  It does, 
however, often happen in practice that an accused is referred by the magistrate's court for 
assessment, knowing that the case will eventually be heard by the high court.204  In Siko,205 
                                                
197  This section may support the practices of Mental Health Courts to have the fitness of the accused 
assessed at the court itself by a multidisciplinary team.  This could result in both time and cost 
savings.  More details about the process followed by Mental Health Courts to assess the triability of 
mentally ill accused persons at court, is discussed in chapter 4 and 5 of this research. 
198  Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 48 at 51.  This is as at 2012. 
199  Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 227.  Also see section 79(2)(a) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act.  
200  Section 79(2)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  Also see Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse 
Strafproses at 249. 
201  Section 79(2)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  See Joubert et al Strafprosesreg 11th ed at 251.  
Also see Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 227, 249.  Prior to the insertion of section 
97(2)(b) by Act 4 of 1992, there was uncertainty as to if the accused had to be present when the 
period for his detention for purposes of observation, is extended.  See Kruger Mental Health Law in 
South Africa at 164 footnote 82 for a discussion of the uncertainty that existed prior to the 
amendment of the Criminal Procedure Act which saw the insertion of section 79)2)(b).  Also see Du 
Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act at 13-27.  
202  See section 158 of the Criminal Procedure Act.  Also see Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse 
Strafproses at 227. 
203  See S v Siko 2010 (2) SACR 406 (ECS) at {1], [9].   
204  Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 250 where it is pointed out that in such an instance 
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for example, the accused was charged with murder.  Since the district magistrates court 
lacks jurisdiction to hear a murder case, the magistrate was of the view that the magistrates 
court also lacks jurisdiction to refer the accused for psychiatric observation.206  The 
magistrate was of the opinion that this task was reserved for a court with the necessary 
jurisdiction over the relevant charge.  The magistrate’s opinion was confirmed by the high 
court.207   
Du Toit et al 208 disagree with this approach on the basis that section 77(1) is wide enough 
to allow a magistrates court to refer a murder accused for assessment even if it lacks 
jurisdiction to hear the actual case.  Du Toit et al opine that it is only the finding on the 
triability of the accused that has to be made subsequent to the assessment in terms of 
section 79 that is reserved for a court with the jurisdiction to adjudicate the actual charge.209  
The magistrate's court can thus, order an assessment even if it lacks jurisdiction to conduct 
the trial. 
Du Toit et al’s view is bolstered by the wording of section 77(6)(a), which states that: 
If the court, which has jurisdiction in terms of section 75 to try the case, finds that the 
accused is not capable of understanding the proceedings so as to make a proper defence….  
This confirms that the jurisdiction of the court is only relevant where a finding of unfitness is 
made and not when the initial referral for such an assessment is made.  This view is 
supported by the fact that no mention is made of the jurisdiction of the court in section 77(1) 
in terms whereof an assessment order is made. 
The decision by a magistrate to refer an accused for psychiatric observation is not 
reviewable by a judge in chambers in terms of section 304 of the Criminal Procedure Act.210  
                                                                                                                                                   
the report containing the findings of the fitness assessment is sent to the relevant high court rather 
than back to the magistrates court in order to avoid delays in the trial. 
205 2010 (2) SACR 406 (ECB). 
206  See S v Siko 2010 (2) SACR 406 (ECB) at [9] footnote 5, where the court points out that:  “A district 
court does not have the necessary jurisdiction to hear a charge of murder.  (See section 89 of the 
Magistrate’s Courts Act No. 32 of 1944) Although Section 110 of the CPA provides that if the 
accused does not plead that the court has no jurisdiction, that the court may dispose of the matter, 
this relates mainly to territorial jurisdiction.  It can not add to the jurisdiction of the court as far as 
offences are concerned (See S v M (1979 (2) SA 959 T) and a person who does not have capacity 
to act could in any event not consent to the court’s jurisdiction”. 
207  S v Siko 2010 (2) SACR 406 (ECB) at [9]. 
208  Du Toit Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act at 13-4. 
209  The jurisdiction as allocated by section 75 of the Criminal Procedure Act.  Also see Du Toit 
Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act at 13-4.  
210  Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 226.  Also see Du Toit et al Commentary on the 
Criminal Procedure Act at 13-7.  See in particular S v Ramokoka 2006 (2) SACR 57 (W) (Hereinafter 
referred to as “S v Ramokoka”) where Willis J expresses his view on reviews of section 77 orders 
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This is illustrated by S v Wills 211 where the magistrate referred the accused for a fitness 
assessment.  The finding of the psychiatrists was that the accused was unfit to stand 
trial.212  The magistrate was of the view that, in terms of section 77(6)(a), a judge in 
chambers had to decide what should happen with the accused forthwith, including if the 
accused should be detained as a state patient.  Hartzenberg J, however, found that the 
initial decision to refer an accused for observation is not reviewable.213   
Once the order for a fitness assessment is made, the accused is usually transferred to a 
psychiatric institution for purposes of the fitness assessment.214  The accused often has to 
wait for long periods in order for a bed in the relevant psychiatric institution to become 
available.  The test employed to establish fitness or the lack thereof is discussed below.  
3.4 Test for fitness to stand trial 
3.4.1 Introduction 
An accused will be unfit to stand trial if he, by reason of mental illness or mental defect, is 
not able to understand the proceedings in order to make a proper defence.215  It is obvious 
that the first element that has to be established during the fitness assessment is whether a 
mental illness is present.  Having said that, bear in mind that the mere fact that someone is 
diagnosed with a mental illness does not in itself render the person unfit to stand trial.216  It 
has to be established that the symptoms of the mental illness impair the functioning of the 
                                                                                                                                                   
taking into consideration the provisions of the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002 that came into 
force in December 2004.  See further in general S v April 1985 (1) 639 (NC).   
211  [1996] 4 All SA 270 (T), 1996 (2) SASV 105 (T). (Hereinafter referred to as S v Wills.) 
212  S v Wills at 106E-F. 
213  S v Wills at 108B-C. 
214  A warrant is issued with the order for assessment – J138A.  An example of such warrant is attached 
as Annexure A to this research. 
215  Section 77(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  Also see Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal 
Procedure Act at 13-3, 13-5.  See further Burchell South African Criminal Law and Procedure 282. 
216  Africa in Psychology and Law at 389.  Also see Kaliski, Borcherds and Williams 1997 SAMJ 1351 at 
1352 where it is stated that the practice at the time (in the 90’s) was that most psychiatrists would 
indicate that an accused is unfit to stand trial where a mental illness or defect has been diagnosed 
as there were no clear guidelines on how the assessment for fitness to stand trial should be 
assessed.  Also see Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 220 who points out that the 
court may take the fact that a person is receiving treatment in a psychiatric institution in terms of the 
Mental Health Care Act into consideration when considering if an accused is indeed fit to stand trial.  
The author points out that it is indeed possible for a court to find that an accused is fit to stand trial, 
despite the fact that he is receiving mental health care treatment and rehabilitation services in terms 
of the Mental Health Care Act.  Also see Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 168 for the 
position prior to the 2002 Mental Health Care Act where he pointed out then already that an 
abnormality does not necessarily affect triability.  See Pillay 2014 South African Journal of 
Psychology 48 at 50 who explains that the diagnosis is not the most important aspect here but rather 
the symptoms and the functional implications of the symptoms. 
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individual to such an extent that he is not able to understand the court proceedings or be in 
a position to give proper instructions to his legal representative.217  
 A common-sense approach to the determination of fitness to stand trial is promoted 218 
even though there are two distinct elements that must be investigated during the fitness 
assessment.  These two assessment elements will be discussed below.219    
3.4.2 Ability to follow the proceedings 
“Ability to follow the proceedings” is understood as a general understanding of the court 
proceedings.220  This first element of the test does not require exact knowledge and 
understanding of the technicalities of criminal procedural law.221  Ignorance of the court 
procedures will not render a person unfit to stand trial, as ignorance can be supplemented 
with explanations and further knowledge.222  Only when an incapacity cannot be remedied 
should the accused be deemed unable to follow the proceedings.223    
The inability to follow court proceedings may be due to a mental illness as contemplated in 
section 77(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act.   This is, however, not the only reason why an 
                                                
217  Africa in Psychology and Law at 389.  Also see Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 48 
at 50. 
218  Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 13-5.  
219  If an accused does not fulfil the requirements in terms of either of the elements, he will be deemed 
unfit to stand trial.    
220  See Snyman 1988 Acta Juridica 128 at 133.  Snyman points out that this position is in line with the 
Australian point of view and quotes from an Australian case, which sets out the concept of fitness to 
stand trial very eloquently:  The supreme court in R v Presser [1958] VR 45 at 48 summarised it as 
follows: “He needs, I think, to be able to understand what it is that he is charged with.  He needs to 
be able to plead to the charge and to exercise his right of challenge. He needs to understand 
generally the nature of the proceedings, namely that it is an enquiry as to whether he did what he is 
charged with. He needs to be able to follow the course of the proceedings so as to understand what 
is going on in court in a general sense, though he need not, of course, understand the purpose of all 
the various court formalities.  He needs to be able to understand, I think, the substantial effect of any 
evidence that may be given against him; and he needs to be able to make his defence or answer to 
the charge”.  This approach is in line with the one followed in the United States of America, where 
the court emphasised in the case of Dusky v United States 363 US 402 (1960), that, when 
determining if an accused is fit to stand trial or not, it is insufficient to ask if the accused is orientated 
as to time and place and if he at least has some recollection of events.  The court stated at 788 that 
the test is rather:  “whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a 
reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as a factual 
understanding of the proceedings against him.”   
221  Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act at 13-5. 
222  Snyman 1988 Acta Juridica 128 at 132. 
223 Snyman 1988 Acta Juridica 128 at 132.  He adds that incapacity for purposes of fitness to stand trial, 
refers to a “total incapacity” which cannot be supplemented by for example an explanation by the 
legal representative of what the court proceedings entail.  Ignorance of the court proceedings can be 
supplemented by an explanation of the proceedings and is therefore in itself not incapacity to render 
a person unfit to stand trial. 
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accused might have difficulty following the proceedings or give instructions to his legal 
representative.  Other reasons could be due to a physical condition of the accused, such as 
being deaf-mute.224  According to older legislation 225 in South African law, a person who 
was unable to understand criminal proceedings for any reason fell under the jurisdiction of 
the Mental Disorders Act.226  The implication of this was that a person who was not able to 
follow the proceedings, for any reason whatsoever (including being deaf-mute), regardless 
of whether a mental illness or defect was present, could be found unfit to stand trial and 
declared a state president’s patient.227  It was later accepted that a person is not mentally ill 
on account of being deaf-mute.228  There is no reason why a deaf-mute person should be 
regarded as unfit to stand trial because the inability to communicate can be remedied by 
arranging for a translator in order to enable the person to understand the proceedings.229  
                                                
224 Snyman 1988 Acta Juridica 128 at 136.  Also see Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 
229.  Deaf-mute persons were regarded as being mentally ill in English law, simply because they 
could not communicate on the basis of which they were detained in terms of the Criminal Lunatics 
Act 1800.  Also see Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 166.  See further Snyman 1988 
Acta Juridica 128 at 137 and 138.  The common law test for fitness to stand trial in English law, was 
set out in the case of R v Prichard [1836] 7 C & P 303 at 304-5; 173 ER 135 where it was intimated 
that a person who cannot communicate property regarding the case should be regarded as of 
unsound mind, regardless of if they can communicate properly on other issues.  English Courts did 
not readily accept that deaf-muteness equates to a mental illness or worse yet, to insanity.  See, 
however, S  v Mamyila 1913 TPD 464 at 467 where the position in the English law at the time was 
explained as that a person that is deaf and dumb from birth and for that reason unable to understand 
the proceedings, will be considered “insane”.  Also see the English case of Berry 1 QB (1875-1876) 
447 where the court concluded that a deaf-mute person was insane.   
225  Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1955. 
226  Section 28 of the Mental Disorders Act. 
227  Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 167.  This result was due to the provisions of section 
164 of the 1995 Criminal Procedure Act and section 28 of the Mental Disorders Act that had to be 
considered in conjunction with each other.  The courts interpreted these sections to mean that a 
person could be declared a State President’ Patients merely on the ground that he is unable to follow 
the proceedings rather than that the relevant person must suffer from a mental illness or defect as a 
prerequisite for being declared a State President’s Patient.  The rule that a deaf-mute person should 
be treated as mentally defective, was laid down in the cases of S v Kansiyo 1930 SR 127 and S v 
Chinzenda 1945 SAR 175.  Also see Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 167.  In Roman-
Dutch law, a deaf-mute person was not regarded as mentally ill.  See S v Mamyila 1913 TPD 464.  
Also see Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 166 footnote 83 where reference is made to 
some older case law and sources where this position in the Roman-Dutch law is confirmed. 
228  It was later agreed that there is no provision that states that a person that cannot be tried should be 
treated as insane.  See In re Pupu 1959 (3) SA 480 (SR, B) at 481H.  Also see Du Toit et al 
Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act at 13-5.  Also see Kruger Mental Health Law in South 
Africa at 167.  Subsequent to the judgment in Pupu supra the court still declared deaf persons State 
President’s Patients in the absence of evidence that such a person suffered from a mental illness or 
mental defect.  This was the case in S v Maxaba 1964(1) SA 645 (C).  The accused in this case was 
deaf and illiterate and there was no evidence that he suffered from a mental illness or defect (at 
645F and 646F). 
229  Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 166.  If all efforts are not made to interpret the 
proceedings for the deaf-mute person, this could constitute a violation of his right to a fair trial and 
could constitute unfair discrimination on the ground of disability in accordance with section 9 of the 
Constitution.  In Pachcourie v Additional Magistrate, Ladysmith 1978 (3) SA 986 (N) 991H it was 
stated that a deaf-mute person is not fit to stand trial if he is unassisted.  
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Current legislation does not allow a referral for a fitness assessment merely because 
someone is deaf-mute.  It is only when the deaf-mute person suffers from a mental illness 
or mental defect that the provisions of section 77(6) find application.230  In these cases, a 
deaf-mute person with a mental illness may be declared a state patient. 231    
The fact that an accused suffers from amnesia will not render him unfit to stand trial unless 
the amnesia is a symptom of a mental illness.232  Similarly, the mere fact that a person has 
an intellectual disability will not automatically render him unfit to stand trial.233  The triability 
of such an accused also depends on other factors such as speech and language 
proficiency, reasoning ability and level of education.234        
The second part of the test focuses on the ability to conduct a proper defence which entails 
being able to instruct one’s legal representative properly. 
3.4.3 Ability to conduct a proper defence  
This simply means that the accused must be able to answer to the charges against him 235 
                                                
230  Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 229 where a deaf-mute accused cannot 
communicate, it has been submitted that this person should be set free.  Concerns have, however, 
been raised about this practice where there is prima facie evidence that the deaf-mute accused 
committed a serious offence.  A deaf-mute accused or witness may make use of an interpreter who 
can convert sign language used by the deaf-mute person into audible language.  Such testimony will 
be regarded as viva voce evidence for purposes of section 161 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
231  S v Matjhesa 1981 (3) SA 854 (O).  Also see Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure 
Act at 13-5. 
232  The person will be unfit to stand trial due to mental illness and not amnesia per se.  Snyman 1988 
Acta Juridica 128 at 135.  Also see this source at 128 at 135 and the sources listed there, which 
includes foreign case law that supports this view. 
233 Calitz FJW, van Rensburg PHJJ, de Jager PP, Olander ML, Thomas L, Venter R and Wessels GA 
“Psychiatric evaluation of intellectually disabled offenders referred to the Free-State Psychiatric 
Complex, 1993-2003” 2007 (13) SAJP 147-1520 at 148 report that common denominators between 
most members of this group, was low levels of education and unemployment.  The crime that was 
mostly committed by this group of intellectually disabled accused was rape, followed by murder and 
indecent assault.  Theft and housebreaking was the most common crimes against property 
committed by this group (see 150 of this source).  It is noteworthy that the type of crimes committed 
by this group of intellectually disabled accused, are mostly sexual crimes where as those committed 
by mentally ill accused are not.  We can deduce that this group of intellectually disabled accused 
who mainly commit crimes against the person, poses a bigger risk to society than accused persons 
with mental illness.  See Schutte 2013 South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 64 at 64 where it 
is stated that the presence of an intellectual disability is a risk factor for violence when compared to 
an intellectually average person. 
234  Calitz et al 2007 SAJP 147 at 148 opine that once it is established that an individual’s language 
proficiency is acceptable and that he can reason, he is competent to stand trial.  They go even 
further and argue that the presence or absence of a mental illness or intellectual disability, then 
becomes irrelevant.  Also see Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 48 at 50 who points 
out that the functional implications of the diagnosis of a mental illness is more important in the fitness 
context than the diagnosis itself. 
235  Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 48 at 50. 
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and must be able to convey relevant information to enable his legal representative to give 
advice thereon.236  The accused must be able to play a constructive role in his trial by giving 
instructions to his legal representative.237  The accused must be able to convey the facts 
upon which he relies to prove his innocence and further be able to evaluate all the evidence 
given at the trial.238  The ability to give exact instructions on how the legal representative 
should conduct his defence is not required.239   
Where an accused decides to conduct his own defence, the court has to be satisfied that 
the accused is indeed able to do so.  The mere fact that someone might be acting against 
his own interests by deciding to conduct his own defence does not in itself make him 
incapable of standing trial.240    
Snyman 241 warns that the fact that an accused does not have a defence to a charge, or 
has a bizarre defence, does not automatically mean that the person is unfit to stand trial.  
Similarly, the fact that someone is unfit to stand trial does not mean that he does not have a 
defence to the charge.   
Some accused persons might find it difficult to communicate due to a language barrier, they 
might be communicating in a second language, as a result of which their vocabulary might 
be limited. This is especially so if the level of education of the particular accused is low.242 
Barriers in communicating should be carefully considered before it is assumed that an 
accused is unfit to stand trial.243  The mere inability to communicate properly is not 
necessarily an indication of or the result of a mental illness.244    
The test for fitness to stand trial as set out above is applied during an assessment period as 
ordered by the court.245  The actual assessment process is examined below. 
 
                                                
236 Snyman 1988 Acta Juridica 128 at 134. 
237  Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act at 13-5. 
238 Snyman 1988 Acta Juridica 128 at 130.  Also see Stevens 2013 THRHR 252 at 253. 
239  Snyman 1988 Acta Juridica 128 at 133. 
240 Snyman 1988 Acta Juridica 128 at 134. 
241 Snyman 1988 Acta Juridica 128 at 134. 
242  Africa in Psychology and Law at 392. 
243  Africa in Psychology and Law at 392. 
244  Psychological knowledge about an accused’s current intellectual and emotional functioning is 
therefore relevant in order to accurately determine the accused’s fitness to stand trial.  See Africa 
https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/17210882/insanitypdf# (Date of use: 10 March 2015) at 
3.  




3.5 Assessment of fitness to stand trial 
3.5.1  Introduction 
The assessment of fitness to stand trial is conducted in terms of section 79 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act.246  The aim of the inquiry during the assessment is to establish if the 
individual’s functioning is impaired by the presence of a mental illness or defect.247 
The prosecutor must submit a report to the institution where the observation is to take 
place, containing all relevant information pertaining to the accused, the charges against him 
and the contact details of the probation officer and the attorney for the accused.248  The 
accused must be informed that a report about the observation period will be drafted by 
those mental health care professionals who conduct the assessment and that he is not 
obliged to divulge any information during this period.249   
The duration of the assessment, what it entails, and by whom it is conducted is discussed 
below.  Further, the content of the report that has to be drafted by those who conducted the 
assessment is discussed hereunder. 
3.5.2 Duration of assessment period 
Ideally, an accused should be moved to the psychiatric hospital for assessment 
immediately after the order for assessment is made.  In practice, however, accused 
persons are sent back to prison whilst awaiting the availability of a bed in the relevant 
                                                
246  Section 79 of the Criminal Procedure Act stipulates, inter alia, by whom the accused should be 
assessed for fitness depending on the type of offence that he is charged with.  The section also 
prescribes the submission of a report by those mental health professionals that conducted the 
assessment.  See Louw in Psycholegal Assessment in South Africa at 42.  Also see Du Toit et al 
Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act at 13-1. 
247  Africa in Psychology and Law at 388. 
248  Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 228.  The report has to indicate inter alia on who’s 
request the assessment is conducted, the stage of the proceedings at which point the assessment 
was requested, information about the accused’s social circumstances and detail about his family.  
The report also has to contain detail about the injuries sustained by the victim of the accused as well 
as the suspected motive for the crime committed.  See this source at 228 for a detailed list of the 
information that should be contained in the prosecutor’s report. 
249  Regulation 41(1) of the General regulations of the Mental Health Care Act published under GG 
R1467 in Gazette number 27117 of 15 December 2004.  Also see Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse 
Strafproses at 249.  The number of mental health care professionals involved in the assessment 
depends on the seriousness of the crime.  If it is a crime involving serious violence, the accused has 
to be assessed by more than one psychiatrist as provided for in section 79(1).  The court may also 




facility where the assessment is to be performed.250  Mentally ill accused persons are often 
placed on long waiting lists owing to the scarce facilities at the institutions where psychiatric 
observations can be conducted.251  Once a bed is available, the accused will be transferred 
to the psychiatric hospital.252   
The assessment period itself shall last for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days at a 
time.253  The 30-day period may be extended by a further thirty (30) days.254 
The Act does not prescribe an assessment period of at least thirty (30) days. There does 
not seem to be any prohibition against releasing an accused from observation earlier than 
on the 30th day of the observation period. In fact, most accused are released after 
approximately 12 days.255  It seems that assessment can be completed in far less than the 
30-day period referred to in the Criminal Procedure Act.256   This leaves room for shorter 
                                                
250  Bateman 2005 SAMJ 208 at 208.  Section 49D of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998 (as 
Amended by the Correctional Matters Amendment Act 5 of 2011 states, “49D.  Mentally ill remand 
detainees.—(1) The National Commissioner may detain a person suspected to be mentally ill, in 
terms of section 77 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act or a person showing signs of mental health 
care problems, in a single cell or correctional health facility for purposes of observation by a medical 
practitioner.”  This presumably refers to observation of the accused person’s general health including 
his mental health and does not refer to the forensic assessment, as that has to be done by a 
psychiatrist or psychologist for purposes of drafting the report in terms of section 79 of the Act. 
251  Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 377 at 378.  Also see Pillay 2014 South African 
Journal of Psychology 48 at 48 who states that the waiting period often extends over several 
months.  Also see cases such as S v Pedro 2015 (1) SACR 41 (WCC) at [2] where it is indicated that 
the accused had to wait for many months before a bed for observation became available at 
Valkenberg hospital.  In the unreported judgment of S v Vika (14519) [2014] ZAWCHC 155 (14 
October 2014) the accused had to wait 11 months for a bed to become available at Valkenberg 
hospital [5-6].  In another unreported judgment of S v Dlali (3/2015) [2015] ZAECBHC 2 (27 February 
2015) the accused had to wait approximately 7 months before a bed at the Fort England psychiatric 
hospital became available.[3-6]. 
252  Section 79(2)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act makes provision for the scenario where a person is 
committed for psychiatric observation whilst in custody.  In such a case the section states, “where an 
accused is in custody when he is so committed, he shall, while he is so committed, be deemed to be 
in the lawful custody of the person or the authority in whose custody he was at the time of such 
committal.”  The accused is transported to the psychiatric facility from prison by the SAPS.  See 
Department of Correctional Services “Draft White Paper on Remand Detention Management in 
South Africa” 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/White%20paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention%20in%20SA
%20Draft%20Final.pdf (Date of use:  26 August 2016) at 52 where it is stated that the SAPS are 
responsible for transport from prison to the psychiatric institution for purposes of the assessment 
since they have to produce a form J188 with the name of the facility and the type of assessment 
required so that the detention centre can register the release as a temporary one. 
253  Section 79(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  Also see Joubert et al Strafprosesreg 11th ed at 251. 
254  The extension of the period of 30 days may be ordered in the absence of the accused.  Section 
79(2)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  Also see Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 
249 and further Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act at 13-27. 
255  Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 48 at 55. 
256  Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 377 at 378 points out that not only is the 30-day 
period too long, in fact the assessment can be completed in a couple of days, but the assessment 
need not be done on an inpatient basis.  The author argues that it is possible to conduct the 
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observation periods to be ordered.257  Kruger 258 states that the duration of the observation 
period has to be limited as far as possible because detention for psychiatric observation 
can infringe the accused’s right to freedom and his right to dignity.   
Opinion exists that 30 days is generally excessive for purposes of a psychiatric observation 
and that the requisite process for assessment can be conducted within a 7-day period in the 
event of a single psychiatrist assessing the accused.259  Shorter periods of assessment can 
lead to a reduction in the waiting period for assessment 260 as it can result in the processing 
of more cases in a shorter period resulting in a reduction in the number of affected awaiting-
trial detainees.261  A reduction in the number of awaiting trial detainees translates into a 
cost-saving for the state.262 
The shortening of the observation period should most definitely be considered for fitness 
assessments but not necessarily for criminal capacity assessments as it is acknowledged 
                                                                                                                                                   
assessment on a day-visit or outpatient basis.  Also see National Prosecuting Authority of South 
Africa  http://www.lhr.org.za/sites/lhr.org.za/files/atd_guidelines_.pdf (Date of use:  17 August 2016) 
at 38 who suggest that a 7-day period is sufficient in the event where the assessment need only be 
conducted by a single psychiatrist.    
257  This is also implied in the Guidelines drafted by National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa  
http://www.lhr.org.za/sites/lhr.org.za/files/atd_guidelines_.pdf (Date of use:  17 August 2016) at 38 
where it is explained that the Act does not state that the observation period must last for the entire 
30-day period.  These guidelines indicate, however, that in a case where an assessment needs to be 
conducted by a panel of psychiatrists, the 30-day observation period may be justifiable.  Where the 
observation is conducted by a single psychiatrist, 7 days are usually sufficient for the psychiatrist to 
complete the requisite processes to determine fitness. 
258  Also see Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 227. 
259  The 30-day observation period is also addressed in National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa  
http://www.lhr.org.za/sites/lhr.org.za/files/atd_guidelines_.pdf (Date of use:  17 August 2016) at 38 
where the opinion is expressed that the 30-day period may be justifiable where the accused has to 
be assessed by a panel of experts but that it is indeed excessive in the event where only one 
psychiatrist is required to conduct the assessment.  Also see Pillay 2014 South African Journal of 
Psychology 48 at 54.  Also see in general Oosthuizen H and Verschoor T “Verwysing van 
onverhoorbare beskuldigdes en die daarstelling van ‘n verhoorbaarheidvasstellingseenheid” 1993 (6) 
SAS 155-164 who explore alternatives to admitting an accused to a psychiatric institution for 
purposes of a fitness assessment.  These shall be considered later in this research.     
260  Reduction in waiting periods for assessment will have a direct impact on the correctional authorities 
as cases will move faster and there will be fewer awaiting trial detainees.  Awaiting trial detainees 
include accused persons awaiting psychiatric observation.  See National Prosecuting Authority of 
South Africa  http://www.lhr.org.za/sites/lhr.org.za/files/atd_guidelines_.pdf (Date of use:  17 August 
2016) 
261  Processing more cases simply means that accused persons will exit the criminal justice system and 
correctional facilities sooner than is presently the case.  National Prosecuting Authority of South 
Africa  http://www.lhr.org.za/sites/lhr.org.za/files/atd_guidelines_.pdf (Date of use:  17 August 2016). 
262  Less awaiting trial detainees result in a cost-saving for the state in that they do not have to provide 
food, education, health services and other essentials as guaranteed in section 35 of the Constitution.  
For details on the cost-saving issue, see National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa  
http://www.lhr.org.za/sites/lhr.org.za/files/atd_guidelines_.pdf (Date of use:  17 August 2016). 
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that the latter assessments are clinically more complex than fitness assessments 263 and 
thus may possibly need to be conducted over a longer period than is required for fitness 
assessments.  
3.5.3 Nature of the assessment 
These assessments are usually done on an inpatient basis,264 although the court recently 
ordered a forensic assessment (for criminal capacity) to be conducted on an outpatient 
basis.265  This is a rather new development.266 
During the 30-day assessment period, the accused is subjected to various examinations 
and assessments.  These assessments include psychiatric interviews, psychological tests 
and physical examinations.267   During the interview, a brief history of the accused is taken 
(purely for background information), and questions are put to the accused to establish if he 
understands why he has been arrested and if he understands the court proceedings.268    
                                                
263  Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 48 at 50. 
264  Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 377 at 377.  Also see Pillay 2014 South African 
Journal of Psychology 48 at 55. 
265  The assessment is conducted during day-visits of the accused to the psychiatric facility Pillay 2014 
South African Journal of Psychology 377 at 377 who refers specifically to the case of Oscar Pistorius 
(S v Pistorius (CC113/2013) [2014] ZAGPPHC 793 (12 September 2014)) where an order in terms of 
section 78 was made which entailed that the accused need not be admitted to a psychiatric 
institution but only needed to attend there every day in order for the assessment to be done.  The 
order is made in terms of section 79, which is also the vehicle for orders in terms of section 77, and 
there is thus no reason why these outpatient assessment orders should not be made in cases of 
persons who need to be assessed for fitness to stand trial. 
266  It is new in the sense that the court does not usually specifically order that the 30-day assessment 
must take place on an outpatient or “day-visitor” basis.  This has only been ordered in S v Volkman 
2005 (2) SACR 402 (K) and the unreported case of Oscar Pistorius:  S v Pistorius (CC113/2013) 
[2014] ZAGPPHC 793 (12 September 2014).  Although day-visit assessment is not commonly used, 
it is employed in some parts of the country such as the Limpopo province.  See Pillay 2014 South 
African Journal of Psychology 377 at 378.  It appears that this decision to conduct the assessment 
on an outpatient basis is taken by the professionals involved as it has been stated that an explicit 
order for the 30-day assessment to take place on an outpatient basis, has only been made in the two 
cases stipulated above.  Pillay points out however that the day-visit option “does not appear to be 
generally favoured” (presumably by the professionals involved) which in turn contributes to the long 
waiting lists as inpatient assessments seem to be the norm. 
267  Calitz 2006 SAJP 47 at 48. See S v Thanda (140060, CA&R348/2014) [2014] ZAECGHC 100 (7 
November 2014) at [8] where the court, referring to the fitness assessment of the accused, explained 
that:  “Their finding was made following a period of observation of the accused for almost a full 
month, during the course of which she underwent psychiatric interviews, physical and neurological 
examinations, blood tests, and constant observation by the psychiatric nursing staff.”. Also see Pillay 
2014 South African Journal of Psychology 377 at 378 who points out that the forensic assessment 
includes interviews with the accused and family members of the accused, psychometric tests and 
reports from multidisciplinary teams on the accused person’s behaviour generally and 
interpersonally.  Pillay is of the view that the assessment can be completed in a couple of days even 
though it entails obtaining all these reports and conducting the stated interviews.    
268  Africa in Psychology and Law at 390, 391.   Also se Calitz 2006 SAJP 47 at 48.  See further Pillay 
  
147 
The evaluation focusses on establishing the accused’s current cognitive functioning and 
levels of consciousness. It also aims to establish whether the accused exhibits psychotic 
symptoms and whether he is able to understand questions and give reasonable answers 
thereto.269 
Many accused persons sent for observation may have existing mental illnesses that require 
treatment.  Previously, these accused persons could only receive treatment, if required, 
once the observation period was completed.270 Ethical concerns about this practice have 
been raised, especially in the case of a seriously mentally ill accused.271  Mentally ill 
accused persons undergoing observation may, however, receive treatment for pre-existing 
medical conditions.272  If an accused has been receiving mental health care treatment prior 
to his admission for observation, it would be unethical to stop such treatment, and it should 
be continued.273 
                                                                                                                                                   
2014 South African Journal of Psychology 48 at 52 who indicates that a detailed psychosocial history 
is taken of the accused.  The accused is evaluated at least once a week according to Africa in 
Psychology and Law at 390.  Also see Kaliski, Borcherds and Williams 1997 SAMJ 1351 at 1352 
where it is indicated that most accused referred for psychiatric observation at the Valkenberg 
hospital from January to June 1996, had no idea as to why they have been referred for observation 
or what the outcome after such observation could possibly be.   
269  Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 48 at 51.  Other aspects that are investigated are 
the accused’s level of understanding of the charges faced, ability to respond to the charges, that is, 
admit or deny them, ability to explain his or her role, or non-involvement, in the alleged offence, 
understanding of the wrongfulness of such an offence, understanding of the plea, the obligation to 
enter a plea, and the implications thereof, understanding of the court context, including the various 
role players as well as his own role in the process and finally if the accused has a conceptualisation 
of possible outcomes. 
270 Gagiano CA, Van Rensburg PHJ and Verschoor T “Unnecessary committals for forensic 
observation:  Section 77 and 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977” 1991 (108) SALJ 714-718 
at 715.  Persons who might therefore be in need of treatment, will not receive same for a period of 
up to two months – if the observation period is extended by the court once as provided for in the 
Criminal Procedure Act and more in particular sections 79(2)(a). 
271 Gagiano, Van Rensburg & Verschoor 1991 SALJ 714 at 715.  It has been pointed out that there can 
be no ethical justification for this, especially in the case of a seriously mentally ill patient who is in 
need of treatment.  Refusing this treatment during the observation period, may have serious 
implications. 
272  Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 48 at 55. 
273  Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 48 at 55.  It should be noted that the tendency to 
refuse medication is much higher amongst mentally ill patients in conflict with the law, possibly 
because the hope is there that if they do not take the medication, they will stay in hospital for longer 
and thus avoid prison.  See Frailing K “The genesis of mental health courts in the United States and 
their possible applicability for the United Kingdom” 2008 C.S.L.R 63-73 at 65.  The position in the 
United States of America is that those that are institutionalised, have the right to refuse treatment 
that includes the right to refuse medication.  The question remains if those under psychiatric 
observation by order of the court in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act, may refuse treatment, 
including the taking of medication?  Having regard to the right to access to health care (Section 27 of 
the Constitution) and the specific provision in the National health Act 61 of 2003 that provides for the 
refusal of treatment, it is likely that these patients may refuse the treatment.  (Section 6 of the 
National Health Act states that the health care user has a right to be informed and to give informed 
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3.5.4 Who conducts the assessment? 
Section 79 states that where an accused is charged with a violent offence such as murder, 
culpable homicide or rape, the inquiry into the accused’s fitness to stand trial must be 
conducted by a panel of psychiatrists, one of which is appointed for the accused by the 
court.274   
Where the charge relates to an offence other than a violent offence, the accused need only 
be assessed by a single psychiatrist.275  The majority of the referrals are for non-violent 
crimes.276    
                                                                                                                                                   
consent, which includes the right to refuse treatment.  The health care user is, however, required to 
sign a release of liability in the event that he refuses the treatment).  It should, however, be bourn in 
mind that refusal of treatment forms part of the right to informed consent which implies that the 
person so refusing treatment must be able to fully understand the risks and consequences.  
(Sections 6 and 7 of the National Health Act contain the provisions of informed consent, which was 
previously only contained in common law).  The lack of mental abilities of the patient may 
necessitate intervention based on his best interest that may include treatment against his will in 
which case his consent will be irrelevant. 
274  Section 79(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Procedure Act states that:  “(1) Where a court issues a direction 
under section 77 (1) or 78 (2), the relevant enquiry shall be conducted and be reported on-  
 (b) where the accused is charged with murder or culpable homicide or rape or compelled rape 
 as provided for in sections 3 or 4 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) 
 Amendment Act, 2007, respectively, or another charge involving serious violence, or if the 
 court considers it to be necessary in the public interest, or where the court in any particular 
 case so directs- 
  (iii) by a psychiatrist appointed for the accused by the court; and 
 The three psychiatrists are the medical superintendent of a psychiatric institution or a psychiatrist 
appointed by him, a psychiatrist appointed by the court but who is not in the full-time employment of 
the state and the psychiatrist appointed for the accused by the court as stated above.  See Kruger 
Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 227 and 248.  The prosecutor has to establish from each 
psychiatrist and the clinical psychologist (if applicable) if he is available to conduct the requested 
psychiatric evaluation prior to referring the matter to the relevant professionals. 
275  Section 79(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act applies in the event of the charge against the 
accused being one of a minor offence, or one “other than one referred to in paragraph (b)”  That is 
paragraph 79(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  Also see Schutte 2013 South African Journal of 
Bioethics and Law 64 at 64 who gives example of such offences as including common assault, theft, 
common robbery and housebreaking.  Schutte explains further that odd behaviour of the accused 
during arrest, in court or during custody was a more prominent reason for referral to a single 
psychiatrist than the case is with referrals to a panel of psychiatrists.  Also see Kruger Heimstra 
Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 227.  Also see comments on this topic in National Prosecuting 
Authority of South Africa   http://www.lhr.org.za/sites/lhr.org.za/files/atd_guidelines_.pdf (Date of use:  
17 August 2016) at 38 where it is stated that the 30-day period is excessive where the accused is 
charged with a minor crime and that a single psychiatrist can usually complete the requisite 
processes pertaining to the assessment within a 7 day period.    
276  Schutte 2013 South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 64 at 65 where a study at Sterkfontein 
hospital conducted in 2010 is reported on.  55% of the referrals in terms of section 79 was for non-
violent crimes and thus necessitated an observation by a single psychiatrist only.  The remainder 
45% required the appointment of a panel of psychiatrists as the charge that the accused faced 
involved violence.  The fact that the majority of mentally ill persons are referred to observations for 
minor offences, is very relevant for purposes of this research, as most Mental Health Courts that 
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Those referred for fitness assessments to a single psychiatrist (cases of non-violent crimes) 
277 appear to be found unfit to stand trial more often than those referred to panels for 
observation.278  This, according to Schutte,279 proves that those with serious mental 
illnesses, more often than not, commit minor offences rather than serious offences such as 
murder. It could, however, also prove that a single assessment psychiatrist errs on the side 
of caution by rather finding a person unfit to stand trial to ensure that he receives treatment.  
In the case of a panel of psychiatrists, views are challenged, and arguably only those that 
are seriously unfit to stand trial are identified as such.  The fact remains that the majority of 
accused persons sent for fitness assessment are found fit to stand trial.280 
Previously only psychiatrists could conduct a fitness assessment.281  Even though 
psychologists are qualified to conduct these assessments, they are not by default part of 
the assessment team and specifically have to be appointed by the court, as is clear from 
the wording of the Criminal Procedure Act.282  The court is, however, not obliged to appoint 
                                                                                                                                                   
originated in other jurisdictions, initially only considered cases of mentally ill persons who committed 
minor offences.  See the detailed discussion of the Mental Health Courts as they originated in 
Canada and selected states of the United States of America as discussed in chapters 4 and 5 of this 
research.  It is only much later that some Mental Health Courts started to consider more serious 
offences.  See for example the Brooklyn Mental Health Court in the United States of America (as 
discussed in chapter 5 of this research) where felonies are also considered.  Many Mental Health 
Courts still only consider minor offences.    
277  Section 79(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
278  Schutte 2013 South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 64 at 65-67 point out that a recent study 
conducted at Sterkfontein hospital found that the majority of accused persons referred for 
observation for fitness to stand trial with regard to non-violent crimes, were found unfit to stand trial.  
55.5% of those referred for fitness assessments for non-violent crimes in this study and who were 
thus assessed by a single psychiatrist, was found unfit to stand trial.  At 66 the author explains that 
odd behaviour of the accused during arrest, in court or during custody was a more prominent reason 
for referral to a single psychiatrist than the case is with referrals to a panel of psychiatrists.  The 
study found however that of those assessed by a panel of experts as provided for in cases where 
serious violence is involved (Section 79(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act.)  only 33.3% were found 
unfit to stand trial.  The majority of the accused who were referred to the panel for being unable to 
instruct counsel, were found fit to stand trial.  The defence attorney’s difficulty to communicate or get 
instructions from his client is more commonly associated with referrals to panels of psychiatrist than 
with referrals to a single psychiatrist.   
279  Schutte 2013 South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 64 at 67, 68.  The author further states that 
this finding disproves previous studies that averred that persons with schizophrenia for example 
mostly commit violent crimes, especially murder. 
280  See the discussion of the profile of the mentally ill accused in chapter 2 of this research.  Also see  
Kaliski, Borchers and Williams 1997 SAMJ 1351 at 1351.  Also see in general Calitz et al 1996 
SAMJ 734-737.  See further Gagiano, Van Rensburg and Verschoor 1991 SALJ 714-718.  See 
further Schutte 2013 South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 64 at 67.  Also see Calitz et al 2006 
SAJP 47 at 49. 
281  The position was amended by section 68 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related matters) 
amendment Act 32 of 2007 read with the Schedule relating to Laws amended or repealed by section 
68 of the Act.  Also see Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 377 at 379. 
282 Section 79(1)(b)(iv) of the Criminal Procedure Act states that  an accused shall be assessed “(iv) by 
a clinical psychologist where the court so directs.”  Also see Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse 
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a clinical psychologist to conduct the assessment.283  It is not clear what criteria will be 
considered to determine whether the appointment of a clinical psychologist is necessary or 
not.284   Pillay 285 laments the fact that psychologists are not appointed regularly in practice 
in accordance with this section, despite the fact that the legislature clearly acknowledges 
the capability of a psychologist to conduct the required forensic assessment. He advocates 
for the routine appointment of clinical psychologists whenever a forensic mental health 
assessment is ordered by the court in terms of either section 77 or 78.286    
Section 79(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act is read to mean that three psychiatrists have 
to observe the person referred for observation in the event of the accused being charged 
with a violent crime.287   Previously the requirement that an accused had to be assessed by 
three psychiatrists only pertained to murder cases but has now been extended to all violent 
crimes.288  This requirement could lead to postponement of the court proceedings because 
the psychiatrists might not always be available on the given court date to explain their 
findings to the court.   Psychiatrists further report problems with regard to logistics, for 
example, not being informed that the patient has already been transferred to the psychiatric 
                                                                                                                                                   
Strafproses at 248.  Also see Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 377 at 378 who points 
out that the fact that a psychologist may now also be appointed to the panel, acknowledges the 
psychologists competence to perform forensic assessments. 
283  Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 48 at 52. 
284  Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 48 at 52, 54 explain that courts tend to appoint 
clinical psychologists in cases where the actions of the accused might be indicative of psychological 
processes rather than a diagnosable mental illness.  For criminal capacity assessments they are 
appointed when the alleged crime seem particularly emotionally charged, for instance where the 
accused was stabbed multiple times. 
285  Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 377 at 379 who points out that a clinical 
psychologist is however seldom appointed by the court, despite the provision in the Criminal 
Procedure Act that provides for it.  This practice raises questions about the motive of the legislature 
in including psychologists as competent persons to conduct forensic assessments as there has been 
pressure from this profession to be included in the past.  Pillay ponders on whether the inclusion was 
done to pacify the profession or if it was truly done as an acknowledgement of the skills of this 
profession to assist with forensic assessments.  Pillay points out further that 10% of the training of 
clinical psychologist focusses on forensic mental health and most forensic assessment facilities 
provide training to psychologists in this regard.   
286  Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 377 at 379.  He is of the view that it will reduce the 
waiting lists for purposes of these assessments since there are more psychologists in the country 
than psychiatrists.   
287  Section 79(1)(b) specifically refers to murder, culpable homicide and rape as such violent crimes.  
Also see in general the case of S v Pedro 2015 (1) SACR 41 (WCC) where the previous versions of 
the Criminal Procedure Act with regard to the appointment of the panel of experts to conduct the 
assessment on the accused are discussed. 
288 Bateman 2005 SAMJ 208 at 212.  Also see Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 165 who 
explain that the initial position was that three psychiatrists were required to assess a person only if 
the sentence for the charge that the accused faced, was the death penalty.  This was prior to the 
amendment brought about by the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997. 
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hospital for observation.289  This causes further delays in the process.  The general lack of 
availability of private psychiatrists makes the appointment of three psychiatrists as required 
by section 79(1) impractical in certain provinces.290  
Upon a closer reading of section 79 as it currently stands,291 it appears that where the 
accused is charged with murder, culpable homicide, rape or another charge involving 
serious violence, the court must appoint at least two psychiatrists;  one acting for the state 
292 and one acting for the accused as appointed by the court.293   A third psychiatrist who 
should not be in the full-time service of the state may be appointed by the court.294  Section 
79(1) reads as follows: (note in particular the wording of section 79(1)(b)(ii)). 
(1)  Where a court issues a direction under section 77 (1) or 78 (2), the relevant enquiry 
shall be conducted and be reported on-  
(a)  where the accused is charged with an offence other than one referred to   
  in paragraph (b), by the medical superintendent of a psychiatric hospital designated 
  by the court, or by a psychiatrist appointed by the medical superintendent at the  
  request of the court; or  
(b)  where the accused is charged with murder or culpable homicide or rape or 
compelled rape as provided for in sections 3 or 4 of the Criminal Law (Sexual 
Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act, 2007, respectively, or another 
charge involving serious violence, or if the court considers it to be necessary in the 
public interest, or where the court in any particular case so directs-  
  (i)  by the medical superintendent of a psychiatric hospital designated by the 
                                                
289 Bateman 2005 SAMJ 208 at 212.  Particular reference is made to the Valkenberg Psychiatric 
hospital in this instance.  Those psychiatrists who visit detention centres for purposes of visits with 
accused persons also reported problems.  Detention centres often have difficulty identifying which 
accused persons have to be psychiatrically observed.  This leads to delays in the process as 
psychiatrists who visit prisons in order to conduct an assessment often have to postpone these 
appointments as the relevant persons cannot be located for the consultation at the given time.  
These challenges are acknowledged by the relevant authorities as is evident in Department of 
Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/Discussion%20Document%20preceding%20Draft%20White%20
Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention_1.pdf (Date of use: 17 August 2016) at 85. 
290  Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 248.  Also see S v Lubisi 2003 (2) SACR 589 (T).  
Also see S v Pedro 2015 (1) SACR 41 (WCC) at [35] where the court points out further that the low 
tariffs that were offered to private psychiatrists to conduct the court ordered psychiatric assessments, 
made those psychiatrists that were available unwilling to assist due to the low fee structure.  
291  Amended by the Judicial Matters Amendment Act 66 of 2008.  Of particular importance is the 
amendment of section 79 (1)(b)(ii) and the insertion of subsection 13 into section 79.  These 
changes were effected by section 10 of the said amendment Act.  These changes were influenced 
by the shortage of psychiatrists and cost considerations.  This is according to Pillay 2014 South 
African Journal of Psychology 48 at 51. 
292  Section 79(1)(b)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
293  Section 79(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  Also see Schutte 2013 South African Journal of 
Bioethics and Law 64 at 64.  See further Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 48 at 51 
where it is confirmed that at least 2 psychiatrists must be appointed in the case where there was 
serious violence involved in the alleged offence.  
294  Section 10 of the Criminal Matters Amendment Act 66 of 2008 amended section 79 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act.  See S v Pedro 2015 (1) SACR 41 (WCC) [24] where the confusion brought about by 




   court, or by a psychiatrist appointed by the medical superintendent at the 
   request of the court;  
  (ii)  by a psychiatrist appointed by the court and who is not in the full-time  
   service of the State unless the court directs otherwise, upon application of 
   the prosecutor, in accordance with directives issued under subsection (13) 
   by the National Director of Public Prosecutions;   
  (iii)  by a psychiatrist appointed for the accused by the court; and 
  (iv)  by a clinical psychologist where the court so directs.   
 
 Section 79(13) referred to in section 79(1)(b)(ii) above provides the following: 
 (13) (a) The National Director of Public Prosecutions must, in consultation with the Minister, 
issue directives regarding the cases and circumstances in which a prosecutor must apply to 
the court for the appointment of a psychiatrist as provided for in subsection (1) (b) (ii) and 
any directive so issued must be observed in the application of this section.  
The wording of section 79(1)(b)(ii) appears to indicate that a third psychiatrist is necessary 
unless it is otherwise ordered.  The wording of section 79(13), however, suggests that two 
psychiatrists will automatically be appointed and that application must be made to have a 
third psychiatrist appointed.  These two provisions seem to be in direct contrast.295  Be that 
as it may, it appears that the provisions of section 79(13) are being followed in practice as 
directives on applying for the appointment of a third psychiatrist have already been issued 
in accordance with section 19(13).296 
The court in S v Pedro, however, indicated that the correct interpretation of these two 
sections is that application should be made to dispense with the appointment of a third 
psychiatrist and that any directive issued in terms of section 79(13) should be read with the 
view to apply whichever criteria is set out therein for dispensing with the requirement to 
appoint a third psychiatrist.297  Three psychiatrists are therefore appointed unless an 
application is brought to dispense with the appointment of a third psychiatrist.  This 
reasoning is followed because section 79(1)(b)(ii), which seems to indicate that three 
psychiatrists should be appointed, is the dominant provision as far as the appointment of a 
                                                
295  See S v Pedro 2015 (1) SACR 41 (WCC) at [48] where Rogers J, in considering the interpretation 
problems with the appointment of panels of psychiatrists to conduct court ordered psychiatric 
observations, mentioned that various interpretation of the current position could lead one to conclude 
that “….something went wrong in the formulation of s 79(13)”.  The court analysed the current 
position after the amendment of the Criminal Procedure Act with regard to the number of 
psychiatrists that should be appointed for observation of an accused charged with a violent crime. 
296  National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa, “Mental Observation Directives” 
https://www.npa.gov.za/sites/default/files/Library/Criminal-Procedure-Act-Mental-Observation 
Directives.pdf  (Date of use: 20 February 2014). 
297  S v Pedro 2015 (1) SACR 41 (WCC) at [60]. 
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private psychiatrist is concerned, and section 79(13) is ancillary thereto.298 
According to the Mental Observation Directive issued by the National Prosecuting 
Authority,299 the prosecution may only apply for the appointment of a third psychiatrist upon 
the written authority of the Director of Public Prosecutions.300  Factors that will play a part in 
the motivation to apply for a third psychiatrist include the seriousness of the offence, the 
complexity of the evidence, whether the accused person wishes the court to appoint a 
psychiatrist of his choice; and, the history of the particular accused person (e.g. previous 
observations of the accused person).301  According to the Pedro judgment, these criteria 
should be used not to determine in which circumstances a third psychiatrist should be 
appointed but rather in which cases the appointment of a third psychiatrist can be 
dispensed with.302 
It appears, therefore, that the court may appoint a minimum of one psychiatrist in the case 
of charges of a non-violent nature303 and a maximum of three psychiatrists, plus a clinical 
psychologist in cases involving serious violence 304 to conduct the fitness assessment. 
It is stated earlier that the inquiry into fitness to stand trial is distinctly different to that into 
criminal capacity.  The fitness assessment is concerned with the current state of mind of the 
accused and is therefore not retrospective.  The state of mind of the accused at the time of 
the offence is irrelevant for purposes of this assessment.  Hence, the offence is not of 
central importance.  The question arises then why we have specific provisions for fitness 
assessments in terms of the number of professionals that have to assess the accused, 
depending on the seriousness of the offence?  If the inquiry is truly not retrospective, then 
                                                
298  S v Pedro 2015 (1) SACR 41 (WCC) at [59]. 
299  The directive was issued in 2014 by the National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa,  
https://www.npa.gov.za/sites/default/files/Library/Criminal-Procedure-Act-Mental-Observation-
Directives.pdf  (Date of use: 20 February 2014). 
300  Section 79(1)(b)(ii), of the Criminal Procedure Act (as amended). 
301  These factors are listed in National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa,  
https://www.npa.gov.za/sites/default/files/Library/Criminal-Procedure-Act-Mental-Observation-
Directives.pdf  (Date of use: 20 February 2014) at 1. 
302  S v Pedro 2015 (1) SACR 41 (WCC) at [59-60]. 
303  In the event of the charge against the accused being one of a minor offence, or one “other than one 
referred to in paragraph (b)” That is paragraph 79(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  Also see 
Schutte 2013 South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 64 at 64 who gives examples of such 
offences as including common assault, theft, common robbery and housebreaking.  Also see section 
79(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  Also see Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 
227. 
304  Section 79(1)(b)(i) to (iv) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  Also see S v Pedro 2015 (1) SACR 41 
(WCC) at {68}.  “For all these reasons, I consider that three psychiatrists, including a private 
psychiatrist, must be appointed when the case falls within s 79(1)(b) unless the court, upon 
application by the prosecutor, directs that a private psychiatrist need not be appointed, in which case 
there must be two psychiatrists.  In either event, the court may appoint a clinical psychologist.” 
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the seriousness of the offence should not be relevant and should not dictate the number of 
professionals to assess an accused’s fitness.  Is a distinction possibly drawn between the 
fitness assessment for accused persons who are charged with serious versus less serious 
crimes because a different level of fitness is required from the one group versus the other?   
3.5.5 Report drafted after assessment 
The Criminal Procedure Act makes provision for expert witnesses to provide reports on the 
accused’s ability or inability to understand and follow court proceedings.305  
After the assessment period, a forensic conference is held by the mental health 
practitioners involved where a diagnosis is made, and the final report on the accused’s 
triability is compiled for the court.306  The report should indicate whether the inquiry was 
aimed at establishing fitness to stand trial or criminal capacity,307 the diagnosis 308 and, if 
the purpose of the inquiry was to establish fitness to stand trial, an opinion on if the accused 
is fit to stand trial or not.309  Only one report is drafted for submission to the court, even 
where there is more than one psychiatrist who conducted the assessment.310  The accused 
is entitled to a copy of the report.311  Where a clinical psychologist was appointed by the 
                                                
305  Section 79(3) read with section 79(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act.    
306  Calitz et al 2007 SAJP 147 at 148.  Also see section 79(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act that sets 
out the detail that should be contained in the report submitted to the court by the person who 
conducted the relevant inquiry.  The section reads that:  “(4) The report shall- (a) include a 
description of the nature of the enquiry; and (b) include a diagnosis of the mental condition of the 
accused; and (c) if the enquiry is under section 77 (1), include a finding as to whether the accused is 
capable of understanding the proceedings in question so as to make a proper defence; or (d) if the 
enquiry is in terms of section 78 (2), include a finding as to the extent to which the capacity of the 
accused to appreciate the wrongfulness of the act in question or to act in accordance with an 
appreciation of the wrongfulness of that act was, at the time of the commission thereof, affected by 
mental illness or mental defect or by any other cause.” 
307  Section 79(4)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
308  Section 79(4)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  Also see Joubert et al Strafprosesreg 11th ed at 251.  
See further Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 48 at 50 who points out that it is not the 
diagnosis in itself that renders a person fit or unfit to stand trial but that the functional impairment of 
the individual has to be assessed as well. 
309  Section 79(4)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  Also see Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal 
Procedure Act 13-5 and 13-6. 
310  Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 165. 
311  Section 79(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act states that:  “(3) The relevant report shall be in writing 
and shall be submitted in triplicate to the registrar or, as the case may be, the clerk of the court in 
question, who shall make a copy thereof available to the prosecutor and the accused.”  Also see Du 
Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act at 13-27.  Section 13(3) of the Mental Health 
Care Act makes provision for a health care provider to temporarily deny a mental health care user 
access to his health records if disclosure of the information contained in such records will seriously 
prejudice the user (section 13(3)(a)), or if the disclosure will cause the accused to conduct himself in 
a manner that may seriously prejudice him or those around him.  This limited protection to 
therapeutic privilege does not seem to be extended to the criminal justice setting, as the Criminal 
Procedure Act does not contain a similar proviso or reference to the provision in the Mental Health 
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court, the findings of the clinical psychologist are submitted in a separate report.312 
The report is considered during a trial-within-a-trial to determine the triability of the accused.  
If the psychiatric report is unanimous 313 and not contested by the accused or prosecution, it 
may be accepted by the court without hearing evidence.314  If the report is not unanimous, 
the court must decide on the matter by hearing evidence from either party, including the 
accused, or from the professionals who conducted the inquiry.315  Evidence may also be 
heard from persons who were not involved in the inquiry.316  Any person who gives 
evidence may be cross-examined.317  The court may still accept the report after hearing the 
evidence referred to above.318  
Misunderstandings often occur between lawyers and psychiatrists when reports do not 
touch upon certain issues which the lawyer would have liked to have investigated.  Lawyers 
often assume that the mental health care practitioner will investigate a certain issue 319 
which lawyers may deem relevant to the particular case.  The mental health care 
practitioner, however, need only assess what is required in terms of the court order that 
was issued in respect of the accused person’s psychiatric observation.  There is no 
                                                                                                                                                   
Care Act.   
312  Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act at 13-30.  The report by the panel of 
psychiatrists appointed  under section 79(2)(ii) must be signed by a psychiatrist.  The view of the 
psychologist is submitted in a separate report.   
313  This appears to be the case in most instances.  See for example Schutte 2013 South African Journal 
of Bioethics and Law 64 at 65 who discuss a study conducted at Sterkfontein hospital.  In all cases 
where more than one psychiatrists had to observe the accused – thus in cases that involved serious 
violence – the psychiatrists were in agreement on both the diagnosis and the finding as if the 
accused is fit to stand trial or not or criminally responsible or not. 
314  Section 77(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  See Joubert et al Strafprosesreg 11th ed at 251.  Also 
see Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 229 who points out that, where the accused 
does not have legal representation, the court must establish whether the accused opposes the report 
prior to making an order in accordance therewith, be it that the accused is fit or unfit to stand trial.  
Also see Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act at 13-6 and 13-26.  See further S 
v Sithole 2005 (1) SACR 311 (W) at 313E-F where it is confirmed that the court may act on a 
unanimous report rendered by the experts involved.  Also see De Vos v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development WCC case.at [8].  Also see S v Vika (14519) [2014] ZAWCHC 155 (14 
October 2014) at [23].  In this case, the magistrate was entitled to make such a finding without 
further evidence regarding the accused’s mental condition because the psychiatric report was 
unanimous and provided the psychiatric report be not disputed either by the prosecutor or by the 
accused.  
315  Section 77(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  Also see Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses 
at 229.  Also see Joubert et al Strafprosesreg 11th ed at 251.  See further Kruger Mental Health Law 
in South Africa at 164.  Also see De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development WCC 
case at [8]. 
316  Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act at 13-6. 
317  Section 77(3) read with section 77(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
318  In S v Kavin 1978 (2) SA 731 (W) the state disputed the report rendered by the experts.  After 
hearing evidence, the court accepted the report by the experts and dismissed the states objection. 
319  Kaliski Psychological Assessment in South Africa at 5. 
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obligation on a psychiatrist to entertain any requests to investigate a particular issue at the 
insistence of the legal representative, or any other party, during the assessment period. 
The report drafted by the mental health care practitioners who conducted the assessment 
of fitness to stand trial will serve to assist the court in making a finding as to if the accused 
is, in fact, triable or not. 
3.6 Findings after assessment and consequences thereof 
3.6.1 Introduction 
After the assessment, the court considers the psychiatric report and makes a finding on 
whether the accused is fit to stand trial or not.320  All previous psychiatric reports on the 
mental condition of the accused must be placed before the court before a finding in respect 
of the accused’s fitness to stand trial can be made.321  The relevance of previous psychiatric 
reports as to the accused’s current state of mind for purposes of fitness is unclear.  
Consideration of previous psychiatric reports could arguably be seen as contradicting the 
principle that a fitness finding pertains to the current state of mind of an accused.  It also 
seems to contradict the fact that a fitness assessment is not retrospective which could be 
interpreted to mean that previous psychiatric information about the accused should also not 
be relevant.   
The final decision concerning competency to stand trial is a legal one as it is ultimately 
taken by the court.322  The court is, however, always guided by expert opinion as it is not an 
expert in the field of psychiatry and will, in most instances, not deviate from the 
recommendations made by the psychiatrists and psychologists.323  The mental health care 
practitioner cannot make pronouncements on ultimate issues, such as if the accused is 
really unfit to stand trial or criminally responsible.324  He can merely express an opinion that 
                                                
320  Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act at 13-6. 
321  Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act at 13-4, 13-28.  This also applies to cases 
where the criminal capacity of the accused is at issue.  Also see S v Motshekgwa 1993 (2) SACR 
247 (A). 
322  Louw in Psycholegal Assessment in South Africa at 45.  Also see Du Toit et al Commentary on the 
Criminal Procedure Act at 13-5.   
323  See in general S v McBride 1979 (4) SA 313 (W).  It has been stated that the intent of sections 77 to 
79 is that, where an issue of mental illness arises, the court will be guided by expert evidence.  See 
Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act at 13-1, 13-11.  Also see S v Mabena 2007 
(1) SACR 482 (SCA) at [16] where it was stated that “’Mental illness’ and ‘Mental defect’ are morbid 
disorders that are not capable of being diagnosed by a lay court without the guidance of expert 
psychiatric evidence.  An inquiry into the mental state of an accused person that is embarked upon 
without such guidance is bound to be directionless and futile”. 
324  Kaliski, Borcherds and Williams 1997 SAMJ 1351 at 1354 where they emphasise that the 
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can guide the court in reaching its final decision.325   
The court makes a final decision regarding fitness, and where the accused is found unfit to 
stand trial, the court must make an order regarding the way forward in the case, which may 
include detention of the accused.326  The finding pertaining to fitness may be made in the 
absence of the accused, whereas the finding as to the detention of the accused, particularly 
when the accused is declared a state patient, may not be made in his absence. 327   
The finding as to fitness can be made at any time before the trial commences 328 or during 
the trial at any time prior to sentencing.329  If a finding of unfit to stand trial is made after 
conviction, but before sentencing, the proceedings are set aside, and the relevant order in 
terms of section 77(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act is made.330  The setting aside of 
proceedings any time after the accused entered a plea shall lead to acquittal.331  Where the 
charges are withdrawn prior to a plea being entered, the accused is not entitled to a verdict 
of acquittal in respect of the particular charges.332  Where the prosecution decides to cease 
                                                                                                                                                   
psychiatrist should not make pronouncements of issues of criminal responsibility. 
325  Kaliski Psychological Assessment in South Africa at 5.  Also see Du Toit et al Commentary on the 
Criminal Procedure Act at 13-5, 13-6.  Also see S v Magongo 1987 (3) SA 519 (A) where the court a 
quo found that an accused was not criminally responsible without having followed the proper 
procedure in terms of section 78.  No psychiatric report was before the court on the issue of criminal 
capacity.  On appeal, the matter was referred back to the court a quo with instructions to follow the 
proceedings as set out in section 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act.  The court a quo ordered that the 
accused be detained in a psychiatric institution as a state patient.  This order was set aside by the 
court of appeal.  This case illustrates the delays that can be caused if the court does not accept the 
guidance from mental health care practitioners in matters concerning the criminal capacity of an 
accused.  The same principle applies to matter involving fitness to stand trial. 
326  Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 230.  Also see section 77(6) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act that, inter alia, provides for the accused to be detained as a State patient in terms of 
section 42 of the Mental Health Care Act or an involuntary mental health care user in terms of 
section 32 of the Mental Health Care Act. 
327  See S v Eyden 1982 (4) SA 141 (T).  Also see Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 230 
who confirms that an order declaring the accused a state patient, may not be made in the accused’s 
absence.   
328  Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act at 13-3 indicates that the issue is usually 
raised before the trial commences and hence the finding is made before the trial commences. 
329  The order pertaining to fitness can thus be made even after conviction but prior to sentencing.  See 
in general S v April 1985 (1) SA 639 (NC) where the court found that the accused was unfit to stand 
trial after conviction but before sentencing in the Magistrates Court.  See further S v van As 1989 (3) 
SA 881 (W) where the Supreme Court, upon reviewing the case, set aside the proceedings after it 
became clear (after conviction) that the accused was not able to conduct a proper defence.  The 
accused was subsequently detained as a state patient.  Also see Du Toit et al Commentary on the 
Criminal Procedure Act at 13-3, 13-4.  
330  Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 225.  Section 77(6) provides that a court may order 
the detention of an accused as an involuntary mental health care user or as a state patient. 
331  Section 6(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
332  Section 6(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  Also see Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 
159 who points out that, at the time, the withdrawal of charges against a mentally ill accused, was a 
common occurrence especially where the charges against them were for minor offences such as 
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the prosecution of an accused who entered a plea, and whose fitness to stand trial is at 
issue, such an accused must be found not guilty 333 and released.  Should the accused 
require further mental health care services, he may be treated in terms of the Mental Health 
Care Act as a mental health care user 334 outside the criminal justice system.   
The Criminal Procedure Act prescribes an elaborate procedure in the event that an accused 
is found unfit to stand trial.  The position of an accused found fit to stand trial seems 
procedurally less complicated.  The consequences of a finding of unfitness are explored 
below, followed by a discussion of the consequences of a finding of fitness.   
3.6.2 Finding of unfit to stand trial 
3.6.2.1 Introduction 
An accused found unfit to stand trial may not be tried while he is incapable of understanding 
the proceedings.335   A trial on the facts may, however, be held to establish the unfit 
accused’s actual involvement in the crime that he stands accused of.336  The outcome of 
the trial on the facts guides the court to make the most suitable order in terms of section 
77(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act.337  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
minor assault. 
333 This will for example be where the crime is a non-violent one where property worth less than 
R1 000.00 is involved; where the facility to which the accused is referred for observation does not 
have the required facilities to cater for the type of treatment required for the accused, or where the 
psychiatrist at the institution to which the accused has been referred, advises the prosecutor that 
there is a less drastic way of ensuring that the accused receives the required mental health care 
treatment.  See Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 227 for more detail.  Also see S v M 
1989 (3) SA 887 (W) 890D-H, 891E.  See also Joubert et al Strafprosesreg 11th ed at 251. 
334  Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 227. 
335  S v Mabena 2007 (1) SACR 482 (SCA) at [12].  Also see Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal 
Procedure Act at 13-3.  Also see Burchell South African Criminal Law and Procedure at 282 who 
confirms that this is a principle of Criminal Law.  See further Joubert et al Strafprosesreg 11th ed at 
21. 
336  Section 77(6)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  Also see Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse 
Strafproses at 230.  Section 77 of the Criminal Procedure Act was amended by the Criminal Matters 
Amendment Act 68 of 1998 to provide for the court to consider evidence to determine whether an 
accused found unfit to stand trial actually committed the act in question.  Also see Kruger Heimstra 
Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 219 who points out that this amendment was brought about by 
amending section 77(6)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act by making provision for a trial on the facts 
of the matter which does not constitute an official trial for purposes of finding the accused guilty or 
not guilty. 
337  The orders available to the court in terms of section 77(6) depends on if violence was involved in the 
crime that the mentally ill accused is charged with or not.  Only accused persons charged with 
violent crime and found to have been involved in it can be declared a state patient, which is the most 




3.6.2.2 Trial on facts 
A trial on the facts only takes place if it is deemed to be in the interest of the accused or 
where there is uncertainty about whether or not the accused was actually involved in the 
commission of the crime.338  The burden of proof for purposes of this inquiry is on a balance 
of probabilities.339    
The trial on the facts is conducted by first examining the available evidence and 
determining if it shows, on a balance of probabilities, that the accused committed the crime 
in question.340  The element of fault is not considered during the trial on facts.341  During the 
trial on the facts, the court will have limited evidence at its disposal as the criminal trial 
would, at the stage when the finding as to fitness is made, in many cases not have been 
concluded and in most, not even have commenced.342  This very fact could, according to 
Louw,343 probably explain why the lesser onus of proof applies.  He points out further that 
this could lead to an innocent person being found guilty of an offence 344 if the court does 
not consider all the evidence as it would during the course of a criminal trial.  The opposite 
is, by implication, also true, viz a person who in actual fact committed the act may be found 
not to have committed the act in question due to the lack of certain evidence.  It is, 
however, possible for a court that finds it impossible to make a determination on the 
accused’s involvement based on the information before it, to order that further information 
                                                
338  Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 230.  Kruger submits hat a trial on the facts will 
occur most of the time.  Also see S v Vika (14519) [2014] ZAWCHC 155 (14 October 2014) at [21] 
where it is stated that, “Upon finding that the accused was mentally unfit to stand trial, the magistrate 
should have acted in accordance with s 77(6)(a), not s 78(6).  And importantly, before he could make 
a direction in accordance with s 77(6)(a), the magistrate was required to determine whether, on a 
balance of probabilities, the accused committed the alleged act of sexual penetration.”  The court in 
this matter seems to be of the view that a trial on the facts must always be held before a finding in 
terms of section 77(6) can be made. 
339  Section 77(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  Also see S v Sithole 2005 (1) 311 (W) at 136D.  The 
burden of proof with regard to the guilt of the accused has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.  
See Louw in Psycholegal Assessment in South Africa at 43.  See further Du Toit et al Commentary 
on the Criminal Procedure Act at 13-6. 
340  Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 230. 
341  Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 230.  Also see S v Sithole 2005 (1) SACR 311 (W) 
at 315H-I where it was stated,  “The phrase ‘has committed the act in question’ obviously carries no 
connotation of mens rea or criminal responsibility and is intended to refer purely to the physical 
commission of the actus reus.”  Also see De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development WCC case at [13] where the court refers to the above quoted paragraph from the 
Sithole judgment. 
342  Louw in Psycholegal Assessment in South Africa at 43. 
343  Louw in Psycholegal Assessment in South Africa at 43. 
344  Louw in Psycholegal Assessment in South Africa at 43. 
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be brought before it in order for such a determination to be made.345 
Kruger,346 however, points out that the purpose of this trial on the facts is not to reach an 
official judgment or finding but is rather an additional inquiry aiming to aid the court in 
reaching a decision pertaining to if and where the accused should be detained.347  Kruger’s 
view on section 77(6)(a) is supported by Du Toit AJ, who expressed the following view on 
behalf of the court: 
the subsection, in my view does not envisage any enquiry in the nature of a trial or a 
'determination' or 'finding' in the sense of a verdict or a judgment.  Any such procedure would 
be completely inappropriate since the person who allegedly committed the act by definition is 
incapable of understanding the proceedings.  All that appears to be required is that, before 
directing that an accused be detained and/or treated in terms of the appropriate provisions of 
the Mental Health Act the court should satisfy itself as to what actus reus, if any, he or she 
has committed.348 
After a trial on the facts, the accused is not convicted or acquitted, but instead, the court 
makes an order as set out in section 77(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act.349   The orders 
that the court may make are explored below. 
3.6.2.3 Orders that can be made after trial on facts 
The nature of the act committed and the evidence placed before the court to prove that the 
accused was involved in the alleged criminal act will guide the court in terms of the order to 
                                                
345  Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 230.  This is only done if the court is satisfied that 
such further information should be brought to the court in the interest of the accused to determine if 
he in fact committed the crime in question.  
346  Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 230.  Also see S v Sithole 2005 (1) SACR 311 (W) 
at 314H-315A. 
347  Meaning to assist the court in deciding if the accused should be detained in a psychiatric hospital or 
if he should be detained in a mental health care facility in terms of the Mental Health Care Act rather 
than detained as a state patient.  The distinction between the two s significant, especially with regard 
to periods of release.  See section 37 and 47 of the Mental Health Care Act in this regard. 
348  S v Sithole 2005 (1) 311 (W) at 135H-I.  Also see S v Pedro 2015 (1) SACR 41 (WCC) at [89]  where 
the court had the following to say about the inquiry into the question if the accused committed the act 
in question:  “Where the psychiatric evaluation concludes that the person lacks capacity to 
understand the proceedings, the enquiry mandated by s 77(6)(a) is not into the question whether the 
accused committed the offence with which he is charged (i.e. whether on a balance of probability he 
could be convicted of the offence) but rather whether the accused ‘committed the act in question’. In 
context, the expression ‘the act in question’ has reference to the actus reus elements of the offence 
with which the accused is charged.  If the lawmaker had intended the court to enquire into the 
question whether the accused would probably be convicted of the charged offence if and when he 
became capable of understanding the proceedings, this would have been said.  The use of the 
words ‘committed the act in question’ points to a more limited enquiry.” 
349  More particularly, an order in terms of section 77(6)(a)(i) or (ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  Also 
see Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 230.  Also see Kruger Mental Health Law in 
South Africa at 164 who confirms the principle that a person who cannot follow the proceedings 
cannot be tried.  See further Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act at 13-6. 
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be made.350  The court must 351 make an order that the acused either be treated as a state 
patient or an involuntary mental health care user.352   
The court does not have the discretion to make any order other than one of those listed in 
section 77(6).353  The effect of these provisions is that an accused who is unfit to stand trial 
will be detained, regardless of if it is proved that he was involved in the commission of the 
crime or not.354  Recently the Constitutional court in De Vos v Minister of Justice 
                                                
350  Louw in Psycholegal Assessment in South Africa at 43.  The court used to have no choice but to 
declare the person a State President's patient prior to the amendment of the Criminal Procedure Act 
by the Criminal Maters Amendment Act 68 of 1998 that came into force on 28 February 2002.  The 
position has been amended by legislation and this is no longer the only order a court is allowed to 
make.  The court is guided in its decision by inter alia the seriousness of the offence committed.  See 
Section 77(6( of the Criminal Procedure Act (as amended).  Also see Kruger Heimstra Suid-
Afrikaanse Strafproses at 230.  Also see the discussion of the trial on the facts earlier in this chapter. 
351  The court does not have discretion to make a finding outside the parameters of section 77(6), it is 
obliged to make one of the orders as set out in this section.  See Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse 
Strafproses at 230.  The court will, however, not be obliged to make an order in terms of section 
77(6) where the state withdraws its charges.  See S v Kahita 1983 (4) SA 618 (K).  Also see De Vos 
v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development WCC case at [11] where the lack of a discretion 
for orders pertaining to persons who are found unfit to stand trial is confirmed.   
352  Section 77(6)(a) provides as follows:  “If the court which has jurisdiction in terms of section 75 to try 
the case, finds that the accused is not capable of understanding the proceedings so as to make a 
proper defence, the court may, if it is of the opinion that it is in the interests of the accused, taking 
into account the nature of the accused’s incapacity contemplated in subsection (1), and unless it can 
be proved on a balance of probabilities that, on the limited evidence available the accused 
committed the act in question, order that such information or evidence be placed before the court as 
it deems fit so as to determine whether the accused has committed the act in question and the court 
shall direct that the accused— 
 (i) in the case of a charge of murder or culpable homicide or rape or compelled rape as 
 contemplated in sections 3 or 4 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) 
 Amendment Act, 2007, respectively, or a charge involving serious violence or if the court 
 considers it to be necessary in the public interest, where the court finds that the accused has 
 committed the act in question, or any other offence involving serious violence, be detained in 
 a psychiatric hospital or a prison pending the decision of a judge in chambers in terms of 
 section 47 of the Mental Health Care Act, 2002; or 
 (ii) where the court finds that the accused has committed an offence other than one 
 contemplated in subparagraph (i) or that he or she has not committed any offence— 
  (aa) be admitted to and detained in an institution stated in the order as if he or she were 
  an involuntary mental health care user contemplated in section 37 of the Mental  
  Health Care Act, 2002, 
 and if the court so directs after the accused has pleaded to the charge, the accused shall not be 
entitled under section 106(4) to be acquitted or to be convicted in respect of the charge in question.” 
353  De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development WCC case at {10}, [11} where the court 
compares section 77(6) with the orders that a court can make in terms of section 78(6) where a 
person is found not criminally responsible due to mental illness.  Section 78(6) grants the court a 
wide discretion in terms of the orders that can be made, including the condition or unconditional 
release of a person found not guilty due to mental illness whereas this is not an option in terms of 
section 77(6(.  This was the main issue before the court for adjudication.  The Constitutional court 
confirmed in De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development CC case at [19] that the 
wording of section 77(6) cannot be interpreted in any way other than that it is peremptory and does 
not leave the court with a discretion in terms of which order to make in a particular case. 
354  Schutte 2013 South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 64 at 64 observes that the mentally ill 
accused population is clearly divided into two groups through the workings of section 79, namely 
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Constitutional Development 355 considered this undesirable situation and ordered that 
section 77(6)(ii) be amended to the effect that the court has the discretion in respect of an 
unfit accused found to have committed a non-violent offence or found not to have 
committed the offence at all, to be released conditionally or unconditionally.356   
The consequences of detention as a state patient and an involuntary mental health care 
user are discussed below.  
i) State Patient 
Where an unfit accused is charged with murder, culpable homicide, rape or another 
crime involving violence, and the court finds on a balance of probabilities that the 
accused did, in fact, commit the act, the court must order that the accused be treated 
as a state patient in terms of the Mental Health Care Act.357   
                                                                                                                                                   
those that are charged with violent offences and those charged with non-violent offences although 
both will be detained upon a finding of unfit to stand trial.  The distinction between these two groups, 
are emphasised by the fact that only a mentally ill accused who is found unfit to stand trial and who 
has committed a violent offence, can be treated as a state patient in terms of section 42 of the 
Mental Health Care Act.  State patients are only released upon an order by a judge in chambers and 
detention can last for extended periods.  For those who committed non-violent offences, the harshest 
“sentence” is an order for involuntary treatment in terms of the Mental Health Care Act. 
355  De Vos N.O and Another v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others; InRe: 
Snyders and Another v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others 2015 (1) 
SACR 18 (WCC) (herein referred to as “De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
WCC case”). 
356  De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development CC case at [68].  Also see the detailed 
discussion of this case later in this chapter.  
357  Section 77(6)(a)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Act read with section 47 of the Mental Health Care Act.  
Only an accused charged with a crime involving serious violence, can, when found to have been 
mentally ill at the time of committing the offence, or unfit to stand trial be declared a state patient and 
detained as such in terms of section 47 of the Mental Health Care Act.  (See Section 78(6)(b)(i) 
regarding lack of criminal capacity).  Also see Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure 
Act at 13-14.  Also see Milton J “Law Commission project 89:  Declaration and detention of state 
patients” 1998 (11) SACJ 228-233 at 233 who points out that the Law Reform Commission’s 
recommendation that those who committed violent crimes should be detained inevitably whilst those 
accused of “other” crimes should be subjected to civil commitment procedures as provided for in the 
Mental Health Act of 1973 is neither “logical, reasonable or just”.  He argues that the conclusion of 
the Commission assumes that, because a person was mentally ill at the time of committing the 
crime, he must still be so mentally ill that he needs to be detained in a mental institution indefinitely.  
This is of course not necessarily so.  He might have recovered from his mental illness after some 
treatment.  Section 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act as it currently stands has, despite Milton’s 
concerns, been amended to the extent that it does distinguish between those that committed serious 
offences, and those that committed less serious offences.  Also see Sections 47 of the Mental Health 
Care Act that regulates the detention and discharge of state patients.  Also see Kruger Heimstra 
Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 231.  See further Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal 
Procedure Act at 13-7.  See further De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
WCC case at [9], [15].  Interesting to note is the concern raised by the psychiatrists who conducted 
the observation in this case as they found that the accused is unfit to stand trial and because he was 
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The order that an accused be detained as a state patient must be made in the 
presence of the accused.358  Such an accused is neither found guilty nor acquitted.359  
It is merely a finding to bring the proceedings to a close.360  The implication of detention 
as a state patient is that the accused shall be detained in a psychiatric hospital or 
prison until a judge in chambers orders his release.361  Kaliski 362 states that the 
rationale for detaining the mentally ill state patient indefinitely is because it is unsure 
how long it will take to stabilise the illness or if it will respond to treatment at all.   This 
view is prefered to the view that detention of the mentally ill is necessary for public 
safety.363   
The Mental Health Care Act provides for the periodic review of the mental state of a 
state patient within six months of the order and thereafter every 12 months.364  This 
                                                                                                                                                   
charged with a violent crime will have to be declared a state patient.  The psychiatrists cautioned in 
their report that since the accused (Mr Snyders) had moderate intellectual retardation, this would 
mean that his detention as state patient could be indefinite as he would never recover and that such 
treatment seems unfair and inappropriate.  See this judgment at [23]. 
358  S v Eyden 1982 (4) SA 141 (T).  Also see Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 
at 13-22. 
359  Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act at 13-6. 
360  Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 226. 
361  Section 47 of the Mental Health Care Act.  Also see Cassim 2004 Codicillus 17 at 20.  Also see 
Louw in Psycholegal Assessment in South Africa at 43.  Prior to the amendment of the Criminal 
Procedure Act to the effect that the seriousness of the crime should play a part in determining if the 
accused should be detained as a state patient if he is found unfit to stand trial, someone accused of 
stealing a loaf of bread who is mentally ill, could be declared a state patient in the same way as 
someone accused of murder who was found unfit to stand trial.  The Criminal Procedure Act prior to 
its amendment by the Criminal Matters Amendment Act – which came into force on 28 February 
2002 - did not take the seriousness of the crime into consideration when declaring an accused a 
state patient.  Snyman 1988 Acta Juridica 128 at 149 is of the view that the seriousness of a crime 
should play a part and was in favour of an amendment to the legislation to include such 
consideration.  Snyman points out that prior to the amendment of the Act, even though the Act 
seemed to have intimated that the seriousness of the crime should not have played any role at all, 
certain attorneys general ordered that the charges against individuals who were found unfit to stand 
trial but who committed a minor offence, be dropped and that they be detained as involuntary users 
in terms of Mental Health legislation, rather than state patients.  The amendments to the Criminal 
Procedure Act, seem to be in line with the practice that emerged prior to its amendments and in the 
interest of fairness and justice to ensure that someone that committed a minor offence, is not 
detained in a psychiatric hospital indefinitely.  See Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal 
Procedure Act at 13-7 where the position after amendment is discussed and where it is clear that the 
seriousness of the offence does indeed play a part in the orders that the court may make.  A person 
who did not commit a crime of a violent nature, cannot be declared a state patient and cannot be 
treated as such in terms of the Mental Health Care Act, but can be treated as an involuntary mental 
health care user in terms of the Mental Health Care Act. 
362  Kaliski S “Does the insanity defence lead to an abuse of human rights?”  2012 (15) Afr J Psychiatry 
83-87 at 85. 
363  Snyman states that this detention of the mentally ill, in institutions should not be seen as 
punishment, rather a measure in the interest of society.  See Snyman J 1988 Acta Juridica 128 at 
148, 149.    
364  Section 46(1) of the Mental Health Care Act.   
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measure ensures that a state patient is not detained indefinitely.365    
Detention in a psychiatric hospital as a state patient does not provide protection against 
prosecution for the offence with which the accused was initially charged.366  If the 
accused regains his ability to follow the trial proceedings, his trial will commence at that 
point.367    
The fact that provision is made for the accused to stand trial once he regains his ability 
to follow the proceedings implies that the condition that the accused is suffering from is 
treatable 368 and that the accused in question can recover from his condition, or at the 
very least, progress to a state where the illness is managed, be it with medication 
and/or therapy.369  Intellectual disability is, however, not treatable, and the prospect of 
standing trial once the ability to understand the proceedings have been regained falls 
away for those found unfit to stand trial as a result of intellectual disability.370  These 
individuals face indefinite detention once declared a state patient.371 
A state patient can be released by order of a judge in chambers.372  A lengthy process 
is prescribed for an application for a state patient’s discharge from care.373  The Mental 
                                                
365  When the review is conducted as referred to in section 46(1), the report on the review must contain 
information on the treatment of the state patient forthwith, the merits of granting leave of absence to 
the accused (section 45) or the discharge of the state patient.  A complete discharge may be granted 
by a judge in chambers in terms of section 47(6) of the Mental Health Care Act. 
366  The only requirement is that the accused must at the point when the proceedings are resumed, be 
able to follow the proceedings.  See Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 231 and S v 
Leeuw 1987 (3) SA 79 (A). 
367  Section 77(7) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  See Louw in Psycholegal Assessment in South Africa 
at 43.  Also see Cassim 2004 Codicillus 17 at 20.  See further Du Toit et al Commentary on the 
Criminal Procedure Act at 13-3 who adds that the trial rarely continues if and when an accused 
regains his ability to stand trial.  Also see Joubert et al Strafprosesreg 11th ed at 252. 
368  Africa in Psychology and Law at 408, endnote 9. 
369  See in general Stevens 2013 THRHR 252-260 for a discussion of the issues involved in subjecting 
those found unfit to stand trial to treatment with psychotropic medication.  He also considers if the 
accused person has a right to refuse such treatment (at 255-256). 
370  Africa in Psychology and Law at 408, endnote 9.  Also see De Vos v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development CC case at [6] where the court explains that three psychiatrists found 
the accused (Mr Snyders) unfit to stand trial due to mental retardation.  The psychiatrists, however, 
expressed concerns over declaring the accused a state patient as this would entail that the accused 
must be detained indefinitely.  Since the accused’s condition (mental retardation) cannot be treated 
to a state where it will improve, the accused faces indefinite detention.  The psychiatrists were 
concerned that this is not in the best interest of the accused.  
371  See De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development WCC case at [22] where the 
psychiatric report drafted for the court warns that since there is no prospect of recovery for the 
accused who suffered from Down Syndrome, he faced indefinite detention in a psychiatric facility 
and that such indefinite detention was undesirable.  Also see De Vos v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development CC case at [6]. 
372  Section 47 of the Mental Health Care Act.  
373  Section 47 of the Mental Health Care Act.  Also see Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 
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Health Care Act provides for applications for discharge to be brought by any of the 
state patient himself, an official curator at litem or administrator if appointed, the 
superintendent of the facility where the state patient is treated, the medical practitioner 
administering the mental health care treatment and rehabilitation services, spouse, 
next of kin or any other person authorised to act on behalf of the state patient.374  An 
application for discharge cannot be brought within 12 months from a previous 
application for discharge having been dismissed.375    
The judge may, instead of ordering the state patient's discharge, rather opt to reclassify 
the accused and order that he be treated as an involuntary or assisted user.376  
Applications for detention or discharge of state patients are not considered by a Mental 
Health Review Board 377 , perhaps leaving state patients vulnerable to unreasonably 
long periods of detention. 
                                                                                                                                                   
231 who explains that in practice, the head of the health establishment where the state patient 
receives treatment, sends the application for discharge to the Department of Defence who in turn 
sends it to the Registrar of the relevant court in order for the application to be considered by a judge 
in chambers.  The Department of Defence is the official curator ad litem of the state patient in this 
instance.  Bateman 2005 SAMJ 208 at 212 explains that it is very difficult to convince a judge that a 
person that was once found unfit to stand trial, is no longer mentally ill or that such a person will now 
take his medication and will in general “behave”.  Under the previous mental health legislation, 
Mental Health Act of 1973, an equally laborious process was prescribed to apply for the discharge of 
a state patient.  
374  Section 47(1)(a) – (g) of the Mental Health Care Act.  Also see S v Pedro 2015 (1) SACR 41 (WCC) 
at [85],  State patients could, according to the 1973 Mental Health Act, only be released if a judge in 
chambers ordered such release upon an application brought by their official curator ad litem.  See 
Section 29 of the Mental Health Act.  In terms of the 1973 Mental Health Act, this was the Attorney 
General.  The practice was that the Attorney General would only request this release if the 
superintendent of the institution where the person involved was detained, was willing to almost 
guarantee that the individual, if released, would not commit a similar offence again.  See Milton J 
“Law reform:  The Criminal Matters Amendment Act 1998 brings some sanity (but only some) to the 
defence of insanity” 1999 (12) SACJ 41-48 at 41.  Releases, were therefore few and far between. 
375  S v Pedro 2015 (1) SACR 41 (WCC) at [85].  Also see Section 47(4)(a) of the Mental Health Care 
Act.  Also see De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development CC case at [36], footnote 
41 where it is confirmed that an application for discharge can only be brought once every 12 months. 
376  Section 47(6)(b) of the Mental Health Care Act.  Also see S v Siko 2010 JOL 25861 (ECB) at [8] 
where it is stated that it is much harder to secure the discharge of a state patient than to secure the 
discharge of a person being treated as an involuntary mental health care user in terms of section 37 
of the Mental Health Care Act.  See further S v Dlali (3/2015) [2015] ZAECBHC 2 (27 February 
2015) at [34] where this is confirmed. 
377  A Mental Health Review Board does not have the jurisdiction to order or confirm the release of a 
state patient as is the case with an assisted or involuntary mental health care user.  Section 19 of 
the Mental Health Care Act sets out the functions and powers of the Mental Health Review Board 
and refers to tasks relating to assisted and involuntary mental health care users as well as mentally 
ill prisoners but no mention is made of state patients.  Since the other categories of mental health 
care users are mentioned specifically, it makes sense that the legislature would have referred to 
state patients specifically if the intention was that the Review Board should be involved in decisions 
regarding their further treatment or release for example.  This fact may still leave the state patients 
more vulnerable than other categories of users, to unreasonably long periods of detention. 
  
166 
ii) Involuntary mental health care user 
If the court finds that an unfit accused committed an act other than the violent acts set 
out above 378  or that the accused did not commit the offence in question,  379 he shall 
be detained as an involuntary mental health care user at a mental health care facility in 
terms of the Mental Health Care Act.380 
As alluded to earlier, when an application for involuntary care is brought to the head of 
the health establishment for a patient outside of the criminal justice system, such 
involuntary care is only continued if the need, therefore, has been confirmed after a 72- 
hour assessment period.381 The 72-hour assessment period is arguably not applicable 
to mentally ill accused persons in respect of whom an order for involuntary care is 
made in accordance with section 77(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act.382  Even though 
a mentally ill accused is assessed by mental health professionals during the fitness 
assessment, such an assessment does not focus on the criteria for involuntary care as 
set out in the Mental Health Care Act.383   
                                                
378  Acts involving serious violence such as murder, culpable homicide or rape.  (Section 77 (6)(a)(i) of 
the Criminal Procedure Act. 
379  Section 77(6)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
380  Section 77(6)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  Also see section 37 of the Mental Health Care Act  
that regulates the detention of involuntary mental health care users.  See further Louw in 
Psycholegal Assessment in South Africa at 43 and further Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse 
Strafproses at 231.  See further Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act at 13-7.  
These persons cannot be detained as state patients as only accused persons who are charged with 
violent offences can be so detained in terms of section 42 of the Mental Health Care Act.  Also see 
De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development WCC case.at [9].    
381  Section 34 of the Mental Health Care Act. 
382  This view may be supported by the opinion of Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 48 at 
56 where he writes with regard to outpatient treatment.  He refers to accused persons undergoing 
observation and states that such observations should be considered on a day-visitor basis which has 
the same meaning as outpatient, but the author reckons that he cannot use the same terminology 
that is used for patients since persons referred for observation by the courts, are not patients in the 
strict sense of the word. 
383  The requirements for involuntary care is set out in section 32 of the Mental Health Care Act which 
states that:   
 “32.  Care, treatment and rehabilitation of mental health care users without consent A mental 
 health care user must be provided with care, treatment and rehabilitation services without 
 his or her consent at a health establishment on an outpatient or inpatient basis if – 
  (a) an application in writing is made to the head of the health establishment concerned to 
 obtain the necessary care, treatment and rehabilitation services and the application is 
 granted;  
  (b) at the time of making the application, there is reasonable belief that the mental health 
 care user has a mental illness of such a nature that – 
  (i)  the user is likely to inflict serious harm to himself or herself or others; or  
  (ii)  care, treatment and rehabilitation of the user is necessary for the protection of the 
  financial interests or reputation of the user; and  
  (c) at the time of the application the mental health care user is incapable of making an 
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In terms of the Mental Health Care Act, involuntary mental health care treatment and 
rehabilitation services are provided to mental health care users who refuse treatment 
and who need such treatment for their own protection or the protection of others.384  An 
element of dangerousness must be present.  As pointed out in De Vos v Minister of 
Justice Constitutional Development 385 , the assessment for fitness to stand trial does 
not make provision for an assessment of dangerousness, nor does the court enquire 
into it before making an order for involuntary care.386  The decision that an accused 
should receive involuntary care is therefore not based on the Mental Health Care Act 
criteria but on arbitrary legal criteria depending on the type of charges that the accused 
faces.   
It appears that there is no room to consider the capacity of the accused to make an 
informed decision as to the need for mental health care treatment and rehabilitation 
services as the case would normally be for matter falling outside the criminal justice 
system.  The very basis of involuntary care in the Mental Health Care Act is the lack of 
the ability to make an informed decision about the need for treatment.  An order by the 
criminal court for the unfit accused to receive involuntary care places the accused in 
the category of involuntary care without the accused actually meeting the legislative 
requirements for this category of care.  It appears that the fact that the order for 
involuntary care is made by the court makes strict adherence to the requirements in the 
Mental Health Care Act pertaining to a particular category of treatment unnecessary. 
It is possible that an accused may be amenable to mental health care treatment or at 
least not opposed to it, in which case the accused, technically if the criteria as set out in 
                                                                                                                                                   
 informed decision on the need for the care, treatment and rehabilitation services and is 
 unwilling to receive the care, treatment and rehabilitation required.” 
384  Section 1 of the Mental Health Care Act sets out the definition as follows:  “involuntary care, 
treatment and rehabilitation” means the provision of health interventions to people incapable of 
making informed decisions due to their mental health status and who refuse but require such 
services for their own protection or for the protection of others.  Also see section 33 of the Mental 
Health Care Act that sets out the procedure to apply for the involuntary admission of a user.  
385  De Vos N.O and Another v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others; InRe: 
Snyders and Another v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others 2015 (1) 
SACR 18 (WCC) (herein referred to as “De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
WCC case”). 
386  See De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development WCC case at [49} where it is 
pointed out that “…s 77(6)(a) does not require, or even permit, the court to enquire into either the 
potential danger to society posed by the accused person or the individual needs or circumstances of 
such person.  Although medical experts are required to assess the accused person’s mental 
capacity, they are not called upon to express any view as to whether or not he or she constitutes a 




the Mental Health Care Act are applied, falls within the definition of a voluntary or 
assisted mental health care user.387  The fact that an accused is found unfit to stand 
trial does not mean that he is unfit to take any other decisions and may very well have 
the capacity to make an informed decision about the need for mental health care 
treatment and rehabilitation services.  
Perhaps the 72-hour assessment period should be expressly made applicable to those 
in respect of whom an order for involuntary care is made by the court.  In this manner, 
mental health care professionals can assess the mental health care need of the 
individual rather than subjecting the accused to care based on an arbitrary decision 
taken by the court.  If the intention of an order for involuntary care by a court is indeed 
treatment and not punishment, there should not be objections against this approach.  
Following this approach may increase the accused’s chances of regaining fitness and 
will contribute to the speedy delivery of justice.  
The Mental Health Care Act promotes the least restrictive method of care treatment 
and rehabilitation, and subjecting an accused, in respect of whom an order for 
involuntary care is made, to the 72-hour assessment period will ensure that he too 
receives the least restrictive care that can possibly be provided having regard to his 
particular mental health care needs.  This is essential since many accused persons 
found unfit to stand trial are found not to have committed a crime at all and should, 
therefore, ideally, be treated in the same manner as a person who encounters the 
mental health care system outside of the criminal justice system.  
The mental condition of an involuntary mental health care user is reviewed six months 
after the commencement of the treatment and thereafter every 12 months.388   These 
persons will be discharged from such involuntary care once it is established, during the 
periodic review or otherwise, that such involuntary mental health care is no longer 
required.389  The Review Board may order the discharge of involuntary mental health 
                                                
387  Section 25 of the Mental Health Care Act provides for voluntary care for those who are able to take 
an informed decision regarding the need for mental health care treatment and rehabilitation services.  
Section 26 of the Mental Health Care Act provides for assisted care, treatment and rehabilitation 
services for those incapable of taking informed decisions but who do not refuse the treatment. 
388  Section 37(1) of the Mental Health Care Act. 
389  Section 37 and 38 of the Mental Health Care Act.  Section 37 provides for the discharge of the 
involuntary mental health care user if, during the periodic review, the Review Board is of the view 
that the user should be discharged.  Section 38 allows for the head of the health establishment to 
discharge the user if he is of the view that the user no longer suffers from a mental illness.  If the 
user is willing to receive further treatment, the user will forthwith be treated as a voluntary mental 
health care user.  Section 38(2) of the Mental Health Care Act read with section 25 thereof.  If the 
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care users.390  The Registrar of the High Court must be informed of the discharge of an 
involuntary mental health care user.391  
In the case of an accused who was treated on an involuntary basis by order of the 
criminal court and who is no longer so detained, this person will probably be deemed to 
have regained his fitness to stand trial, and the criminal trial may continue at this 
stage.392  
The question arises as to why an accused that is charged with a serious offence but 
not convicted must be declared a state patient, whereas it is not the case with 
someone who committed a non-violent offence, as the latter is detained as an 
involuntary mental health care user.  If fitness is truly distinctly different from the inquiry 
into criminal capacity and concerned with the present state of mind, surely the order as 
to the manner of detention should be dictated by the mental health care needs of the 
accused rather than the type of charges against him?  This is especially so considering 
that no provision for the assessment of the dangerousness of the accused is made 
during the fitness assessment.  It almost appears as if this provision is based on the 
assumption that an unfit accused charged with a serious offence requires stricter 
measures of confinement during treatment than those accused of less serious crimes.  
This, despite the fact that the accused has not been convicted of any offence. 
3.6.2.4 Review of decision regarding fitness in terms of section 77(6) 
The finding by a court that an accused is unfit to stand trial is not subject to automatic 
review in terms of section 302(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act.393  Related hereto is the 
                                                                                                                                                   
user is not willing to receive further treatment and the head of the health establishment is satisfied 
that this person no longer suffers from a mental illness, such person must be discharged and the 
high court must be informed of such discharge.  Section 38(3) of the Mental Health Care Act read 
with section 37(6) of the Mental Health Care Act. 
390  Section 37(5) of the Mental Health Care Act. 
391  Section 37(6) of the Mental Health Care Act. 
392  See chapter 4 of this research for the discussion of the “keep fit” order where an accused who has 
regained his fitness may be detained in a psychiatric facility awaiting his trial if the court is of the 
view that the accused will become unfit again if he is detained in the correctional facility awaiting 
trial.  Such an option is currently lacking in the South African system.  A suggestion to incorporate 
such an order is made in chapter 6 of this research. 
393  S v Blaauw 1980 (1) SA 536 (K).  Also see Joubert et al Strafprosesreg 11th ed at 383.  Also see S v 
Ramokoka and more recently, S v Zondi 2012 (2) SACR 445 (KZP).  Also see Maluka v S 
(A197/2013) [2014] ZAGPPHC 862; 2015 (2) SACR 273 (GP) (31 October 2014).  The court in the 
Maluka judgment referred to the judgment in Ramokoka and stated that: “RAMOKOKA however took 
a different approach and even though the court recognised that the Legislature did not create an 
automatic right of review in respect of orders made in terms of section 77(6) of the Act, it took the 
position that ‘in view of the potential for serious prejudice to an accused person where an order is 
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fact that an order by a magistrate declaring an accused a state patient does not have to be 
approved by a judge in chambers.  
In S v Malcolm 394  the magistrate made an order in terms of section 77(6) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act declaring the accused a state patient, but the form on which the order was 
made suggested that this order had to be confirmed by a judge in chambers.395  It was 
found that the judge has no part to play in the initial decision to have a person declared a 
state patient as a result of not being fit to stand trial.396  The judge in chambers only plays a 
part in the decision regarding the further detention or release of state patients.397   Willis J 
confirmed in S v Ramokoka 398 that an order made in terms of section 77(6) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act does not have the automatic consequence of being put in front of a judge in 
chambers for confirmation.399  
In addition, a special review does not apply to a finding of fitness.  The provisions pertaining 
to special review 400 only apply to sentenced persons and persons who have been 
convicted but not yet sentenced.401  These review provisions are therefore not applicable to 
                                                                                                                                                   
made in terms of s 77(6), some kind of review mechanism seems desirable.’  On that basis the court 
concluded that as ‘a matter of good practise, magistrates should refer their orders made in terms of 
section 77 (6) to the High Court for review’.  Also see S v Dlali (3/2015) [2015] ZAECBHC 2 (27 
February 2015) at [34]. 
394  1998 (1) SASV 577 (OK).  (Hereinafter referred to as “S v Malcolm”. 
395  S v Malcolm at 581A-C. 
396  S v Malcolm at 581B-C.  Also see the discussion of this case in Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse 
Strafproses at 226.   
397  S v Wills at 108A-D.  Also see the discussion of this case in Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse 
Strafproses at 226.  Section 36 of the Mental Health Care Act makes provision for judicial review of a 
decision that a mental health care user must continue to be treated as an involuntary mental health 
care user.  Section 34(7) of the Mental Health Care Act compels a Review Board to submit 
documentation pertaining to the decision to continue to treat a mental health care user as an 
involuntary mental health care user, to the Registrar of the High Court for consideration.  This is 
understood to mean that the decision to treat a person as an involuntary mental health care user 
must be confirmed by the High Court and confirms the Judge’s involvement in the decision regarding 
the further treatment of the mental health care user.  If these provisions will apply in a case where 
the court orders an accused to be detained in terms of section 77(6) is doubtful as part of the 
documents that need to be submitted to the registrar is the findings on the 72 hour assessment 
period which the accused would not have been compelled to undergo if his detention as an 
involuntary user is the result of an order in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act.  Nevertheless, the 
periodic reviews as provided for in section 37 of the Mental Health Care Act apply to all involuntary 
mental health care users.   
398  2006 (2) SACR 57. 
399  S v Ramokoka 2006 (2) SACR 57 at [11].  Also see Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal 
Procedure Act at 13-7, 13-8.  See further S v Pedro 2015 (1) SACR 41 (WCC) at [106].   
400  Section 304 of the Criminal Procedure Act.  Also see S v Ramokoka 2006 (2) 57 (W) at [13]. 
401  Section 304(A) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  Also see S v Ramokoka 2006 SACR 57 (W) at [13].  
See further See further S v Pedro 2015 (1) SACR 41 (WCC) at [106] where it is pointed out that the 
automatic review does not apply because an order in terms of section 77(6) does not have the 
consequence that an accused is “convicted” and it does not constitute a “sentence”.    
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those detained in terms of section 77, because persons detained in terms of section 77, 
have not been convicted or sentenced.    
Bearing in mind the serious impact that a finding of unfitness to stand trial may have on the 
accused, some form of review is, however, desirable.402  In S v Ramokoka,403 Willis J was 
of the view that magistrates should, as a matter of good practice, submit decisions taken in 
terms of section 77(6) to the high court for review.404  Willis J resorted to using the common-
law review powers of the high court 405 and reviewed an order given in terms of section 77 
of the Criminal Procedure Act taken by the court a quo in the Ramokoka case supra and set 
it aside.406   
Since there is no mechanism in place for the automatic review of a decision that an 
accused is unfit to stand trial, or the manner of detention following such finding, it might be 
worth exploring the possibility of expanding the powers of the Mental Health Review Boards 
to review decisions by courts to have accused persons detained as state patients or 
involuntary mental health care users.  This is explained later in the research.  
3.6.2.5 Appeal against finding of unfit to stand trial 
An accused found unfit to stand trial may appeal against this finding but only if the finding 
was based on facts other than averment made by the accused.407  Should the appeal 
                                                
402  S v Ramokoka at [12].  Also see Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act at 13-8.  
Also see in general the unreported judgment of Maluka v S (A197/2013) [2014] ZAGPPHC 862; 
2015 (2) SACR 273 (GP) (31 October 2014). 
403  S v Ramokoka at [16]. 
404  S v Ramokoka at [11], [30].  Also see Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act at 13-
8.  The view taken in the Ramokoka judgment was confirmed and followed by the High Court in the 
unreported judgment of Maluka v S (A197/2013) [2014] ZAGPPHC 862; 2015 (2) SACR 273 (GP) 
(31 October 2014) at [8].  Also see S v Pedro 2015 (1) SACR 41 (WCC) at [107] where it is pointed 
out that the High Court has jurisdiction to review cases heard in lower courts.  This is provided for in 
terms of section 22(1) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 that states that the proceedings of a 
lower court may be brought under review in the High Court by virtue inter alia of a ‘gross irregularity 
in the proceedings’.  The court further held at [108} that “The High Court also has an inherent power 
to review the proceedings of lower courts on the basis of the constitutional principle of legality”. 
405  S v Ramokoka at [14].  Also see Joubert et al Strafprosesreg 11th ed at 393.  These review powers 
are however only used in exceptional cases where it appears that there will be a gross injustice if the 
high court does not interfere. 
406  S v Ramokoka at [30].  Caution was however taken not to have the accused released into society 
due to the potential danger that the accused posed to society in this particular instance. 
407  Section 77(8)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  Also see Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse 
Strafproses at 231.  See further Cassim 2004 Codicillus 17 at 20.  Also see Kruger Mental Health 
Law in South Africa at 168 who explains at footnote 110 that the position that an accused can only 
appeal against a finding of unfit to stand trial if he did not aver himself that he is not triable, is 
probably so to avoid appeals by the accused without merit.  See also Joubert et al Strafprosesreg 
11th ed at 252. 
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succeed, the case is referred back to the court a quo for the trial to proceed as per 
normal.408  The effect of a successful appeal in this instance is, therefore, that the accused 
is deemed fit to stand trial and should stand trial in the court a quo.  It is important to note 
that the state may not appeal against a finding of unfitness to stand trial, only the accused 
may do so.409 
3.6.3 Constitutionality of section 77(6) challenged 
Recently, the provisions of section 77(6) were found unconstitutional by the high court in 
the case of De Vos v Minister of Justice Constitutional Development.410  The case 
concerned two mentally ill accused persons, one accused of murder and the other of 
rape.411  The validity of section 77(6)(i) and (ii) was attacked.  In effect, the fate of a 
mentally ill accused person who is found unfit to stand trial was at issue.412  It was argued 
on behalf of the accused persons that this section was in violation of a mentally ill accused 
person’s right to equality, dignity as well as freedom and security of person.413    
The right to freedom and security of a person received a lot of attention in the arguments 
put before the court.414  The court had to consider whether the detention of mentally ill 
accused persons in terms of section 77(6) is arbitrary or without just cause so as to 
                                                
408  Section 77(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  Also see Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses 
at 231. 
409  Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 231.  Also see Du Toit et al Commentary on the 
Criminal Procedure Act at 13-7.  
410  De Vos N.O and Another v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others; InRe: 
Snyders and Another v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others 2015 (1) 
SACR 18 (WCC).  This case was decided in September 2014. 
411  The first accused, Mr Stuurman, was accused of stabling a 14-year-old girl to death when he himself 
was only 14 years old.  He sustained a head injury at the age of five, which left him severely mentally 
handicapped.  He was sent for observation by the Oudtshoorn regional court and the finding was 
that he is unfit to stand trial – although the three psychiatrists differed in their reasons for this finding, 
the finding was unanimous.  The second accused, Mr Snyders who was born with Down Syndrome 
and had cognitive impairments, was accused of raping a girl who, at the time of the trial was 11 
years old.  The rape was alleged to have taken place some 5 to 6 years prior to the trial.  Mr Snyders 
was sent for observation by the Blue Down’s Magistrates court and was found unfit to stand trial.  
The report indicated that he had moderate mental retardation. 
412  De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development WCC case.at [2]. 
413  These rights are protected in sections 9,10 and 12 respectively of the Constitution.  See De Vos v 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development WCC case.at [33].  It was also contested 
because it violates the rights of children in terms of section 28(2) of the Constitution.  The position of 
children and thus the part of the judgment of the court dealing with the position of children will not be 
discussed here since the position of children in conflict of the law does not form part of this research. 
414  Section 12(1)(a) of the Constitution states that ‘[e] everyone has the right to freedom and security of 
the person, which includes the right - (a) not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just 
cause’.   
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constitute a violation of the constitutional right to freedom and security of the person.415 
In considering the fairness of section 77(6)(ii), the court’s attention was drawn to the 
discrepancies between this section and section 32 of the Mental Health Care Act in terms 
whereof an accused who is found unfit to stand trial is to be detained if it is found that he 
committed a non-violent offence or did not commit any offence at all.416  For a person to be 
admitted as an involuntary mental health care user in terms of the Mental Health Care Act, 
the person has to suffer from a mental illness, be a danger to himself or others and must be 
unwilling to undergo treatment.417  When the court orders an accused to be detained as an 
involuntary mental health care user because he is unfit to stand trial, no provision is made 
for an assessment of whether or not the person is a danger to himself or society in order to 
meet the criteria for an involuntary mental health care user as defined in the Mental Health 
Care Act.  It appears that an order in terms of section 77(6)(ii) overrides the need to assess 
the elements as identified in section 32 of the Mental Health Care Act, which sets out the 
criteria for treatment as an involuntary mental health care user.418   
This may result in a mentally ill accused being treated as an involuntary mental health care 
user, whereas such a person might not be a danger to anyone and may be willing to accept 
treatment.419  The willingness of a mental health care user to accept treatment and the 
ability to make decisions regarding the need for treatment places him in a different category 
of mental health care treatment and rehabilitation services that are less restrictive.420  
When considering if the detention is for a just cause, the court noted that: 
 
                                                
415  De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development WCC case.at [38]. 
416  De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development WCC case.at [40], [42]. 
417  Section 37 of the Mental Health Care Act.  Also see De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development WCC case.at [40]. 
418  The applicability of the 72-hour assessment period as provided for in section 34 of the Mental Health 
Care Act also comes into question.  The 72-hour assessment period is conducted in order to 
determine if further mental health care treatment and rehabilitation is necessary or not.  In the event 
that the court makes an order in terms of section 77(6) the decision has been taken, albeit by the 
court and not a mental health care professional, that further mental health care treatment and 
rehabilitation services are necessary. 
419  De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development WCC case.at [41], [42]. 
420  In terms of the Mental Health Care Act, a person who is willing to accept treatment is treated as a 
voluntary mental health care user and a person who is not capable of taking a decision regarding the 
need for treatment but who does not object thereto, is treated as an assisted mental health care 
user.  The discharge of these categories of users are much easier than that of a patient detained as 




 It is a fundamental principle of our law that when there is an interference with physical liberty 
of a person, the party causing the interference bear ‘the burden to justify the deprivation of 
liberty, whatever form it may have taken, that is, to convince the court that the deprivation of 
liberty is not arbitrary and for a just cause.421 
The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development as the respondent in the De Vos 
matter had to convince the court that the detention of Mr Stuurman and Snyders, in this 
case, was not arbitrary but for a just cause.  The reasons for advanced was that such 
detention was necessary for the protection of the accused and society at large, as mentally 
ill persons may pose a danger to themselves and society.422  It is important to note, 
however, that as pointed out above, the dangerousness of the accused is never assessed 
before a finding of unfitness to stand trial is made or before the court orders the detention of 
an unfit accused.  To state that the detention is because the accused might pose a danger 
to himself or society is based on an arbitrary assumption about persons with mental illness 
and not on the actual circumstances of the accused before the court.  This amounts to 
arbitrary decision-making.423 
The court acknowledged that there might be circumstances in which the involuntary 
detention of mentally ill persons is justified and that such detention in those circumstances 
serves a legitimate purpose.424  The court, however, importantly pointed out that: 
 It is equally well-recognised, however, that not every person with a mental illness or mental 
defect is a danger to society or requires to be detained in an institution.  This is so because 
there are varying degrees of mental illness and various types of mental disability, and 
institutionalisation is not invariably required or indeed appropriate.  And herein lies the rub 
because s 77(6)(a) does not require, or even permit, the court to enquire into either the 
potential danger to society posed by the accused person or the individual needs or 
circumstances of such person.425 
                                                
421  De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development WCC case.at [41], [43] relying on the 
case of Zealand v Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development 2008 (4) SA 458 (CC) at [24\, 
[25]. 
422  De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development WCC case.at [41], [46], [47] where the 
case of the respondent is set out as that the deprivation of freedom in the case of persons detained 
because they are mentally ill, ”gives effect to legitimate governmental objectives, which were 
identified by the respondents as being the following: (a) An accused person with a mental illness, 
who is found to have committed a serious or violent act, poses a potential danger to society.  The 
community must accordingly be protected from such persons and the State must fulfil its obligation 
to provide safety and security for the people of South Africa.  (b) The DPP further contended that s 
77(6)(a) is ‘designed primarily to protect the interest of the accused person’ and that it is necessary 
‘to protect the mentally ill person from danger to him, as well as the public from possible danger from 
the accused person’. 
423  In other jurisdictions, such as Canada, provision is made for the assessment of dangerousness 
before a disposition is made.  This can be ordered by either the court or the Review Board.  See 
chapter 4 of this research for a discussion on the role of the Review Board in this process. 
424  De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development WCC case.at [48]. 
425  De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development WCC case at [49]. 
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The court found that section 77(6)(a) dictates a predetermined and mandatory outcome 426 
that deprives the court of using its discretion with regard to an appropriate order having due 
regard to the facts of the individual case.427  This lack of discretion can lead to serious 
consequences where the mechanical application of a rule can lead to injustice in some 
instances.  Judicial discretion has a very important role to play to ensure justice.428 
The court found that the provision in section 77(6) that compelled a court to declare an 
accused person charged with a violent crime and who is unfit to stand trial, a state patient 
429  can give rise to an arbitrary and irrational result amounting to an infringement of the 
accused’s right to freedom and security of the person.430   
As with all constitutional rights, the limitation clause in the Constitution had to be considered 
to establish if the limitation of the right to freedom of movement was justifiable.  The court, 
however, found that it was not and that there were less restrictive ways to achieve the goal 
set by section 77(6).  The court was of the view that there is no reason why the court in 
cases of section 77(6)(i) should not have the same discretion as a court dealing with a case 
in terms of section 78(6)(i) and further, with section 77(6)(ii) cases, there are alternatives 
available before admitting a person as an involuntary mental health care user in terms of 
the Mental Health Care Act.431  The court did not indicate what such alternatives might be.  
This could conceivably be to treat the accused as an assisted user or on an outpatient 
basis or to release the person on conditions. 
                                                
426  De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development WCC case at [49]. 
427  De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development WCC case at [49]. 
428  De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development WCC case at [50] where the court 
quoted from the judgment of Ngcobo J, writing for the majority in Director of Public Prosecutions, 
Transvaal v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development where it was stated that:  “The 
importance of judicial discretion cannot be gainsaid.  Discretion permits judicial officers to take into 
account the need for tailoring their decisions to the unique facts and circumstances of particular 
cases.  There are many circumstances where the mechanical application of a rule may result in an 
injustice.  What is required is individualised justice, that is, justice that is appropriately tailored to the 
needs of the individual case.  It is only through discretion that the goal of individualised justice can 
be achieved.  Individualised justice is essential to the proper administration of justice.” 
429  An accused is detained as a state patient until a judge in chambers orders his release and this could 
potentially give rise to lengthy periods of detention. 
430  De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development WCC case at [52].  In reaching its 
conclusion, the court compared the options available to a court when dealing with a case under 
section 78(6), with the options available to a court under 77(6), and was unable to find a rational 
explanation for the difference.  Section 78(6) includes the option to order the conditional or 
unconditional release of an accused found not guilty because of mental illness whereas the option of 
discharge is not available when a person is found unfit to stand trial.  The court found this to be 
unjust.  The court went on to deal with the infringement of section 28(2) of the Constitution with 
regard to the rights of children in the criminal justice system since Mr Stuurman was a child himself 
when he allegedly committed the crime.  Due to the scope of this work, this part of the judgment, 
although very interesting and relevant, is not included in this work. 
431  De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development WCC case at [65]. 
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Section 77(6)(i) and (ii) were declared unconstitutional by the high court and the order 
suspended for a period of 24 months to enable the legislature to cure the invalidity.432  Out 
of concern for the situation that the two accused persons may find themselves in, pending 
the amendment of the legislation, the court made an order pertaining to how matters that 
fall under section 77(6)(i) and (ii) should be dealt with in the interim.  The court made the 
following order:433 
(c)  During the period of suspension, section 77(6)(a)(i) is deemed to read as follows 
(words inserted by this order are underlined and words omitted are deleted): 
‘(i)  in the case of a charge of murder or culpable homicide or rape or compelled rape as 
contemplated in sections 3 or 4 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related 
Matters) Amendment Act, 2007, respectively, or a charge involving serious violence 
or if the court considers it to be necessary in the public interest, where the court 
finds that the accused has committed the act in question, or any other offence 
involving serious violence, be detained in a psychiatric hospital or a prison pending 
the decision of a judge in chambers in terms of section 47 of the Mental Health Care 
Act, 2002 
(aa)  detained in a psychiatric hospital or prison pending the decision of a judge in 
chambers in terms of section 47 of the Mental Health Care Act, 2002; 
(bb)  be admitted to and detained in an institution stated in the order and treated as if he 
or she were an involuntary mental health care user contemplated in section 37 of the 
Mental Health Care Act, 2002; 
(cc)  released subject to such conditions as the court considers appropriate; or 
(dd)  released unconditionally.’ 
(d)  During the period of suspension, sub-paragraph 77(6)(a)(ii) is deemed to read as 
follows (words inserted by this order are underlined): 
‘(ii)  where the court finds that the accused has committed an offence other than one 
contemplated in subparagraph (i) or that he or she has not committed any offence – 
(aa)  be admitted to and detained in an institution stated in the order as if he or she were 
an involuntary mental health care user contemplated in section 37 of the Mental 
Health Care Act, 2002; 
(bb)  released subject to such conditions as the court considers appropriate; or 
(cc)  released unconditionally. 
 
The Court emphasised that the reading-in suggested is merely an interim measure and not 
intended to prescribe to the legislature how these provisions should be corrected.434  It is 
submitted, however, that the reading in of the words as suggested by the court will remedy 
the situation and render the provisions fair and just to those who are found unfit to stand 
trial. 
In this judgment, the court compared the provisions and consequences of a finding of not 
criminally responsible as provided for in section 78 and those of a finding of unfit to stand 
trial as provided for in section 77.  The court identified those provisions that create 
                                                
432  De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development WCC case at [72]. 
433  De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development WCC case at [72]. 
434  De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development WCC case at [70]. 
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inequality between those that fall under section 77 and those that fall under section 78.435  
A provision that adds to such inequality is the fact that when an accused does not quite 
meet the criteria for the section 78 defence (not criminally responsible), the lack of criminal 
capacity (diminished capacity) may still be taken into account during sentencing.436  Such 
an accused’s mental illness is taken into account later in the proceedings and softens the 
impact of the traditional criminal justice system, as far as sentencing is concerned.  Three 
categories of persons under section 78 exist, namely, those that are criminally responsible, 
those that lack criminal responsibility, and those that have diminished criminal capacity who 
do not meet the criteria of the first two categories. 
There is no similar provision for those that fall under section 77.  An accused is considered 
either fit to stand trial or unfit to stand trial.  No provision is made for those who do not quite 
meet the criteria for unfitness yet have a mental illness.  If the accused suffers from a 
mental illness that does not affect his fitness, he will be found fit to stand trial despite the 
presence of a mental illness.  The mental illness is not considered further in the 
proceedings, and the accused is dealt with in the same manner as those who do not have a 
mental illness.  A need is identified for the acknowledgement of the third category of 
persons under section 77, namely those who are fit to stand trial but mentally ill. 
The De Vos matter was taken to the Constitutional court for confirmation of the order of 
invalidity of section 77(6)(i) and (ii).437    
The Constitutional court agreed with the court a quo that the provisions of section 
77(6)(a)(i) 438 are peremptory and that it deprives the court of exercising judicial 
                                                
435  To illustrate, section 77 provides for persons who are found not to have committed a crime to be 
detained whereas section 78 provides for persons who have committed a crime to be released 
unconditionally.  This will be remedied by the suggested reading-inn of words as proposed by the 
court in the De Vos case.  An accused found not fit to stand trial, may have to face a criminal trial in 
future whereas the case of someone who was found not criminally responsible is finalised with a not 
guilty verdict.   
436  Section 78 (7) of the Criminal Procedure Act states that:   “(7) If the court finds that the accused at 
the time of the commission of the act in question was criminally responsible for the act but that his 
capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of the act or to act in accordance with an appreciation of the 
wrongfulness of the act was diminished by reason of mental illness or mental defect, the court may 
take the fact of such diminished responsibility into account when sentencing the accused.” 
437  See De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development CC case. 
438  Section 77(6)(ii) states that:  “(6) (a) If the court which has jurisdiction in terms of section 75 to try the 
case, finds that the accused is not capable of understanding the proceedings so as to make a proper 
defence, the court may, if it is of the opinion that it is in the interests of the accused, taking into 
account the nature of the accused's incapacity contemplated in subsection (1), and unless it can be 
proved on a balance of probabilities that, on the limited evidence available the accused committed 
the act in question, order that such information or evidence be placed before the court as it deems fit 




The Constitutional court further agreed with the court a quo that the routine imprisonment of 
an unfit accused who have been found to have committed the offence in question is not 
acceptable and should only be employed as a “stop-gap” measure where such an accused 
awaits the availability of a bed a hospital for treatment and where the court is of the view 
that such an accused presents a danger to himself and others if released awaiting such 
availability.440  Where no such threat of harm exists, an order similar to that provided for in 
section 35(1)(f) of the Constitution 441 or 79(2)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act 442 should 
be considered.443  These provisions enable the court to exercise discretion – at least in so 
far as the waiting period for purposes of treatment as a state patient is concerned.  The 
court eventually found with regard to section 77(6)(a)(i) that: 
 Section 77(6)(a)(i) operates rationally subject to certain qualifications.  Imprisonment should 
only be available to accused persons who pose a serious danger to society or themselves.  If 
an accused person does not pose a serious danger to society or themselves, then resources 
alone cannot dictate that an accused person be placed in prison.  If resources alone require 
an accused person to be kept in prison, then to this extent, section 77(6)(a)(i) is inconsistent 
with the Constitution and is invalid.  If resources are significantly constrained such that a bed 
in a psychiatric hospital is unavailable, then a presiding officer should be able to craft an 
appropriate order that encompasses treating the accused as an outpatient, for example, by 
extending the bail conditions or any other appropriate order pending the availability of a bed 
in a psychiatric hospital.444 
The court, however, found that it is permissible to order the detention of an accused in a 
psychiatric hospital after being found unfit to stand trial and having committed the serious 
offence in question.445  Such detention, the court reckoned, serves the purpose of care and 
                                                                                                                                                   
that the accused- (i) in the case of a charge of murder or culpable homicide or rape or compelled 
rape as contemplated in sections 3 or 4 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) 
Amendment Act, 2007, respectively, or a charge involving serious violence or if the court considers it 
to be necessary in the public interest, where the court finds that the accused has committed the act 
in question, or any other offence involving serious violence, be detained in a psychiatric hospital or a 
prison pending the decision of a judge in chambers in terms of section 47 of the Mental Health Care 
Act, 2002;” 
439  De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development CC case at [19]. 
440  De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development CC at [47]. 
441  Section 35(1)(f) states that:  (1) Everyone who is arrested for allegedly committing an offence has 
the right— (f) to be released from detention if the interests of justice permit, subject to reasonable 
conditions.” 
442  Section 79(2)(c) states that:  “The court may make the following orders after the enquiry referred to 
in subsection (1) has been conducted- (i) postpone the case for such periods referred to in 
paragraph (a), as the court may from time to time determine; (ii) refer the accused at the request of 
the prosecutor to the court referred to in section 77 (6) which has jurisdiction to try the case; (iii) 
make any other order it deems fit regarding the custody of the accused; or (iv) any other order.”    
443  De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development CC at [48]. 
444  De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development CC at [63]. 
445  In terms of section 77(6)(a)(i) that deals with persons accused of serious crimes involving violence. 
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treatment, and for this reason justifies the infringement of the accused’s liberty.  The 
safeguards built into section 47 of the Mental Health Care Act, particularly with regard to 
discharge measures, are sufficient according to the court to protect the accused’s rights.446  
With regard to section 77(6)(a)(ii),447 the Constitutional court found that: 
 Section 77(6)(a)(ii) also operates rationally only in respect of an accused person who is 
likely to inflict harm to himself or others or requires care, treatment and rehabilitation.  To the 
extent that section 77(6)(a)(ii) prescribes that all accused persons must be institutionalised, 
regardless of whether they are likely to inflict harm to themselves or others and do not 
require care, treatment and rehabilitation in an institution, it is inconsistent with the 
Constitution and stands to be invalidated.  The mere fact that an accused person brushes 
shoulders with the criminal justice system is not a just cause for institutionalisation and 
renders the provision constitutionally invalid in respect of such persons.448 
The court analysed the criteria for involuntary admission as set out in the Mental Health 
Care Act and pointed out that the provisions of section 77(6)(a)(i) effectively create a 
pathway for an accused through the criminal justice system to be admitted as an 
involuntary user where he would not have met the criteria had he not been in the criminal 
justice system.449  The court pointed out that not all mental illnesses can be treated (such 
as Downs Syndrome, for instance) and that institutionalisation of a person with this 
condition will not serve the purpose of treatment as the condition will not improve.450  
The court agreed with the applicant’s contention that section 77)(6)(a)(ii) perpetuates 
stereotyping in that it nurtures the perception that all persons with mental illnesses are 
dangerous.451  It violates the mentally ill accused’s person’s right to equality and dignity.452  
                                                
446  De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development CC at [35]-]38]. 
447  Section 77(6)(a)(ii) states that:  “(ii) where the court finds that the accused has committed an offence 
other than one contemplated in subparagraph (i) or that he or she has not committed any offence- 
(aa) be admitted to and detained in an institution stated in the order as if he or she were an 
involuntary mental health care user contemplated in section 37 of the Mental Health Care Act, 2002,” 
448  De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development CC at [66]. 
449  The court explains at ]]45] that:  If the accused person is committed involuntarily, he may only be 
institutionalised if— “any delay in providing care, treatment and rehabilitation services or admission 
may result in the— 
 (i) death or irreversible harm to the health of the user; 
 (ii) user inflicting serious harm to himself or herself or others; or 
 (iii) user causing serious damage to or loss of property belonging to him or her or others.” 
 Accordingly, without a court order, the accused would not be able to be institutionalised involuntarily 
unless (i), (ii) or (iii) above can be established.  Thus, absent one of the above criteria, if an accused 
has committed no offence, institutionalisation cannot follow under the Mental Health Care Act.  In 
effect, then, accused persons are more readily institutionalised under the Criminal Procedure Act 
without the ordinary safeguards prescribed by the Mental Health Care Act. 
450  The objective of treatment in itself is therefore not sufficient to justify an infringement of a person’s 
liberty.  See De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development CC at [55]. 
451  De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development CC at [56]. 
452  De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development CC at [56]. 
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The court pointed out that there is a Constitutional duty in terms of section 7 of the 
Constitution to promote the equality of, especially, persons disadvantaged by past 
practices.453  Such persons include persons with disabilities.454  The court opined that the 
trial on the facts is not an adequate procedural safeguard against the deprivation of liberty 
since the outcome is automatic institutionalisation as an involuntary user even where the 
trial on facts shows that the accused was not involved in the alleged offence.455   
The court found that section 77(6)(a)(ii) is unconstitutional as it amounts to an arbitrary 
deprivation of freedom under section 12 of the Constitution.456  The court found that such 
deprivation could not be justified in terms of the limitation clause.457  
On the discrepancies in discretion provided for in section 77 and 78 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act, the Constitutional court was of the view that: 
 Finally, the fact that section 78 provides for a wider discretion when dealing with accused 
persons, who at the time of the commission of the offence are found not to have had 
capacity, is of no moment.  The distinction made between the options provided for under 
section 77(6)(a)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Act on the one hand, and section 78(6) on the 
other, is not irrational.  They deal with different enquiries and different possible outcomes.  
Section 78 deals with a person who commits an offence and who, by reason of a mental 
illness or an intellectual disability, was incapable of appreciating the wrongfulness of the act 
or of acting in accordance with an appreciation of the wrongfulness of the act.  If it is 
established that at the time of the offence, the person did not have the requisite appreciation 
or ability to act in accordance therewith, the accused must, for that reason, be found not 
guilty.  It is only then that the several options in section 78(6) become available.  Sections 77 
and 78 serve different purposes, and that is why section 78(6) provides a wider range of 
options.  An accused, dealt with in terms of section 78(6), may have no mental illness at the 
time of the court proceedings, in which case mandating hospitalisation would be patently 
irrational.  Thus the different prescripts of the provision are but a red herring.458 
The Constitutional court consequently did not agree with the court a quo’s suggested 
reading in of the provisions of section 78(6) into section 77(6)(a)(i).459  The Constitutional 
court did, however, order that reading in is appropriate with regard to section 77(6)(a)(ii).460  
Section 77(6)(a)(ii) now reads, from the date of the judgment: 
 
                                                
453  De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development CC at [56]. 
454  De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development CC at [56]. 
455  De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development CC at [58]. 
456  De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development CC at [58].  The court again refers to 
article 14 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which dictates 
that the presence of a disability in itself can never warrant the depravation of liberty. 
457  Section 36 of the Constitution.  See De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development CC 
at [59]. 
458  De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development CC at [39]. 
459  De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development CC at [61].     
460  De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development CC [67], [69]. 
  
181 
(ii) where the court finds that the accused has committed an offence other than one  
  contemplated in subparagraph (i) or that he or she has not committed any offence— 
(aa) be admitted to and detained in an institution stated in the order as if he or she were 
  an involuntary mental health care user contemplated in section 37 of the Mental  
  Health Care Act 17 of 2002; 
(bb) be released subject to such conditions as the court considers appropriate; or 
(cc) be released unconditionally. 
 
In considering the appropriate remedy, the court acknowledged that the interest of society 
had to be taken into account as well.461 
The judgment goes a long way to safeguard the rights of mentally ill accused persons.  The 
amendment of section 77(6)(a)(ii) is especially helpful to accused persons who committed 
minor offences and those who did not commit the offence at all as the option is now 
available to be released unconditionally.462 
The option of conditional release may create space in the criminal justice system for 
treatment programmes in order for the accused to become fit to stand trial. 
3.6.4 Finding of fit to stand trial 
If the court finds that the accused is fit to stand trial, the criminal proceedings simply 
continue.463   A fitness finding does not imply the absence of a mental illness.  An accused 
with a serious mental illness can and have been found fit to stand trial.464 
                                                
461  De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development CC at [62].  The Constitutional court 
points out that the court a quo did not deal with the interplay between the Mental Health Care Act 
and the Criminal Procedure Act when dealing with mentally ill accused persons.  For this reason, the 
court indicated that the remedy in this case has to be a progressive one. 
462  See the amended section 77(6)(a)(ii) as set out in the De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development CC case at [69].  These amendments do not have retrospective force. 
463  Section 77(5) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  Also see Louw in Psycholegal Assessment in South 
Africa at 43.  See further Cassim 2004 Codicillus 17 at 19-20.  See further Kruger Heimstra Suid-
Afrikaanse at 229, 230.  Note that if the trial proceeds and the accused is found guilty, the accused 
may appeal against his conviction as well as the finding made in terms of section 77(5) namely that 
he was fit to stand trial.  If the appeal succeeds, the conviction and sentence will be set aside and 
the appeal court will make an order in terms of section 77(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  See 
Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 231.  Also see Joubert et al Strafprosesreg 11th ed 
at 251. 
464  See chapter 2 of this research where it is pointed out that a number of accused persons with mental 
illnesses such as schizophrenia and major depression are found fit to stand trial.  They do not 
always meet the criteria to be declared unfit to stand trial.  See Africa in Psychology and Law at 389.  
Also see Lurigio and Snowden 2009 The Justice System Journal 196 at 198 who specifically 
mention that persons with serious mental illness do not always meet the incompetence to stand trial 
criteria and are, consequently, found fit to stand trial and sent to prison.  See also Slobogin, Rai and 
Reisner Law and the Mental Health System 1020 where various studies revealed that in 
approximately 30% of matters, those with serious mental illnesses sent for observation are found fit 
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In the event that the accused is fit to stand trial but mentally ill, no further consideration is 
given to the presence of the mental illness during the trial unless either party raises the 
fitness issue again.  The issue of mental illness is otherwise only relevant if the accused 
decides to raise a lack of criminal capacity as a defence. 
An accused found fit to stand trial is transferred back to prison/jail, where he awaits his trial.  
The negative effect of incarceration of those with mental illnesses has been pointed out.  
Mental health care services for awaiting trial prisoners are not readily available, and it is 
likely that the mental illness will go untreated whilst the accused awaits trial.465  Detention in 
prison awaiting trial is a particular concern in cases of a person with an intellectual 
disability.  Intellectually disabled accused persons should not be sent to prison awaiting trial 
as this is a potentially destructive and hazardous environment for a fragile mind and can 
expose the intellectually disabled accused to abuse.466  Most accused persons awaiting a 
fitness assessment, among whom may be persons with intellectual disabilities,467 are, 
however, kept in prison awaiting such an assessment.468 
Fit but mentally ill accused persons may be released on bail pending their trial, although 
this is not routinely done.469  Where an accused with a mental illness is released on bail, 
mental health treatment during this time can be obtained on a voluntary basis if the accused 
seeks assistance.   
As pointed out earlier,470 criminal behaviour may be a symptom of an untreated mental 
illness.  Lack of treatment may cause the mentally ill person to clash with the criminal 
justice system again in future, perpetuating the revolving door phenomenon.   
                                                                                                                                                   
to stand trial.    
465  See the discussion of the lack of facilities and trained staff in correctional facilities and psychiatric 
institutions as discussed in chapter 2 of this research. 
466 Calitz et al 2007 SAJP 147 at 151.  Also see De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development WCC case at [22] where the psychiatrists that assessed the accused for fitness in this 
case expressed concern about the fact that he will face indefinite detention in the event that he is 
found unfit and declared a state patient to be detained in a psychiatric institution indefinitely.  
467  Calitz et al 2007 SAJP 147 at 148 reports that in a study conducted in the Free State between 1993 
and 2003, it was found that 80 of the 1203 awaiting trial prisoners were intellectually disabled.  This 
constitutes 6.7% of awaiting trial prisoners in the Free State.  At 149 the authors explain that 62.5% 
of the group were diagnosed with mild intellectual disability whilst 20% of this group was also 
diagnosed with epilepsy.   
468  Bateman C “The insanity of a criminal justice system” 2005 (95) SAMJ 208-212 at 208. 
469  As indicated earlier in this chapter, mentally ill accused persons are not readily released on bail due 
to possibly a perceived perception that they might pose a danger to society.  See the discussion of 
bail under the section on the Constitution earlier in this chapter.  
470  See the discussion of reasons for contact with the criminal justice system as discussed in chapter 2 
of this research.  One of the reasons for the increase in number of mentally ill persons in the criminal 
justice system is that crime is often a result of a treatable but untreated mental illness. 
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3.6.4.1 Appeal against finding of fit to stand trial 
If the accused is convicted, he may only lodge an appeal against the finding of fit to stand 
trial after conviction 471 but not directly after the finding of fitness as this finding constitutes 
an interim finding which is arrived at during a trial within a trial.472  Should the appeal 
succeed, the accused’s conviction and sentence will be set aside, and the appeal court will 
make an order in terms of section 77j(6) as it deems fit.473  The effect of this successful 
appeal is that the accused is deemed unfit to stand trial and should never have been tried 
by the court a quo.  The state does not have a right of appeal under section 77.474 
3.7 Conclusion 
It is clear from the discussion of the relevant procedural aspects pertaining to fitness to 
stand trial that there are some challenges that have to be addressed. 
The position of accused persons found unfit to stand trial is regulated in detail, and 
safeguards are built into the system to ensure the protection of their rights and that their 
vulnerability in having a mental illness is attended to. This is bolstered by the decision in the 
De Vos matter that makes it possible for unfit accused persons charged with minor offences 
to be released with or without conditions.  Even though the court expanded the options in 
terms of orders available to the court where an accused is found unfit to stand trial, the 
court’s discretion on how to deal with a mentally ill accused is still limited in that only a list of 
specific orders can be made.  
It might be worth considering expanding the powers of the Review Board to assist with the 
decision on what the most appropriate way is to deal with the particular mentally ill accused.  
Specialised skills are resident in the Review Board, which skills can be employed to 
determine the type of assessments required and the type of treatment that the accused 
should undergo to achieve the best results. 
                                                
471  Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act at 13-7.  Section 77(8)(a)(i) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act.  Also see Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 231.  See further Cassim 
2004 Codicillus 17 at 20 and Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa  at 168.  See also Joubert et 
al Strafprosesreg 11th ed at 252. 
472  Section 77(8)(a)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  Also see Du Toit et al Commentary on the 
Criminal Procedure Act at 13-6, 13-7. 
473  Section 77(9) of the Criminal Procedure Act states that:  “(9) Where an appeal against a finding in 
terms of subsection (5) is allowed, the court of appeal shall set aside the conviction and sentence 
and direct that the person concerned be detained in accordance with the provisions of subsection 
(6).”  Also see Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 231. 
474  Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act at 13-7.  Also see Kruger Mental Health 
Law in South Africa at 168. 
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The position of accused persons found fit to stand trial but who has a mental illness is not 
well regulated in South Africa.  In fact, no mention is made of this category of persons in 
current legislation.  Although the majority of persons sent for fitness assessments are found 
fit to stand trial, many may still suffer from a  mental illness, although it might not be of such 
a nature that it affects their fitness.  An accused with a serious mental illness can be found 
fit to stand trial. The seriousness of the mental illness per se is not indicative of fitness or 
unfitness.  The cases of seriously mentally ill but fit accused persons may still be processed 
through the traditional criminal justice system. 
These persons may raise the insanity defence later in the trial, but, as pointed out earlier, 
the presence of a mental illness does not presuppose a lack of criminal capacity.  The fact 
that a person currently suffers from a mental illness does not imply that he suffered from a 
mental illness at the time of committing the offence.  For these persons, the issue of mental 
illness will not be raised again during the trial unless fitness becomes an issue again.  The 
mental illness is likely to go untreated and likely to worsen as the fit, but mentally ill accused 
awaits trial in prison.  
4  CHALLENGES IN THE TRADITIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AS IT 
PERTAINS TO THE MENTALLY ILL ACCUSED  
4.1 Introduction 
From the discussion above, a number of challenges in the criminal justice system as it 
pertains to mentally ill accused persons can be identified.  The discussion below groups the 
challenges together in main themes being:  delays in fitness assessments, high cost of 
fitness assessments, lack of training and specialised skill, and the disregard for mental 
illnesses that do not affect fitness.  The final obstacle pertains to the lack of diversion 
options for fit but mentally ill accused persons.  This research suggests that many of the 
identified challenges could be remedied by the implementation of a Mental Health Court, 
and the manner in which this can be achieved is briefly touched upon throughout this 
summary of challenges.  
4.2 Delays in fitness assessment 
The delays in fitness assessments potentially frustrate the accused’s constitutional right to 
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a speedy trial 475 and the victim’s expectations that justice should be served.476 
As pointed out above, once an order for a fitness assessment is made, the accused often 
has to wait for long periods for an available bed at a specialised psychiatric facility where 
the assessment can be done.  The two main reasons to which this long waiting period can 
be ascribed are a shortage of beds in these specialised facilities and a shortage of forensic 
mental health personnel at these facilities to conduct these assessments.477   
Other reasons that contribute to the long waiting lists for assessments are the fact that 
psychiatrists, rather than clinical psychologists, are routinely appointed to conduct these 
assessments whilst there is a shortage of psychiatrists in the country; the fact that 
assessments are largely done in hospitals with stays of up to 30 days at a time; the limited 
number of facilities in the country at which these assessments can be conducted; and the 
fact that the justice department relies on the resources of the Department of Health for 
conducting these observations.478 
                                                
475  Section 35(3) of the Constitution makes provision for this right.  See Joubert et al Strafprosesreg 11th 
ed at 285, 286 for a detailed explanation of what the right to a speedy trial entails and the possible 
effect that a delay in proceedings can have on an accused.  They point out that a delay in the 
finalisation of the trial could affect the accused’s right to freedom of movement, and could also 
potentially damage the accused’s reputation, or he may lose employment due to his continued 
absence from work because he is incarcerated, awaiting trial.  A delay in the finalisation of the trial 
may also have a negative effect on the proceedings itself as witnesses may not be able to give an 
accurate account of events if it is too long after the incident or witnesses may no longer be available 
to testify at the trial.  Also see Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 48 at 48 who points 
out that the fact that the criminal trial cannot continue until after the 30-day observation period has 
taken place in itself causes a delay in the trial. 
476  Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 377 at 379, 380 who refers to the famous saying by 
Martin Luther King that “justice too long delayed is justice denied” and applies it the survivors and 
victims of crimes firstly, and secondly to the accused who’s trial is being delayed by the forensic 
mental health process. 
477  Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 377 at 378 points out that there are very few 
psychiatrists in South-Africa and even less that specialise in the field of forensic psychiatry.  There 
are almost four times as many clinical psychologists than psychiatrists in South Africa.  (see this 
source at 378 and 379).  Also see the discussion regarding the shortage of facilities at psychiatric 
institutions in chapter 2 of this research.  See further Pillay 2014 South African Journal of 
Psychology 48 at 51 where it is indicated that there are only 10 facilities across South Africa where 
court ordered forensic assessments could be conducted.  Also see S v Pedro 2015 (1) SACR 41 
(WCC) at [2] where it is indicated that the accused had to wait for many months before a bed for 
observation became available at Valkenberg hospital.  In the unreported judgment of S v Vika 
(14519) [2014] ZAWCHC 155 (14 October 2014) the accused had to wait 11 months for a bed to 
become available at Valkenberg hospital [5-6].  In another unreported judgment of S v Dlali (3/2015) 
[2015] ZAECBHC 2 (27 February 2015) the accused had to wait approximately 7 months before a 
bed at the Fort England psychiatric hospital became available.[3-6].  Also see De Vos v Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Development CC case at [44] where the shortage of beds in psychiatric 
facilities is accepted as common cause. 
478  Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 48 at 49 who points out that a major challenge 
facing correctional facilities with regard to accused persons in detention awaiting psychiatric 
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The assessment period can last for 30 days with a possibility of an extension of another 30 
days.  The trial is postponed pending the fitness assessment.479  The assessment can 
indicate that the accused is fit to stand trial, in which case he goes through the normal 
criminal justice channels, which includes waiting in prison for his day in court.  Bail is not 
routinely granted to accused persons with mental illnesses, although this is permitted.480  
Because of the assessment time, waiting for a bed to become available and waiting, after 
the assessment, for the court to reveal the fitness finding, the accused with a mental illness 
that was sent for assessment possibly spends more time in the criminal justice system than 
someone accused of the same crime, but in respect of whom, fitness is not at issue.  Such 
a person will not be subjected to the waiting periods associated with the fitness assessment 
as explained above. 
In addition to the long delays caused by the scarcity of resources at psychiatric institutions, 
delays are exacerbated by the fact that the criminal courts are experiencing backlogs due to 
case overloads.481  These caseloads have a negative effect on remand detainees as they 
wait in prison for their cases to be heard.482 
                                                                                                                                                   
observation, is that there is no statutory obligation on the Department of Health to make services 
available for these purposes and this leads to persons often being detained for up to two years in 
certain instances, awaiting the availability of a bed in a health facility for purposes of the observation.  
These waiting periods are acknowledged and touched upon in Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/White%20paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention%20in%20SA
%20Draft%20Final.pdf (Date of use:  26 August 2016) at 74.  Also see the discussion chapter 2 of 
this research about the scarcity of facilities at psychiatric institutions tasked with conducting 
psychiatric observations.    
479  Since the fitness issue can be raised at any point during the proceedings prior to sentencing, a 
postponement for purposes of the psychiatric observation (fitness assessment) can be requested at 
any point in time during the trial.  See Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/White%20paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention%20in%20SA
%20Draft%20Final.pdf (Date of use:  26 August 2016) at 40.  Also see Pillay 2014 South African 
Journal of Psychology 48 at 48 who points out that the trial cannot continue until the psychiatric 
observation has been conducted.  
480  Schutte 2013 South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 64 at 67 discusses the findings of a study 
done at Sterkfontein hospital which indicates that the majority of accused persons who were 
eventually found unfit to stand trial, was denied bail and that the presence of a mental illness rather 
than the seriousness of the charges against the accused, appeared to be the deciding factor as to if 
bail should be granted or not.  Also see the discussion of the potential discrimination against 
accused persons with mental illness at the bail stage under the discussion of Constitutional 
provisions earlier in this chapter. 
481  Institute for security studies “Criminal (In)justice in South Africa.  A civil society perspective” (Institute 
for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2009) https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Book2009CrimeInJust.pdf 
(Date of use:  14 September 2016) at 106 where it is indicated that across South Africa there is 
approximately 1 000 000 new cases before the courts annually.  In 2008, it was reported that 
regional courts had a 35% case backlog (at xvi).  Also see Pillay 2014 South African Journal of 
Psychology 48 at 48 who states that there is a huge backlog of cases involving 30-day observation 
periods. 
482  The case backlogs result in long waiting periods for remand detainees before their cases go on trial.  
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Most of the accused persons referred for the 30-day psychiatric observation, are found fit to 
stand trial.483  The accused may be diagnosed with a mental illness, but it does not affect 
his ability to follow the proceedings.  One could argue that such referrals were unnecessary 
to begin with.  It should, however,  be born in mind that there is a legal obligation on a court 
to refer an accused for psychiatric observation once a mere suspicion of mental illness 
arises.484  A reasonable possibility that the accused may be suffering from a mental illness 
or defect is sufficient for the obligation of referral upon the court to arise.485   
Possible unnecessary referrals suggest that there is a need for clear reasons to be given by 
courts for referring an accused person for psychiatric observation.486  Unfortunately, many 
accused sent for observation try to manipulate the system to rather be detained in a mental 
institution than face the full force of the law in a criminal trial.487  This may also be an 
indication that the current system is not ideal and needs a fresh approach with the aim of 
cost- and time-saving.488  Mental Health Courts are proposed as an alternative to the 
current fitness assessment system that can achieve all these objectives. This suggestion is 
discussed in more detail later in this research. 
Schizophrenia, which is diagnosed most often during forensic assessments, is usually 
diagnosed at a fairly early stage, after which a therapeutic programme is started with the 
patient. A view exists that it is not necessary to refer these persons for a full 30-day 
                                                                                                                                                   
The delays caused by psychiatric observations contribute to the long waiting periods.  It is reported 
in Institute for Security Studies  https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Book2009CrimeInJust.pdf (Date of 
use:  14 September 2016) at 106 that 44% of the 50 284 remand detainees in South Africa  in 2008, 
had to wait at the very least three months in order for their cases to go on trial. 
483  Calitz et al 2007 SAJP 147 at 147.  Persons found fit to stand trial may be diagnosed with a mental 
illness, even a serious mental illness, but such diagnosis in itself does not render the accused unfit 
to stand trial.  Persons with serious mental illness may be found fit to stand trial. 
484  Section 77(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act states that: “(1) If it appears to the court at any stage of 
criminal proceedings that the accused is by reason of mental illness or mental defect not capable of 
understanding the proceedings so as to make a proper defence, the court shall direct that the matter 
be enquired into and be reported on in accordance with the provisions of section 79.” 
485  Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa  at 163.  Also see Du Toit et al Commentary on the 
Criminal Procedure Act 13-4.  Also see S v Tom and Others 1991 (2) SACR 249 (B) at 250H-251C. 
486  Note the observation by Schutte 2013 South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 64 at 67 that 
evidence given by the accused himself about his mental illness, should possibly not be regarded as 
a ground for referral as all of the accused who raised this issue themselves and gave evidence about 
their own mental illness in court, were found fit to stand trial in this particular study conducted at 
Sterkfontein hospital in 2010. 
487 Bateman 2005 SAMJ 208 at 212 points out that this fact was confirmed by Dr Linda Hering, Director 
of Mental Health Facilities for the Western Cape at the time. 
488  Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 48 at 56 advocates for a fresh approach to the 
psychiatric observation of mentally ill persons and the problems associated therewith such as the 
delays caused by the fact that only psychiatrists are routinely appointed to do these observations 
whilst they are not readily available due to the scarcity of psychiatrists in the country.  He advocates 
for the fresh approach to focus on reduced recidivism as well. 
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observation period but that evidence by a member of the primary care team should be 
sufficient to prove that he suffers from a mental illness.  Gagiano et al 489 submit that 
referring this person for observation will not add to the knowledge that the court could gain 
from a member of the primary care team.  Resources and money spent on observing these 
individuals should rather be spent on community programmes where they can receive 
support.  In the Free State in 1990, more than 1000 individuals with schizophrenia were 
part of such a community program.490  This suggestion supports the notion of a Mental 
Health Court where diversion programmes are implemented in the form of community 
programmes. 
Outpatient care could assist in reducing delays in fitness assessment since this would not 
entail a waiting period for an available bed at a psychiatric hospital for assessment on an 
inpatient basis.  South African case law has not suggested that outpatient assessment for 
fitness to stand trial is an option, whereas this has been ordered in cases of assessment for 
criminal capacity.491  Most assessments in South Africa are done on an inpatient basis 
where the accused is admitted for a 30-day observation period.  Pillay 492 promotes that the 
assessments be conducted on an outpatient basis, which will in and of itself save costs.  He 
also submits that the entire observation process can be conducted in only a few days and 
that a 30-day period is not necessary.493  This is in line with the view of Oosthuizen and    
Verschoor 494 that 30 days is generally excessive for purposes of psychiatric observation.  A 
view exists that the assessment by a single psychiatrist for a non-violent crime can be 
                                                
489 Gagiano, Van Rensburg and Verschoor 1991 SALJ 714 at 716. 
490 Gagiano, Van Rensburg and Verschoor 1991 SALJ 714 at 717. 
491  The court does not usually specifically order that the 30-day assessment must take place on an 
outpatient or “day-visitor” basis.  This has only been ordered in S v Volkman 2005 (2) SACR 402 (K) 
and the unreported case of Oscar Pistorius S v Pistorius (CC113/2013) [2014] ZAGPPHC 793 (12 
September 2014).  Although day-visit assessment is not commonly used, it is employed in some 
parts of the country such as the Limpopo province.  See Pillay 2014 South African Journal of 
Psychology 377 at 378.  It appears that this decision to conduct the assessment on an outpatient 
basis is taken by the professionals involve as it has been stated that an explicit order for the 30-day 
assessment to take place on an outpatient basis, has only been made in the two cases stipulated 
above.  Pillay points out however that the day-visit option “does not appear to be generally favoured” 
(presumably by the professionals involved) which in turn contributes to the long waiting lists as 
inpatient assessments seem to be the norm. 
492  Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 377 at 379.  Also see Pillay 2014 South African 
Journal of Psychology 48 at 49. 
493  Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 377 at 379.  Also see Pillay 2014 South African 
Journal of Psychology 48 at 49.  See, however, National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa  
http://www.lhr.org.za/sites/lhr.org.za/files/atd_guidelines_.pdf (Date of use:  17 August 2016) at 38 
who reckons that the 30-day period may be justifiable where the accused has to be assessed by a 
panel of experts but that it is indeed excessive in the event where only one psychiatrist is required to 
conduct the assessment.   
494  See in general Oosthuizen and Verschoor 1993 SAS 155-164.  
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conducted within a 7-day period.495  Shortening the observation period will, in itself, reduce 
delays in the observation process and will further reduce costs associated with it.   
It is suggested that fitness assessments should be done on an outpatient basis,496 
especially since assessments for fitness to stand trial are clinically less complicated than 
assessments of criminal capacity.497  Fitness assessments have, in fact, been taking place 
on such a basis in the Limpopo province for some time now.498  This will open up beds in 
psychiatric facilities for seriously mentally ill patients in dire need of inpatient treatment.499 
The number of professionals appointed by the criminal court to conduct the assessment in 
terms of section 79 of the Criminal Procedure Act possibly also contributes to delays in the 
fitness assessment process.  Up to three psychiatrists together with a clinical psychologist 
can be appointed to assess the fitness of an accused, depending on the seriousness of the 
offence.  This causes delays as the availability of these professionals must be considered 
for purposes of assessment and presentation of their subsequent report to the court (or 
giving evidence thereon at a later stage).  In addition, appointing many specialists obviously 
has huge cost implications. 
4.3 High cost of fitness assessments 
Assessments for fitness to stand trial are time consuming and expensive.500  In 1991 the 
                                                
495  This is especially possible in the event of a single psychiatrist assessing the accused.  See  National 
Prosecuting Authority of South Africa  http://www.lhr.org.za/sites/lhr.org.za/files/atd_guidelines_.pdf 
(Date of use:  17 August 2016).  See further Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 48 at 
55 who opines that the assessment can be conducted during 2 or 3 day visits to the psychiatric 
hospital and need not be done on an inpatient basis. 
496  Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 48 at 55 points out that there is no prohibition in the 
Criminal Procedure Act against assessments for fitness to stand trial on a day-visitors basis.  The 
author uses “day visitor” rather than “outpatient” as the accused persons that are sent for 
observation are, in his view, not patients.  Assessments on a day-visitor basis poses challenges of 
its own, such as transport to and from the psychiatric facility, but this could be arranged with the 
assistance of the police service.  The author acknowledges that day-visitor type assessments may 
not be suitable for all accused, especially where there is a risk that the accused may abscond but 
states that these type of assessments will ensure far less admissions to psychiatric hospitals for 
fitness assessments.  The hospital system must remain in place as it will be necessary in certain 
cases.   
497  Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 48 at 50. 
498  Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 48 at 55 where it is pointed out that 80% of all 
accused persons in Limpopo is assessed on a day-visitor basis. 
499  Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 48 at 55. 
500  Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 377 at 379 referring to assessments for fitness to 
stand trial as well as assessments fir criminal capacity.  This is especially so because most 
assessments in South Africa is done on an inpatient basis where the accused is admitted for a 30-
day observation period.  Pillay promotes that the assessments be conducted on an outpatient basis, 
which will in itself save costs.  He also submits that the entire observation process can be conducted 
in only a few days and that a 30-day period is not necessary. 
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cost for a 30-day observation period amounted to R16 500.501  The cost for a 30-day 
psychiatric observation period per accused raised to approximately R80 000.00 in 2005.502  
The period could be extended by the court if necessary, which has further cost implications.  
The fact that the forensic expenditure comprised a large portion of a psychiatric hospital's 
budget503 raises huge concerns with regard to the resources available for the other patients.   
Unnecessary referrals result in costs for the Department of Health.504  The high cost of 
fitness assessments should, in and of itself, be a deterrent for unnecessary referrals for 
observation. Unnecessary referrals should be avoided 505 at all cost.  However, courts have 
an obligation to refer accused persons for observation when mental illness is raised as a 
concern. 
Psychiatric observation on a day-visitor (or outpatient) basis could assist in reducing costs 
together with shorter observation periods since opinion exists that the current 30-day period 
is generally excessive.  
4.4 Lack of training and specialised skill 
In some instances, the high figures of mentally ill persons in prisons might be attributed to 
ignorance and lack of training on the part of the police force.  Knowledge of identifying the 
behaviour of a person, who might possibly suffer from a mental illness, will go a long way to 
ensure that mentally ill suspects are treated appropriately.  Educating them about the option 
to take a person to the hospital for observation 506 rather than pressing charges should 
assist in reducing the number of persons with mental illness in the criminal justice system. 
Further, it is clear from certain judgments that magistrates are not always familiar with the 
correct procedure to follow in cases where fitness is at issue as opposed to cases where 
criminal capacity is at issue.507  The problem is exacerbated by the fact that proper review 
                                                
501 It cost R550.00 per day to keep a patient for psychiatric observation.  Gagiano, Van Rensburg and 
Verschoor 1991 SALJ 714 at 715. 
502  Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 226, 249.  See, however, Pillay 2014 South African 
Journal of Psychology 48 at 55 who estimates that a 30-day psychiatric observation cost the state 
approximately R30 000.00 in 2005. 
503 Gagiano, Van Rensburg and Verschoor 1991 SALJ 714 at 715.  In 1990 forensic services comprised 
50% of the psychiatric hospital’s budget.  
504  See Kaliski, Borcherds and Williams 1997 SAMJ 1351 at 1354 who confirms this fact and adds that 
the observation periods are time-consuming.  Also see Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses 
at 249 where the cost of a 30-day assessment is said to have been R80 000 in 2005. 
505  Kruger Heimstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 249. 
506  As provided for in section 40 of the Mental Health Care Act. 
507  See for instance S v Pedro 2015 (1) SACR 41 (WCC) at [5] where the accused, charged with 
culpable homicide, was found unfit to stand trial and lacking criminal capacity.  The accused was 
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mechanisms are not in place for orders made in terms of section 77.508  Considering the 
serious consequences that a finding of unfitness to stand trial can have on the accused, 
some form of review is most definitely desirable. 
Gagiano et al 509 opine that the fact that section 77 to 79 of the Criminal Procedure Act 
provides that any court can refer a person for psychiatric observation without prior 
consultation with anyone – including a mental health care practitioner - contributes to the 
high number of psychiatric assessment referrals.  Their objection seems to suggest that the 
involvement of mental health care skills in the early stages of the court process might help 
manage the number of mentally ill persons in the criminal justice system.  
Gagiano et al 510 submit that only cases where there are complicated diagnostic problems 
should be referred for observation and then only once the presiding judge or magistrate has 
heard evidence from a forensic psychiatrist or district surgeon with training in forensic 
psychiatry.511  The essence of this is that specialised skills with regard to mental illness are 
                                                                                                                                                   
found not guilty in terms of section 78(6) and an order was made for him to be detained as an 
involuntary mental health care user, rather than as a state patient as section 77(6)(a)(i) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act prescribes.  The court found at [81] that:  “Where, by contrast, an accused is 
not capable of understanding proceedings as contemplated in s 77, he cannot in the nature of things 
enter a plea and the question of his criminal responsibility at the time of the alleged offence cannot 
be judicially determined in accordance with s 78.  An accused who by reason of mental illness or 
mental defect is not capable of understanding the proceedings may or may not also have lacked 
criminal responsibility at the time he perpetrated the alleged offence; either way, he must be dealt 
with in accordance with s 77, not s 78.  This means that he can be found neither guilty nor not guilty; 
no verdict is entered, and instead a direction must be made in accordance with either sub-para (i) or 
(ii) of s 77(6)(a).  There are several cases in which erroneous verdicts in terms of s 78(6) have on 
this basis been set aside on review (see, for example, S v Matumbela Case 104/02/2012 WCHC 
Reference 2/13; S v Hendricks Case B690 WCHC Ref No 13195).”  Also see S v Vika (14519) 
[2014] ZAWCHC 155 (14 October 2014) where an accused who was found unfit to stand trial was 
found “not guilty” in terms of section 78(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  The Magistrate in this case 
also did not follow the correct procedure with regard to the appointment of the panel for psychiatric 
observation (only two psychiatrists and a clinical psychologist was appointed and no application was 
brought (as stipulated in the Pedro matter) to dispense with the requirement for a third psychiatrist).  
The magistrate did also not consider the psychiatric report in open court. 
508  See the discussion of the review earlier in this chapter.  
509 Gagiano, Van Rensburg and Verschoor 1991 SALJ 714 at 715.  “Unnecessary referrals” is 
understood to mean referrals of which the result is that the accused referred for observation, had no 
mental illness at all.  Neither his fitness to stand trial or criminal capacity is thus affected.  The 
authors are further of the view that the District surgeons lack of knowledge of psychiatry and the fact 
that the district surgeon does not consult a psychiatrist on matters of psychiatry, may also contribute 
to referrals of persons who may very well have no mental illness at all.  The authors opine that the 
humiliation for a potentially sane person being locked up in a psychiatric ward is imaginable and it is 
submitted that this should only happen if the accused himself is raising the mental illness as an 
issue.  In particular where the accused raises the insanity defence. 
510 Gagiano, Van Rensburg and Verschoor 1991 SALJ 714 at 716. 
511 Gagiano, Van Rensburg and Verschoor 1991 SALJ 714 at 716, 717 where it is suggested that 
consultation with the forensic team will serve as a further sifting procedure to ensure that only those 
that present difficult diagnostic problems are sent for observation. 
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required in the criminal justice system.  The Mental Health Court initiative acknowledges 
that mental health issues require the application of specialised skills and employs mental 
health professionals on-site at the court.  Mental Health Courts aim to have observations 
performed on-site by qualified psychiatrists and/or psychologists 512 who will be able to 
recognise signs of mental illness.  Only those in serious need of treatment or in respect of 
whom observation is essential will be sent for off-site assessments.  This approach will 
relieve the burden on the mental health care institutions that are currently burdened with 
psychiatric observations of all mentally ill accused.513  
The scarcity of skills in the forensic setting may be lightened somewhat by the fact that 
psychologists are now also allowed to conduct these forensic inquiries if the court so 
directs.514  New challenges may arise since some conditions (such as battered wife 
syndrome) are not recognised by psychiatrists as a mental illness, whilst they are indeed 
recognised by psychologists.515  Whilst such conditions might not necessarily affect a 
person’s capacity to stand trial, it might increase the number of persons with mental illness 
found fit to stand trial, falling into the category of accused persons for whom no provision is 
made in the current Criminal Procedure Act. 
The deterioration of the mental state of the accused whilst incarcerated has been proven a 
real risk and could be avoided if Mental Health Courts are introduced where assessments 
are done on-site and prolonged detention prior to such assessment is eliminated. 
4.5 Disregard for mental illnesses that do not affect fitness  
What contributes to the disregard for a mental illness that does not affect an accused’s 
fitness to stand trial is the fact that the discretion of the court is limited when deciding on the 
way forward for a mentally ill accused person where the issue of fitness to stand trial is 
concerned.  Even though the provisions of section 77(6)(a)(ii) will be brought in line with 
those in section 78 after the recent judgment in De Vos, it is submitted that the court’s 
                                                
512  See Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 377 at 378 who points out that, the fact that the 
Criminal Procedure Act provides for psychologists to be appointed to the panel for forensic 
assessments in terms of section 79 of the Criminal Procedure Act, confirms that the legislature views 
a psychologist as competent to conduct forensic assessments.  Pillay also advocates for the routine 
appointment of psychologists to the panel of experts whenever the court orders assessment in terms 
of section 77 and 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
513  This is at least the case in South Africa according to Schutte 2013 South African Journal of Bioethics 
and Law 64 at 67. 
514  Section 79 makes provision for the appointment of a psychologist to the panel of mental health 
professionals that are required to conduct an assessment in terms of section 77 or 78. 
515 Spamers A Critical Analysis of the Psycholegal Assessment of Suspected Criminally Incapacitated 
Accused Persons as Regulated by the Criminal Procedure Act at 29. 
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discretion is still very limited as no provision is made for the court to order a treatment 
programme, for example, or to specifically order treatment in order for the accused to 
become fit to stand trial.    
Where an accused is found fit to stand trial, and such an accused suffers from a mental 
illness, the court does not have discretion to divert the accused or make any other order 
besides that criminal proceedings shall continue as per normal.516   
4.6 Lack of diversion options for the fit but mentally ill accused 
 Diversion of mentally ill accused persons away from the criminal justice system into the 
mental health care system will ensure that accused persons who are mentally ill will receive 
treatment and rehabilitation necessary to avoid or at the very least limit the chances of 
recidivism.  This, in turn, leads to a safer society as there will be less crime.  Despite this 
fact, no formal diversion options for mentally ill accused persons are available in South 
Africa.  
 Gagiano et al 517 suggest that those with known psychiatric disorders, as well as those who 
clearly exhibit signs of mental illness, should not be referred for observation in terms of the 
Criminal Procedure Act. Instead, they suggest, the state should, in these instances and in 
particular where accused of minor offences, withdraw the charges against the accused and 
refer him for psychiatric treatment in terms of mental health legislation.518  In this way, these 
individuals are removed from the criminal justice system.  This is what Mental Health Courts 
aim to achieve.  To remove, especially those who committed petty crimes, from the criminal 
justice system and divert them into some sort of therapeutic programme to enhance their 
chances of rehabilitation which might, in certain instances, merely entail placing the patient 
on proper and effective medication.  
 Cassim suggested that the mentally ill accused in South Africa should be treated in the 
mental health care system rather than the criminal justice system.519  She points out that 
                                                
516  Section 77(5) of the Criminal Procedure Act states that:  “(5) If the court finds that the accused is 
capable of understanding the proceedings so as to make a proper defence, the proceedings shall be 
continued in the ordinary way.” 
517 Gagiano, Van Rensburg and Verschoor 1991 SALJ 714 at 715.  The writers refer to the Mental 
Health Act of 1973 as it was in force at the time of writing their article.  Also see Kruger Mental 
Health Law in South Africa at 159 who points out that it was common when the Criminal Procedure 
Act just came into operation that charges against mentally ill accused persons charged with minor 
offences such as minor assault, was withdrawn. 
518  Gagiano, Van Rensburg and Verschoor 1991 SALJ 714 at 715.  
519  Cassim 2004 Codicillus 17 at 27.  Also see this source at 24, 25 where she suggests the British 
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diverting the mentally ill away from the criminal justice system will relieve the burden of 
backlogs on the criminal courts resulting in cost- and time-saving in the long run.520  These 
suggestions are in line with the concept of diversion that Mental Health Courts envisage in 
that the mentally ill accused is diverted away from the criminal justice system into the 
mental health care system.       
The benefit of diversion away from the criminal justice system, as an alternative to 
traditional prosecution, is acknowledged and implemented to a certain extent in the South 
African criminal justice system for certain groups of offenders, such as child offenders.  
There is, however, currently no formal diversion options for mentally ill accused persons.  
Removal of mentally ill accused from society as state patients or involuntary health care 
users is not a form of diversion but rather part of an adversarial approach to criminal 
procedure.  
Existing alternatives to traditional prosecution as currently employed in South Africa are 
explored below. 
5  ALTERNATIVES TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM FOR THE 
MENTALLY ILL ACCUSED 
5.1 Introduction 
As pointed out above, it is not ideal for a person with a mental illness to encounter the 
criminal justice system.  The position of the person who has a mental illness but who is fit to 
stand trial is of particular concern as his case will be processed through the criminal justice 
system, and he will have to face a normal criminal trial.  No special provision is made for 
the diversion of these accused persons.  It is submitted that alternatives to traditional 
prosecution for these accused persons must be considered.      
The suggested alternative is a Mental Health Court to which all cases involving mental 
illness can be channelled.  From cross-jurisdictional research, assessments will then be 
performed on-site by a multidisciplinary team, ensuring speedy processing of cases and 
diversion of mentally ill accused persons away from the already overburdened criminal 
justice system.  Assessments by a multidisciplinary team such as that envisaged by the 
                                                                                                                                                   
model where those that are unfit to plead, are dealt with by the mental health care system rather 
than the criminal justice system. 




Mental Health Court movement may assist in alleviating the burden on psychiatrists.  If 
assessments are done quicker and mentally ill accused persons have diverted away from 
the criminal justice system, it means that the number of remand detainees in prison will, as 
a result, decline, which in turn will assist with the problem of overcrowding in prisons. The 
use of a Mental Health Court is, in essence, an example of formal diversion.  
Diversion, as mentioned earlier, is not unusual in the South African context, although it has 
never been formalised in the case of mentally ill accused as it has, for example, for child 
offenders.  The framework for such a diversionary approach is, however, already apparent 
in the South African adjectival framework.  
The South African Department of Correctional Services defines the purpose of diversion as: 
The purposes of diversion are the disposal of cases in a manner that equips the accused 
with the necessary life-skills, enables him/her to attain personal growth, and where the 
accused is not encumbered with a criminal record 521  
It is necessary to consider the extent to which the concept of diversion has been 
incorporated into the South African criminal justice system to establish whether there is 
room for diversion of the mentally ill accused in South Africa in the form of Mental Health 
Courts. 
5.2 Diversion in South Africa 
There is a need for legislation to deal specifically with special groups of remand detainees 
such as ”mentally challenged” or “legally insane” persons.522  Each institution that houses 
mentally ill remand detainees should have a programme for mentally ill persons who have 
been labelled as a special group of detainees in need of special programmes.523  Lack of 
                                                
521  Diversion away from the criminal justice system is addressed in Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/Discussion%20Document%20preceding%20Draft%20White%20
Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention_1.pdf (Date of use: 17 August 2016) at 24. 
522  The terminology used by the Department of Corrections is not the same as that used in the Criminal 
Procedure Act (section 77 and 78 in particular) but there is no doubt that the reference to “legally 
insane” and “mentally challenged” accused refers to those in the criminal justice system that is in 
need of mental health care services.  See Department of Correctional Services.  Discussion 
Document on Management of Remand Detainees in Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/Discussion%20Document%20preceding%20Draft%20White%20
Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention_1.pdf (Date of use: 17 August 2016) at 53, 54.    
523  The Department of Correctional Services acknowledges that special measures must be taken to 
protect the human rights of remand detainees and mentions remand detainees with mental illness in 
particular.  See Department of Correctional Services:  “Strategic plan for 2015/2016-2019/202”  
http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/Strategic%20Plan%202015-2016%20- 2019-2020_a.pdf 
(Date of use:  9 September 2016) at 21.  Also see the detail in Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/White%20Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention%20Manage
ment%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf (Date of use:  22 August 2016) at 45. 
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resources, however, remain a problem.  In addition, the Department of Correctional 
Services acknowledges the need for training of its staff on dealing with “mentally 
challenged” remand detainees.524   
5.2.1 Background 
Diversion of the mentally ill is not a new concept in the South African law as traces thereof 
can be found in the 1973 Mental Health Act, which provided for a police officer to apply for 
a reception order if he came across a person whom he believed was mentally ill and not 
properly cared for.525  This provision could, for instance, be used where a mentally ill person 
was a public nuisance, and it was not desirable to channel this person through the criminal 
justice system.526  This provision was, however, not used often.527  The current Mental 
Health Care Act contains a similar provision and provides that the police may use the 
necessary constraining measures to apprehend such a person.528  The Act empowers the 
police to, instead of arresting the presumably mentally ill person, take the individual to the 
hospital for psychiatric evaluation529 to determine if the person requires further involuntary 
treatment.530  If there is no sign of mental illness after the assessment period, the 
apprehended person will be discharged.531  If the police are made aware of this procedure, 
and proper training thereon is provided, many a mentally ill dwelling the streets and at risk 
of being apprehended for public indecency, for example, can be picked up from the streets 
and taken to hospitals for treatment rather than being taken to police cells and channelled 
                                                
524  The need for training is set out in the white paper drafted by the Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/White%20Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention%20Manage
ment%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf (Date of use:  22 August 2016) at 12.  The training needs were 
further identified and addressed in the Draft white paper by Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/White%20paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention%20in%20SA
%20Draft%20Final.pdf (Date of use:  26 August 2016) at 15. 
525  Section 14 of the Mental Health Act of 1973.  Also see Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 
160. 
526  Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 160.  This person would then be sent for treatment at an 
institution by way of a reception order in terms of the Mental Health Act of 1973.   
527  Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa at 160 footnote 70. 
528  Section 40 of the Mental Health Care Act.  See in particular section 40(8), which provides that:  “A 
member of the South African Police Service may use such constraining measures as may be 
necessary and proportionate in the circumstances when apprehending a person or performing any 
function in terms of this section.”  This raises potential concerns about the treatment of mentally ill 
accused persons by the police, especially if there is a lack of understanding from the side of the 
police regarding the symptoms of some mental illnesses. 
529  With a form MHCA 22 in the Mental Health Care Act.  The head of the health establishment where 
the police decides to take the individual to, approves the admission on a form MHCA 07. 
530  Section 34(3)(b) of the Mental Health Care Act. 
531  Section 34(3)(a) of the Mental Health Care Act.  If the user consents to further treatment, then the 
user may be treated as a voluntary mental health care user in terms of section 25 of the Mental 
Health Care Act. 
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through the criminal justice system.  This type of diversion initiative can be labelled as pre-
booking diversion that is aimed at preventing the mentally ill person’s contact with the 
criminal justice system. 
Pre-arrest diversion programmes will be most effective in limiting the number of mentally ill 
persons in the criminal justice system.  Mental illnesses are, however, often only detected 
after the accused has formally entered the criminal justice system after arrest.  Any 
diversion initiative after an arrest could be labelled as a post-booking or post-arrest 
diversion option if South Africa were to establish Mental Health Courts.532   
The question arises if there are any post-arrest diversion options available to a mentally ill 
accused in the South African criminal justice system? This question is investigated below.  
5.2.2 Current post-arrest diversion options in South Africa 
Diversion in South Africa is either formal or informal.533  The difference between the two 
being that informal diversion does not follow a set programme, but it entails that the 
prosecutor can be innovative with regard to the programmes that the accused should 
complete.534    
Currently, formal diversion exists for child offenders in terms of the Child Justice Act 75 of 
2008 and is very successful, as is evident from the reduction in the number of children in 
remand detention.535  Informal diversion is usually applicable in the case of petty crimes.536  
Where informal diversion is considered, the accused is required to acknowledge liability for 
the offence.537  Participation in such informal diversion programmes is completely 
                                                
532  See the discussion of diversion in chapter 2 of this research for the general categories of diversion 
options.  The terms pre-booking and post-booking are used in chapter 2.  The researcher, however, 
proposes that the terms pre-arrest and post-arrest are clearer descriptors of the stage in the criminal 
process at which the particular diversion option occurs.  
533  Diversion options in South Africa is discussed in National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa  
http://www.lhr.org.za/sites/lhr.org.za/files/atd_guidelines_.pdf (Date of use:  17 August 2016) at 24-
29. 
534  Informal diversion leaves more room for creative problem solving.  See National Prosecuting 
Authority of South Africa  http://www.lhr.org.za/sites/lhr.org.za/files/atd_guidelines_.pdf (Date of use:  
17 August 2016) at 29 for detail on informal diversion. 
535  The reduction in the number of child offenders, is discussed in Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/White%20Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention%20Manage
ment%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf (Date of use:  22 August 2016) at 53.  It is reported here that 
children accused of crimes in detention decreased with 86.9% from the introduction of the Child 
Justice Act shortly after 2007 to 2012.  Also see National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa  
http://www.lhr.org.za/sites/lhr.org.za/files/atd_guidelines_.pdf (Date of use:  17 August 2016). 
536  National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa Awaiting Trial Detainee Guidelines.  
http://www.lhr.org.za/sites/lhr.org.za/files/atd_guidelines_.pdf (Date of use 17 August 2016) at 29. 
537  This requirement is in line with the principle of taking responsibility for one’s actions as promoted by 
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voluntary.538  Compliance with the diversion programme usually leads to the withdrawal of 
the charge(s) against the accused.539  Once the prosecutor decides to divert the accused, a 
note to this effect must be made in the docket of the accused, and the investigation diary 
must be endorsed with the outcome.540 
Post-arrest diversion programmes “recruit” their participants from accused persons awaiting 
trial.  A large group of these potential participants will be in remand detention.  The 
Department of Correctional Services sets out to reduce the number of remand detainees by 
focussing on diversion at three main stages of the pre-trial phase, namely prior to the first 
court appearance, at the first court appearance and after the first court appearance.541    
Diversion at the first court appearance has been identified as a way in which overcrowding 
of remand detainees can be reduced 542 , but no initiatives specifically relevant to mentally 
ill accused persons have been introduced.  The National Prosecuting Authority’s policy on 
prosecution makes provision for the prosecutor to exercise his discretion pertaining to 
prosecutions and has the option to decline to prosecute and opt for pre-trial diversion or the 
non-criminal resolution of the matter.543  Once again, however, there is no formal 
programme specifically for the mentally ill in place as there is in the case of child offenders, 
                                                                                                                                                   
therapeutic jurisprudence that is typically applied in diversion programmes.  See National 
Prosecuting Authority of South Africa .http://www.lhr.org.za/sites/lhr.org.za/files/atd_guidelines_.pdf 
(Date of use 17 August 2016) at 29 where the requirement that the accused must admit his 
involvement in the crime is stated. 
538  The voluntary nature of diversion is stressed in National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa  
http://www.lhr.org.za/sites/lhr.org.za/files/atd_guidelines_.pdf (Date of use 17 August 2016) at 29. 
539  The accused will have to submit a certificate of completion or some sort of proof of completion of the 
diversion programme at the end of the diversion program.  National Prosecuting Authority of South 
Africa  http://www.lhr.org.za/sites/lhr.org.za/files/atd_guidelines_.pdf (Date of use:  17 August 2016) 
at 29.    
540  The practice of endorsing the file is explained in National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa  
http://www.lhr.org.za/sites/lhr.org.za/files/atd_guidelines_.pdf (Date of use:  17 August 2016) at 30. 
541  These stages are explained in more detail in Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/White%20Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention%20Manage
ment%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf (Date of use:  22 August 2016) at 54.  The focus on the three 
pre-trial stages is also discussed in the discussion document by Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/Discussion%20Document%20preceding%20Draft%20White%20
Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention_1.pdf (Date of use: 17 August 2016). 
542  Overcrowding presents the Department of Correctional Services with huge challenges.  Mentally ill 
accused persons awaiting psychiatric observation contributes to this problem.  Diversion at the first 
court appearance (not specifically a mentally ill accused) is aimed at diverting accused persons 
away from the criminal justice system as early as possible.  See Department of Correctional 
Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/White%20Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention%20Manage
ment%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf (Date of use:  22 August 2016) at 54. 
543  National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa “Prosecution Policy 2013” 
https://www.npa.gov.za/sites/default/files/Library/Prosecution%20Policy%20%28Final%20as%20Rev




for example.  
The relevant part of the pre-trial process at which diversion can occur and that the mentally 
ill accused could possibly benefit from is only after the first court appearance.   The fast-
tracking of “mental observation” has been identified as a method to reduce the number of 
remand detainees in prison, of which mentally ill persons form part.544  These initiatives, 
however, are reported to be ineffective due to the scarce resources in South Africa 545 , 
resulting in accused persons waiting for excessive periods of time for a bed to become 
available for assessment.546  This accentuates the need for specialised initiatives to speed 
up the process for those accused of crimes and burdened with mental illness. Although 
initiatives such as fast-tracking are applicable to the mentally ill, they cannot be seen as a 
form of diversion as they are specifically aimed at swift movement through the system as 
opposed to removal from the system of criminal justice.  
Diversion usually has rehabilitation as its aim so that the accused can eventually be 
reintegrated into society as a productive citizen. 
5.3 Rehabilitation 
In a white paper issued by the Department of Correctional Services, the following definition 
of rehabilitation is provided:    
Rehabilitation is the result of a process that combines the correction of offending behaviour, 
human development and the promotion of social responsibility and values.  It is a desired 
                                                
544  As mentioned earlier, the large number of remand detainees, among whom are the mentally ill 
accused, presents a huge problem to the state.  See Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/White%20Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention%20Manage
ment%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf (Date of use:  22 August 2016) at 54. 
545  Resource shortages refer to the shortage of facilities at which forensic assessments can be 
conducted as well as a shortage of psychiatrists to conduct such forensic assessments.  South 
Africa has a serious shortage of psychiatrists.  Suggestions have been made that clinical 
psychologists should be allowed to conduct these assessments in order to relieve the strain on the 
small number of psychiatrists who are called upon to do these assessments.  The resource 
shortages in South Africa is also confirmed in a discussion document by the Department of 
Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/Discussion%20Document%20preceding%20Draft%20White%20
Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention_1.pdf (Date of use: 17 August 2016) at 18.  Also see the 
discussion in chapter 2 of the South African forensic setting where the resource shortages are 
discussed. 
546  This is according to the guidelines drafted by National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa  
http://www.lhr.org.za/sites/lhr.org.za/files/atd_guidelines_.pdf (Date of use:  17 August 2016) at 37 
highlights that those psychiatric hospitals where assessments can be done generally experience 
huge staff shortages and logistical challenges causing a backlog in cases awaiting psychiatric 
observation.  Also see the De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development CC case at 
[44] where shortage of beds in psychiatric facilities is confirmed. 
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outcome of processes that invoke both departmental responsibilities of Government and 
social responsibilities of the nation.547 
The white paper further states that rehabilitation should be viewed as a holistic 
phenomenon incorporating and encouraging social justice, social responsibility, 
empowerment with life skills and other skills, active participation in democratic activities and 
a contribution to making South Africa a better place to live.548  It should therefore be viewed 
as much more than just a strategy to prevent crime. 
A rehabilitation intervention targets a specific aspect of an individual, for example, his 
mental illness, with the purpose and aim of reducing the likelihood of him re-offending 
because of it.549  The medical model in psychiatry aims to achieve “clinical recovery”.550  
This entails curing the illness, or the illness being in remission, or where this seems to be 
impossible, the aim is control of the symptoms over the long term.551  What exactly would 
constitute a cure or long-term control of symptoms is determined by the psychiatrist.  This 
approach has to lead to criticism, and the concept of personal recovery is rather 
promoted.552  This entails that the psychiatrist works in a partnership with the patient where 
the recovery of the patient no longer only depends on the medication prescribed.553 
Forensic rehabilitation is a lengthy process.  It entails that a multidisciplinary team form 
“long term therapeutic alliances” with their patients.554  A problem within the multidisciplinary 
                                                
547  In a white paper issues by the Department of Correctional services, it is stated that the Department 
is shifting its focus from punishment to rehabilitation.  See Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/White%20Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention%20Manage
ment%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf (Date of use:  22 August 2016) at 38. 
548  The holistic approach to rehabilitation is explained further in Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/White%20Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention%20Manage
ment%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf (Date of use:  22 August 2016) at 38. 
549  Muntingh L Research Paper Nr. 10:  Offender rehabilitation and reintegration:  Taking the White 
Paper  on Corrections forward (Civil Society Prison reform initiative 2005).  Also available at 
http://cspri.org.za/publications/researchreports/Offender%20rehabilitation%20and%20reintegration%
20%20taking%20the%20White%20Paper%20on%20Corrections%20forward%20(Research%20Pap
er%20No.%2010).pdf  (Date of use:  12 February 2015) at 6. 
550  Kaliski SZ and De Clercq HG “When coercion meets hope:  Can forensic psychiatry adopt the 
recovery model?”  2012 (15) Afr J Psychiatry 162-166 at 164. 
551  Kaliski and De Clercq 2012 African Journal of Psychiatry 162 at 164.  
552  Kaliski and De Clercq 2012 African Journal of Psychiatry 162 at 164.  Institutions applying this 
philosophy have to revisit their approaches to treatment and largely, the paternalistic approach in 
psychiatry. 
553  Kaliski and De Clercq 2012 African Journal of Psychiatry 162 at 164.  When considering the 
treatment plan for the patient, factors such as the patient’s culture, religion, aspirations and personal 
circumstances have to be taken into consideration.  The submission is that the use of this model 
might motivate the multidisciplinary team to make use of creative risk assessment methods by for 
example incorporating creative risk monitoring mechanisms for “dangerous patients” and releasing 
patients easier instead of keeping “dangerous patients” locked up.  (See this source at 166). 
554  Kaliski and De Clercq 2012 African Journal of Psychiatry 162 at 162.  In the “normal” non-forensic 
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team is sometimes that the members of the team subscribe to different paradigms, which 
may have an impact on the treatment programmes as the team is not in agreement as to 
what the aim of the programme is or should be.555  Patients may also encounter different 
multidisciplinary teams, and if such a team has worked with a particular forensic patient in 
the past, they may harbour negative prejudices towards the patient.556  Many forensic 
patients have comorbid conditions and might, for this reason, not respond to efforts from a 
multidisciplinary team.557  These potential problems are, however, not insurmountable, and 
it is submitted that the benefits of a multidisciplinary approach far outweigh the potential 
drawbacks of such an approach.  
Some in the field of correctional service elect to avoid the term rehabilitation as it originated 
from the field of medicine and presupposes that there is a pathological condition in the 
individual that needs to be addressed.558  For this reason, the term reintegration is often 
preferred as it explains the ultimate goal, namely to reunite the offender with his 
community.559  What complicates this issue is the fact that often the very people that are 
required to support the mentally ill accused in the process of reintegration were a victim of 
his violent behaviour in the past.560  Re-entry refers to the physical transfer of an 
incarcerated person back into society and encompasses both rehabilitation and 
reintegration.561 
South Africa releases approximately 6 000.00 people from jail per month 562 with the hope 
that these individuals will make a constructive contribution to society and that they will, most 
importantly, not re-offend.  For this reason, rehabilitation and reintegration programmes are 
of the utmost importance.  Diversion programmes such as those offered in Mental Health 
                                                                                                                                                   
psychiatric setting, the patients contact with a multidisciplinary team is fragmented as there is a high 
patient turnover and patients generally stay for a shorter period. 
555  Kaliski and De Clercq 2012 African Journal of Psychiatry 162 at 162. 
556  Kaliski and De Clercq 2012 African Journal of Psychiatry 162 at 162. 
557  Kaliski and De Clercq 2012 African Journal of Psychiatry 162 at 166. 
558  Muntingh  Research Paper Nr. 10:  Offender Rehabilitation and Reintegration:  Taking the White 
Paper on Corrections Forward at 6. 
559  Muntingh  Research Paper Nr. 10:  Offender Rehabilitation and Reintegration:  Taking the White 
Paper on Corrections Forward at 6-8 explains that reintegration introduces a social dimension, which 
is in contrast with the focus of rehabilitation, which is on law abidance, and avoidance of risk 
/behaviour.  It is a process of support that starts at incarceration and continues after the offender’s 
release.  Successful reintegration is illustrated by an individual’s ability to function in different 
spheres of his life such as family and work and to avoid re-offending. 
560  Kaliski and De Clercq 2012 African Journal of Psychiatry 162 at 164.   
561  Muntingh  Research Paper Nr. 10:  Offender Rehabilitation and Reintegration:  Taking the White 
Paper on Corrections Forward at 8, 9. 
562  Muntingh  Research Paper Nr. 10:  Offender Rehabilitation and Reintegration:  Taking the White 
Paper on Corrections Forward at 5. 
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Courts are aimed at the rehabilitation of the accused persons through treatment.  
The Department of Correctional Services in South Africa is shifting the focus of the penal 
system from punishment to rehabilitation.563  The Department of Correctional Services 
identified mentally ill persons in the criminal justice system as a special group of persons 
that pose a challenge for them in the correctional setting.564  The focus of rehabilitation is 
also in line with the goal of the Mental Health Care Act that promotes the utmost level of 
independent functioning as the ultimate goal of rehabilitation.565  The Mental Health Care 
Act further promotes rehabilitation in a community setting.566  Mental Health Courts will 
achieve this goal, as will be demonstrated in later chapters.  
The implementation of a Mental Health Court aimed at diverting the mentally ill accused 
away from the criminal justice system can assist in achieving the goals set by the 
Department of Correctional Services as set out above, as well as going some way to 
resolving the procedural issues identified earlier in this chapter.  
5.4 Mental Health Courts for South Africa?  
South Africa, as a signatory to the International Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, is obliged to provide health and social services to mentally ill persons to enable 
them to live in the community.567  Even though Mental Health Courts are not the cure-all 
solution,568 the support that the Mental Health Court provides to mentally ill accused 
persons could bring South Africa one step closer to fulfilling this obligation in terms of this 
                                                
563  This shift is evident from the white paper issued by the Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/White%20Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention%20Manage
ment%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf (Date of use:  22 August 2016) at 5. 
564  For other groups in detention that require special care, see Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/White%20Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention%20Manage
ment%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf (Date of use:  22 August 2016) at 9. 
565  Section 1 of the Mental Health Care Act in the definition of “rehabilitation”.  Landman and Landman 
The Mental Health Care Act at 14. 
566  Section 4 of the Mental Health Care Act.  Also see Landman and Landman The Mental Health Care 
Act at 14. 
567  Article 19 of United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.  Also see Barrett J 
and Shandler R Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law (Carswell Toronto 2006) at 1-30. 
568  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 1-29 where it is pointed out that 
society should aim for crime prevention and social integration if it is to ensure the fair and respectful 
treatment of persons with mental disorders.  Also see Nolan JL “The international problem solving 
court movement:  A comparative perspective” 2011 (37)  Monash University Law Review 259-279 at 
270 where the differences between approaches and attitudes to problem solving courts in and 
outside the United States of America is discussed and where it is acknowledged that those involved 
in Mental Health Courts in Canada are willing to acknowledge that Mental Health Courts are not the 
ultimate solution but only part thereof, this is different to the radical approach held by those involved 
in the problem solving court movement in the United States of America who believe that it is a much 
larger part of the solution, if not the ultimate one. 
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International Convention.   
There are currently no formal diversion programmes for mentally ill accused persons in 
South Africa.  Introducing Mental Health Courts into the South African criminal justice 
system will therefore not constitute a duplication of a current diversion option.  What is 
more, the use of specialised courts in the criminal justice system through which 
rehabilitation programmes may be offered is not a foreign concept in South Africa.  Equality 
courts, children’s courts and domestic violence courts are examples of specialised courts 
that have been part of the South African legal system for some time now.  
Mental Health Courts for South Africa are promoted for their common sense approach and 
for the underlying logic of the operation of these courts.569   Therapeutic jurisprudence, as 
the vehicle through which justice is delivered in these courts, creates opportunities for the 
law to address the underlying issue that caused the accused to clash with the law in the first 
place.  Reducing recidivism as one of the major goals of these courts leads to a safer 
society.  In addition, Mental Health Courts aim to achieve cost-saving.570  It is simply more 
cost-effective in the long term to treat a mentally ill individual in a non-prison setting.571  
The South African Department of Correctional Services identified mentally ill persons in 
remand detention as a vulnerable group.572  It has further been acknowledged that 
inadequate provision is made for the management of the mentally ill remand detainee 
throughout the entire process from arrest to detention.573  A need for an initiative such as a 
Mental Health Court that focusses specifically on mentally ill persons clearly exists.  
                                                
569  Fisher C “Towards a new understanding of mental health courts“ 2015 (54) The Judge’s Journal 8-
13 at 8, 9.  Those in favour of these courts assumed that untreated mental illnesses, contribute to 
criminal behaviour and that treatment combined with judicial supervision will keep defendants 
engaged in treatment programmes and will lead to reduced recidivism. 
570  Slinger E and Roesch R “Problem-solving courts in Canada:   A review and a call for empirically-
based evaluation methods” 2010 (33) International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 258-264 at 260.  
This is a goal of all problem solving courts, including drug courts and community courts. 
571  Heerema M “An introduction to the mental health court movement and its status in Canada” 2005 
(50) Crim.L.Q 255-282 at 63.  Also see Slinger and Roesch 2010 International Journal of Law and 
Psychiatry 258 at 259 who points out that the cost of incarcerating a mentally ill accused is almost 
twice as much as incarcerating a non-mentally ill accused. 
572  Besides the mentally ill accused persons in detention, the vulnerable groups further include pregnant 
women and the elderly.  See the White Paper by the Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/White%20Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention%20Manage
ment%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf (Date of use:  22 August 2016) at 11.  For more detail on the 
vulnerable groups in the correctional setting, see Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/White%20paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention%20in%20SA
%20Draft%20Final.pdf (Date of use:  26 August 2016) at 64.  
573  The gaps in the management process is explained in Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/White%20Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention%20Manage
ment%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf (Date of use:  22 August 2016) at 19. 
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The Department of Correctional Services has identified mentally ill inmates, including 
remand detainees, as a special group that pose a challenge for them in the correctional 
setting.574  The South African Department of Correctional Services acknowledges that it is 
the ideal that mentally ill persons should not be accommodated in prison but that they 
should rather be diverted to organisations with the necessary knowledge to cater for their 
specific needs.575  It is submitted that Mental Health Courts can offer the required 
knowledge to cater for the unique challenges that mental illness brings to the criminal 
justice system.  The challenge is, of course, to make space for this initiative within the 
existing criminal justice system. 
The structural and procedural framework for an initiative such as a Mental Health Court is 
available within the South African criminal justice system.  It is now a matter of determining 
what the best model would be to implement within the said framework to best cater for the 
unique challenges that the mentally ill accused bring to the South African criminal justice 
system. 
The time is ripe for the introduction of an initiative such as Mental Health Courts in South 
Africa as the Department of Correctional Services in South Africa is shifting the focus of the 
South African penal system from punishment to rehabilitation.576  Since these courts 
primarily aim to channel accused persons into treatment, such courts can offer a solution 
for the challenges that the Department of Correctional Services face with regard to mentally 
ill accused persons.  The focus on rehabilitation is also in line with the goal of the Mental 
Health Care Act, which promotes the utmost level of independent functioning as the 
ultimate goal of rehabilitation.577  The Mental Health Care Act further promotes rehabilitation 
                                                
574  The list of special categories of offenders for whom special provision within the correctional setting 
should be made are children, female offenders, offenders with disabilities, elderly offenders, first time 
offenders, offenders with long and/or life sentences, offenders that are foreign nationals and mentally 
ill offenders.  See the White Paper drafted by the Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/White%20Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention%20Manage
ment%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf (Date of use:  22 August 2016) at 75. 
575  The preference for diversion of the mentally ill accused as well as the need for specialised skill with 
regard to mental illness is discussed further in Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/White%20Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention%20Manage
ment%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf (Date of use:  22 August 2016) at 75.  This White paper sets out 
the goals of the Department of Correctional Services for the next 20 years commencing 2005. 
576  The shift in focus is emphasised in the white paper by Department of Correctional Services 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/White%20Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention%20Manage
ment%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf (Date of use:  22 August 2016) at 5. 
577  Section 1 of the Mental Health Care Act in the definition of “rehabilitation”.  Also see Landman and 
Landman The Mental Health Care Act at 14. 
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in a community setting.578  Mental Health Courts will achieve this goal.   
Diversion to Mental Health Courts could alleviate overcrowding of correctional facilities and 
could assist in reducing pre-trial delays associated with fitness assessments.  These are 
only some of the benefits that a Mental Health Court has to offer. 
6  CONCLUSION 
From the discussion of the South African adjectival law, it is clear that the manner in which 
cases of mentally ill accused persons are dealt with in the South African criminal justice 
system is not ideal. Their trials are often unduly delayed by the fact that resources in 
forensic facilities where assessments are done are scarce, resulting in mentally ill accused 
persons having to wait in prison for a bed to become available.    
From the challenges highlighted above, it is clear that alternatives to traditional prosecution 
for persons with mental illness must be considered in an attempt to limit delays in the 
finalisation of cases, reduce costs of forensic assessments, ensure that persons with the 
necessary skill are involved in cases involving mental illness and lastly, provide an 
alternative to traditional prosecution for the mentally ill accused in the form of diversion. 
The position of the mentally ill but fit accused, whose cases are currently processed 
through the normal criminal justice process, require particular attention. No consideration is 
given to the fact that the accused may have a mental illness once he is found fit to stand 
trial.   This accused is sent back to prison awaiting his trial date.  Such a person may 
require mental health care treatment pending trial but is at risk of not receiving it due to the 
lack of mental health resources in South African prisons.579 
Considering the negative impact that incarceration has on persons with mental illnesses, it 
is submitted that a diversion programme aimed at diverting mentally ill accused persons 
away from the criminal justice system is essential.  It has been suggested that the mentally 
ill accused in South Africa should be treated in the mental health care system rather than 
the criminal justice system.580  Diverting the mentally ill accused away from the criminal 
justice system will relieve the burden of backlogs on the criminal courts with cost- and time 
                                                
578  Section 4 of the Mental Health Care Act.  Also see Landman and Landman The Mental Health Care 
Act at 14. 
579  Refer to the discussion of South African prisons in chapter 2 of this research. 
580  Cassim 2004 Codicillus 17 at 27.  She suggested that we should follow the British model where 
those that are unfit to plead, are dealt with by the mental health care system rather than the criminal 
justice system.  (see this source at 24, 25). 
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savings in the long run.581  This is in line with some of the advantages that have been 
identified by the proponents of Mental Health Courts. 
The need for intervention by specialists on mental health in the criminal justice system has 
been identified by Gagiano et al.582  Mental Health Courts create the mechanism and 
opportunity to do just that. Mental Health Courts can assist in diverting the mentally ill away 
from the criminal justice system into the mental health care system, where they can receive 
proper treatment services and reduce the occurrence of the revolving door phenomenon.   
Mental Health Courts for South Africa should be explored, especially when considering the 
benefits resulting through their use in Canada and the United States of America (discussed 
in the following chapters). Chapters 4 and 5 consider two different Mental Health Court 
models employed in Canada and the United States of America.   These two models are 
studied with the view of selecting aspects thereof that could enhance the position of the 
mentally ill accused in the South African criminal justice system within the researcher’s 
proposal of Mental Health Courts for South Africa.  
 
                                                
581  Cassim 2004 Codicillus 17 at 27.  Also see Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 48 at 48 
who points out that cases involving 30-day observation periods are contributing to the backlog and 
caseloads on the courts.  




MENTAL HEALTH COURTS IN CANADA 
1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores the Mental Health Court model in Canada.  The investigation into the 
role of the Mental Health Court in Canadian criminal justice begins by exploring the 
structure and legal framework of the Canadian criminal justice system for the convenience 
of the reader.  A brief overview of the relevant provisions pertaining to the mentally ill 
accused in the relevant pieces of legislation such as the Constitution of Canada 1 and the 
Criminal Code of Canada 2 is included, followed by a summary of the Canadian court 
structure (including the role of the Review Boards). 
This chapter will focus mainly on procedural issues affecting the mentally ill accused in the 
Canadian criminal justice system.  The focus is further narrowed to pre-trial issues and, in 
particular, assessments of fitness to stand trial.  The focus on fitness assessments is 
motivated by the fact that one of the main functions of the Mental Health Court in Canada is 
to conduct fitness assessments and, subsequently, to provide an alternative measure to 
criminal prosecution for those who are fit to stand trial but nonetheless mentally ill.    
The chapter explores the procedure for assessing fitness to stand trial that commences in 
the traditional criminal justice system.  The test for fitness and the actual assessment 
thereof are explored.  The role of the Mental Health Court during this process is highlighted 
where relevant. 
Diversion in the Canadian criminal justice system is explained whereafter the focus shifts to 
the particular Mental Health Court model employed in Canada.  The goals and underlying 
principles of the Canadian Mental Health Court are explored.  The Toronto Mental Health 
Court in Ontario is the focus of this chapter as it was the first Mental Health Court in 
Canada and remains the only full-time Mental Health Court.3  Significant discrepancies 
                                                
1  The Constitution Act of 1982 (hereinafter referred to as the “Constitution of Canada”). 
2  Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46 (hereinafter referred to as the “Criminal Code”). 
3  Ryan S and Whelan D “Diversion of offenders with mental disorders:  Mental health courts” 2012  (1) 
Web Journal of Current Legal Issues 1-18 at 8.  Also see Schneider RD, Bloom H and Heerema M 
Mental Health Courts – Decriminalizing the Mentally Ill (Irwin Law Canada 2007) at 34, 97 who state 
that Mental Health Courts originated in Canada, and more particularly in Toronto, Ontario.  This court 
opened its doors in 1998.  This Court’s emergence is attributed to the efforts of the founding judge, 
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between the dynamics of the Toronto Mental Health Court and other Mental Health Courts 
in Canada are highlighted where necessary.  
The procedural dynamics of the Canadian Mental Health Court are studied with particular 
reference to the eligibility criteria for referral to this court.  The Canadian Mental Health 
Court follows a two-phased approach.  The two phases for which the eligibility criteria differ 
are discussed in some detail.      
A synoptic analysis of the successes and challenges of the Mental Health Court model 
employed in Canada is included.  A brief comparison between the South African system as 
explained in chapter 3 and the Canadian system as it pertains to mentally ill accused 
persons concludes this chapter. 
2  LEGAL FRAMEWORK RELATING TO MENTALLY ILL ACCUSED UNDER 
CANADIAN CRIMINAL LAW 
2.1 Introduction and background 
 Historically the mentally ill in Canada were detained in psychiatric institutions.4  The 
mentally ill were often treated in a questionable manner, including the routine administration 
of electric shock treatment and forced sterilisation.5   
                                                                                                                                                   
Justice Edward (Ted) Ormston.  His motto for this Court was “close the book and open your heart”.  
See Heerema M “An introduction to the mental health court movement and its status in Canada” 
2005 (50) Crim.L.Q 255-282 at 271.  See further Barrett J and Shandler R Mental Disorder in 
Canadian Criminal Law (Carswell Toronto 2006) at 1-29 who confirms that the first Mental Health 
Court in Canada opened its doors in 1998.  This was one of the first Mental Health Courts in the 
world. 
4  McLachlin B “Medicine and the law:  The challenges of mental illness” 2010 (33) Dalhousie Law 
Journal 15-33 at 18.  This was the case until the latter part of the 20th century.  Also see Read A 
“Psychiatric deinstitutionalization in BC: Negative consequences and possible solutions” 2009 (1) 
University of British Columbia Medical Journal 25-26 at 25.  Also see Court JMP, Simpson AIF and 
Webster CD  ”Contesting mad versus bad:  The evolution of forensic mental health services and law 
at Toronto” 2014 (22) Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 918-936 at 921 where it is explained that the 
first temporary asylum in Canada opened in 1841. 
5  This was especially the case in Canada in the 1950’s and 1960’s.  See McLachlin B 2010 Dalhousie 
Law Journal 15 at 18, 19.  Legislation in Canada at the time (Sexual Sterilization Act, SA 1928, c 37; 
Sexual Sterilization Act, SBC 1933, e 59) provided for such forced sterilisation.  In some instances, 
the legislative requirements pertaining to such forced sterilisations were not met which led to claims 
for damages against the government.  In one instance, a young girl (Leilani Muir) was irreversibly 
sterilised at the age of 14 years whilst under the impression that she is undergoing an 
appendectomy.  She brought an action for damages many years later and was awarded a generous 
amount of damages.  See the case of Muir v Alberta (1996), 36 Alta LR (3d) 305, 132 DLR (4th) 695 
(QB).  Also see a discussion of the case in McLachlin B 2010 Dalhousie Law Journal 15 at 18.  After 
the success of this case, the court heard more claims from victims who suffered under the 
inappropriate application of the relevant sterilisation legislation and the Government eventually spent 
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Persons with mental illness who were exposed to the criminal justice system were initially 
treated in the same manner as any other person, in that mental illness was not considered 
as mitigating.6  Mentally ill accused persons were detained with other convicted criminals 
and only isolated from the convicted offenders where their behaviour caused disruption.7 
Later, when mental illness was acknowledged as a factor in criminal proceedings, the 
automatic and indefinite detention of those with mental illness in the criminal justice system 
was ordered.8  The Canadian criminal law and procedure, however, developed over time 
and altered the position.9  It is no longer presumed that those with mental illnesses in the 
criminal justice system are dangerous and, for that reason, alone need to be detained.10  
Mental illness became an issue that criminal courts had to deal with more often.  The 
Supreme Court of Canada stated that:   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
$142 million in settlement of these claims.  See further Shea G Redress Programs Relating to 
Institutional Child Abuse in Canada (Law Commission of Canada, 1999).  Also available at 
http://dalspace.library.dal.ca/bitstream/handle/10222/10443/Shea%20Research%20Redress%20 
Programs%20EN.pdf?sequence=1 (Date of use:  24 July 2012) at 7.  Also See United Nations 
General Assembly resolution 46/119, Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and 
for the Improvement of Mental Health Care A/RES/46/119 (17 December 1991) 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/46/a46r119.htm  (Date of use: 13 August 2016) which now 
prohibits the forced sterilisations of mentally ill persons.  See principle 11 and 12 in particular that 
states, “sterilisation shall never be carried out as a treatment for mental illness”.   
6  McLachlin B 2010 Dalhousie Law Journal 15 at 20.  This position was inherited from the English law 
from which system Canada derived its criminal law.  Also see Winko v Forensic Psychiatric Institute 
(1999) 25 C.R (5th) 1 (S.C.C) at [17] where the common law position is confirmed. 
7  Court, Simpson and Webster 2014 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 918 at 920.  The mentally ill 
were detained with all other types of persons including debtors, persons awaiting trial and hardened 
criminals.  The appalling conditions in which female mentally ill inmates were detained are discussed 
and it is pointed out that they were often held in cages below the ground with only straw to sleep on. 
8  McLachlin B 2010 Dalhousie Law Journal 15 at 23.  Also see Court, Simpson and Webster 2014 
Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 918 at 919 where the history of the treatment of the mentally ill in 
conflict with the law is discussed and where it is pointed out that even where an accused person was 
acquitted on account of mental illness, the result was indefinite detention in a gaol.    
9  Canadian criminal law is mainly derived from English common law.  Mewett AW An Introduction to 
the Criminal Process in Canada (Carswell Ontario 1996) at 4.  Also see Coughlan S Criminal 
Procedure (Irwin Law Toronto 2012) at 39.  The power to create criminal law only vested in the 
Canadian parliament as from 1867 with the enactment of the Constitution Act 1867 (U.K), 30 & 31 
Vict, c.3.    
10  McLachlin B 2010 Dalhousie Law Journal 15 at 23.  Also see Canadian Mental Health Association 
“Police and mental illness:  Increased interactions” http://www.cmha.bc.ca/files/policesheets_all.pdf  
(Date of use: 13 March 2015) at 5 where it is stated that it is a myth that all persons with mental 
illnesses are dangerous.  It is only a small group of persons with serious and persistent mental 
illnesses that are potentially dangerous.  The report notes that the role of the media in portraying 
persons with mental illnesses as dangerous and antisocial should not be underestimated in creating 
the perception among the general population that persons with mental illnesses are dangerous. 
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In every society there are those who commit criminal acts because of mental illness.  The 
criminal law must find a way to deal with these people fairly, while protecting the public 
against further harms.  The task is not an easy one.11 
Canada’s criminal justice system is adversarial.12  Both federal and provincial laws govern 
criminal law and criminal procedure.13  Where federal and provincial legislation overlap, 
provincial legislation must give way to federal legislation.14  Any reference to provincial laws 
in this chapter will be limited to the laws of Ontario since the Mental Health Court, as it 
operates in Toronto, Ontario, will be studied in this chapter. 
The Constitution of Canada and the Criminal Code create the framework within which 
substantive issues relating to mentally ill accused persons are considered.  These are 
discussed below. 
2.2 The Constitution of Canada  
The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada; all other legislation is subject to 
it and only valid in so far as it is consistent with the Constitution.15  The Charter of Rights 
and Freedom 16 form part of the Constitution 17 and is applicable to both provincial and 
                                                
11  In Winko v Forensic Psychiatric Institute (1999) 25 C.R (5th) 1 (S.C.C) at [1]. 
12  Van der Wolf M, van Marle H, Mevis P and Roesch R ”Understanding and evaluating contrasting 
unfitness to stand trial practices:  A comparison between Canada and the Netherlands” International 
Journal of Forensic Mental Health 2010 (9) 245-258 at 258. 
13  There are two branches of criminal law in Canada.  The first being criminal law reserved for the 
federal government which has jurisdiction over criminal law and criminal procedure.  Section 91(27) 
of the Constitution Act of 1867 gives the federal government this jurisdiction.  Also see Roach K, 
Berger BL, Healy P and Stribopoulos J Criminal Law and Procedure Cases and Materials 10th ed 
(Emond Montgomery Publications Toronto Canada 2010) at 3.  Secondly there is the criminal law 
within the provincial jurisdictions.  Provinces have exclusive jurisdiction over certain aspects in the 
province such as property and civil rights and all aspects of a local or private nature.  The provinces 
derive this jurisdiction from section 92(15) of the Constitution Act of 1876 which also lists the areas of 
the law in respect whereof provinces will have exclusive jurisdiction.  Provinces may also impose a 
fine or punishment, including imprisonment in the course of enforcing the law of the province.  See 
Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 1, 2.  Also see Roach et al Criminal 
Law and Procedure at 8 where it is pointed out that provinces are responsible for establishing 
reformatories where sentences of less than 2 (two) years are served whereas the federal parliament 
has the responsibility to establish and maintain penitentiaries where sentences of more than two 
years are served.  See sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution of Canada. 
14  Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 3.  See, however, Roach et al Criminal 
Law and Procedure at 10, 11 where it is pointed out that the Canadian courts are hesitant to declare 
provincial legislation invalid because of its clash with federal laws. 
15  Section 52(1) of the Constitution of Canada contains the supremacy provision.  Part 1 of the 
Constitutions Act of December 8, 1981 contains a Charter of Rights and Freedoms containing rights 
of all persons.  See Stuard D, Delisle R and Qigley T Learning Canadian Criminal Procedure 9th ed 
(Thomsom Carswell Toronto 2008) at 30, 31.  (similar to the Bill of Rights in the South African 
Constitution of 1996).  Also see Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 17.   
16  Hereinafter referred to as the “Charter”. 
17  The Charter constitutes part 1 of the Constitution.  See Stuart D Charter Justice in Canadian 
Criminal Law at 1.  Also see Roach et al Criminal Law and Procedure at 3. 
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federal laws.18  The most relevant provisions as they pertain to mentally ill accused persons 
are discussed below. 
Section 15 of the Charter is of particular importance to the position of a mentally ill accused 
person. It guarantees equal protection for everyone under the law and prohibits 
discrimination on the ground of inter alia mental disability.19   
Section 6 of the Charter provides that an arrested person charged with an offence shall be 
presumed to be innocent until proven guilty20 and consequently has the right not to be 
denied reasonable bail without just cause.21   
Section 11(b) of the Charter states that an accused has the right to be tried within a 
reasonable time.22  This right is of particular relevance to mentally ill accused persons since 
pre-trial issues such as fitness assessments can often cause substantial delays due, inter 
alia, to the lack of available beds at psychiatric facilities at which assessments can be 
conducted.  The remedy for a violation of the right to be tried within a reasonable time is a 
stay of proceedings.23  It must be proven, however, that the delay caused prejudice towards 
the accused.24   
                                                
18 Section 32(1) of the Charter.  See Stuart D Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law 3rd ed 
(Carswell Toronto 2001) at 1. 
19  Section 15(1) of the Charter reads as follows “every individual is equal before and under the law and 
has the right to the equal protection and equal benefits of the law without discrimination, and, in 
particular, without discrimination based on race,  national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or 
mental or physical disability.” 
20  Section 6 of the Criminal Code.  The proof of someone’s guilt must be done at a public hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal.  Section 11(d) of the Charter.  Also see Mewett An Introduction to 
the Criminal Process in Canada at 29 who explains that the right to be presumed innocent until 
proven guilty entails that, as soon as a charge is laid against an accused, the opposite of the 
allegation making out the charge is deemed to be the truth until such time as the prosecution who 
laid the charge, can prove that the allegations on which the charge is based, are true.  See further 
Roach et al Criminal Law and Procedure at 7. 
21  Section 11(e) of the Charter protects the right of the accused “not to be denied reasonable bail 
without just cause.” 
22  Section 11((b) of the Charter.  What a “reasonable time” is will depend on the circumstances of each 
case.  The longer the delay, the more it will have to be justified.  The Court in R v Askon (1990) 2 
S.C.R 119, 75 O.R (2d) 673, 79 C.R (3d) 273, 59 C.C.C (3d) 449, 74 D.L.R. (4th) 355, 49 C.R.R. 1, 
42 O.A.C. 81, 113 N.R. 241 stated that delays caused by the system will also count against the 
prosecution.  A scenario that comes to mind regarding mentally ill accused is delays caused by the 
shortage of beds in psychiatric institutions to which the accused person is referred for psychiatric 
observation. 
23  Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 56.  This remedy is however not available if the delay is due to the 
actions of the accused.  Also see Stuart Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law at 317. 
24  R v Morin [1992] 1 S.C R 771.  Prior to this judgment, it was easier to apply for a stay of 
proceedings, especially in large urban jurisdictions where there is a higher case load.  See for 
example the case of R v Askov [1990] 2 S.C.R 1199.  Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 56 points out 
that applications for stay of proceedings have been on the increase in Ontario over the last couple of 
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Section 7 of the Charter grants every person the right to life, liberty, and security of the 
person.25  The rights provided for in the Charter are not absolute and may be limited as 
prescribed by law and as can be justified in a free and democratic society.26  An individual’s 
right to liberty may, for example, be limited if it is in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice.27  This section protects persons from; inter alia, illegal detention and 
arbitrary arrests.28  In addition, everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily detained or 
imprisoned.29  Should a person be arrested or detained, they have the right not to be 
subjected to cruel or unusual treatment or punishment.30  The detained accused must be 
informed of the reasons for the detention.31  A detained accused has the right to instruct 
counsel without delay 32 and to have the validity of the detention challenged by way of 
habeas corpus.33  A detained accused is entitled to immediate release if the detention is 
found invalid.34  Detention denotes some form of “compulsory restraint of a person’s 
liberty”.35   
The assessment of mentally ill accused persons is further addressed in the Criminal Code. 
                                                                                                                                                   
years and states that the issue of institutional delays will have to be considered by the highest court. 
25  Section 7 of the Charter reads “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and 
the right not to be deprived thereof accept in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice”. 
26  Section 1 of the Charter.  Also see Stuart Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law at 2, 3.  See 
further Roach et al Criminal Law and Procedure at 7 who explain that any law that is not consistent 
with the Charter is, according to section 52 of the Charter “to the extent of the inconsistency, of no 
force and effect”. 
27  Section 7 read with section 9 of the Charter.  Also see Stuart Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal 
Law at 1, 2.  See further Roach et al Criminal Law and Procedure at 7. 
28  Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 19. 
29  Section 9 of the Charter.  Also see Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 22 
where it is explained that sections 7 and 9 should be read together and that section 7 is more 
general than section 9 in that it enables the court to consider any justifiable detention whereas 
section 9 prohibits any baseless detention or imprisonment.  See further Roach et al Criminal Law 
and Procedure at 7 and further at 171 where it is explained that the purpose of the protection that 
section 9 of the Charter offers is that it protects the individual from state interference.  See further in 
general R v Grant 2009 2 S.C.C. 253 where it is stated that the liberty protected includes mental 
liberty in the sense that it includes making decisions free from state interference. 
30  Section 12 of the Charter. 
31  Section 10(a) of the Charter. 
32  Section 10(b) of the Charter.  Also see Roach et al Criminal Law and Procedure at 7 where the right 
to instruct counsel is emphasised. 
33  Where a person is detained against his will, he may apply for the writ of habeas corpus If the person 
who is detaining the applicant cannot show that the detention is lawful, the court shall order the 
release of the applicant.  See Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 24, 25 
and 213, 214 for a detailed discussion of this common-law remedy that has now been codified in the 
Charter under section 10 thereof.  
34  Section 10(c) of the Charter. 
35  Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 23.  Also see in general R v Therens, 
[1985] 1 S.C.R 613 38 A. L.R  (2d)  99, 45 C.R (3d) 97, 32 M.V.R. 153, {1985} 4 W.W.R. 286, 18 
C.C.C (3d) 481, 13 C.R.R. 193, 18 D.L.R (4th) 655, 59 N.R 122, 40 Sask R. 122.  The courts have 
identified some factors to be taken into account to determine if a person was indeed detained.  See 
R v Morin (1987), 36 C.C.C (3d) 225, 21  O.A.C 38. 
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2.3 The Criminal Code 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code sets out the provisions pertaining to those with mental 
disorders in the criminal justice system.36  Traditionally the Criminal Code was interpreted 
strictly to give the accused the benefit of the doubt.  Recently, however, the strict 
interpretation method is used only when there is ambiguity in the Code.37   
The Criminal Code, based on the British Criminal Code, was amended over time to provide 
for the psychiatric assessments of the mentally ill accused.38  These amendments serve to 
address the stereotyping and stigmatisation that the mentally ill accused had to endure in 
the past.39  The new regime of dealing with mentally ill accused persons as set out in part 
XX.1 of the Criminal Code provides a “rational and more humane method of dealing with 
                                                
36  Schneider RD Annotated Ontario Mental Health Statutes 4th ed (Irwin Law Toronto 2007) at 407.  
Also see Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 289.  The Criminal Code was based on the British Criminal 
Code.  The British Criminal Code was never enacted but was adopted by Canada as its first 
Canadian Criminal Code in 1892.  See Salhany RE Canadian Criminal Procedure 6th ed (Canada 
Law Book Toronto 2015) at 1, 2.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 
19.  The British Criminal Code was influenced by the Criminal Lunatics Act 800 (U.K) 39, which was 
the first acknowledgement of the fact that mentally ill persons will encounter the Criminal Justice 
System and that they should not be dealt with in the same manner as non-mentally ill accused.  
Those found not guilty due to mental illness could only either be released into the community or be 
imprisoned indefinitely.  The Criminal Lunatics Act 1800 (U.K) 39 introduced the option that a 
mentally ill person may be detained and then released at the pleasure of His Majesty.  The Act was 
the result of the case of Rex v Hadfield 27 State Trials (N.S 1281 (1800) England.  Mr Hadfield fired 
a shot at King George III and was found not guilty due to “insanity” at the time of the shooting.  Lord 
Kenyon expressed his concern that the only two options available to the court was either to send the 
accused back to prison or to have him admitted indefinitely.  Mr Hadfield in this instance was sent 
back to prison.  Also see in general Court, Simpson and Webster 2014 Psychiatry, Psychology and 
Law 918-936. 
37  Roach et al Criminal Law and Procedure at 37.  It should be noted that the Criminal Code does not 
contain all the criminal law of Canada, as other legislation exists on a federal level that imposes 
criminal sanctions.  See Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 5.  An example 
would be Income Tax legislation. 
38  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 19 and 20 explain that Part XX.I of the 
Criminal Code as it stands today, is the result of the proclamation of Bill C-30.  See further Barrett 
and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 1-9.    
39  Stuart Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law at 440, 441.  See further Barrett and Shandler 
Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 1-9.  Also see Winko v Forensic Psychiatric Institute 
(1999) 25 C.R (5th) 1 (S.C.C) at [85] where it is stated that:  “The stereotype of the ‘mad offender’ too 
often led to the institutionalization of an acquitted accused or worse, incarceration in prisons where 
they were denied the medical attention they required and were subjected to abuse.  By forcing an 
accused to face indefinite detention at the pleasure of the Lieutenant Governor in Council, on the 
assumption that such confinement was necessary for purposes of public safety, it encouraged the 
characterization of mentally ill people as quasi-criminal and contributed to the view that the mentally 
ill were always dangerous, a view we now know to be largely unfounded.  In many cases, indeed, it 
treated people who had committed no crime and were indeed not capable of criminal responsibility 
worse than true criminals, sometimes using jails as the places of detention.”   
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such persons”.40  The new system focuses on assessment and treatment 41 and as a result 
introduces a therapeutic element.    
The 1991 case of R v Swain 42 was a strong impetus for the above amendments.43  The 
Supreme Court of Canada found the indefinite detention of a person found not guilty due to 
mental illness unacceptable and a violation of the right not to be arbitrarily detained as 
provided for in section 9 of the Charter.44  The court based its finding on the fact that not all 
                                                
40  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 1-9.  Also see R v Swain [1991] I 
S.C.R. 933 at 1015 where it is stated,  “While the assumption that persons found not guilty by reason 
of insanity may well be rational, I hasten to add that I recognize that it is not always valid.  Whilst 
past violent conduct and previous mental disorder may indicate a greater possibility of future 
dangerous conduct, this will not necessarily be so.  Furthermore, not every individual found not guilty 
by reason of insanity will have such a personal history”.  See further Luther G and Mela M ”The top 
ten issues in law and psychiatry” Sask L Rev 2006 (69) 401-440 at 418 where the view is expressed 
that the amendments to the Criminal Code after Swain ensures that those found not criminally 
responsible or unfit to stand trial is treated fairly and that this is the mission of the Review Boards set 
up in terms of the amended Criminal Code to deal with such accused persons. 
41  Winko v Forensic Psychiatric Institute (1999) 25 C.R (5th) 1 (S.C.C) at [39]. 
42  R v Swain [1991] I S.C.R. 933. Mr Swain was charged with assault following a uncanny incident in 
which he attacked his wife and two children.  After the incident, Mr Swain received psychiatric 
medication and treatment and was functioning well on bail in the community.  His trial took place 
more than one year after the commencement of his release on bail.  At the trial the Crown raised the 
insanity defence over the objection of Mr Swain.  This resulted in Mr Swain being found not guilty by 
reason of insanity with the result that he was placed in strict custody without review. (R v Swain 
[1991] I S.C.R. 933 at 935a).   Also see the discussion of the case in Schneider, Bloom and 
Heerema Mental Health Courts at 19, 20.  Also see Mackay R “Insanity and fitness to stand trial in 
Canada and England:  A comparative study of recent developments” 1995 (6) The Journal of 
Forensic Psychiatry 121-138 at 122 who explains that this inflexible form of treatment of the mentally 
ill was modelled on the English Criminal Lunatics Act of 1820.  This strict custody entailed that the 
court had no opportunity to enquire if the accused actually needed to be detained or not and the 
court could not exercise any discretion in this regard. (R v Swain [1991] I S.C.R. 933 at 943E-F 
where it is pointed out that the judge is required to order confinement without a hearing (this is in 
accordance with the old provisions of the Criminal Code (section 542(2)) which has subsequently 
been amended as a result of this case). Mr Swain appealed against this decision to the Ontario 
Court of Appeal, arguing that such right of the Crown to raise the defence over his objection, 
infringed his right to liberty and security of the person as contained in the Charter.  His appeal was 
unsuccessful, His subsequent appeal was however successful and the court found that his Charter 
rights have indeed been infringed.  It is explained in Roach et al Criminal Law and Procedure at 780 
that the purpose of the common law rule that enabled the Crown to raise the insanity defence over 
the objection of the accused, was to ensure that persons who were “insane” at the time of 
commission of the offence were not found guilty in cases where such person refuses to admit or give 
evidence that he was indeed insane at the time of commission of the offence.  The second objective 
was to protect society from potentially dangerous persons who required hospitalisation.  Also see the 
discussion of this case in Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 1-6, 1-
7. 
43  More particularly for the enactment of Bill C-30.  See Mackay 1995 The Journal of Forensic 
Psychiatry 121 at 122.  Also see Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 
1-6, 1-9 for a discussion of the Swain case that prompted the enactment of the abovementioned Bill 
that changed the way Canadian criminal law dealt with mentally disordered accused persons.  Also 
see Harradence H “Re-applying the standard of fitness to stand trial” 2012 (59) Crim.L.Q 511-558 at 
512 who confirms that the Swain judgment was a strong impetus for the legislative amendments.  
44 R v Swain (1991) S C R 933 at 943J-944A.  Also see Stuart Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal 
Law at 358.  Also see Mackay 1995 The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 121 at 122 where this type of 
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mentally ill accused persons are dangerous and therefore necessitating detention.45  The 
court’s view was that an accused found not guilty by reason of insanity should be assessed 
for dangerousness within a reasonable period of time so as to avoid infringing the 
accused’s right to liberty and the right to be free from arbitrary detention.46    
The court’s order entailed that Parliament had to amend the legislative provisions pertaining 
to strict custody of a mentally ill accused within a period of 6 (six) months from the date of 
judgment.  As a result, Bill C-30 was introduced, setting out the comprehensive procedure 
to be followed when dealing with mentally disordered accused,47 including provisions for 
review of mentally ill accused persons.48   
Bill C-30 also introduced the definition of “unfitness to stand trial” and further created 
Review Boards.49  One important impact of Bill C-30 is that it amended some terminology in 
the Code.  For example, the words “disease of the mind” and “natural imbecility” that was 
previously used to refer to a mentally ill person were removed from the Code and replaced 
by a reference to a person suffering from a “mental disorder” which is more respectful. 50 
Even though the Swain judgment was handed down in a matter involving the insanity 
defence, the principles highlighted therein are equally applicable to other persons with 
mental illness, especially the notion that not all persons with mental illness are dangerous 
                                                                                                                                                   
detention is referred to as “strict custody” and where it is explained that it was found unconstitutional 
due to the lack of procedural safeguards for those found to be “legally insane”.  See further Roach et 
al Criminal Law and Procedure at 777. 
45  See Mackay 1995 The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 121 at 123 for a discussion of the Supreme 
Court’s finding in R v Swain.  Also see Canadian Mental Health Association 
http://www.cmha.bc.ca/files/policesheets_all.pdf  (Date of use: 13 March 2015) at 2 where it is 
pointed out that there is a false perception amongst the community that persons with mental illness 
are dangerous. 
46  Section 7 to 9 of the Charter.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 19, 
20 for a discussion of the case and the findings of the various courts involved. 
47  The Bill was preceded by a working Paper by the Law Reform Commission of Canada in which the 
contents of the Bill was proposed.  See Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 20.  
Also see Van der Wolf et al 2010 International Journal of Forensic Mental Health 245 at 246.  See, 
however, Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 1-8 where it is 
explained that there were certain provisions in the Bill that were not accepted and passed and these 
related to hospital orders, capping of dispositions and dangerous mentally ill accused persons. 
48  Section 672.82 of the Criminal Code.  One very important impact of Bill C-30 is that it amended 
some terminology in the Code.  For example, “not guilty by reason of insanity” was replaced by “not 
criminally responsible on account of mental disorder”.  These changes were effected in 1992.  The 
words “disease of the mind” and “natural imbecility” was also removed from the Code.  See 
Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 21.  See further Barrett and Shandler 
Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 1-11 where it is pointed out that the term “mental 
disorder” is used in the Criminal Code instead of the aforementioned terms. 
49  Harradence 2012 Crim.L.Q 511 at 511. 
50  These changes were effected in 1992.  See Schneider Annotated Ontario Mental Health Statutes at 
411.  See further Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 1-11. 
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and therefore necessitating detention.51 
The provisions of the Criminal Code, as far as they pertain to fitness to stand trial in 
particular and alternative methods of prosecution, are essential for this research as they 
create the basis upon which the Mental Health Court initiative is based.52   
The Criminal Code explains the terms unfit to stand trial and not criminally responsible.  
Only the definitions are highlighted below.  An examination of the order for assessment to 
determine fitness to stand trial, the test to determine same, and the consequences of a 
finding of unfit to stand trial and fit to stand trial, are discussed under the heading of 
procedural aspects relating to the mentally ill accused under Canadian criminal law below. 
2.3.2 Fitness to stand trial 
The Criminal Code contains a definition of what is to be understood under “unfit to stand 
trial”.53  Fitness to stand trial is, therefore, to be understood by what it is not, as the Criminal 
Code defines unfitness rather than fitness. 
The definition of “unfitness” reads as follows:54 
means unable on account of mental disorder 55 to conduct a defence at any stage of the 
proceedings before a verdict is rendered or to instruct counsel to do so and in particular 
unable on account of mental disorder to 
Understand the nature or object of the proceedings,56 
Understand the possible consequences of the proceedings, or 
Communicate with counsel.57 
                                                
51  See Byrick K and Walker-Renshaw B A practical guide to Mental Health and the Law in Ontario 
(Ontario Hospital Association Toronto 2012) at 76 where the Swain judgment and the impact that it 
had on the development of mental health law is discussed. 
52  Many Bills that dealt with mental health issues were introduced resulting in the amendment of the 
relevant sections of the Criminal Code dealing with mentally ill accused.  There are, however, 
provincial policies that deal specifically with the diversion of mentally ill accused persons to Mental 
Health Courts and these will be discussed in detail when the procedural dynamics of Mental Health 
Courts are examined later in this chapter. 
53  Prior to the Criminal Code, the concept of “fitness” was not defined even though the concept that a 
person must be able to follow the proceedings at his trial in order to be tried, dates back to the 
earliest common law provisions.  See Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal 
Law at 1-11. 
54  Section 2 of the Criminal Code.  Also see Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 290. 
55  Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 289 points out that the mental disorder for purposes of rendering a 
person not fit to stand trial, is the same requirement set in section 16 of the Criminal Code in respect 
of a mental disorder that would render a person not criminally responsible on account of mental 
disorder.  The presence of a mental disorder is the first leg of the test for fitness to stand trial 
according to Coughlan.  The second leg of the test consists of the remainder of the provisions of 
section 2 as set out above. 
56  This includes an understanding of the roles of the court officials.  See Barrett and Shandler Mental 
Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-4. 
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According to the definition, the accused must therefore be diagnosed with a mental 
disorder, which disorder must have a definite impact on the accused’s ability to understand 
the nature or possible consequences of the proceedings or to communicate with his 
counsel.58  Fitness to stand trial only pertains to the accused’s involvement in the criminal 
proceedings and the extent to which his ability to participate therein, as set out above, is 
affected by his mental illness.  The focus is on the accused’s current state of mind and not 
his state of mind at the time of the commission of the alleged offence.  The latter is relevant 
for purposes of a determination of criminal capacity. 
2.3.3 Not criminally responsible 
 Section 16 of the Criminal Code states that a person shall not be held criminally responsible 
for an act or omission performed whilst suffering from a mental disorder, which rendered 
him incapable of appreciating the nature of the act or incapable of knowing that it was 
wrong.59  Case law confirms that the accused must also be unable to apply the knowledge 
regarding the nature of the act as referred to above in order not to be held criminally 
responsible, even though this is not an express requirement in terms of the Criminal 
Code.60  As stated in R v Chaulk:61  “The section embodies the policy of the law that such 
persons are sick as opposed to blameworthy and should be treated rather than punished”.  
Criminal capacity pertains to the impact that the mental illness had on the accused at the 
time of the commission of the alleged offence and is considered during sentencing.   
                                                                                                                                                   
57  Of the three sub-requirements listed in section 2 of the Criminal Code, the requirement that the 
accused must be able to communicate with Counsel, attracted the most attention.  See Coughlan 
Criminal Procedure at 290.  Also see Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal 
Law at 3-3. 
58  Newby D and Faltin R “The very essentials of fitness for trial assessment in Canada” 2008 (47) 
Journal of Offender Rehabilitation 185-207 at 186.  Also see section 2 of the Criminal Code.  Also 
see Parliamentary Information and Research Service Current issues in Mental Health in Canada: 
Mental Health and the Criminal Justice System (Library of Parliament Ottawa Canada 2013) at 2.  
See further Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-1.  A low standard 
has been set to determine if an accused is capable of communicating with his legal representative.  
All that is required is that the accused must be able to communicate the facts relating to the alleged 
offence.  Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 290.  Also see Van der Wolf et al 2010 International 
Journal of Forensic Mental Health 245 at 245. 
59  Section 16(1) of the Criminal Code.  Also see Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in 
Canada at 179.  The terminology utilised prior to 1992 was the insanity defence but it was replaced 
with “not Criminally Responsible on Account of Mental Disorder” NCR in short.  See Schneider 
Annotated Ontario Mental Health Statutes at 410, 411.  The defence of not criminally responsible 
because of mental illness only became available to accused persons charged with summary 
conviction offences after the 1992 amendments to the Criminal Code.  See Barrett and Shandler 
Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 1-13.  Prior to these amendments the defence was 
only available to those accused of indictable offences. 
60  See R v Charest (1990), 57 C.C.C. (3d) 312 (Que. C.A.). 
61  (1990), 62 C.C.C (3rd) 193 at p 217. 
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 Since this research is primarily concerned with pre-trial issues, the assessment of criminal 
capacity and the consequences in the event that a lack of criminal capacity is established 
will not be canvassed further unless the context of the discussion on fitness issues dictates 
otherwise.62 
2.4 Mental Health Legislation 
 Provincial mental health legislation in Canada mostly applies to the civil commitment of 
mentally ill persons.63  Each province has its own mental health laws.64  The requirements 
                                                
62  It needs to be mentioned though that the Not Criminally Responsible Reform Act came into force in 
July 2014.  (S.C 2014.  C.6). Also see Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal 
Law at 1-30.  The three main aims of this Act is to ensure that public safety is the main consideration 
when dealing with accused persons found not criminally responsible on account of mental illness; to 
provide for a mentally ill accused to be classified as “high risk” and to ensure the involvement of 
victims when dealing with persons found not criminally responsible on account of mental illness.  
See the Not Criminally Responsible reform Act itself (Bill C-14).  The effect of the enactment of this 
Act is that it amended certain sections of the Criminal Code that applies to accused persons found 
not criminally responsible because of mental illness.  A court may find that a person found not 
criminally responsible on account of mental illness, is a “high risk” with due consideration to the 
nature of the offence, any pattern of repetitive behaviour of which the offence forms part, the current 
mental state of the accused, reports from experts who have assessed the accused, and whether the 
accused is willing to receive treatment.  The consequence for the accused is that there is no 
possibility for him to be discharged and he must be detained in hospital until a Judge of the Superior 
Court lifts the designation of “high risk” person.  Section 67.64 states that the finding of an accused 
being a high risk is available in cases where the court is satisfied that the accused will use violence 
that will endanger the lives of others, or where the crime committed is so brutal that it is an indication 
of risk of physical or psychological harm to another.  Section 672.64(2) of the Criminal Code that was 
inserted by the Not Criminally Responsible reform Act sets out the factors that have to be considered 
when declaring an accused a “high risk”.  Such a finding is however only possible with regard to 
adults (section 672.64) and may only be made by a court and not by a Review Board.  See Barrett 
and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 1-31, 1-32.  Section 672.64(3) of the 
Criminal Code.  Also see Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 1-31 
where the automatic hospital detention that follows a decision that an accused is a “high risk” 
accused, is criticised mainly because it eliminates the assessment of dangerousness that is required 
in respect of every accused in respect of whom a disposition has to be made and does not allow for 
each case to be decided individually based on the merits of the matter.  This criticism is made with 
the finding of the court in the Winko decision in mind.  Once the “high risk” status of the accused has 
been revoked, he must then be treated as an accused found not criminally responsible because of 
mental illness who does not pose a high risk to the public and a disposition, including an absolute 
discharge is available to such an accused.  The dispositions as set out in section 672.54 of the 
Criminal Code may be ordered in respect of an accused that is not a high risk to the safety of 
society.  A finding of a person with mental illness being a “high risk” cannot be made in respect of a 
person who has been found unfit to stand trial but only in respect of a person found not criminally 
responsible on account of mental illness  Also see Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian 
Criminal Law at 1-310. 
63  Byrick and Walker-Renshaw A practical guide to Mental Health and the Law in Ontario at 1 where it 
is pointed out that health is generally a provincial matter whilst criminal law, as stated above, is 
usually a federal matter.  The Ontario Mental Health Act R.SO 1990 (hereinafter referred to as the 
“Ontario Mental Health Act”) for example provides for the treatment of voluntary, informal and 
involuntary patients.  Reference is made to the mentally ill accused persons and provision made for 
the detention of such persons under section 25 of this Act. 
64  Van der Wolf et al 2010 International Journal of Forensic Mental Health 245 at 255.  In Ontario, for 
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for civil commitment in all provinces are the same, namely, that the accused must have a 
mental illness and must pose a danger to the self or others.65   
The Ontario Mental Health Act makes provision for two categories of mental health care 
users, namely voluntary 66 and involuntary.67  Provision is also made for a 72-hour 
assessment period prior to continuing with involuntary care.   
Section 21 of the Ontario Mental Health Act makes provision for a judge to order an 
assessment of an accused who appears before him and whom he suspects may have a 
mental illness.68  A judge may issue a treatment order in terms of the Ontario Mental health 
Act of not more than two months.69  An order for assessment or treatment may not be made 
unless a psychiatric facility has confirmed the availability of its services for the relevant 
accused.70    A report must be submitted to the judge on the mental state of the accused.71   
                                                                                                                                                   
example, see the Mental Health Act, R.S.O. 1990, and, the Health Care Consent Act 1996. 
65  Van der Wolf et al 2010 International Journal of Forensic Mental Health 245 at 255.  The author 
points out further that some provinces, however, lack a functional definition of mental illness.  
Provinces also differ on how strict their civil commitment requirements are.  
66  Also referred to as an “informal patient” and defined in section 1 of the Ontario Mental Health Act as 
““informal patient” means a person who is a patient in a psychiatric facility, having been admitted 
with the consent of another person under section 24 of the Health Care Consent Act, 1996”.  Such 
patient may not be restrained (see section 14 of the Act).  The status of an informal patient can be 
changed to that of an involuntary patient upon the filing of a certificate of involuntary admission by a 
physician.  (See section 19 of the Act). 
67  Defined in section 1 of the Ontario Mental Health Act as ““involuntary patient” means a person who is 
detained in a psychiatric facility under a certificate of involuntary admission, a certificate of renewal 
or a certificate of continuation”.  A person will be admitted as an involuntary patient if he is incapable 
of taking an informed decision regarding the need for care and if the lack of treatment could lead to 
harm to himself or others (see section 20 (1.1) of the Act).  Section 20(4) of the Act states that a 
certificate of involuntary care will have the effect that “An involuntary patient may be detained, 
restrained, observed and examined in a psychiatric facility, (a) for not more than two weeks under a 
certificate of involuntary admission.”  The period may be extended through a certificate of renewal 
(see section 20(4)(b)(i) to (iv) for the applicable periods of renewal).  The status of an involuntary 
patient may be changed to informal upon the completion of relevant form by the physician, even 
before the initial period of detention according to the certificate of informal detention has expired - 
see section 20(7). 
68  Section 21(1) of the Ontario Mental Health Act.  The section states, “Where a judge has reason to 
believe that a person who appears before him or her charged with or convicted of an offence suffers 
from mental disorder, the judge may order the person to attend a psychiatric facility for examination.” 
69  Section 22 of the Ontario Mental Health Act states that “Where a judge has reason to believe that a 
person in custody who appears before him or her charged with an offence suffers from mental 
disorder, the judge may, by order, remand that person for admission as a patient to a psychiatric 
facility for a period of not more than two months.”  Also see Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division Practice Memorandum:  Mentally Disordered/Developmentally Disabled 
Offenders: Diversion (Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General Ontario 2006) at 10. 
70  Section 23 of the Ontario Mental Health Act reads that “A judge shall not make an order under 
section 21 or 22 until he or she ascertains from the senior physician of a psychiatric facility that the 
services of the psychiatric facility are available to the person to be named in the order.  R.S.O. 1990, 
c. M.7, s. 23.”  Also see Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General Criminal Law Division Practice 
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Even though the criminal justice system often looks at the provincial mental health facilities 
in order to conduct assessments and treat accused persons in the criminal justice setting 72   
, the provisions of the Mental Health Legislation for purposes of assessment for fitness to 
stand trial is of lesser importance since fitness assessments via the Mental Health Court 
takes place on-site.  Reference will, however, be made to the legislation of the Ontario 
province throughout the research where relevant. 
 In order to better elucidate the dynamics of the Criminal Code as it pertains to the mentally 
ill accused, the structure of the Canadian criminal justice system is briefly surveyed below.  
The synoptic elucidation is intended to better contextualise the status of Mental Health 
Courts within the criminal justice system.   
3  STRUCTURE OF THE CANADIAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM  
3.1 Introduction 
 This section focuses on the structure of the Canadian criminal justice system within which 
issues relating to fitness to stand trial are considered.  The structure of the criminal justice 
system is set out briefly, including the levels of courts and the type of offences considered 
by them.  The role of Review Boards is discussed, and the position of the Mental Health 
Court within the criminal justice structure is set out synoptically since Mental Health Courts 
are discussed in detail later in this chapter. 
 An understanding of the types of offences and the jurisdiction of the courts over them are 
of particular relevance to the Mental Health Court model in Canada since only certain types 
of offences qualify for the diversion component of the Mental Health Court.  
3.2 Criminal courts 
The Canadian criminal justice system follows an accusatorial approach.73  Since the 
enforcement of the Criminal Code is generally delegated to the provinces, the attorney 
                                                                                                                                                   
Memorandum: Mentally Disordered/Developmentally Disabled Offenders: Diversion at 10. 
71  Section 21(2) of the Ontario Mental Health Act.  
72  Byrick and Walker-Renshaw A practical guide to Mental Health and the Law in Ontario at 2.  Also 
see section 25 of the Ontario Mental Health Act that reads “Detention under the Criminal Code 
(Canada) 25.  Any person who is detained in a psychiatric facility under Part XX.1 of the Criminal 
Code (Canada) may be restrained, observed and examined under this Act and provided with 
treatment under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996.  2000, c. 9, s. 8.” 
73  Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 29. 
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general of the province is the principal law officer of the Crown 74 through whom all public 
prosecutions are conducted.75  
The Constitution gives provinces the authority to establish courts within their territorial 
jurisdiction.76  The classification of offences impacts the jurisdiction and criminal process 
followed in a particular court.77  The Criminal Code allocates jurisdiction over offences to 
the various courts created through the said constitutional provision.78    
In essence, there are two main types of offence, namely: indictable offences and summary 
conviction offences.79  An indictable offence generally has a higher maximum penalty than 
a summary conviction offence.80  Indictable offences are subdivided into three categories, 
                                                
74  Stuard, Delisle and Quigley Learning Canadian Criminal Procedure at 3.  Enforcement of other 
federal legislation such as the Income Tax Act is the responsibility of the attorney general of Canada 
and not the provincial attorney generals.  See Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 43 who explains that 
there is an attorney general in the Federal government and in each of the provinces.  The attorney 
general may be represented by agents.  See section 2 of the Criminal Code.  Also see R v Light 
(1993), 78 C.C.C (3d) 221 at 253 (B.C.C.A).  Also see Schizophrenia society of Ontario The Justice 
Process, a guide for families.  http://www.schizophrenia.on.ca/getmedia/d252fe01-ab2a-429c-bd6b-
5322115c4204/justice_process_guide.pdf.aspx (Date of use:  20 September 2016) at 1 where it is 
explained that the Crown is the attorney for the state who seeks justice for the public. 
75  Public prosecutions are those in which the Crown prosecutes whereas private prosecutions are 
those in which someone other than the attorney general or someone authorised to act on his behalf, 
drives the prosecution.  Private prosecutions are rare and are only conducted where the public 
prosecutor decided not to proceed with a public prosecution due to either lack of evidence or the fact 
that prosecution will not be in the best interest of the public.  See Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 40 
footnote 46.   
76  Section 92(15) of the Constitution of 1867.  Also see Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 40. 
77  Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 37 such as the court procedure to be followed, the jurisdiction of the 
court, police powers, methods of ensuring attendance and the interim release of an accused who is 
about to stand trial on a particular type of charge.  It also affects sentencing as well as the method of 
appeal.  (see this source at 39). 
78  Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 40 footnote 20. 
79 This distinction was drawn at common law where indictable offences were triable only by a judge 
and jury and summary conviction offences were triable by a justice of the peace sitting without a jury.  
See Stuard, Delisle and Quigley Learning Canadian Criminal Procedure at 6.  The classification of 
the offence is not necessarily an indication of the seriousness thereof.  See Coughlan Criminal 
Procedure at 37 where it is pointed out that some violent offence can be prosecuted via summary 
conviction whereas some less serious property offences has to be prosecuted via indictment.  He 
points out further that the current classification of offences cannot always be rationalised by 
reference to its seriousness and that the development of an increasing number of hybrid offences, is 
proof of this fact – hybrid offences grants the prosecution the opportunity to choose to proceed via 
summary conviction or indictment.  See however Stuard, Delisle and Quigley Learning Canadian 
Criminal Procedure at 6 who opines that those offences triable by indictment only are the more 
serious offences.  The current classification system has been criticised as unnecessarily complex 
(see this source at 39) and an impediment to the development of Canadian Criminal Procedure law.  
See in general Law Reform Commission of Canada Our Criminal Procedure (Ottawa Law Reform 
Commission of  Canada 1988).    
80  Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 37.  Also see this source at 39 who points out that those serving 
sentences for indictable offences will serve such sentence in a federal penitentiary.  Sentences of 
more than two years are served in federal penitentiaries.  Section 743(1) of the Criminal Code. 
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namely:  superior court exclusive indictable offences, which are the very serious offences,81 
absolute jurisdiction offences that are the least serious offences 82 and all other indictable 
offences not covered by the previous two categories.83    
Summary conviction offences are generally offences that are punishable with a maximum 
prison term of 6 months and/or a fine not exceeding $2 000.00.84  Whether an offence is a 
                                                
81  Superior court exclusive indictable offences are the very serious offences such as murder, piracy, 
treason and crimes against humanity.  These offences must be heard by the superior court of 
criminal jurisdiction.  See Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 70, 71.  Also 
see Stuard, Delisle and Quigley Learning Canadian Criminal Procedure at 6, 7 who confirm that the 
most serious indictable offences are given into the exclusive jurisdiction of the superior court of 
criminal jurisdiction.  In Ontario for example, the court is called the Supreme Court of Justice.  See 
further Salhany Canadian Criminal Procedure at 1-7.   
82  These include theft under $5 000 and some minor property and fraud offences.  A provincial court 
judge must hear these offences.  This implies that the accused will be tried in the court of criminal 
jurisdiction and not the supreme court of criminal jurisdiction.  Also see Stuard, Delisle and Quigley 
Learning Canadian Criminal Procedure at 6 who confirm that these are the least serious indictable 
offences that will be heard by a provincial court judge.  See however Salhany Canadian Criminal 
Procedure at 1-7 who indicates that the absolute jurisdiction of a provincial court judge may be 
superseded by the jurisdiction of the superior court of criminal jurisdiction.  This means that a 
superior court of criminal jurisdiction may hear a case of theft of goods to the value of less than 
$5 000.  See for example the case of R v Holliday (1973) 12 C.C.C (2d) 56 (Alta S.C. App Div) 
where the superior court of criminal jurisdiction found the value of the stolen goods to be less than 
$200 (which was the limit for provincial court cases at the time) and could even thereafter proceed to 
trial the case   The accused does not have an election by whom he wants to be tried and is 
automatically subjected to the trial method of the court under which jurisdiction the particular type of 
indictment falls. Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 70, 71.  Also see 
Stuard, Delisle and Quigley Learning Canadian Criminal Procedure at 6, 7 where it is explained that 
absolute jurisdiction means that the provincial court has the absolute right to trial the less serious 
indictable offence in the sense that the jurisdiction is not dependant on the accused electing to be 
tried in this court.  It does however not have exclusive jurisdiction and other courts may hear less 
serious indictable offences should a case come before them.  See further Salhany Canadian 
Criminal Procedure at 1-5.     
83  In this case, the accused has an election as to the method of the trial in the court of criminal 
jurisdiction.  Salhany Canadian Criminal Procedure at 1-8.  Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal 
Process in Canada at 68, 79 for a summary of the three options in respect of a trial in the court of 
criminal jurisdiction. 
84  Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 69, 71, 72 where it is explained that all 
provincial offences are summary conviction offences.  Nothing prohibits a province from stating that 
an offence will be an indictable offence but there are doubts about the constitutionality thereof.  Most 
provincial legislation pertaining to the process to follow in a summary conviction offence mirrors the 
content of the Criminal Code pertaining to the federal procedure to be followed in respect of 
summary conviction offences.  Part XXVII of the Criminal Code sets out the procedure to follow in 
federal matters.  Some provinces such as Ontario for example, have their own procedural legislation 
for provincial offences committed.  Ontario has a Provincial Offences Act in terms whereof a 
Provincial Offences Court is established which is presided over by a provincial court judge or a 
justice of the peace.  There is no preliminary inquiry in this type of court.  See Stuard, Delisle and 
Quigley Learning Canadian Criminal Procedure at 7.  Also see Mewett An Introduction to the 
Criminal Process in Canada at 69.   See further Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 38 who points out 
that sentences of less than two years are served in a provincial jail – it is thus most likely that a 
sentence for a summary conviction offence will be served in a provincial jail.    
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summary conviction offence or not will be stated by the particular provincial legislation.85    
Where the option is available to prosecute the offence as either a summary conviction or an 
indictable offence, such an offence is known as a hybrid offence.86  The Crown elects which 
route to follow, and the appropriate procedure ensues.87   
There are three levels of criminal courts.  The lowest level of court is the summary 
conviction court, followed by the court of criminal jurisdiction.  The highest level of court in 
Canada is the superior court of criminal jurisdiction.88   A brief discussion of each of these 
follows. 
The first and lowest level of courts in Canada is the summary conviction courts.89  These 
                                                
85  Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 69.  These offences must be heard by 
a provincially appointed judge in the area where the offence was committed and proceedings must 
commence within 6 months from the date of the alleged offence.     
86  Stuard, Delisle and Quigley Learning Canadian Criminal Procedure at 7.  Also see Salhany 
Canadian Criminal Procedure at 1-3 who gives impaired driving as an example of a hybrid offence.  
See however Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 35, 36 where it is pointed out the hybrid offences 
should not be seen as a third category of offences as they do not follow a separate procedure but 
the offence is merely designed to fall under either procedure at the election of the prosecutor.  This 
source further at 36 states that hybrid offences are treated as indictable offences until the 
prosecution has made an election in terms of which process to follow forthwith.  Also see The 
Interpretation Act R.S.C 1985 c 1-21 section 34.  R v Gougeom;   R v Heasler;   R v Gray (1980), 55 
C.C.C (2d) 218 (Ont, C.A) Similarly, if  proceedings commence in the summary convictions court 
prior to the prosecution having chosen the mode of process, it will be assumed that the election was 
to proceed via summary conviction.  See Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 54.  Also see Mewett An 
Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 70, 71.  Also see this source at 73 for a 
schematical explanation of how hybrid offences fit into the Canadian criminal court system. 
87  The decision by the Crown will determine the court that will try the matter, Mewett An Introduction to 
the Criminal Process in Canada at 70, 71.  Also see Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 36 footnote 3 
where it is indicated that hybrid offences are treated as indictable offences until decided otherwise.  
Also see The Interpretation Act R.S.C 1985 c 1-21.  See further Salhany Canadian Criminal 
Procedure at 1-4.  Where hybrid offences are proceeded with by way of summary conviction, the 
maximum sentence in respect of some of these hybrid offences is more than 6 (six) months.  
Offences that attract these higher sentences include sexual assault as provided for in section 271 of 
the Criminal Code and assault with the intent to do bodily harm as provided for in section 267 of the 
Criminal Code.  The maximum penalty for these offences since 1994 is now 18 months.  See Stuard, 
Delisle and Quigley Learning Canadian Criminal Procedure at 7, 8.  These offences must be heard 
by a provincially appointed judge in the area where the offence was committed and proceedings 
must commence within 6 months from the date of the alleged offence.  See Section 786(2) of the 
Criminal Code.  See Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 69, 71.  Also see 
Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 54 and further at 37, 51 where it is pointed out that the 6 (six) month 
rule can be relaxed if the Crown and the accused consent thereto.   
88  Note that these are not necessarily three separate courts, but represent the three levels of courts.  
Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 67.  All summary convictions are heard 
in a Provincial Court in front of a Provincial Court judge without a jury.  A summary conviction court is 
thus a provincial court.  See Stuard, Delisle and Quigley Learning Canadian Criminal Procedure at 7. 
89  Section 785 of the Criminal Code explains the meaning of a Summary Conviction court.  See Mewett 
An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 69.  Also see Salhany Canadian Criminal 




courts are presided over by a provincial court judge 90 and hear only cases involving 
summary conviction offences that are mainly minor offences.91  The accused need not 
appear in person in this court unless the court requires such a personal appearance.92  
There is no preliminary inquiry in summary conviction proceedings.93 
The second level of courts comprises the court of criminal jurisdiction that has jurisdiction 
over all indictable offences that are not supreme court exclusive offences.94  These courts 
have jurisdiction over an accused if he was found, arrested, or detained in custody in the 
territorial jurisdiction of the particular court of criminal justice.95  These courts of criminal 
justice can appear in three forms, but all with equal jurisdiction.96 The main difference 
between the forms of this court is that it is presided over by either a judge and jury or a 
judge only depending on the election of the accused.97  
                                                
90  Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 69.  A justice of the peace may also 
sometimes preside over these courts but it is unusual for this to be the case.  They physical 
presence of the accused is not required at the proceedings of the summary conviction court and his 
lawyer or other agent may represent him.  The judge may however order that he be present in 
accordance with section 800(2) of the Criminal Code.  Also see Stuard, Delisle and Quigley Learning 
Canadian Criminal Procedure at 7. 
91  Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 69.  Also see Coughlan Criminal 
Procedure at 40 where these courts are also referred to as “provincial courts”. 
92  The accused may be represented by an agent or by Counsel.  See Salhany Canadian Criminal 
Procedure at 1-19. 
93  Stuard, Delisle and Quigley Learning Canadian Criminal Procedure at 8. 
94  These courts thus have general jurisdiction over all indictable offences, except for those listed in 
section 469 of the Criminal Code.  See Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 40.  Also see Mewett An 
Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 68. 
95  Section 470 of the Criminal Code. 
96  Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 68. 
97  Firstly there is the court presided over by a superior court judge and a jury.  Also referred to as the 
court of general session, or session of the peace.  This court will preside over those indictments in 
respect whereof the accused elected to be tried by judge and jury.  See Mewett An Introduction to 
the Criminal Process in Canada at 68.  Also see Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 35.  Secondly, 
there is the court that is presided over by a superior court judge only who hears cases of those 
accused that elect to be tried by judge without jury.  Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process 
in Canada at 68.  Also see Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 35.  In either of these first two methods 
of trial, a preliminary inquiry may be held at the request of the accused or the Crown.  Section 535 of 
the Criminal Code.  Also see Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 60, 254.  A preliminary inquiry serves 
as a screening mechanism to rule out prosecutions with little or no merit.  Coughlan at 254 is of the 
opinion that the role of preliminary inquiries are becoming less important, especially since the 
amendment of the Criminal Code in 2004 which had the effect that a preliminary inquiry is no longer 
an automatic part of the criminal proceedings, but is only held upon request of either of the parties.  
Coughlan at 255 points out further that a preliminary inquiry will most often be requested by the 
accused as it grants him an opportunity to test the strength of the case against him and get 
information on the evidence that will be levied against him at the trial.  The issues in respect of which 
a preliminary inquiry should be held, must be specified by the accused prior to submitting a request 
for a preliminary inquiry, the inquiry will no longer cover the entire case, as was the position prior to 
the amendments of the Criminal Code in 2004.  The Scope of the inquiry is defined by section 535 of 
the Criminal Code.  See Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 259-262 for detail on the scope of the 
preliminary inquiry.  The accused do not always have this election and that the Criminal Code 
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Lastly, the superior court of criminal jurisdiction is the highest court in each province 98 and 
is presided over by a federally appointed judge.99  The default mode of trial in this court is 
trial by judge and jury 100 unless the attorney general has consented to a trial without a 
jury.101  The accused cannot exercise election as to the mode of trial.102    
                                                                                                                                                   
sometimes prescribes that certain offences be heard in a certain court.  See for example section 469 
and 553 of the Criminal Code.  See this source at 35 where it is pointed out that a preliminary inquiry 
is held in a provincial court and only after it is evident that there is enough evidence to proceed with 
a trial, will the trial proceed in the superior court of criminal jurisdiction.  A plea is, however, only 
entered at the trial and not at the preliminary inquiry.  See Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 60.  
Thirdly, there is the court that is presided over by a provincial court judge who hears the cases of 
accused who chose to be tried by provincial court judge without jury.  The choice between being 
tried by a superior court judge and a provincial court judge affects the procedure of the trial to follow.  
Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 68.  Also see Coughlan Criminal 
Procedure at 35 and further at 60 where it is explained that section 555(1) of the Criminal Code 
provides for a trial in front of a provincial judge to be converted into a Preliminary Inquiry where 
appropriate.  In the case of a trial in a provincial court, the accused waives his right to request a 
preliminary inquiry.  See Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 41. 
98  Section 2 of the Criminal Code sets out the names of these Courts in every province as:  “superior 
court of criminal jurisdiction” means (a) in the Province of Ontario, the Court of Appeal or the 
Superior Court of Justice, (b) in the Province of Quebec, the Superior Court, (c) in the Province of 
Prince Edward Island, the Supreme Court, (d) in the Provinces of New Brunswick, Manitoba, 
Saskatchewan and Alberta, the Court of Appeal or the Court of Queen’s Bench, (e) in the Provinces 
of Nova Scotia, British Columbia and Newfoundland, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeal, (f) in 
Yukon, the Supreme Court, (g) in the Northwest Territories, the Supreme Court, and (h) in Nunavut, 
the Nunavut Court of Justice;  Also see Salhany Canadian Criminal Procedure at 1-4. 
99  Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 67.  Judges of these courts are 
appointed by the federal parliament.  See Roach et al Criminal Law and Procedure at 8.  These 
courts are also often referred to as the Supreme or Superior Court of the Province or the court of 
Queen’s Bench.  In Ontario, this court is called the Ontario Court of Justice (General Division). 
100  Section 471 of the Criminal Code.  A criminal trial is mostly conducted by way of judge and jury 
although the jury may be dispensed with under certain circumstances.  See Mewett An Introduction 
to the Criminal Process in Canada at 68.  Also see Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 35, 36 where he 
points out that the Criminal Code in section 471 creates the impression that trial by judge and jury is 
the default trial method for indictable offences but that such impression is wrong since the Code 
creates exceptions for the hearing of many types of offences elsewhere in the Code. 
101  Section 473(1) of the Criminal Code.  The jury will be dispensed with only with the consent of the 
Attorney General and the accused.  See Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada 
at 68.  Also see Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 35, 60.  See further Salhany Canadian Criminal 
Procedure at 1-5.   
102  “Election” means the formal step in the criminal proceedings where the accused has the option to 
choose between the various forms of trials available in the criminal court of jurisdiction.  Section 536 
of the Criminal Code makes provision for this election.  Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal 
Process in Canada at 70.  Also see Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 41.  Also see this source at 35 
and further at 60 where it is pointed out that where an accused does not make an election as to the 
preferred trial method, a trial by judge and jury shall be held.  Also see Stuard, Delisle and Quigley 
Learning Canadian Criminal Procedure at 6 where this is confirmed in accordance with Section 
565(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.  The Criminal Code, however, provides that certain offences can only 
be heard by certain courts in which case the accused will not have the election as referred to above.  
See Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 35 and 40 where it is explained that offences listed in section 
553 of the Criminal Code for example can only be heard by a provincial court as they are not 
deemed serious enough to warrant a trial by jury.  On the other hand, offences contained in section 
469 of the Criminal Code, has to be heard by the superior court due to its serious nature.  These 
offences include for example murder.  The accused may also in certain instances re-elect the mode 
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Superior courts have jurisdiction over all indictable offence.103  Practically, the offences 
actually heard by the superior court are earmarked as Supreme Court exclusive offences.104  
These are typically treason, piracy, murder and include conspiracy to commit any of these 
crimes.105  This court has jurisdiction over an accused if the accused was found, arrested, 
or detained in custody in the territorial jurisdiction of the particular court.106 
Mental Health Courts are criminal courts that form part of the Canadian criminal justice 
system to which accused persons with mental health issues may be diverted and provide 
for an alternative prosecution method as provided for in the Criminal Code.107  The 
jurisdiction of this court depends on the practice directive that has been issued by the 
Ministry of the Attorney General in each province.108  Only certain types of offences are 
heard by Mental Health Courts 109 as informed by the specific diversion programme of the 
                                                                                                                                                   
of trial once the proceedings have commenced.  Section 561 of the Criminal Code.  Also see 
Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 41.  See further Stuard, Delisle and Quigley Learning Canadian 
Criminal Procedure at 7.  Also see Salhany Canadian Criminal Procedure at 1-12, 1-18 for a detailed 
discussion of the circumstances under which an accused may re-elect his mode of trial.  The Crown 
may, however, in certain instances override the election of the accused and orders that a trial by jury 
be held despite the accused’s election.  Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 35.  Also see Stuard, 
Delisle and Quigley Learning Canadian Criminal Procedure at 7.  For instance where the offence is 
punishable with more than five years imprisonment.  (Section 568 of the Criminal Code). 
103  Section 468 of the Criminal Code.  Also see Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 40. 
104  Generally the more serious offences such as murder where only this Superior court has jurisdiction.  
See section 469 of the Criminal Code for a complete list of crimes over which the superior court of 
criminal jurisdiction shall have exclusive jurisdiction.  See Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal 
Process in Canada at 68, 70.  Also see Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 40, 59, 60 who explains that 
section 468 read with section 469 of the Criminal Code reveals that the Superior Court of Criminal 
Jurisdiction has exclusive jurisdiction over those offences listed in section 469 and that the court of 
criminal jurisdiction has general jurisdiction over all other indictable offences not so listed in section 
469 of the Criminal Code. 
105  Treason is an offence in terms of section 47 of the Criminal Code.  Piracy is an offence in terms of 
section 74 of the Criminal Code.  Murder is an offence in terms of section 235 of the Criminal Code.  
Conspiracy to commit any of these crimes constitutes an offence in terms of section 469(e) of the 
Criminal Code. 
106  Section 470 of the Criminal Code. 
107  Section 717 of the Criminal Code makes provision for alternative prosecution methods in certain 
circumstances.  Also see Legal Aid Ontario “LawFacts:  A legal information resource from legal aid 
Ontario” http://lawfacts.ca/mental-health/court  (Date of use:  22 September 2016) where the Mental 
Health Court‘s status as a criminal court is confirmed.  
108  The Ministry of the Attorney General in Ontario for example issued a Practice memorandum for the 
diversion of mentally disordered accused persons.  This document sets out which offences are 
eligible for diversion to the Mental Health Court.  See Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division Practice Memorandum: Mentally Disordered/Developmentally Disabled 
Offenders: Diversion.   
109  There are certain offences that will not be considered for diversion.  These are typically serious 
offences such as murder and sexual offences.  See for example the lists of divertible offences in 
Ontario for purposes of diversion for mentally ill accused persons as set out in Ontario Ministry of the 
Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General Criminal Law Division Practice Memorandum: Mentally 
Disordered/Developmentally Disabled Offenders: Diversion at 3, 4, 5.  These offences are listed as 
murder, manslaughter, infanticide, criminal negligence causing death; causing death or bodily harm 
by dangerous or impaired driving;  any offence causing serious bodily harm; simple impaired driving 
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particular province.110    
Each province is required to establish a Review Board.  A Review Board is a very important 
role player in the criminal proceedings for accused persons found unfit to stand trial or not 
criminally responsible.  Review Boards function separately from Mental Health Courts as 
set out below. 
3.3 Review Boards 
In accordance with the Criminal Code, a Review Board must be established in each 
province.111  Review Boards are independent.112  Review Boards are tasked with holding 
disposition hearings and reviewing dispositions made by courts 113 concerning any accused 
in respect of whom the court rendered a verdict of unfit to stand trial or not criminally 
responsible due to mental disorder.114  Approximately 900 mentally ill accused appear in 
                                                                                                                                                   
or driving with a prohibited blood alcohol concentration; offences involving firearms; criminal 
organisation offences; kidnapping;  spouse/partner offences child abuse; offences involving child 
pornography sexual offences including sexual assault, interference and exploitation, invitation to 
sexual touching and incest; specific hate offences home invasions; and perjury. 
110  See for example Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General Criminal Law Division Practice 
Memorandum: Mentally Disordered/Developmentally Disabled Offenders: Diversion.  In terms of this 
document, sexual offences and offences involving firearms for example cannot be diverted.  Also 
see Byrick and Walker-Renshaw A practical guide to Mental Health and the Law in Ontario at 107. 
111  In accordance with S672.38 of the Criminal Code.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental 
Health Courts at 18 where it is pointed out that the establishment of Review Boards can be traced 
back to the 17th century.  Also see Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 177.  
See further Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 1-9 who explains that 
the Review Board system replaced the system that existed prior to the 1992 amendments to the 
Criminal Code and addressed the concerns raised by the court in the Swain decision in that the new 
system avoided arbitrary and indefinite detention.  Also see Court, Simpson and Webster 2014 
Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 918 at 929 where it is pointed out that these Review Boards are 
established federally but administered provincially.  See further Harradence 2012 Crim.L.Q 511 at 
548 who points out that the Review Boards were established with the insertion of the fitness 
provisions in the Criminal Code in 1992. 
112  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 18. 
113  “Disposition” means an order made by a court or Review Board under section 672.54 of the Criminal 
Code or an order made by a court under section 672.58 of the Criminal Code.  Amendments to the 
Canadian Criminal Code made it possible for the court to hold a disposition hearing immediately 
after handing down the verdict.  These court-ordered dispositions are however subject to review by 
the Review Board.  See Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 21.  Also see 
Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 7-2 where it is indicated that the 
Review Boards have exclusive jurisdiction over all review hearings. 
114  S672.38(1) of the Criminal Code.  See further Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in 
Canada at 177.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 18 where it is 
pointed out that a person who falls within the jurisdiction of a Review Board shall be referred to as 
“an accused”.  See further Byrick and Walker-Renshaw A practical guide to Mental Health and the 
Law in Ontario at 5 where it is confirmed that the Review Board has jurisdiction over all those 
accused found unfit to stand trial or not criminally responsible. 
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front of the Ontario Review Board every year.115 
Review Board review the state of the relevant mentally ill accused persons directly after the 
verdict of unfitness or non-criminal responsibility and thereafter at least once every 12 
months.116  The Review Boards decide where an unfit person or a person found not 
criminally responsible will be detained, what level of security is required during such 
detention and when they can be released.117  
The power of the Review Board to make the final decision is curtailed in some instances.  
Only a court and not a Review Board can find that an accused, who is found not criminally 
responsible because of mental illness, is a “high risk” person.118  Only a court and not a 
Review Board may order a stay of proceedings in respect of an accused that is 
permanently unfit to stand trial as this ensures that due consideration is given to public 
safety.119 
                                                
115  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 21. 
116  Section 672.81(1) of the Criminal Code.  See Winko v Forensic Psychiatric Institute (1999) 25 C.R 
(5th) 1 (S.C.C) at [28].  Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 21.  See 
further Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 1-9 who confirms that a 
review of the mental state of the accused must usually take place once a year.  See however section 
672.81(2) of the Criminal Code that states that such a review may take place within 24 months 
provided the accused has legal representation and that all parties consented thereto.  Section 672.  
81(1), reviews can also be held if the restrictions on the liberty of the accused are increased or when 
the accused requests such a review.  Reviews may be extended to only take place every 36 months 
in the case of high risk accused persons according to section 672.81 (1.31) of the Criminal Code.  
Also see Byrick and Walker-Renshaw A practical guide to Mental Health and the Law in Ontario at 
98.  See further Court, Simpson and Webster 2014 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 918 at 929 
where it is confirmed that the condition of mentally ill accused persons had to be reviewed annually.  
These Review Boards replace the advisory boards that previously advised the Lieutenant Governor 
on these issues.  See Mackay 1995 The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 121 at 128.  Also see Barrett 
and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 1-25, 1-38 where it is indicated that 
these advisory review boards were introduced in 1964 and remained in operation until the 
establishment of Review Boards in 1992 that were vested with the power to make dispositions.  Also 
see Luther and Mela 2006 Sask L Rev 401 at 418. 
117  Schizophrenia society of Ontario http://www.schizophrenia.on.ca/getmedia/d252fe01-ab2a-429c-
bd6b-5322115c4204/justice_process_guide.pdf.aspx (Date of use:  20 September 2016) at 2. 
118  Section 672.64(1) of the Criminal Code.  See Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian 
Criminal Law at 1-36 who expresses concern about the fact that power is being taken away from the 
Review Board, especially having regard to the fact that these Boards contain expertise in the field of 
mental health and further the fact that courts have always relied heavily on and respected the 
findings of Review Boards. 
119  Section 672.851 of the Criminal Code states that a Review Board may only recommend a stay of 
proceedings.  The final decision is to be taken by the court after due consideration of the factors 
listed in the subsections of section 672.851 such as if a stay of proceedings will be in the interest of 
the proper administration of justice.  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law 
at 1-22, 3-42.1.  See further Luther and Mela 2006 Sask L Rev 401 at 419 where it is confirmed that 
the Review Board does not have the jurisdiction to order a stay of proceedings.  Also see 
Harradence 2012 Crim.L.Q 511 at 552 where it is stated that a stay of proceedings will only be 
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The Review Board follows a multi-disciplinary approach, as is evident from its constituency.  
A judge of the Federal Court, or the provincial court or a person qualified for such 
appointment, or a retired judicial officer, chairs the Review Board.120  The Board must 
consist of not less than 5 (five) members 121 , at least one of whom must be entitled to 
practice psychiatry under the laws of the province, and at least one other member must 
have training and experience in the field of mental health (where only one member is 
entitled to practice psychiatry).122   
The Review Board may make its own rules and procedures subject to the approval of the 
Lieutenant Governor.123  Proceedings before a Review Board are inquisitorial and informal 
in nature.124  Review Board hearings are often held in a hospital boardroom, and witnesses 
                                                                                                                                                   
ordered if the accused is not a threat to public safety. 
120  Section 672.4(1) of the Criminal Code.  The constituency of a Review Board is also set out in 
Schizophrenia society of Ontario http://www.schizophrenia.on.ca/getmedia/d252fe01-ab2a-429c-
bd6b-5322115c4204/justice_process_guide.pdf.aspx (Date of use:  20 September 2016) at 2.  See 
further Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 7-6.   
121  Section 672.38(1) of the Criminal Code prescribes the number of members on the Review Board.  
Also see Byrick and Walker-Renshaw A practical guide to Mental Health and the Law in Ontario at 
86.  See further Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 7-6.  Also see 
Court, Simpson and Webster 2014 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 918 at 929 where it is stated 
that the Board must consist of at least 5 members and that 3 members will form a quorum.  See 
further Schizophrenia society of Ontario http://www.schizophrenia.on.ca/getmedia/d252fe01-ab2a-
429c-bd6b-5322115c4204/justice_process_guide.pdf.aspx (Date of use:  20 September 2016) at 2 
where it is explained that he other members on the Review Board are community members and a 
lawyer (besides the chairperson).      
122  Section 672.39 of the Criminal Code.  Also see Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian 
Criminal Law at 7-6.  Also see Byrick and Walker-Renshaw A practical guide to Mental Health and 
the Law in Ontario at 86 where it is explained that in circumstances where not all the members of a 
Review Board can meet, at least three members may meet provided that two out of the three 
members are the Chairperson and a psychiatrist.  See further Harradence 2012 Crim.L.Q 511 at 550 
where it is pointed out that at least one member of the Board must be a psychiatrist and it may 
further have members who are psychologists – the latter is not compulsory. 
123  S672.44 of the Criminal Code.  Also see Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal 
Law at 1-20, 2-14.15 who explains that some of the powers that the Review Board has in terms of 
this provision to make its own rules and procedures is to order psychiatric assessments of accused 
persons in order to arrive at a suitable disposition, to issue a summons for the appearance of the 
accused and to make orders with regard to publication bans on the identity of either the accused or 
the victim if this is deemed to be in the interest of justice.  The Ontario Review Board has published 
its rules of procedure available at www.orb.on.ca.  Also see Byrick and Walker-Renshaw A practical 
guide to Mental Health and the Law in Ontario at 101. 
124  Section 672.5(2) of the Criminal Code states that proceedings before the Review Board may be as 
informal as is appropriate in the circumstances.  Also see Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in 
Canadian Criminal Law at 7-3, 8-4.3 where it is explained that even though cross-examination is 
allowed in these proceedings such cross-examination is much less confrontational than in criminal 
proceedings.  This is in line with the more inquisitorial and less formal nature of the proceedings in 
front of the Review Board.  Also see Byrick and Walker-Renshaw A practical guide to Mental Health 
and the Law in Ontario at 101. 
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need not testify under oath.125 
Where the Review Board holds a disposition hearing, it must be an open hearing at which 
the accused may attend and give evidence.126  Where the accused does not have legal 
representation, the Review Board may assign counsel to the accused if they are of the view 
that it is in the interest of justice.127   
The Review Board may make a number of dispositions.  It may order the unconditional 
discharge of an accused who was found not criminally responsible because of mental 
illness and who does not pose a threat to society.128  The Review Board cannot release an 
accused found unfit to stand trial unconditionally, but the court may order a stay of 
proceedings in respect of such an accused.129  Where an accused poses a threat to society, 
he may be conditionally discharged, or an order may be made for his detention in the 
hospital.130  As of 2005, the Review Board has the discretion to order assessments of an 
accused person for purposes of making the most appropriate disposition.131  
                                                
125  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 8-4.3 where it is pointed out that 
a court reporter must also be present to record the proceedings of the Review Board, including the 
testimony given by witnesses which need not be given under oath. 
126  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 1-9.  These hearings may also 
take place in absentia in appropriate circumstances.  The accused may also be barred from 
attending the hearing in circumstances where the accused is disruptive or where the presence of the 
accused at the hearing will be detrimental to his recovery.  These grounds are set out in section 
672.5(10)(b) of the Criminal Code. 
127  Section 672.5(8)(b) of the Criminal Code.  Also see Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in 
Canadian Criminal Law at 7-8.2, 7-8.3. 
128  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 21.  This, however, only applies to an 
accused that has been found not criminally responsible and does not apply to an accused that has 
been found unfit to stand trial.  See Mackay 1995 The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 121 at 129.  
129  Section 672.851 of the Criminal Code states that a Review Board may only recommend a stay of 
proceedings.  The final decision is to be taken by the court after due consideration of the factors 
listed in the subsections of section 672.851 such as if a stay of proceedings will be in the interest of 
the proper administration of justice.  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law 
at 1-22, 3-42.1.  Also see Luther and Mela 2006 Sask L Rev 401 at 419 where it is pointed out that 
the requirement that a stay of proceedings should be in the interest of justice is an additional 
requirement not envisaged by the decision in R v Demers [2004\ 2 S.C.R 489, 2004 S.C.C 46.  Also 
see Van der Wolf et al 2010 International Journal of Forensic Mental Health 245 at 250. 
130  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 21 reiterates the importance of available 
resources in the forensic system in order for the Review Boards to be effective.  Also see Mewett An 
Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 177.  See further Barrett and Shandler Mental 
Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 1-18. 
131  Section 672.12.1 as inserted in 2005 through Bill C-10.  Section 672.12.1 sets out when 
assessments may be ordered by the Review Board and reads as follows: 
 “1 The Review Board that has jurisdiction over an accused found not criminally responsible on 
account of mental disorder or unfit to stand trial may order an assessment of the mental condition of 
the accused of its own motion or on application of the prosecutor or the accused, if it has reasonable 
grounds to believe that such evidence is necessary to  
 (a) make a recommendation to the court under subsection 672.851(1);  
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Non-compliance with the disposition order or failure to attend to an assessment as ordered 
by the Review Board is not an offence.132  The police may, however, be approached for 
assistance to ensure the presence of the accused at the assessment as ordered or to, for 
example, attend a psychiatric hospital for treatment as part of the conditions for 
discharge.133 
Parties may appeal against the disposition made by either a Review Board or a court to the 
court of appeal in accordance with the normal rules of court.134   
Now that the structure of the criminal justice system within which the procedure functions 
has been explained, an explanation of the relevant procedural issues pertaining to fitness to 
stand trial follows.  Reference is only made to assessment for criminal capacity in order to 
highlight the differences between the two types of assessments where relevant.  The 
                                                                                                                                                   
 (b) make a disposition under section 672.54 in one of the following circumstances:  
  (i) no assessment report on the mental condition of the accused is available,  
  (ii) no assessment of the mental condition of the accused has been conducted in the 
  last twelve months, or  
  (iii)  the accused has been transferred from another province under section 672.86; or  
 (c) determine whether to refer to the court for review under subsection 672.84(1) a finding that an 
accused is a high-risk accused.”  Also see Byrick and Walker-Renshaw A practical guide to Mental 
Health and the Law in Ontario at 78.  See further Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian 
Criminal Law at 2-14.13 where it is explained that the Review Board has to carry the costs of 
independent assessments ordered by the Review Board.  It was confirmed in R v Taylor that a 
Review Board does not have the jurisdiction to order that any other party pay the costs.”  See 
Ontario (Attorney General) v Ontario (Review Board) 2010 Carswell Ont 267 (sub. nom.  R v Taylor) 
2010 ONCA 35 (Ont C.A). 
132  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 1-26.  It was suggested that non-
compliance with disposition or assessment orders should be classified as an offence.  This was, 
however, not accepted by parliament as caution was raised to respect the Charter rights of the 
accused.  Also see Byrick and Walker-Renshaw A practical guide to Mental Health and the Law in 
Ontario at 101. 
133  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 1-27, 2-37.  The Police are, 
however not allowed to detain the accused prior to the assessment or disposition hearing.  This, 
according to Barrett et al is a gap in the system that will hopefully be addressed soon to ensure 
proper compliance with the orders of the Review Board.  Also see Byrick and Walker-Renshaw A 
practical guide to Mental Health and the Law in Ontario at 94. 
134  Section 672.72 of the Criminal Code.  Also see Winko v Forensic Psychiatric Institute (1999) 2 S.C.R 
(5th) 1 (S.C.C) at [28].  Where the Review Board made a disposition that the accused be treated in 
hospital, that particular hospital may for example appeal against the finding of the Review Board 
should the hospital not have beds available to treat the relevant mentally ill accused person.  See 
Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 28 where it is reported that hospitals 
indeed successfully appealed against dispositions made by the Review Board.  The authors point 
out that such appeal might influence the Review Board’s mandate to make a disposition that protects 
public safety and that is least restrictive to the accused.  This in turn may affect the Review Board’s 
mandate to make a disposition that protects public safety and that is least restrictive to the accused.  
Also see Byrick and Walker-Renshaw A practical guide to Mental Health and the Law in Ontario at 
102 where it is pointed out that these appeals are governed by the provisions of the Criminal Court 
and the Ontario Court of Appeal’s Criminal Appeal rules.  Also see Court, Simpson and Webster 
2014 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 918 at 929. 
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assessment for fitness is a distinct inquiry from the assessment for criminal capacity.135  
This research focuses on the former. 
4  PROCEDURAL ASPECTS RELATING TO FITNESS ASSESSMENTS UNDER 
CANADIAN CRIMINAL LAW 
4.1 Introduction 
 The procedural issues surrounding fitness to stand trial are canvassed below, including 
how the order for assessment is made, the test for determining fitness to stand trial, and the 
consequences of a finding of unfit to stand trial as opposed to a finding of fitness. 
Challenges with fitness assessments are pointed out throughout the discussion of the 
procedural issues pertaining to fitness. 
 One of the primary functions of a Canadian Mental Health Court is to assess an accused’s 
fitness to stand trial 136 since fitness is a prerequisite to participate in any of the Mental 
Health Court programmes.  A clear understanding of what fitness to stand trial entails is 
therefore necessary. 
4.2 Overview  
The earliest formulation of the fitness requirement as it pertains to Canada can be traced 
back to the English common law of the 17th Century.137  The requirements at that time for 
fitness to stand trial were that the accused had to be able to understand the consequences 
of the crime and the pleas available to him.  He also had to be able to identify the 
necessary information to build a defence.138  Although the concept of fitness was 
developing and an understanding emerged of what it should entail, there was no formal 
definition of “fit to stand trial” contained in the Criminal Code at the time.139  Provisions 
pertaining to fitness to stand trial and the assessment thereof were inserted into the 
                                                
135  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-14.1 where it is specifically 
pointed out that having criminal capacity and being able to testify in one’s own case, is not a 
prerequisite for being found fit to stand trial.   
136  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 92, 97.  Also see Mackay 1995 The Journal 
of Forensic Psychiatry 121 at 128.  
137  Newby and Faltin 2008 Journal of Offender Rehabilitation 185 at 185.  Also see Harradence 2012 
Crim.L.Q 511 at 517 where the development of the fitness test as it is applied in Canada is explored.  
See this article for a discussion of relevant English case law that contributed to the fitness test that 
was eventually used in Canada.  
138  Newby and Faltin 2008 Journal of Offender Rehabilitation 185 at 185. 
139  Harradence 2012 Crim.L.Q 511 at 511 who points out that prior to 1992 the Criminal Code did not 
contain a definition of fitness to stand trial. 
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Criminal Code in 1992.140     
The justification for a doctrine that provides for unfitness is fairness since it would be 
completely unfair to try a person who is not capable of understanding the proceedings 
against him.141  The rationale behind the fitness provisions is, inter alia, to protect the 
accused’s right to a fair trial and to answer to the charges against him.142 
The Criminal Code contains a presumption of fitness and states that everyone shall be 
presumed fit to stand trial unless it is proved on a balance of probabilities that the accused 
is unfit to stand trial.143  The provisions pertaining to fitness to stand trial only apply as long 
as a verdict has not been handed down.144     
A vital right of an accused in the Criminal Code is to be present in court during his entire 
                                                
140  Section 2 of the Criminal Code.  Prior to 1992, the provisions regarding fitness to stand trial were 
spread across the Criminal Code.  It is only after the 1992 amendments that the provisions regarding 
assessment for fitness to stand trial was consolidated and inserted in one place in the Criminal 
Code, namely, section 2.  See Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 1-
12, 3-2.  Also see Schneider Annotated Ontario Mental Health Statutes at 407.  See further 
Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 289, 290.  Also see O’Shaughnessy RJ “AAPL practice guideline for 
the forensic psychiatric evaluation of competence to stand trial: Canadian legal perspective” 2007 
(35) The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 505-508 at 505.  See further 
Newby and Faltin 2008 Journal of Offender Rehabilitation 185 at 185, 186 who is of the view that the 
guidelines contained in the Criminal Code is far more strict than the common law requirements 
pertaining to when a person will be “unfit to stand trial”.  Prior to the codification of the common law 
position pertaining to fitness to stand trial, the position was regulated by criteria derived from case 
law.  Also see Parliamentary Information and Research Service Current Issues in Mental Health in 
Canada at 2.  For the position of mentally disordered persons in the Canadian Criminal Justice 
system prior to 1992, see Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 1-1, 1-
13.    
141  Van der Wolf et al 2010 International Journal of Forensic Mental Health 245 at 249, 245 where it is 
stated, “It is based on the principle that it is fundamentally unfair to allow defendants who are unable 
to understand the legal proceedings or communicate with their attorneys to proceed with trial.”  This 
author points out that the “moral dignity” of the criminal justice system is related to its fairness. 
142  Harradence 2012 Crim.L.Q 511 at 513.  These rights are protected in the Charter as discussed 
earlier in this chapter.  This author argues that, considering the rationale behind the fitness 
provisions, the cognitive capacity test employed to test fitness is not effective and does not achieve 
the goal of protecting these rights of the accused.  See the discussion of the cognitive capacity test 
later in this chapter.  
143  See Section 672.22 and 672.23(2) of the Criminal Code.  Also note that the measure of proof 
required for fitness to stand trial, is that of “on a balance of probabilities” which is not as harsh as the 
usual standard of proof used in criminal trials, namely “beyond reasonable doubt”.  Also see 
Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 290.  Also see Parliamentary Information and research service 
Current issues in Mental Health in Canada at 8, footnote 6 where it is explained that “the balance of 
probabilities standard of proof requires that something is more likely than not, in contrast to the 
general criminal law standard, which is beyond a reasonable doubt, a higher standard”.  Also see 
Byrick and Walker-Renshaw A practical guide to Mental Health and the Law in Ontario at 80. 
144  Schneider Annotated Ontario Mental Health Statutes at 408.  The scope of this research does not 
allow for a discussion of the issues arising from the situation where an accused becomes unfit to 
stand trial after a verdict has been handed down.  For a discussion on the issue of fitness to stand 
trial post-verdict, see Schneider Annotated Ontario Mental Health Statutes at 408, 409.   
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trial 145  and to make full answer and defence at his trial.146  This implies the physical and 
mental presence of the accused at the trial.147  Where a mental condition renders an 
accused incapable of defending himself because he cannot understand the proceedings or 
the charge against him and cannot, due to the mental condition instruct counsel so as to 
defend his case, such an accused shall not be tried as long as the mental condition 
rendering him so incapable persists.148    
An accused whose fitness to stand trial is in issue has the right to legal representation.149  
Where a mentally ill accused does not have legal representation, such an appointment 
must be made before the court proceedings may continue.150    
                                                
145  Section 650(1) of the Criminal Code.  Sections 650(1)(1.1) and 650(1)(1.2) makes provision for an 
exception to this rule in cases where the trial occurs via video link.  Section 650(2) provides for 
further exceptions to the general rule for instance that an accused may be kept out of court during a 
trial regarding his fitness to stand trial if the court is of the view that hearing the issue will have an 
adverse effect on the accused (section 650(2)(c).  Also see Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in 
Canadian Criminal Law at 3-33.  An accused will be deemed to have waived his right to be present 
at his trial where he absconded (Section 475(a)(a) of the Criminal Code) and the trial may proceed in 
his absence.  A verdict may also be reached and a sentence handed down in his absence in these 
circumstances (Section 475(1)(b)(i)).  Also see Stuard, Delisle and Quigley Learning Canadian 
Criminal Procedure at 6, 7.  Where the accused is charged with a summary conviction offence, he 
need not be personally present in court and a lawyer or other agent can appear on his behalf, unless 
the judge orders that the accused appears personally.  (See section 800(2) of the Criminal Code). 
146  Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 175.  The trial must take place in open 
court.  See Section 486(1) of the Criminal Code.  The court may however exclude the public from 
part of the trial if the court deems it to be in the interest of the public morals or the proper 
administration of justice. 
147 Schneider Annotated Ontario Mental Health Statutes at 407.  Also see Byrick and Walker-Renshaw 
A practical guide to Mental Health and the Law in Ontario at 81.  See further Bloom H and Schneider 
RD Mental Disorder and the Law:  A Primer for Legal and Mental Health Professionals (Irwin Law 
Toronto 2006) at 60. 
148 Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 175.  Also see Van der Wolf et al 2010 
International Journal of Forensic Mental Health 245 at 245 who adds that the principle that the 
accused must be fit to stand trial is because it would be fundamentally unfair for a mentally ill 
accused who cannot participate in his own defence to stand trial. 
149  Section 672.24 of the Criminal Code.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health 
Courts at 92 
150  Section 672.24(1) of the Criminal Code.  Also see Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 292.  Also see 
Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-24.  See further Byrick and 
Walker-Renshaw A practical guide to Mental Health and the Law in Ontario at 81.  Where the 
accused does not qualify for Legal Aid, the costs for legal representation shall be borne by the 
Attorney General as far as the accused cannot pay for the fees (Section 672.24(2) of the Criminal 
Code).  Where the Attorney General and the appointed legal representative cannot agree on the 
fees to be paid, the Criminal Code makes provision for the costs to be taxed.  Schneider, Bloom and 
Heerema Mental Health Courts at 92, 441 where it is pointed out that Counsel may often find himself 
in a difficult situation where the Counsel is for example paid for by a family member who then also 
gives “instructions”.  The mentally ill accused however remains the client of counsel and counsel 
must be sure to follow the instructions of the client and not the family member, even though the 
instructions of the family member might sound more rational.  Also see Barrett and Shandler Mental 
Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 2-6, 2-7 where it is emphasises that legal representation for 
the period of the proceedings prior to the assessment having been ordered is of cardinal importance. 
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There has been a rapid increase in the number of accused persons being referred for 
fitness evaluations in Canada.151  The majority of those sent for fitness evaluations are 
found fit to stand trial.152  With these high numbers of accused persons found fit to stand 
trial, suspicions arose that the assessments of fitness to stand trial was used for other 
purposes such as treating psychotic illnesses 153 of those who would not otherwise have 
had access to mental health care were it not for their clash with the criminal justice 
system.154  Fitness assessments were sometimes ordered literally to stabilise an accused 
person’s mental state.155  This suspicion was strengthened by evidence that the average 
number of days for a fitness assessment remained 25 days even after the amendment of 
the Criminal Code, which introduced a 5-day assessment period.156    
Where there is doubt about the fitness of the accused, the accused’s fitness to stand trial 
has to be assessed by suitably qualified persons, and the court may make an order for 
assessment to this effect. 
 
                                                
151  O’Shaughnessy 2007 The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 505 at 506.  
For confirmation of the increase in fitness referrals, see Toronto Mental Health Court “Overview of 
the Court” http://www.mentalhealthcourt.ca/pages/2/Overview.htm (Date of use:  21 July 2015) 
where it is pointed out that the number of mentally ill persons in the Canadian criminal justice system 
in general rose rapidly since the 1990”s.  Also see Court, Simpson and Webster 2014 Psychiatry, 
Psychology and Law 918 at 929 who observed that the demand for forensic services increased 
rapidly after the amendments to the Criminal Code in 1992 brought about by the provisions of Bill C-
30.  Also see Van der Wolf et al 2010 International Journal of Forensic Mental Health 245 at 251 
who states that fitness assessments are more often requested than assessments for criminal 
capacity. 
152  O’Shaughnessy 2007 The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 505 at 507 
reported that 79% of those evaluated for fitness to stand trial on an inpatient basis, were found fit to 
stand trial and 74% of those evaluated for fitness on an outpatient basis, were found fit to stand trial.  
Also see in general  Zapf PA and Roesch R “Fitness to stand trial, characteristics of remand since 
the 1992 Criminal Code amendments” Canadian Journal of Psychiatry 1998 (43) 287-293 who’s 
study found that 90% of all the accused sent for fitness evaluations in their study, was found fit to 
stand trial.  See further Newby and Faltin 2008 Journal of Offender Rehabilitation 185 at 188 where 
this figure is confirmed – although reported as 11% of all referrals being found not fit to stand trial.  
See in general Roesch R, Ogloff JR, Hart SD, Dempster RJ, Zapf PA and Whittemore KE “The 
impact of Canadian Criminal Code changes as remands and assessments of fitness to stand trial 
and criminal responsibility in British Columbia“ 1997 (42) Canadian Journal of Psychiatry 509-514.    
153  See in general Zapf and Roesch 1998 Canadian Journal of Psychiatry 287.  Also see R 
O’Shaughnessy 2007 The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 505 at 507.  
Also see Newby and Faltin 2008 Journal of Offender Rehabilitation 185 at 188. 
154  O’Shaughnessy 2007 The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 505 at 507. 
155  Newby and Faltin 2008 Journal of Offender Rehabilitation 185 at 188.  Also see Barrett and Shandler 
Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-23 where it is confirmed that assessment orders are 
often extended to afford treatment to the patient.  The authors caution that this practice should not 
be encouraged. 
156  The possible reason for this average of 25 days for treatment could be that psychotropic medication 
takes several weeks before positive results are achieved.  See Newby and Faltin 2008 Journal of 
Offender Rehabilitation 185 at 188. 
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4.3 The order for assessment of fitness to stand trial 
This discussion explores by whom the order for assessment is made, the content of the 
order, at which point in the proceedings such order can be made and on what grounds it 
can be made. 
The Criminal Code provides for the court to order an assessment of the mental condition of 
the accused for purposes of fitness to stand trial.157  An assessment order can be made by 
a summary convictions court as well 158 , i.e. the lowest level of the three levels of courts in 
Canada.  Assessments may therefore be ordered by trial courts and also by courts which, 
for example, hear the bail application of the accused.159  Mental Health Court may also 
make assessment orders.160 
The formal assessment can be requested on application by the accused or the 
prosecution.161  The Crown has an obligation to raise the fitness issue where he believes 
                                                
157  Section 672.11 of the Criminal Code sets out the 6 instances in which a court may make an 
assessment order.  This section states that  ”A court having jurisdiction over an accused in respect 
of an offence may order an  assessment of the mental condition of the accused, if it has reasonable 
grounds to believe that such evidence is necessary to determine  
 (a) whether the accused is unfit to stand trial; 
 (b) whether the accused was, at the time of the commission of the alleged offence, suffering from a 
mental disorder so as to be exempt from criminal responsibility by virtue of subsection 16(1);  
 (c) whether the balance of the mind of the accused was disturbed at the time of commission of the 
alleged offence, where the accused is a female person charged with an offence arising out of the 
death of her newly born child;  
 (d) the appropriate disposition to be made, where a verdict of not criminally responsible on account 
of mental disorder or unfit to stand trial has been rendered in respect of the accused; 
  (db.)  whether a finding that the accused is a high-risk accused should be revoked under subsection 
672.84(3); or  
 (e) whether an order should be made under section 672.851 for a stay of proceedings, where a 
verdict of unfit to stand trial has been rendered against the accused”.  Section 21 of the Ontario 
Mental Health Act provides for an assessment of the mental state of the accused to be conducted 
and reported on. 
158  Schneider Annotated Ontario Mental Health Statutes at 429.  This was one of the amendments 
brought about by the amendment of the regime pertaining to the treatment of the mentally ill accused 
person in the criminal justice system that was brought about by the provisions of Bill C-30 that 
resulted in the changes to the Criminal Code pertaining to mentally ill accused persons.  See Barrett 
and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 1-11. 
159  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 2-1 who adds that sentencing 
courts and appellate courts may also order assessments. 
160  Legal Aid Ontario http://lawfacts.ca/mental-health/court  (Date of use:  22 September 2016).  Also 
see Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General Criminal Law Division Practice memorandum: Mentally 
Disordered/Developmentally Disabled Offenders: Diversion at 7 where specific provision is made for 
admission of the accused to hospital for an assessment. 
161  Section 672.12 of the Criminal Code.  Also see Roach et al Criminal Law and Procedure at 778.  See 
further Byrick and Walker-Renshaw A practical guide to Mental Health and the Law in Ontario at 77.  
Also see Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-18.  See further Van 
der Wolf et al 2010 International Journal of Forensic Mental Health 245 at 251 who point out that the 
Crown may sometimes raise the fitness issue in order to secure the confinement of the accused in 
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that the accused may be unfit to stand trial.162  Where the application for assessment is 
unopposed, evidence of possible lack of fitness is sufficient, however, where such an 
application is opposed, the Crown must adduce evidence that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that the accused suffers from a mental illness that may have an effect on 
his fitness.163  The burden of proof pertaining to unfitness is on the party who raises the 
issue.164  The standard of proof required for proving unfitness to stand trial is on a balance 
of probabilities.165     
The assessment can further be ordered by the court by its own motion if it has reasonable 
grounds to believe that the accused is unfit to stand trial.166  All that is needed is reasonable 
ground to believe that an assessment is necessary to determine whether the accused is, in 
fact, unfit to stand trial or not.167    
                                                                                                                                                   
order to gain information about his mental state, especially where the accused intends to raise the 
insanity defence – the Crown can gain insight into the basis upon which the insanity defence will be 
raised and can prepare therefore.  The Crown may further simply raise the fitness issue in order to 
delay the criminal proceedings, presumably so that they may have more time to prepare for the trial.  
Also see Schizophrenia society of Ontario http://www.schizophrenia.on.ca/getmedia/d252fe01-ab2a-
429c-bd6b-5322115c4204/justice_process_guide.pdf.aspx (Date of use: 20 September 2016) at 15 
where it is explained that the fitness issue can be raised by any party to the proceedings. 
162  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-20.2.  The Crown counsel will 
usually raise the fitness issue informally with the accused’s legal representative.  If after such 
discussion the Crown counsel is still concerned about the accused’s fitness, there is an obligation on 
such counsel to raise it in court. 
163  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 2-14.19.  The Crown has to 
convince the court that such an assessment is necessary. 
164  Section 672.23(2) of the Criminal Code.  Also see Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 290.  See further 
Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-24.  The exception to the rule is 
where the accused has allegedly regained his fitness to stand trial, in such a case the presumption 
of fitness no longer applies and the party that alleges the recovery has to prove same on a balance 
of probabilities.  See section 672.32(1) of the Criminal Code.  Also see Mewett An Introduction to the 
Criminal Process in Canada at 147 where he highlights the fact that the only instance, in which an 
accused will have the burden of proof in a criminal case, is when he raises the issue of mental 
incompetence. 
165  Section 672.22 and 672.23(2) of the Criminal Code.  Also see Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 290.  
See further Schneider Annotated Ontario Mental Health Statutes at xv.  See further Barrett and 
Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-24. 
166  Section 672.12(1) of the Criminal Code.  Also see Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 290.  See further 
Parliamentary Information and research service Current issues in Mental Health in Canada at 3.  
See also Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 1-12, 2-1, 2-18.  
However, in a summary conviction case the court can only grant the application for assessment if it 
is raised by the accused or if the prosecution shows reasonable grounds upon which the belief that 
the accused is unfit to stand trial, is based.  The court cannot order an assessment out of its own 
here.  See section 672.12 (2) of the Criminal Code.  See further Mackay 1995 The Journal of 
Forensic Psychiatry 121 at 128.  
167  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 2-2.  Also see Ontario Ministry of 
the Attorney General Criminal Law Division Practice memorandum:  Mentally 
Disordered/Developmentally Disabled Offenders: Diversion at 10 where it is confirmed that the 
Crown or the Defence must be ready to establish such reasonable belief in order to obtain an order 
for assessment.  
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The fact that the Criminal Code provides for an assessment to be ordered, does not compel 
a court to make such an assessment order.  The court still has discretion in ordering the 
assessment.168  Where it is obvious to the court that an accused is unfit to stand trial, an 
assessment may be considered redundant 169 , and matters may proceed to the fitness 
hearing without a fitness assessment having been conducted.  The only instance where 
ordering an assessment is mandatory is where it is necessary to determine if an accused is 
permanently unfit to stand trial so that a stay of proceedings can be ordered.170 
The assessment order must contain specific information with regard to the details of the 
assessment.  The assessment order must specify the service or person who is to make the 
assessment or the hospital where it is to be done.171  It further has to indicate whether the 
accused is to be detained in custody for the duration of the assessment order.172  Lastly, the 
order should indicate the period for which the order shall be in force, which should include 
travelling time to and from the place where the assessment should take place.173 
                                                
168  See the use of the word “may” in section 672.11 that sets out the purposes for which the court may 
order an assessment and section 672.12 for the purposes for which a Review Board may order an 
assessment.  See however Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 2-8, 
3-17 where the view is expressed that a fitness hearing should be mandatory except in cases where 
there is no reason to doubt the fitness of the accused.    
169  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-20.3. 
170  Section 672.851(5) of the Criminal Code.  Which reds that “(5) If the court holds an inquiry under 
subsection (3) or (4), it shall order an assessment of the accused.”  See, however, Barrett and 
Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 2-14.11, 3-42.2 where it is pointed out that if 
the Review Board recommended the stay of proceedings the court will already be in possession of 
an assessment report and may simply confirm that finding without ordering a new assessment, 
despite the mandatory language employed by section 672.851. 
171  See R v Gray 2002 169 C.C.C (3d) 194 (BLC).  S.C) at [47] where the court ordered an assessment 
to be done at a private facility by medical practitioner experienced in conducting such assessments.  
It was found on appeal that the judge exceeded her jurisdiction, as a specific person cannot as such 
be ordered to conduct an assessment.  Rather, it should be a person associated with the particular 
facility and experienced in forensic mental health (and licenced to practice in the particular province) 
that should conduct the assessment.  Also see the form 48 in terms whereof the assessment order is 
made where a space is duly left for the court to fill in the name of the psychiatric institution where the 
assessment is to be conducted.  See Annexure B to this research for an example of this form. 
172  There is a presumption that assessments will take place out of custody.  See Schneider Annotated 
Ontario Mental Health Statutes at xv.  Also see section 672.16 and 672.17 of the Criminal Code. 
173  An assessment for fitness to stand trial lasts for 5 (five) days unless otherwise agreed upon or so 
ordered by the court.  See Section 672.14(1) of the Criminal Code.  Section 672.13(1) of the Criminal 
Code sets out the requirements for an order for assessment.  Section 672.13(2) sets out the forms 
that must be used by a court (From 48) and a Review Board (Form 48.1) when making the 
assessment orders.  See an example of Form 48 attached to this research as Annexure B.  Failure 
to use the forms will not affect the validity of the order for assessment, as the use of these forms is 
not mandatory.  See Byrick and Walker-Renshaw A practical guide to Mental Health and the Law in 
Ontario at 78 where the content of an assessment order in terms of section 672.13 of the Criminal 
Code is discussed.  An assessment order is accompanied by a From 8 in terms of the Ontario 
Mental Health Act, which allows for the transport and admission of the accused to the relevant 
psychiatric facility.  See Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General Criminal Law Division Practice 
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 It is important to note that assessments for fitness to stand trial shall only last for five days 
unless otherwise ordered by the court.174  The accused and the prosecution may agree to a 
longer period for assessment, not exceeding 30 days.175  The assessment period may be 
extended for a further period provided that the entire period of assessment may not exceed 
60 days in total.176  An accused may be subjected to a further period of assessment only if it 
                                                                                                                                                   
memorandum:  Mentally Disordered/Developmentally Disabled Offenders: Diversion at 10. 
174  Section 672.14(2) of the Criminal Code limits the time period for assessment for purposes of 
determining fitness to stand trial to 5 (five) days.  These days are calculated with exclusion of public 
holidays and the time it takes the accused to be transported to and from the facility where the 
assessment will be taking place.  The order may be made for a longer period if the court so orders.  
See section 672.1.2 and 672.14(1) of the Criminal Code.  Section 672.13(1) of the Criminal Code 
sets out the requirements for an order for assessment.  Section 672.13(2) sets out the forms that 
must be used by a court (Form 48) and a Review Board (From 48.1) when making the assessment 
orders.  Failure to use the forms will not affect the validity of the order for assessment, as the use of 
these forms is not mandatory.  Also see O’Shaughnessy 2007 The Journal of the American 
Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 505 at 505.  Also see Newby and Faltin 2008 Journal of 
Offender Rehabilitation 185 at 188 who report that according to research done, the average day for a 
fitness assessment is 25 days.  See further Mackay 1995 The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 121 at 
128 who confirms the periods.  See further Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian 
Criminal Law at 2-34, 3-5 who confirms that assessments for fitness to stand trial can generally be 
conducted in a short time period.  Also see Schneider Annotated Ontario Mental Health Statutes at 
434 who explains that opinion exists that the period for the assessment starts running from the date 
the assessment order is made and not from the date that the accused is admitted in hospital.  This 
position could however put pressure on mental health care professionals to rush the assessment 
once the accused finally reaches the specific hospital.  This may also imply an extra appearance for 
the counsel of the accused in that he may have to apply for an extension of the initial period of 
assessment.  Especially in the case of assessments for fitness to stand trial that should last only 5 
days, counsel for the accused will be heading back to court if the accused has not been transferred 
after, for example, the third day since the assessment order was made.  The more practical 
approach seems to be to calculate the period from the day of the accused’s admission to hospital 
indicated in the assessment order.  Persons awaiting assessments for fitness to stand trial should 
however not be detained in correctional facilities for prolonged periods awaiting assessment.  See 
Phuneuf v Ontario 2010 ONCA 901 at [28].  Also see Ministry of Health and Long-term Care  
http://www.health.gov.on.ca/en/common/ministry/publications/reports/mentalhealth/framework.pdf   
(Date of use: 26 August 2015) at 4 where it is pointed out that persons with mental illness that is kept 
in a correctional setting is at higher risk of experiencing more severe symptoms of mental illness and 
are at a higher risk of homelessness once they are released.  These accused persons are further 
often isolated from mental health care for as long as they are kept in the correctional facility.  Finally, 
see Schizophrenia society of Ontario http://www.schizophrenia.on.ca/getmedia/d252fe01-ab2a-
429c-bd6b-5322115c4204/justice_process_guide.pdf.aspx (Date of use: 20 September 2016) at 15 
where the practicalities of the court process is explained and it is stated that a fitness assessment 
usually lasts for 5 days but that the parties can agree for it to last 30 days, or even 60 days. 
175  Section 672.14(2) of the Criminal Code,  Also see O’Shaughnessy 2007 The Journal of the American 
Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 505 at 505.  Also see Newby and Faltin 2008 Journal of 
Offender Rehabilitation 185 at 188.  See further Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian 
Criminal Law at 1-12, 2-34 who confirms that assessments for fitness is generally limited to 5 days 
and up to 30 days upon consent. 
176  According to section 672.15(1) of the Criminal Code read with section 672.15(2) and 672.14(3) of the 
Criminal Code that provides for an initial order for a 60 day observation period when special 
circumstances exist.  Also see Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 176.  
See further Mackay 1995 The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 121 at 128 who confirms that the 
maximum period for observation can be 60 days.  See further Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder 
in Canadian Criminal Law at 1-12, 2-34 as well as Byrick and Walker-Renshaw A practical guide to 
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is for another purpose.177  
A statutory presumption exists that the assessment for fitness to stand trial will take place 
out of custody.178  This presumption applies to assessment orders made by courts as well 
as Review Boards.179  Despite this presumption in the Criminal Code, the majority of 
assessments take place in custody.180  If an assessment occurs in custody, it is usually 
done at a psychiatric hospital.181  The assessment order may not contain a provision that 
forces the accused to submit to psychiatric or any other treatment during the assessment 
period.182  Such treatment may, however, be provided if the accused consents thereto.183   
                                                                                                                                                   
Mental Health and the Law in Ontario at 79.  See further Schizophrenia society of Ontario 
http://www.schizophrenia.on.ca/getmedia/d252fe01-ab2a-429c-bd6b-
5322115c4204/justice_process_guide.pdf.aspx (Date of use: 20 September 2016) at 15.  Also see 
Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General Criminal Law Division Practice memorandum:  Mentally 
Disordered/Developmentally Disabled Offenders: Diversion at 10 where it is pointed out that an “in-
custody” assessment for fitness to stand trial may not last longer than two months.  
177  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 2.34 where the example is used 
of an accused who was assessed and found fit to stand trial.  Later in the trial, the criminal 
responsibility of the accused was in question and in such circumstances it is permissible to have the 
accused assessed again but this time for purposes of establishing his criminal capacity. 
178  Section 672.16 of the Criminal Code reads as follows:  “672.16 (1) Subject to subsection (3), an 
accused shall not be detained in custody under an assessment order of a court unless 
 (a) the court is satisfied that on the evidence custody is necessary to assess the accused, or 
 that on the evidence of a medical practitioner custody is desirable to assess the accused 
 and the accused consents to custody; 
 (b)  custody of the accused is required in respect of any other matter or by virtue of any other 
 provision of this Act; or 
 (c)  the prosecutor, having been given a reasonable opportunity to do so, shows that detention 
 of the accused in custody is justified on either of the grounds set out in subsection 515(10).” 
 Also see Schneider Annotated Ontario Mental Health Statutes at xv.  It is only if a conclusion cannot 
be reached that the patient will be admitted for assessment.  Also see Barrett and Shandler Mental 
Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 2-14.15. 
179  See section 672.16 for the presumption where an assessment order was made by a court.  See 
section 672.121 for the presumption where an assessment is ordered by a Review Board.  In the 
latter case, assessments shall take place out of custody unless   
 (a)  the accused is currently subject to a disposition made under paragraph 672.54(c); 
 (b)  the Review Board is satisfied on the evidence that custody is necessary to assess the 
 accused, or that on the evidence of a medical practitioner custody is desirable to assess the 
 accused and the accused consents to custody; or 
 (c)  custody of the accused is required in respect of any other matter or by virtue of any other 
 provision of this Act. 
180  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 2-21.  The reason for this is inter 
alia due to lack of facilities to do these assessments out of custody.    
181  Newby and Faltin 2008 Journal of Offender Rehabilitation 185 at 187.  Also see Byrick and Walker-
Renshaw A practical guide to Mental Health and the Law in Ontario at 94 where it is pointed out that 
Ontario has 12 registered psychiatric facilities where assessments can be done, one of which is a 
maximum secure facility.  These facilities are also designated to provide treatment to those under 
disposition orders of the court or review board.  See further Legal Aid Ontario 
http://lawfacts.ca/mental-health/court  (Date of use:  22 September 2016). 
182  Section 672.19 of the Criminal Code.  Also see O’Shaughnessy 2007 The Journal of the American 
Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 505 at 505.  See further Byrick and Walker-Renshaw A practical 
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Where the order states that the assessment must take place in custody, an accused is 
usually kept in a correctional facility pending such assessment.  The practice in Canada to 
detain an accused in prison whilst awaiting psychiatric observation has been criticised, and 
calls have been made to have the practice abolished.184  This exact practice was 
challenged in R v Hussein.185  The court found that this practice violates the right to liberty 
and the right not to be arbitrarily detained.186  These rights obviously have to be weighed up 
against the public’s right to safety.  
The Ontario Court of Appeal, however, expressed the view that the Hussain case was 
incorrectly decided and that remand in a detention centre awaiting assessment is not 
unlawful per se.187  The court found that an accused in respect of whom an assessment 
was ordered need not be transferred to a psychiatric facility immediately and may, in fact, 
be detained in a correctional facility pending transfer to the relevant hospital.  The court 
focussed on the use of the word “custody” in the Criminal Code and pointed out that it 
clearly provides for the accused to be detained during the assessment period; this includes 
being detained in a correctional facility, for example, awaiting transfer to a psychiatric 
                                                                                                                                                   
guide to Mental Health and the Law in Ontario at 80. 
183  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 2-14.15 who explains that where 
such treatment is given by hospital authorities without the consent of the accused, they will have to 
show that such treatment, for example treatment to stabilise the accused, is justified under provincial 
mental health legislation.  
184  McLachlin B 2010 Dalhousie Law Journal 15 at 23.  Also see Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder 
in Canadian Criminal Law at 223 who points out that this has been a contentious issue in 
jurisprudence for some time. 
185  R v Hussein (2004), 191 CCC (3rd) 113 (Ont S.C.J).  The case concerned two accused persons who 
had to undergo psychiatric evaluation.  Two individuals before the Ontario Supreme Court of Justice 
brought an Application, challenging the practice of detaining an accused in jail pending the 
availability of beds in a psychiatric institution for purposes of psychiatric assessment.  One accused 
was detained for 32 days before being transferred to a psychiatric hospital for the assessment and 
the other was detained for 29 days awaiting transfer for the assessment.  It should be noted at this 
juncture that the average waiting period for an accused awaiting assessment in a South African 
correctional facility, is at least 3 months.  See chapter 2 of this research for the discussion of the 
delays experienced in the South African criminal justice system with regard to assessments for 
fitness to stand trial. 
186  R v Hussein (2004), 191 CCC (3rd) 113 CR (6th) 368 (Ont Sup Ct J) at [33], [26].  Also see 
McLachlin B 2010 Dalhousie Law Journal 15 at 25, 26 for a discussion on how the shortage of 
facilities affects the referral of children for psychiatric assessment.  Also see Barrett and Shandler 
Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 2-23, 2-24 for a discussion of the controversy around 
the Hussain case in which it was found that the right to liberty is infringed by being detained in a jail 
awaiting psychiatric assessment. 
187  See Phuneuf v Ontario 2010 ONCA 901.  The accused in this case waited 16 days to be transferred 
to a psychiatric institution.  Instead of challenging the assessment order, she instituted a civil claim 
for wrongful detention and it is in this judgment of the civil case, that the finding was made that the 
Hussain decision could not be interpreted to mean that an accused have to be transferred to a 
forensic facility immediately upon the assessment order being granted without a “stop-over” at a 
correctional facility, but rather meant that the assessment must take place before the expiry date of 
the assessment order. 
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hospital.  As far as the Hussain case is read to mean that an accused must be transferred 
to a psychiatric hospital immediately without going to a detention centre first, the Ontario 
Court of Appeal found that Hussain was decided incorrectly.188   
The Court of Appeal, however, stressed the importance of not detaining mentally ill persons 
in correctional facilities for too long as such a setting creates the risk that the mentally ill 
accused person’s condition will deteriorate.189  The court recommended that bail be 
considered for an accused in respect of whom mental illness is in issue and for whom a bed 
at the psychiatric hospital where the assessment must be performed is not immediately 
available.190  Where such a person is not granted bail due to, for example, concerns for 
public safety and consequently detained in a correctional facility awaiting transfer to a 
psychiatric facility for assessment, the court suggested that such a person be brought 
before the court within a “couple of days” from the order for a “bed check”, to see if space in 
a relevant assessment facility has become available.191   
                                                
188  Phuneuf v Ontario 2010 ONCA 901 at [17], [19].  See however in general Centre for Addiction and 
Mental Health v R 2012 ONCA 342 where the court pointed out that there may be circumstances 
that warrants the immediate transfer of an accused to a psychiatric facility such as where it is 
apparent that if the transfer is delayed it will affect the accused’s chances to become fit to stand trial 
under a treatment order granted for this purpose. 
189  Phuneuf v Ontario 2010 ONCA 901 at [28].  Also see Ministry of Health and Long-term Care A 
Program Framework for: Mental Health Diversion/ Court support services (2006)  
http://www.health.gov.on.ca/en/common/ministry/publications/reports/mentalhealth/framework.pdf   
(Date of use: 26 August 2015) at 4 where it is pointed out that persons with mental illness that is kept 
in a correctional setting is at higher risk of experiencing more severe symptoms of mental illness and 
are at a higher risk of homelessness once they are released.  These accused persons are further 
often isolated from mental health care for as long as they are kept in the correctional facility. 
190  Phuneuf v Ontario 2010 ONCA 901 at [29].  Also see Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in 
Canadian Criminal Law at 2-29, 2-5, 2-22 where it is pointed out that these provisions are included to 
ensure that mentally ill accused persons are not unnecessarily detained.  Note that assessment 
order issued by a court takes precedence over a bail hearing.  See Section 672.17 of the Criminal 
Code.  Also see Byrick and Walker-Renshaw A practical guide to Mental Health and the Law in 
Ontario at 80.  See further Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 2-5 
where it is pointed out that since an assessment order given by a court takes precedence over an 
accused’s bail hearing, the court may therefore not consider bail whilst an assessment order issued 
by the court is underway.  The same does not apply to an assessment order issued by a Review 
Board.  In the latter case, the court may grant an accused bail.  This could create difficulty in 
ensuring the accused attends to the assessment as ordered by the Review Board. 
191  Phuneuf v Ontario 2010 ONCA 901 at [30].  The court however points out that judges in these 
proceedings routinely make enquiries about the availability of beds in facilities before they make an 
assessment order and generally try to limit the detention time in a facility for the accused to the 
absolute minimum.  Also see Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 2-
29.  In Phaneuf v Ontario 2010 ONCA 901 at [29], [30] the court explains that it is often the case that 
an accused who is awaiting assessment, poses a safety risk to society.  In such an instance, the 
court must make an order for the incarceration of the accused pending the assessment.  The judge 
can, depending on the circumstances of the case, make specific orders as to the place of detention 
pending the assessment.  In this particular case, the court ordered that that the accused be brought 
back to court within a few days in order to check the availability of beds. 
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An assessment for fitness to stand trial can be ordered at any point in time during the 
proceedings 192 prior to the verdict.193  The order is usually made prior to arraignment 194 
and the commencement of the trial and before the accused enters a plea.195  Where the 
issue is raised during a preliminary inquiry, the judge may proceed to try the fitness issue196 
or postpone it to not later than such time, as the accused is required to answer the charge 
(arraignment).197   
Where the accused elects trial by judge and jury as the mode of trial, the trial judge has 
discretion as to if it wants to put the issue of fitness to stand trial before the jury.198  Where 
there is insufficient reason to doubt the accused’s fitness to stand trial, the judge will be 
justified in not putting the issue to the jury.199  The judge has the discretion to postpone the 
                                                
192  Section 672.12 of the Criminal Code.  Also see Newby and Faltin 2008 Journal of Offender 
Rehabilitation 185 at 187.  Also see Parliamentary Information and research service Current issues 
in Mental Health in Canada at 3 where it is confirmed that the fitness issue can be raised at any point 
during the proceedings.  See further A Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal 
Law at 1-12 and 2-1, 3-18.  Also see Byrick and Walker-Renshaw A practical guide to Mental Health 
and the Law in Ontario at 77. 
193  Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 291.  Also see Byrick and Walker-Renshaw A practical guide to 
Mental Health and the Law in Ontario at 81.  See further A Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in 
Canadian Criminal Law at 1-12, 2-8 where it is stated that most assessment order made at the pre-
trial stage is to determine fitness to stand trial or criminal capacity whereas most assessment orders 
made after the trial but prior to the verdict, is to determine the appropriate disposition for the 
particular accused.   
194  This is where the information about the charge is read out to the accused.  See Mewett An 
Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 70.  See further Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 
59 who explains that the arraignment is the accused’s first appearance in court on which occasion 
he is required to answer the charge.  Also see Schneider Annotated Ontario Mental Health Statutes 
at 408 where it is indicated that the issue of fitness to stand trial mostly arises prior to arraignment.  
See further Parliamentary Information and research service Current issues in Mental Health in 
Canada at 3 where it is stated that the issue of fitness is usually raised at the first appearance or at 
the bail hearing. 
195 Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 175, 176.  Also see Schneider, Bloom 
and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 141 where it is indicated that fitness issues usually arise very 
early in the proceedings, even before a bail hearing.  See further Barrett and Shandler Mental 
Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-23 who confirms that the fitness issue is often raised at the 
first appearance of the accused.  Where a hybrid offence is the object of the charge against the 
accused, the judge must postpone the fitness hearing until after the Crown has elected whether to 
proceed by indictment or summarily.  See Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 291.  Also see 
Schizophrenia society of Ontario http://www.schizophrenia.on.ca/getmedia/d252fe01-ab2a-429c-
bd6b-5322115c4204/justice_process_guide.pdf.aspx (Date of use: 20 September 2016) at 15 where 
it is stated that the fitness issue is usually raised during the first court appearance or at the bail 
hearing 
196  Section 672.27 of the Criminal Code.  Also see Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in 
Canada at 77 , 78 for an explanation of what a preliminary inquiry entails. 
197  Section 672.23(2)(a) of the Criminal Code.  Also see Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 291.  See 
further Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-28. 
198  Schneider Annotated Ontario Mental Health Statutes at 438.  Also see in general R v Kolbe (1974), 
27 C.R. (N.S.) 1 (Alta S.C.A.D.) and R v Wolfson [1965] 3 C.C.C 304 (Alta.C.A.). 
199  R v Wolfson [1965] 3 C.C.C 304 (Alta.C.A.).  Also see Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in 
Canadian Criminal Law at 3-17 where it is confirmed that the court does not have to hold a fitness 
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hearing of the fitness issue until the Crown presented its case and it is time for the accused 
to present his case.200  The effect of this is that if the accused is acquitted at the close of the 
Crown’s case, the fitness issue will not be heard at all.201  The judge also has the discretion 
to postpone the fitness hearing until such time as evidence has been heard on whether the 
accused actually committed the offence.202  This practice addresses concerns regarding the 
possibility that an accused who raises the fitness issue early in the proceedings, and who is 
then found unfit, might be detained indefinitely in a psychiatric hospital (if he is found 
permanently unfit, for example) without his involvement in the crime actually having been 
established.203    
Reasonable grounds for ordering a fitness assessment must exist.  These reasonable 
grounds need not be derived from medical evidence.204  Reasonable grounds in this context 
include evidence of significant confusion or evidence of hallucinations and delusions 
affecting the accused’s comprehension of the proceedings or ability to participate.205  
Evidence of marked impairment of mood, or if the accused is suicidal, mute, apathetic or is 
unable to concentrate, should suffice as reasonable grounds to order a fitness 
assessment.206  Incomprehensible communication by an accused, if the accused laughs for 
no reason or talks to himself, may also suggest problems with fitness.207  However, it was 
                                                                                                                                                   
inquiry if there is no reasonable ground to doubt the accused’s fitness to stand trial. 
200  Section 672.25 (2)(b) of the Criminal Code.  Also see Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 291.  See 
further Mackay 1995 The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 121 at 125 who confirms that the judge may 
postpone the fitness issue until the Crown has completed its case. 
201  Section 672.3 of the Criminal Code.  Also see Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 291. 
202  Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 291.  Also see Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian 
Criminal Law at 3-24. 
203  Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 178 explains that concerns have been 
raised about the fact that a potentially innocent mentally ill accused whose guilt is yet to be proved, 
may be sentenced to indefinite detention in a psychiatric hospital.  This concern has partly been 
addressed by the practice that the hearing on the issue of fitness may be postponed until later in the 
proceedings in order to afford the accused the opportunity to move to have the charges against him 
dismissed if it appears that the prosecution does not have a prima facie case against him.  If the 
motion succeeds, the accused will be found not guilty without the fitness issue being heard.  The 
consequence is that if there is indeed a mental illness involved, the accused will not be treated or 
referred for treatment, at least not in the criminal justice context.  The accused may, however, still 
voluntarily seek treatment from the mental health care system.    
204  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 1-12.  Prior to the 1992 
amendments to the Criminal Code, referrals for assessment for fitness to stand trial had to be based 
on medical evidence.  Evidence by the police, social worker or own observations by the court may 
suffice as evidence. 
205  Schneider Annotated Ontario Mental Health Statutes at 431, 432.  Also see Byrick and Walker-
Renshaw A practical guide to Mental Health and the Law in Ontario at 77. 
206  See Schneider Annotated Ontario Mental Health Statutes at 431, 432 for a detailed list of scenarios 
that should suffice as reasonable grounds for the court to order an assessment for fitness to stand 
trial.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 142 for a table of good and 
bad reasons for a court to order an assessment for fitness to stand trial. 
207  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 141, see Table 10 on this page for a list of 
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found that communication difficulties in itself, such as those that a deaf person may 
encounter, will not suffice as a reasonable ground to order an assessment as this is not a 
mental disorder but a communication disorder.208 
On the other hand, the mere fact that an accused suffers from a mental illness will not per 
se stand as a reasonable ground to order an assessment.  The illness has to have an 
influence on the fitness of the accused in order for an assessment to be ordered.209  This 
may have the unfortunate consequence that not all accused persons with mental illness are 
assessed for fitness, and some mental illnesses may go undetected. 
It should be noted that mental illness is not synonymous with unfitness.210  Similarly, the 
mere fact that an accused is homeless, or has a history of psychiatric treatment, should not 
be taken as sufficient reason to order an assessment for fitness to stand trial without signs 
of mental illness co-existing with homelessness or psychiatric history.211  Where there are 
no such grounds to believe that an accused is unfit to stand trial, there is no obligation on a 
court to order an assessment, especially if it appears that such an assessment is requested 
merely to manipulate the criminal proceedings.212  
                                                                                                                                                   
overly odd behaviour in court or custody that may be suggestive of fitness problems.  Also see 
Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-20 where examples from case 
law is discussed that illustrates the type of behaviour that a court may consider reasonable where 
the court itself has witnessed the odd behaviour.  
208  See R v Isaac 2009 ONCJ 662, 2009 Carswell Ont 8642, 250 C.C.C (3d) 565 (Ont C.J at [21], [26], 
and [27] where the court expressed the view that the issue at hand was one of a lack of schooling, 
not of mental illness.  The accused was deaf, not mentally ill.  The court stated that Part XX.I of the 
Criminal Code was aimed at persons with mental illnesses and expressed the view that it did not 
think that it was parliament’s intention to include all other disabilities under those provisions 
pertaining to assessment for fitness to stand trial.  The application for assessment was dismissed.  
Also see Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-33. 
209  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 2-14.16, 3-7.  Also see R v John 
Doe 2011 ONSC 92 Carswell Ont 58 (Ont S.C.J) at [39], [40] where this was confirmed.  In this case 
the Crown’s request for an assessment was turned down.  The Crown based its application for a 
fitness assessment on the possibility that the accused may suffer from a mental illness that may 
affect his criminal capacity. 
210  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-18.  Also see Viljoen JL, 
Roesch R and Zapf PA ”An examination of the relationship between competency to stand trial, 
competency to waive interrogation rights and psychopathology” 2002 (5) Law and Human Behavior 
481-506 at 483. 
211  See Schneider Annotated Ontario Mental Health Statutes 431, 432 for a comprehensive list of 
reasons or scenarios that Schneider submits will not constitute a “reasonable ground” for the court to 
order an assessment for fitness to stand trial.  These scenarios include requests by the family that 
the accused be hospitalised and not detained in jail, where the accused is seen muttering to himself 
or where he interrupts the proceedings, or is angry and loud with no evidence of a mental disorder 
being present.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 142. 
212  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 2-4.2.  Also see in general R v B 
(B) 2009 Carswell Ont 1083 Ont S.C.J where a request for an assessment for fitness to stand trial 
was brought immediately after the court refused to declare a mistrial.  There was no evidence to 
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Where an order for assessment is made, the accused will be tested to determine his fitness 
to stand trial.  The nature of the test for fitness to stand trial is explained below. 
4.4 Test for fitness to stand trial 
Section 2 of the Criminal Code, which contains the definition of unfit to stand trial, in effect 
sets out the test for fitness.213  According to section 2 of the Criminal Code, the aspects to 
consider are the accused's understanding of the nature or object of the proceedings, the 
accused’s understanding of the possible consequences of the proceedings or his ability to 
communicate with his legal representative.214    
The limited cognitive capacity test is employed to determine fitness to stand trial.215  The 
test was established in 1992 in the case of R v Taylor 216 where the accused allegedly 
stabbed counsel who acted for the Law Society.  He was a lawyer himself and had a good 
understanding of the proceedings and the technicalities thereof, but could not communicate 
with his counsel properly because he suffered from paranoid schizophrenia, as confirmed 
                                                                                                                                                   
suspect that the accused is unfit to stand trial and the accused did not have a history of mental 
illness.  After the court’s refusal to grant a mistrial the accused suddenly became suicidal and 
consulted a psychiatrist who recommended that the accused be assessed for fitness to stand trial 
but did not exclude the possibility that the accused may be using the suicidal threats to disrupt the 
criminal process.  This, together with the timing of the request for the assessment and the fact that 
the accused had no psychiatric history, convinced the court not to grant the request for an 
assessment, as there were no reasonable grounds to rebut the presumption of fitness in this 
instance.  
213  See Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 148.    
214  Section 2 of the Criminal Code.  Also see the discussion of the definition of unfitness to stand trial 
earlier in this chapter. 
215  Schneider Annotated Ontario Mental Health Statutes at 409, 144.  Also see Coughlan Criminal 
Procedure at 290 who confirms that this test and not the “analytical capacity test” is used.  See 
further Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-7 who confirms the use 
of the ”limited cognitive capacity” test over the “analytical capacity” test.  Also see Mackay 1995 The 
Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 121 at 124 who confirms the court’s preference for the limited 
capacity test. 
216  R v Taylor (1992), 22 O.R. (3d) 323 (C.A) (hereinafter referred to as R v Taylor).  The position was 
approved in R v Whittle [1994] 2 S.C.R 914 and affirmed in R v Jobb, 2008 SKCA 156.  Also see a 
brief discussion of the Taylor case in O’Shaughnessy 2007 The Journal of the American Academy of 
Psychiatry and the Law 505 at 506.  In accepting this test, the court in R v Taylor rejected the 
“analytic capacity” test.  The analytical capacity test requires that the accused, in addition to 
understanding the court process and his legal predicament, must be able to act rationally and in his 
best interest.  See Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 144.  Mackay 1995 The 
Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 121 at 125 points out the position in Canada pertaining to the test to 
be used for fitness, is in line with that used in England.  Also see Byrick and Walker-Renshaw A 
practical guide to Mental Health and the Law in Ontario at 81.  See further Harradence 2012 
Crim.L.Q 511 at 526 who indicates that this was the first case in which an appellate court had to 
consider the provisions of the newly formulated section 2 of the Criminal Code that contained the 
definition of unfitness and the criteria to be applied when it is considered.  
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by two psychiatrists at trial.217  The limited cognitive capacity test was employed to establish 
his lack of fitness.  It was concluded on appeal in Taylor that the limited cognitive capacity 
test succeeds in striking a balance between the rules relating to fitness assessments and 
the accused’s constitutional right to have a trial within a reasonable time.218  The minimum 
cognitive capacity test was set in Ontario, and other jurisdictions are not mandated to follow 
the precedent 219 , although the judgment seems to have been followed in other jurisdictions 
as well.220 
The limited cognitive capacity test entails that a person shall be fit to stand trial if he has a 
rudimentary factual understanding of the legal dilemma that he finds himself in.221  The 
accused need not have a rational understanding of the legal proceedings, nor is it required 
of him to be able to act in his best interest.222  Even if these requirements are met, it does 
                                                
217  R v Taylor at 553.  See discussion of the case in Newby and Faltin 2008 Journal of Offender 
Rehabilitation 185 at 186.  This case is also discussed in Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental 
Health Courts at 143, 144 and in Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 
3-6 – 3-14.2. 
218  R v Taylor (1992), 77 C.C.C (3d) 551.  Also see O’Shaughnessy 2007 The Journal of the American 
Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 505 at 506.  See further Newby and Faltin 2008 Journal of 
Offender Rehabilitation 185 at 187.  See further Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian 
Criminal Law at 3.8 and in particular at 3-2 where it is stated that the right to control one’s own 
defence and the right to liberty and to be brought before a court within a reasonable time are all 
rights that often have to be weighed up against another in the “fitness regime”.  See however this 
source at 3-10 where it is questioned whether the court managed in striking a correct balance 
between the relevant rights that had to be considered.  Also see Harradence 2012 Crim.L.Q 511 at 
512 where it is stated that the result of the Taylor judgment is that it placed a disproportionate focus 
on expediency.  
219  O’Shaughnessy 2007 The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 505 at 506.  
Some recognition was however given to the position by the Supreme Court of Canada in the case of 
R v Whittle [1994] 2 S.C.R 914 which dealt with the accused’s cognitive ability to waive rights rather 
than the issue of fitness to stand trial. 
220  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-3 where reference is made to 
cases in other states than Ontario where the Taylor judgment has been followed such as Quebec.  
Also see Harradence 2012 Crim.L.Q 511 at 612 who points out that the test has become the 
standard test to apply for fitness in Canada.  The author promotes the development of a new test 
that focusses on the accused’s ability to take a rational decision and that focusses on the accused’s 
right to choose.  
221  This entails that the accused must be able to communicate the facts relating to the offence.  
Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 290.  Also see Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian 
Criminal Law at 3-18 who states that as long as the accused has a basic understanding of what is 
happening in the criminal process and is able to communicate with his lawyer, he will be found fit to 
stand trial.  All that is required in order to be found fit to stand trial is that an accused must be able to 
give a factual account of matters to their legal representatives with no requirement that such an 
account must be rational and that the accused must be able to analyse the account of events.  
O’Shaughnessy 2007 The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 505 at 506.  
Also see Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 290.  Also see Van der Wolf et al 2010 International 
Journal  of Forensic Mental Health 245 at 246 where the strict nature of the test is confirmed at it is 
pointed out that the accused need only have a “rudimentary understanding” of the criminal process 
in order to be found fit to stand trial.  Also see Harradence 2012 Crim.L.Q 511 at 512. 
222  R v Taylor, (1992), 77 C.C.C (3d) 551. 17 C.R (4th) 371 at 567, a finding of the Ontario Court of 
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not necessarily constitute a true understanding of the legal dilemma as it can be argued 
that true understanding would imply rational understanding.   
An accused, who understands the proceedings and the parties involved and is able to 
instruct counsel, will be found fit to stand trial, despite the fact that he suffers from a mental 
illness.223  The mental illness in itself does, therefore, not render an accused unfit.224     
The cognitive capacity test became the standard test for fitness assessments in Canada.225  
Opinion exists that the cognitive capacity test is too restrictive and that the bar for fitness is 
set too low with the consequence that the test will not necessarily identify all individuals 
who are, in fact, unfit to stand trial.226  The result might be that persons stand trial that may 
have been found unfit to stand trial if a different test or a criterion other than the cognitive 
                                                                                                                                                   
Appeal, Schneider Annotated Ontario Mental Health Statutes at 409.  Also see Coughlan Criminal 
Procedure at 290.  See further O’Shaughnessy 2007 The Journal of the American Academy of 
Psychiatry and the Law 505 at 506 where the Taylor case is discussed.  See further Newby and 
Faltin 2008 Journal of Offender Rehabilitation 185 at 187.  Also see Roach et al Criminal Law and 
Procedure 779.  Also see Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-7 
where it is confirmed that the accused need not be able to act in his own best interests.  It is also 
pointed out that there are many accused persons who do not raise mental illness as an issue who 
take decisions that are not in their best interests such as choosing not to follow the advice of their 
counsel.  See further Byrick and Walker-Renshaw A practical guide to Mental Health and the Law in 
Ontario at 81 where it is confirmed that only a basic understanding of the proceedings and the 
charges against the accused is required.  Also see Harradence 2012 Crim.L.Q 511 at 512 who 
highlights that a big point of criticism against the cognitive capacity test is that it does not require 
rational understanding by the accused. 
223  Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 290.  R v Trecroce  (1980) 55 C.C.C (2d) 202 (Ont. C.A.).  Also see 
Newby and Faltin 2008 Journal of Offender Rehabilitation 185 at 187.  Also see Van der Wolf et al 
2010 International Journal of Forensic Mental Health 245 at 246 who explains that this could mean 
that someone with paranoid delusions will not per se be found unfit to stand trial but only if such 
delusions affect the accused’s ability to instruct counsel and the latter cannot, on account of the 
delusions, represent the accused due to inability to obtain instructions from him for instance.  
224  R v Trecroce  (1980) 55 C.C.C (2d) 202 (Ont. C.A.).  Also see Van der Wolf et al 2010 International 
Journal of Forensic Mental Health 245 at 247. 
225  Harradence 2012 Crim.L.Q 511 at 512.  The author adds, however, that it is often applied without 
considering the consequences thereof. 
226  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-1.  Also see O’Shaughnessy 
2007 The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 505 at 506.  Also see Bloom 
H and Schneider RD Mental Disorder and the Law:  A Primer for Legal and Mental Health 
Professionals (Irwin Law Toronto 2006) at 76-78 where the view is expressed that persons with 
depression or paranoia for example will have their cognitive abilities in tact but might not be fit to 
stand trial due to their depressive state for example.  Also see Byrick and Walker-Renshaw A 
practical guide to Mental Health and the  Law in Ontario at 81 for criticism of the cognitive capacity 
test.  The test has been labelled as too restrictive.  See O’Shaughnessy 2007 The Journal of the 
American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 505 at 506.  Also see in general Schneider RD and 
Bloom H “R v Taylor:  A Decision not in the best interests of some mentally ill accused” 1995 (38) 
Crim L Q 183-205.  Also see Harradence 2012 Crim.L.Q 511 at 527, 531 who is critical of the 
judgment in Taylor stating that the fitness test was made too narrow and that it is not in touch with 
the realities of mental illness and the impact thereof on the accused.  
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capacity test was used.227  It is argued that the analytical capacity test would be a better 
tool to use to determine fitness than the limited cognitive capacity test used in the Taylor 
judgment, as the analytical capacity test would seek to establish the extent to which the 
mental illness influences the accused’s ability to make decisions.228    
The Court of Appeal in Taylor supra, however, warned that the adoption of a very high 
threshold for fitness to stand trial, which will possibly result in more persons being found 
unfit to stand trial, will have a negative impact on the principle of fundamental justice in 
terms whereof an accused has the right to have his trial finalised without undue delay.229  
As pointed out earlier, fitness assessments are time-consuming and cause delays in the 
finalisation of a trial due inter alia to lack of resources for assessments.  The increased 
number of persons that could be found unfit to stand trial by employing a higher threshold 
will also put pressure on the mental health care system to provide care for those found unfit 
to stand trial.230    
The Canadian Psychiatric Association and the Canadian Bar Association hold the view that 
a higher level of functioning (for purposes of fitness to stand trial) should be required.231  
                                                
227  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-14 where examples are given 
of situations where persons may not meet the criteria for “unfitness” but in the opinion of some, these 
persons may very well be unfit to stand trial for example, someone suffering from major depression 
may act in a self-destructive manner which is not in line with protecting his best interests at all.  
Another example given is of an “intellectually limited” accused who may believe that he deserves 
punishment and may not appreciate the extent and consequences of the position that he finds 
himself in.  This confirms that even where a person does not meet the criteria of unfitness as set out 
in the Taylor case, they may very well be unfit to stand trial.  
228  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-7.  It is also argued that het use 
of this test will ensure a fair trial for the accused.  The test employed in the United States of America 
in fact focuses more in the impact that the mental illness has on the accused’s capacity to take 
decisions.  This will be discussed in chapter 5 of this research. 
229  As provided for in section 11(b) of the Charter.  Also see Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 293.  See 
further Schneider Annotated Ontario Mental Health Statutes at 438 and Schneider, Bloom and 
Heerema Mental Health Courts at 144.  Also see Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian 
Criminal Law at 3-8 where it is pointed out that a delay in processing the case of the accused also 
translates in delayed justice for the victim of the crime.  Also see Schneider Annotated Ontario 
Mental Health Statutes at 438 where it is pointed out that autonomy of the accused in the criminal 
justice system implies an ability to choose the defence that he wants to put forward and that the 
accused should be allowed to do so.  The accused should then also assume the risks involved in 
such a decision including the delays that will be brought about if the fitness issue is raised.  It should 
be pointed out that this argument is more applicable to the scenario where the accused raises the 
insanity defence and not so much where the issue of fitness to stand trial is raised.  This is so since 
the fitness issue can be raised by any party and where the prosecution raises the issue, there is little 
that he accused can do about it and has to wait for the result of the fitness assessment.  The 
accused has more of a choice as to the defence that he wants to present when he is found fit to 
stand trial.  It should also be noted that unfitness to stand trial is not a defence per se as a trial will 
not follow if the accused is indeed found not fit to stand trial.   
230  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-8. 
231  O’Shaughnessy 2007 The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 505 at 506.   
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Recommendations have been made to review the definition of fitness to stand trial to 
provide for a higher threshold, but this has yet to be acted upon.232    
The test for fitness is applied during the assessment period.  What exactly the assessment 
entails is discussed below. 
4.5 Assessment of fitness to stand trial 
Fitness to stand trial is assessed with a focus on the accused’s current mental state.  His 
mental state at the time of the alleged offence is irrelevant for the purposes of this 
inquiry.233  Fitness to stand trial, however, has an element of prospectivity in that the 
accused must be able to follow the proceedings, conduct a proper defence and instruct 
counsel throughout his trial in order to conduct his defence.234  For this reason, an accused 
whose mental abilities fluctuate will probably be deemed unfit to stand trial, as a state of 
sustained fitness is generally required.235   
The assessment is conducted by a medical practitioner or any other person who has been 
designated by the Attorney General to do so.236  It appears that only one mental health 
                                                
232  Calls were further made for the test to be simplified.  See O’Shaughnessy 2007 The Journal of the 
American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 505 at 506.  Also see Harradence 2012 Crim.L.Q 511 
at 543 where the recommendations as contained in the report of the Standing Committee on Justice 
and Human Rights are discussed.  The recommendations pertain to expanding the fitness test to test 
for “real” ability to communicate and instruct counsel.  
233  Schneider Annotated Ontario Mental Health Statutes at 409.  Also see Coughlan Criminal Procedure 
at 289.  See, however, Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-3, 3-4 
who is of the view that the first two requirements of fitness to stand trial as set out in the Criminal 
Code are straight forward and easy to determine.  It is often the ability to communicate with counsel 
that is difficult to determine. 
234  Schneider Annotated Ontario Mental Health Statutes at 410.  Also see Lurigio RJ and Snowden J 
“Putting therapeutic jurisprudence into practice: The growth, operations, and effectiveness of mental 
health courts” 2009 (2) The Justice System Journal 196-218 at 206 where the Mental Health Court 
model employed in the United States of America is discussed but where it is highlighted that the 
continued fitness of an accused is something that has to be considered during Mental Health Court 
proceedings as well.  
235  Schneider Annotated Ontario Mental Health Statutes at 410 where it is pointed out that caution 
should in particular be applied when assessing the psychotic patient, whose mental state might 
fluctuate from the one minute to the next.  The fact that he was assessed in a moment of clarity is 
not necessarily an indication of what his state of mind will be like at the trial.  See for example in 
general the case of R v Adam 2013 ONSC 373 where the accused’s mental health fluctuated 
throughout the proceedings.  The court eventually found that the accused is unfit to stand trial in 
such circumstances.  See, however, R v Miller 2011 BCSC 1292 where the accused suffered from a 
neurological disease (Huntington’s Disease).  The accused was found fit to stand trial but the trial 
judge allowed that the issue be revisited later if the accused’s neurological condition deteriorates 
because of the disease.  
236  Section 672.1(1) of the Criminal Code defines assessment as ““assessment” means an assessment 
by a medical practitioner or any other person who has been designated by the Attorney General as 
being qualified to conduct an assessment of the mental condition of the accused under an 
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practitioner is required to conduct the fitness assessment.237  The fact that persons other 
than medical practitioners can be designated to conduct assessments makes it possible for 
qualified mental health practitioners such as forensic psychologists to be appointed to 
conduct assessments.238    
The assessment entails a clinical assessment as well as an interview 239 with the accused 
to determine his ability to conduct a defence and instruct counsel.240  The accused is 
questioned on his understanding of the role of the officials in court and the consequences 
that may follow should he be found guilty.241  Questions are directed at the accused in order 
to determine if any disorientation or delusions are present.242 
The subjective interpretation of the very concept of fitness to stand trial and the fact that the 
three requirements set out in the Criminal Code for purposes of fitness are not very specific 
                                                                                                                                                   
assessment order made under section 672.11 or 672.121, and any incidental observation or 
examination of the accused”.  The definition of assessment was amended in 2005 to widen the 
scope of persons that can be appointed to conduct the assessments, previously, only medical 
practitioners could conduct such assessments.  Also see Viljoen, Ogloff and Zapf 2003 Canadian 
Psychology 369 at 372 where it is confirmed that only medical practitioners were allowed to conduct 
assessments prior to the amendment of the Criminal Code.  For historical background on how 
psychology became relevant to the law and how it was incorporated therein, see Viljoen, Ogloff and 
Zapf 2003 Canadian Psychology 369 at 372. 
237  See Form 48 in terms whereof the assessment order is made which only allows the court to indicate 
the name of the person or institution where the assessment is to be conducted. See Annexure B to 
this research for form 48. This is in contrast to the position in South Africa where more than one 
mental health practitioner must conduct the assessment depending on the seriousness of the 
offence.  On the J138A form used in the South African system to order an assessment, provision is 
made for the names of the mental health practitioners to be filled in. See Annexure A to this 
research. 
238  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 2-19, 2-20 where it is pointed out 
that the development that persons other than medical practitioners may conduct assessments, are in 
line with developments in the United States of America.  The forensic mental health care systems in 
the United States of America is discussed in chapters 5 of this research.  Also see Viljoen, Ogloff 
and Zapf 2003 Canadian Psychology 369 at 372 where it is explained that the reason why medical 
practitioners (who do not necessarily have knowledge of psychiatry) is allowed to conduct psychiatric 
assessments, is to provide for cases in remote areas where psychiatrists might not be available to 
provide such service. 
239  Newby and Faltin 2008 Journal of Offender Rehabilitation 185 at 190, 192 explain two models 
developed to gather information from the accused whose fitness to stand trial is at issue.  See the 
explanation of the FIT-R (fitness interview test – revised) and the BFFTT (basic fitness for trial test), 
the latter was redesigned to consist of a multiple choice questionnaire. 
240  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 148-151.  Also see Van der Wolf et al 2010 
International Journal of Forensic Mental Health 245 at 250 where it is pointed out that court ordered 
fitness assessments are paid for by the state.  Also see Legal Aid Ontario http://lawfacts.ca/mental-
health/court  (Date of use:  22 September 2016) where it is pointed out that there might be more than 
one interview depending on the length of the assessment.  
241  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-4 where further questions that 
might be put to the accused are discussed.  These include questions about the accused’s 
understanding of why he is in court, including how he got there and if he can talk to his lawyer about 
the crime that he has been charged with.  
242  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-5. 
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creates problems within the context of fitness assessments.243  Since the fitness concept is 
interpreted subjectively and therefore potentially differently by each professional involved, 
the possibility that professionals may differ in their opinions on if a particular accused is fit 
to stand trial or not is augmented. 
The court may order that a report be submitted by the person who conducted the 
assessment.244  The Criminal Code does not make the submission of a report compulsory, 
as is clear from the use of the word “may” in section 672.2(1) of the Criminal Code.245  If a 
report is drafted, it must be made available to the Crown and the accused 246 but may be 
withheld from the accused in certain circumstances.247  The report becomes part of the 
court record.248  The trial judge is not bound by the reports submitted to the court, and these 
reports are therefore not indicative of the final decision on fitness that will be made by the 
court.249  The report must be sent to the relevant Review Board that assists in determining 
                                                
243  Newby and Faltin 2008 Journal of Offender Rehabilitation 185 at 192. 
244  Section 672.2(1) of the Criminal Code.  See Byrick and Walker-Renshaw A practical guide to Mental 
Health and the Law in Ontario at 80 where it is stated that an assessment order usually contains a 
provision that the person who conducts the assessment should submit a report on the assessment to 
court.  Where the assessment order entails that a report should indeed be filed, such report is 
drafted by the person who conducted the assessment and filed with the court or Review Board that 
ordered the assessment.  See Section 672.2(2) of the Criminal Code.  Also see Barrett and Shandler 
Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 2-19, 2-20 where it is explained that the report should 
be addressed to the court and copies filed to be handed to the Crown and the defence.  See Byrick 
and Walker-Renshaw A practical guide to Mental Health and the Law in Ontario at 80 where it is 
pointed out that the report should be addressed to the Registrar of the particular court for the 
attention of the particular judge who made the order.  Also see Legal Aid Ontario 
http://lawfacts.ca/mental-health/court  (Date of use:  22 September 2016) where the practice of filing 
a report after a fitness assessment in Ontario is confirmed.  
245  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 2-38 indicates that in cases 
where there are concerns about the privilege between solicitor and client with regard to the 
information in the report, the court will not request the submission of a report or may request that it 
be filed with the defence counsel only.  See Van der Wolf et al 2010 International Journal of Forensic 
Mental Health 245 at 247 who indicates that a fitness assessment usually results in a report filed 
with the court.  See, however, the provisions of sections 21(2) and 22(2) of the Ontario Mental 
Health Act that provides for the assessment of a mentally ill accused and for a treatment order of 
such an accused respectively.  In terms of these sections, the senior physician is compelled to file a 
report with the court that ordered such an assessment or treatment. 
246  Section 672.2(4) of the Criminal Code.  Also see Byrick and Walker-Renshaw A practical guide to 
Mental Health and the Law in Ontario at 80 who explains that the court staff will make a copy of the 
report available to the relevant parties. 
247  Section 672.51(3) of the Criminal Code.  This is where the disclosure would have a negative effect 
on the recovery or treatment of the accused or where the disclosure of the report to the accused will 
endanger a third person’s life.  See Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law 
at 2-38.1. 
248  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 2-38.1. 
249  R v Hogan (1985), 21 C.C.C (3d)285 (B.C.C.A).  See Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in 
Canadian Criminal Law at 2-21, 2-38.1 who confirms that the report drafted by the person who 
conducted the assessment is merely a recommendation to the court.  See, however, Van der Wolf et 
al 2010 International Journal of Forensic Mental Health 245 at 247 who indicates that courts rarely 
deviate from the recommendations as contained in fitness reports. 
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the appropriate disposition to be made in the particular case.250 
As soon as the assessment is completed, but not later than the last day of the assessment 
period, the accused must appear before the court or the Review Board that made the 
assessment order.251  A fitness hearing is held to determine if the accused is, in fact, fit to 
stand trial or not.252  At this hearing, the report drafted during the assessment period is 
considered together with all the other available evidence.253  Should it appear that an 
accused refused to co-operate with the psychiatrist for purposes of an assessment ordered 
by the Crown, the trier of fact may draw an adverse inference from such refusal.254 
The finding pertaining to the fitness of the accused will determine the path of the accused 
within the criminal justice system.  The consequences of an unfitness finding are explored 
below. 
4.6 Personal and procedural consequences of a finding of not fit to stand trial 
A finding of not fit to stand trial can have serious consequences for a mentally ill accused 
and can result in deprivation of liberty for a substantial period of time.255  A finding of 
unfitness applies to all the charges against the accused and need not be established in 
respect of each separate charge.256  If found unfit, the accused’s plea will be set aside, and 
                                                
250  Sections 672.2(1) to (4) of the Criminal Code.  Also see Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in 
Canadian Criminal Law at 238. 
251  Section 672.191 of the Criminal Code.  See Byrick and Walker-Renshaw A practical guide to Mental 
Health and the Law in Ontario at 80 where it is stated that the accused must appear before the 
Review Board or court as soon as the assessment is done, especially if it is completed in a shorter 
time than the period for which the assessment was ordered.  Also see Barrett and Shandler Mental 
Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 2-21,  2-34 who explain that this provision was added to 
ensure that mentally ill accused persons are not detained for unnecessary long periods for purposes 
of an assessment. 
252  The issue is heard and determined by the presiding judge in the case where the accused elected 
trial by judge with no jury.  Where the issue arises in respect of an accused that elected to be tried 
by a judge and jury, and the issue arises before the trial commenced, a special jury will be elected to 
hear the fitness issue.  Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 176, 177.  Also 
see Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 291.  With the consent of the accused, this special jury may 
then also hear the case relating to the charge for which he stands trial.  See Section 672.26(1) of the 
Criminal Code.  Where the fitness issue arises during the course of the trial the same jury will merely 
be instructed to direct their attention to the fitness issue and will have to decide on the fitness issue.  
Section 672.26(b) of the Criminal Code.    
253  Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 176.  Also see Legal Aid Ontario 
http://lawfacts.ca/mental-health/court  (Date of use:  22 September 2016). 
254  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 2-62-263. 
255  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 143.  Also see Newby and Faltin 2008 
Journal of Offender Rehabilitation 185 at 189 who confirms that a finding of “not fit to stand trial” can 
result in the accused staying in a psychiatric hospital for a considerable period. 
256  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-28. 
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any jury that has been convened will be discharged.257  Neither a conviction nor an acquittal 
is made in respect of an unfit accused.258  The proceedings are stayed until the accused 
regains fitness, if at all.259 
After the finding of unfitness, a disposition hearing must be held by either the court or the 
Review Board.260  The preference in practice seems to be to refer the matter to the Review 
Board for a disposition at the outset.261    
Prior to the disposition hearing, the Crown may bring an application to the court for a 
treatment order with the view of securing treatment for the accused so that he can recover 
sufficiently to stand trial.262  This treatment, however, excludes psychosurgery 263 and 
electroconvulsive therapy.264  Such treatment order may only be made by a court, including 
                                                
257  Section 672.31 of the Criminal Code.  Also see Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian 
Criminal Law at 3-48. 
258  Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 177. 
259  Van der Wolf et al 2010 International Journal of Forensic Mental Health 245 at 250 who adds that 
there is no time limit to this temporary stay of proceedings. 
260  Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 292. 
261  Mackay 1995 The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 121 at 129.  Also see Barrett and Shandler Mental 
Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3.37. 
262  Section 672.58 read with 672.59(1 and 672.61 of the Criminal Code provides for a court to order 
treatment for an accused to render him fit to stand trial.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema 
Mental Health Courts at 97, 143.  Also see Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 292.  Also see Mewett 
An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 177 footnotes 2.  See further Newby and Faltin 
2008 Journal of Offender Rehabilitation 185 at 189.  See further Mackay 1995 The Journal of 
Forensic Psychiatry 121 at 129.  Also see Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian 
Criminal Law at 3-33.  Lastly, see Byrick and Walker-Renshaw A practical guide to Mental Health 
and the Law in Ontario at 80.  Also see Schizophrenia society of Ontario 
http://www.schizophrenia.on.ca/getmedia/d252fe01-ab2a-429c-bd6b-
5322115c4204/justice_process_guide.pdf.aspx (Date of use: 20 September 2016) at 15 where it is 
explained that this is sometimes referred to as a “make fit” order.  
263  “Psychosurgery” is defined in section 672.61(2) of the Criminal Code as: “...means any procedure 
that by direct or indirect access to the brain removes, destroys or interrupts the continuity of 
histologically normal brain tissue, or inserts indwelling electrodes for pulsed electrical stimulation for 
the purpose of altering behaviour or treating psychiatric illness, but does not include neurological 
procedures used to diagnose or treat intractable physical pain, organic brain conditions, or epilepsy, 
where any of those conditions is clearly demonstrable”.  Section 49 of the Ontario Mental Health Act 
also prohibits the provision of psychosurgery to an accused detained pursuant to the provisions of 
the Criminal Code.  Section 49 reads as follows:  “Psychosurgery 49.(1)Psychosurgery shall not be 
administered to an involuntary patient, to a person who is incapable of giving or refusing consent to 
psychosurgery on his or her own behalf for the purposes of the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, or to 
a person who is remanded or detained in a psychiatric facility pursuant to the Criminal Code 
(Canada).1992, c. 32, s. 20 (39); 1996, c. 2, s. 72 (30).” 
264  Section 672.61(1) of the Criminal Code.  Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 292.  Also see Barrett and 
Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-36.2.  Electro-convulsive therapy is defined 
in section 276.61(2) of the Criminal Code as  “…means a procedure for the treatment of certain 
mental disorders that induces, by electrical stimulation of the brain, a series of generalized 
convulsions”.  Section 49 of the Ontario Mental Health Act also prohibits the provision of 
psychosurgery to an accused detained pursuant to the provisions of the Criminal Code.  Section 49 
reads as follows:  “Psychosurgery 49.(1)Psychosurgery shall not be administered to an involuntary 
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a Mental Health Court, whereas a Review Board lacks such authority.265  A treatment order 
will, however, only be made if it is certain that without the relevant treatment, the accused is 
likely to remain permanently unfit to stand trial.266  These orders are often made in respect 
of persons with schizophrenia or bipolar disorder who can often return to a state of fitness 
with antipsychotic drug treatment.267  The hospital or physician, who must administer the 
treatment, must consent to such treatment order.268  A treatment order may be made 
without the consent of the accused but only for a maximum of 60 days.269  
If the accused recovers during the 60-day treatment period and is fit for trial, the accused is 
referred back to the criminal court for a fitness hearing.  If the accused is found fit to stand 
trial at such hearing, the criminal proceeding continues.270  The party asserting that the 
                                                                                                                                                   
patient, to a person who is incapable of giving or refusing consent to psychosurgery on his or her 
own behalf for the purposes of the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, or to a person who is remanded 
or detained in a psychiatric facility pursuant to the Criminal Code (Canada).  1992, c. 32, s. 20 (39); 
1996, c. 2, s. 72 (30).” 
265  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-39.  Also see Byrick and 
Walker-Renshaw A practical guide to Mental Health and the Law in Ontario at 102.  A treatment 
order may also be made by a Mental Health Court. 
266  Section 672.59(2)(b) of the Criminal Code.  The court also has to be satisfied that it is the least 
restrictive treatment available and that the risk of harm is not disproportionate to the anticipated 
benefit.  Also see Mackay 1995 The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 121 at 130 who points out that 
medical evidence has to be led to show that the accused will remain unfit if he does not receive the 
relevant treatment. 
267  Centre for Addiction and Mental Health v R 2012 ONCA 342 at [39].  Also see Byrick and Walker-
Renshaw A practical guide to Mental Health and the Law in Ontario at 83. 
268  Section 672.62 of the Criminal Code.  Also see Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian 
Criminal Law at 3-36, 3-36.1 where some of the practical challenges experienced by hospitals in this 
regard is discussed.  Also see Byrick and Walker-Renshaw A practical guide to Mental Health and 
the Law in Ontario at 82, 83.  Also see section 23 of the Ontario Mental Health Act that provides that 
a treatment order may only be made once the psychiatric hospital where it is to be provided confirms 
the availability of its services to the particular accused.  
269  Mackay 1995 The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 121 at 130.  Also see Barrett and Shandler Mental 
Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 1-11 where it is pointed out that this is the only instance where 
the court may compel a mentally disordered accused to undergo treatment.  Also see Byrick and 
Walker-Renshaw A practical guide to Mental Health and the Law in Ontario at 83 where the unique 
nature of the authority to order treatment without the patient’s consent or substituted consent by an 
authorised person is discussed.  See further Van der Wolf et al 2010 International Journal of 
Forensic Mental Health 245 at 256 who confirms that the unfit accused’s consent is not required for 
the order or for the treatment that he will receive during this period.  Section 22 of the Ontario Mental 
Health Act makes provision for the a judge to order that an accused with a mental illness receives 
treatment at a psychiatric hospital for a period not exceeding 2 months.  See further Centre for 
Addiction and Mental Health v R 2012 ONCA 342 at [39] where the court explains that the purpose 
of these treatment orders are to assist those that can regain fitness through for example anti-
psychotic drug treatment which usually has an effect within 30 to 60 days.  (one to two months).  
Also see Schizophrenia society of Ontario http://www.schizophrenia.on.ca/getmedia/d252fe01-ab2a-
429c-bd6b-5322115c4204/justice_process_guide.pdf.aspx (Date of use: 20 September 2016) at 15 
that states that treatment as a consequence of a “make fit” order is done without the consent of the 
accused and that this is the only instance where the law allows treatment of an accused person 
without consent.    
270  Section 672.32(1) of the Criminal Code that states, “A verdict of unfit to stand trial shall not prevent 
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accused has recovered to such an extent that he is now fit to stand trial, bears the onus of 
proving such on a balance of probabilities.271  The accused may, however, despite being 
found fit to stand trial, be detained in hospital until the trial commences if the Review Board 
is of the view that the accused may become unfit to stand trial again should he be 
discharged pending the trial.272  This is referred to as a “keep fit” order.273  This would 
typically be the case for an accused who, even though fit to stand trial, suffers from a 
mental illness.274  If, after the treatment period in terms of the treatment order, the court 
finds that the accused is still unfit to stand trial, the trial will proceed as in a case where no 
such treatment order was made, in that a disposition hearing may be held by the court or 
the matter may be referred to the Review Board to decide on the appropriate disposition.275    
The court or Review Board (depending on if the disposition hearing is conducted by the 
court or the Review Board) may, on application of either of the parties or of its own accord, 
order an assessment of the accused where information that can be obtained from such 
assessment is needed to decide on an appropriate disposition.276  Such an assessment 
                                                                                                                                                   
the accused from being tried subsequently where the accused becomes fit to stand trial”.  Also see 
Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-24 where it is pointed out that 
where it has to be proved that an accused has recovered from his unfitness, the presumption of 
fitness no longer applies.  The criminal proceedings that continues after an accused is found fit to 
stand trial, may also include referral to the Mental Health Court.  Also see Van der Wolf et al 2010 
International Journal of Forensic Mental Health 245 at 247 who states that the majority of accused 
persons that were initially found unfit, are eventually sent to court as fit after having received 
treatment during this time, mostly by way of psychotic medication. 
271  Section 672(32)(2) of the Criminal Code states that “(2) The burden of proof that the accused has 
subsequently become fit to stand trial is on the party who asserts it, and is discharged by proof on 
the balance of probabilities”. 
272  Section 672.49(1) of the Criminal Code.  Mackay 1995 The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 121 at 
130.  Also see Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-39.  The Review 
Board thus has the same power as the court to order that a person remain in hospital despite the 
fact that they are found fit to stand trial.  The aim is to protect the accused’s mental state, as there is 
a risk that it will deteriorate if he is transferred to a correctional facility without proper psychiatric 
services.  See also Byrick and Walker-Renshaw A practical guide to Mental Health and the Law in 
Ontario at 81 who is of the view that the accused may be detained until completion of the trial. 
273  Section 672.29 of the Criminal Code.  See Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian 
Criminal Law at 3-33 where it is pointed out that the court may order that the accused remains in 
hospital even though he is fit to stand trial if the court is concerned about the accused’s mental state 
should he be sent back to the correctional facility where psychiatric services are limited.  Also see 
.Byrick and Walker-Renshaw A practical guide to Mental Health and the Law in Ontario at 82.  See 
further Schizophrenia society of Ontario http://www.schizophrenia.on.ca/getmedia/d252fe01-ab2a-
429c-bd6b-5322115c4204/justice_process_guide.pdf.aspx (Date of use: 20 September 2016) at 15. 
274  It is specifically these individuals that may benefit from a Mental Health Court where accused 
persons who are fit to stand trial but mentally ill can be diverted away from the Criminal Justice 
system. 
275  As provided for in section 672.45 of the Criminal Code.  Also see Mackay 1995 The Journal of 
Forensic Psychiatry 121 at 130.  See further Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian 
Criminal Law at 3.34. 
276  A disposition as provided for in section 672.54 of the Criminal Code.  Also see section 672.121 of the 
Criminal Code, which empowers a Review Board to order an assessment of the accused under 
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might be necessary where for instance there is no assessment report on the accused 
available, where assessment information on the accused is outdated, or where the accused 
has been transferred from another province.277  The reason why a report might not be 
available is that, as discussed earlier, the Criminal Code does not make it compulsory for a 
mental health professional to file an assessment report with the court unless the court 
specifically requests it.  This could lead to duplication of assessments which impacts costs 
and available resources.  This could easily be remedied by making the filing of an 
assessment report compulsory, regardless of whether the court made an order to this 
effect.  
The psychiatric report, if available, must be made available to all parties involved in the 
disposition hearing.278  Such information may, however, be withheld from the accused if the 
court is of the view that disclosure of the information to the accused will be detrimental to 
the accused or a third party.279 
Due process is followed at the disposition hearing 280 at which the accused is entitled to be 
present 281 and legally represented.282  The court may make a disposition if it is satisfied 
that the accused is indeed unfit to stand trial 283 and if the court deems it necessary for a 
                                                                                                                                                   
certain circumstances.  Also see section 672.11.(d) of the Criminal Code that provides specifically for 
an assessment order to be made where the goal of such an assessment is to determine the 
appropriate disposition for a person found not fit to stand trial.  See further Byrick and Walker-
Renshaw A practical guide to Mental Health and the Law in Ontario at 78. 
277  In terms of section 672.86 of the Criminal Code.  See section 672.121(b) for the circumstances 
under which the Review Board may make an assessment order.  These circumstances include an 
assessment where the accused was assessed more than 12 months ago and assessment 
information is thus out-dated. 
278  Section 672.51(2) of the Criminal Code. 
279  Section 672.51(3) of the Criminal Code states that “(3) The court or Review Board shall withhold 
some or all of the disposition information from an accused where it is satisfied, on the basis of that 
information and the evidence or report of the medical practitioner responsible for the assessment or 
treatment of the accused, that disclosure of the information would be likely to endanger the life or 
safety of another person or would seriously impair the treatment or recovery of the accused”.  This 
provision seems to incorporate the concept of therapeutic privilege in the law where information may 
be withheld from a patient where non-disclosure is in the interest of such patient.  Also see Barrett 
and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 2-38.1. 
280  Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 177. 
281  Section 672.5(9) of the Criminal Code.  This right is however subject to certain exceptions set out in 
section 672.5(10 of the Criminal Code, for example where the accused disrupts the proceedings, to 
such an extent that it is not feasible to attempt to continue with the hearing in the presence of the 
accused (section 672.5(10)(b)(i)).  The provisions of section 672.5(13) of the Criminal Code is also 
relevant here in that it allows the court or Review Board to communicate with an accused via close-
circuit television where the accused is not present in court.  Also see Harradence 2012 Crim.L.Q 511 
at 550. 
282  Section 672.5(7) read with section 672.8(a) of the Criminal Code.  Also see Harradence 2012 
Crim.L.Q 511 at 550. 
283  Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada  at 177. 
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disposition to be made without delay.284  This is particularly the case where the verdict is 
that the accused is unfit to stand trial and poses no risk to the public.  The disposition made 
by the court is reviewed by the Review Board.285 
If the court is of the opinion that more information is necessary in order to make an 
appropriate disposition, the matter is referred to the Review Board, and the accused will fall 
under the jurisdiction of such Review Board.286  The Review Board is provided with a 
transcript of the court proceedings and all other documents 287 and must make a 
disposition.288  The accused may be remanded in custody in a psychiatric hospital pending 
the disposition hearing by the Review Board.289 
The Review Board must make a disposition that is necessary and appropriate in the 
circumstances with due consideration to public safety, the mental disorder of the accused 
and other needs of the accused, as well as the reintegration of the accused into society.290  
                                                
284  Section 672.45(2) of the Criminal Code.  Also see Mackay 1995 The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 
121 at 129 who points out that the court must be satisfied that it could readily make this order 
immediately.  If there is doubt the matter must be referred to the relevant Review Board.  Also see 
Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 8-1 where it is explained that 
where a disposition hearing is conducted by a court and not a Review Board, the procedures that 
govern the Review Board during such proceedings shall apply.   
285  The Review Board must review the disposition within 90 days from date of the order.  See Byrick and 
Walker-Renshaw A practical guide to Mental Health and the Law in Ontario at 82, 97. 
286  Section 672.45(1.1), 672.47 of the Criminal Code.  Also see Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal 
Process in Canada at 177.  See further Mackay 1995 The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 121 at 129.  
Also see 672.121 of the Criminal Code, which empowers a Review Board to order an assessment of 
the accused under certain circumstances.  See further Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in 
Canadian Criminal Law at 3-37. 
287  Section 672.45 (1.1) where the court does not hold a disposition hearing and section 672.52(2) 
where the court held a disposition hearing. 
288  Section 672.47(1) of the Criminal Code.  See Byrick and Walker-Renshaw A practical guide to 
Mental Health and the Law in Ontario at 82, 97 where it is explained that, where the court does not 
hold a disposition hearing, the Review Board must have such a hearing within 45 days but where the 
court made a disposition, the Review Board must have a hearing within 90 days to review the 
disposition granted by the court.  For more on these reviews, see Schizophrenia society of Ontario 
http://www.schizophrenia.on.ca/getmedia/d252fe01-ab2a-429c-bd6b-
5322115c4204/justice_process_guide.pdf.aspx (Date of use: 20 September 2016) at 15 where these 
time frames for the Review Board hearing to be held is set out. 
289  Section 672.46(2) of the Criminal Code.  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal 
Law at 8-3.  This is however not the default position.  The status quo in terms of detention or non-
detention that existed prior to the court referring the matter to the Review Board will remain unless 
the court makes a different order to vary such status.  Section 672.46(1) of the Criminal Code states 
that any other order made by the court prior to the disposition being heard by the Review Board, for 
example, conditional discharge, shall remain in force until the Review Board ordered the relevant 
disposition. 
290  Section 672.54 of the Criminal Code after amendment by the Not Criminally Responsible Reform 
Act.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 21.  Also see Mewett An 
Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 177.  See further Roach et al Criminal Law and 
Procedure at 777.  See further Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 7-
33 where the public nature of the hearings is discussed. 
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The safety of the public is now the paramount consideration after the latest amendment of 
the Criminal Code.291  Prior to the amendment of the Criminal Code, a disposition had to be 
made that was least restrictive and onerous on the accused with due consideration to the 
safety of the public and the accused’s mental condition.292  The focus seemed to have 
shifted from the liberty of the accused to the safety of the public.293  The Supreme Court of 
Canada,294 however, held that a disposition that is “necessary and appropriate” should 
necessarily be made within the framework of what the “least onerous and restrictive” 
disposition would be having regard to public safety, the mental disorder of the accused, his 
other needs and his reintegration into society.  Although the safety of the public is the main 
consideration, no victim impact statements are allowed at a disposition hearing of an 
accused found unfit to stand trial since the presumption of innocence still applies.295 
The dispositions that may be made in respect of an unfit accused can take the form of a 
discharge subject to certain conditions 296 or detention in a hospital subject to such 
conditions as the court or Review Board determine.297    
                                                
291  The Criminal Code was amended by the Not Criminally Responsible Reform Act Bill C-14.  The 
principle of the safety of the public, including the victim, being the paramount consideration is 
echoed in the directive issued by the Ontario Attorney General in the context of considering a stay of 
proceedings as well.  See Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General Criminal Law Division Practice 
memorandum:  Mentally Disordered/Developmentally Disabled Offenders: Diversion at 5. 
292  Section 672.54 of the Criminal Code.  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal 
Law at 1-9 explain that the Review Boards succeed in keeping the focus on the treatment of the 
mentally ill accused person whilst ensuring public safety.  Also see Mewett An Introduction to the 
Criminal Process in Canada at 177.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts 
at 21.  See further Mackay 1995 The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 121 at 129.  
293  The requirement of the disposition being the least restrictive on the accused has fallen away.  This is 
after the amendment of the Criminal Code by the Not Criminally Responsible Reform Act that sets 
public safety as paramount consideration.  See Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian 
Criminal Law at 1-34 who predicts that this amendment might be challenged on the basis that it 
violates the accused’s Charter rights. 
294  Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre v Ontario (Attorney General) 2004 S.C.C 20.2004 Carswell 
Ont 1136 at [56].  The accused in this case was found not criminally responsible on a charge of 
assault with a weapon and was placed in a medium security facility from where he was later 
transferred to a high security facility.  The accused suffered from paranoid schizophrenia with a 
personality disorder displaying antisocial traits.  The accused averred that his detention in a secure 
facility violates his Charter rights.  The court however found that this is not the case.  The court found 
that the word “appropriate” used in section 672.54(b) and (c) necessarily has to be interpreted in the 
context of what is the least restrictive disposition for the accused with due consideration to the public 
safety, mental condition of the accused and his ultimate reintegration into society. 
295  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 1-24 where it is pointed out that 
victim impact statements are allowed at disposition hearings where the accused is found not 
criminally responsible because of mental illness and that such impact statements may be presented 
verbally in court unless ordered otherwise.  This is, however, impermissible where an accused was 
fount unfit to stand trial. 
296  Section 672.54(b) of the Criminal Code.  Also see Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 292. 
297  Section 672.54(c) of the Criminal Code.  Also see Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 292. 
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The accused found unfit to stand trial cannot be discharged unconditionally.298  This 
practice has been criticised because accused persons found not criminally responsible 
because of mental illness may well be discharged unconditionally.299  This is especially 
grounds for concern if regard is had to the fact that the latter group of mentally ill accused 
persons have actually been found guilty of committing the crime that they have been 
accused of, whereas those who are unfit to stand trial due to mental illness, are yet to stand 
trial in order for their guilt or innocence to be established.300 
The Supreme Court of Canada considered the absence of a provision for the absolute 
discharge of a permanently unfit accused in R v Demers.301  The Court found that it is 
indeed unconstitutional that there is no possibility for a permanently unfit accused of being 
released after a finding of unfitness.302  The court, however, proposed that a permanent 
stay of proceedings against such an accused rather than an absolute discharge be 
implemented.303  The court explains that:  
The unavailability of an absolute discharge relates to the fact that the accused has not been 
tried, rather than the presumption that the accused is guilty or dangerous.304   
The court’s approach is welcomed, as the accused is no longer subject to the infringement 
of his liberty by being detained indefinitely.  The difference between an absolute discharge 
versus a stay of proceedings is of little to no consequence to the mentally ill accused 305 
since either one ensures his freedom and that he will not face a trial with regard to the 
charges brought against him in future.    
                                                
298  Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 292.  Section 672.54(a) of the Criminal Code.  Also see Mackay 
1995 The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 121 at 129. 
299  Section 672.54 of the Criminal Code. 
300  See Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 1-22, 1-23 who shares this 
point of criticism and who is sceptical of the current regime and points out that a court might very 
well soon have to determine if this is in line with an accused’s Charter rights. 
301  [2004\ 2 S.C.R 489, 2004 S.C.C 46. (Hereinafter referred to as the ”Demers case”.) 
302  The Demers case at [56]].  Also see Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law 
at 3-42 who points out that without the option to be released unconditionally, an accused who 
remains permanently unfit will remain under state supervision for as long as a case can be proved 
against them, even in the absence of any dangerousness.  Also see Byrick and Walker-Renshaw A 
practical guide to Mental Health and the Law in Ontario at 90.  See further Luther and Mela 2006 
Sask L Rev 401 at 419.  Also see Harradence 2012 Crim.L.Q 511 at 551, 552 where it is explained 
that this judgment rectified the unfair situation that existed for permanently unfit accused in that it 
declared the practice of indefinite detention of such accused unconstitutional.  
303  The Demers case at [60], [64]. 
304  The Demers case at [34]. 
305  See Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 1-22 where it is pointed out 
that the court in the Demers decision suggested that permanently unfit accused persons should be 
absolutely discharged.  Parliament however opted for the permanent stay option as no determination 
of responsibility for the crime has been made. 
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As a result of this finding in the Demers case, Bill C-10 was promulgated which amended 
the Criminal Code to the effect that a permanent stay of proceedings may be ordered in 
respect of an accused who is permanently unfit to stand trial.306  Where an accused 
appears to be permanently unfit to stand trial, an assessment must be ordered to determine 
if an order for the stay of proceedings should be made.307  Only a court, and not a Review 
Board, may order a stay of proceedings as this ensures that due consideration is given to 
public safety.308  If a stay of proceedings is ordered, the accused is released as a stay of 
proceedings renders any disposition given by a Review Board of no effect.309  If a stay of 
proceedings is not ordered, the unfit accused remains under the jurisdiction of the Review 
                                                
306  Section 672.851 of the Criminal Code as amended by Bill C-10 promulgated in 2005.  A permanent 
stay of proceedings may be ordered if the court is convinced that the accused will not ever regain his 
fitness to stand trial, that the accused does not pose a significant threat to society and that such stay 
of proceedings will be in the interest of the administration of justice (section 672.851(7).  The order to 
stay the proceedings against the accused, is made with due consideration to the seriousness of the 
offence, the impact that a stay of proceedings may have on public confidence in the judicial system 
and the time that has lapsed since the commission of the offence.  This provision was inserted after 
the court’s decision in the Demers case where it was evident that the accused will never regain 
fitness to stand trial.  It was found that the lack of a provision for an absolute discharge for an 
accused who remains unfit to stand trial but who poses no threat to society violates section 7 of the 
Charter.  The court declared the relevant provisions invalid and ordered that the law be amended 
within 12 months from the order in order to remedy the unconstitutional provisions, see {60}, {66} of 
the judgment.  Also see Roach et al Criminal Law and Procedure 779.  Also see Barrett and 
Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 1-21.  See further Van der Wolf et al 2010 
International Journal of Forensic Mental Health 245 at 250.  See further Schneider Annotated 
Ontario Mental Health Statutes at 473 where it is explained that the situation prior to the introduction 
of Bill C-10 was that an accused who had a brain injury for example, could remain subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Review Board forever, since he will never regain fitness to stand trial.  The Review 
Board’s jurisdiction was not based on the question if the accused posed a danger to society but 
merely if the accused has a mental disorder.  See further Harradence 2012 Crim.L.Q 511 at 552.   
307  Section 672.11(e) of the Criminal Code.  This is done in cases where an accused appears to be 
permanently unfit to stand trial and unlikely to recover. 
308  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 1-22.  Also see Byrick and 
Walker-Renshaw A practical guide to Mental Health and the Law in Ontario at 91 where the safety of 
the public is highlighted as one of the primary considerations where a court considers ordering a 
permanent stay of proceedings.  See further Luther and Mela 2006 Sask L Rev 401 at 419. 
309  Section 672.851(9) of the Criminal Code.  An order for the stay of proceedings will only be made if it 
is clear that the accused is and will remain unfit to stand trial, that he does not pose a significant 
threat to the public and that a stay of proceedings is in the interest of the proper administration of 
justice in this case (see section 672.851(7).  Whether such stay will be in the interest of the proper 
administration of justice, is determined by giving due considerations to submissions made by the 
prosecution or the accused regarding (a) the nature and seriousness of the alleged offence; (b) the 
salutary and deleterious effects of the order for a stay of proceedings, including any effect on public 
confidence in the administration of justice; (c) the time that has elapsed since the commission of the 
alleged offence and whether an inquiry has been held under section 672.33 to decide whether 
sufficient evidence can be adduced to put the accused on trial; (see section 672.851(8)). Also see 
the Demers case at [64] where the court indicates that other factors that might have an influence on 
the decision to stay proceedings is the nature of the accusation, previous medical records of the 
accused and whether the accused is taking medication for his condition.  Also see Van der Wolf et al 
2010 International Journal of Forensic Mental Health 245 at 255 who confirms that the accused may, 
subsequent to the decision in Demers be released.  Hospitalisation may, however, also be ordered.  
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Board 310 where his fitness will be reviewed periodically.311  These reviews continue until 
such time as the accused is found fit to stand trial, found permanently unfit to stand trial or 
until such time as it is found that the Crown no longer has any evidence to support a case 
against the accused.312  If during such review 313 the Review Board finds that the accused is 
fit to stand trial, the accused is referred back to court, and the criminal proceedings shall 
continue as per usual.314   
The Criminal Code provides for the examination of the evidence against the accused bi-
annually, a provision that was included to avoid the detention of an accused without the 
Crown actually having a case against him.315  Where a prima facie case against the 
accused cannot be proved, or where the court is of the view that evidence is no longer 
sufficient, the accused may be acquitted.316  
                                                
310  Section 672.851(9) of the Criminal Code.  Also see Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in 
Canadian Criminal Law at 3-43. 
311  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-38, 3-39 where it is stated that 
the Review Board reviews the fitness status of the accused annually.  Also see Van der Wolf et al 
2010 International Journal of Forensic Mental Health 245 at 250 who explain that the Review Board 
reviews a decision of unfitness within 90 days and thereafter annually.  
312  Schizophrenia society of Ontario http://www.schizophrenia.on.ca/getmedia/d252fe01-ab2a-429c-
bd6b-5322115c4204/justice_process_guide.pdf.aspx (Date of use: 20 September 2016) at 15.  Also 
see Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-38.  
313  The Review Board is required to conduct periodic reviews on the state of accused persons found not 
fit to stand trial.  Section 672.81 of the Criminal Code.  Also see Newby and Faltin 2008 Journal of 
Offender Rehabilitation 185 at 189. 
314  Section 672.48(2) of the Criminal Code.  Also see Parliamentary Information and research service 
Current issues in Mental Health in Canada at 3.  Also see Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in 
Canadian Criminal Law at 3-33.  This entails that the court holds a fitness hearing again and if it is 
confirmed that the accused is fit, the criminal proceedings shall continue.  Also see Harradence 2012 
Crim.L.Q 511 at 550. 
315  Section 672.33 of the Criminal Code provides for these inquiries into the evidence against the 
accused every two years until the accused is tried or acquitted.  Also see Barrett and Shandler 
Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 1-12.  See further Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 292 
who points out that such a review can also be done sooner where the accused avers that the Crown 
is no longer able to prove its case against the accused.  See further Mackay 1995 The Journal of 
Forensic Psychiatry 121 at 130.  Section 672.33(1.1) provides that the period for the review of the 
evidence may be extended if it is in the interest of the proper administration of justice.  Also see 
Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-34 and 3-41.  See further Van 
der Wolf et al 2010 International Journal of Forensic Mental Health 245 at 250.  Lastly, see 
Harradence 2012 Crim.L.Q 511 at 550. 
316  As provided for in section 672.33(6) of the Criminal Code.  Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal 
Process in Canada at 178.  Also see Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 292 who states that the 
accused is then “entitled” to an acquittal.  See further Mackay 1995 The Journal of Forensic 
Psychiatry 121 at 130.  Also see Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 
3-40.  See again Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 292 who points out that the procedure for these 
hearings, to determine if there is still sufficient evidence, is not set out in the Criminal Code and can 
be conducted by way of affidavit.  See further Van der Wolf et al 2010 International Journal of 
Forensic Mental Health 245 at 250.  Also see Byrick and Walker-Renshaw A practical guide to 
Mental Health and the Law in Ontario at 91. 
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The Crown and the accused may appeal against a finding of unfit to stand trial 317 and/or a 
stay of proceedings.318  The Appeal court generally refers the matter to the Review Board 
as the courts generally lack the expertise to decide on an appropriate disposition.319  The 
Ontario Court of Appeal acknowledged the important function of the Review Boards by 
stating: 
In the present case, the board had to review extensive psychiatric material and consider 
somewhat conflicting psychiatric opinions.  In doing so, the board was required to assess the 
mental condition of the accused, the dangerousness of the accused, the treatment prospects 
of the accused, and the treatment regime, which would best fit the dictates of s. 674.54.  All 
of these judgments called into play the board's medical expertise and its knowledge of the 
various facilities available within the mental health system.  This court has neither that 
expertise nor that knowledge…320 
It is evident that the criminal courts, including the appellate courts, acknowledge the 
specialised skills that the Review Board has to offer and that they make use thereof during 
cases involving accused persons with mental illness.  
The finding of unfit to stand trial is not valid indefinitely as an accused may be tried once he 
recovers, if at all, and becomes fit to stand trial.321   The position of such an accused and an 
accused who was found fit from the outset of the criminal proceedings is discussed below. 
4.7 Consequences of a finding of fit to stand trial 
The consequences of being found fit to stand trial are equally serious, especially for an 
                                                
317  Section 675(3) and 676(3) of the Criminal Code.  Also see Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 292 who 
interprets sections 675(3) and 676(3) to include an appeal against a finding of fit to stand trial.  The 
wording of these sections however specifically refer to a finding of unfit to stand trial.  See further 
Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 11-12. 
318  Section 672.852(1) of the Criminal Code.  An order not to grant such a stay of proceedings may 
however not be appealed against.  See Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal 
Law at 3-43. 
319  In R v Packham (1994) (Peckham v. Attorney General of Ontario (1994), 93 C.C.C. (3d) 443 (Ont. 
C.A.) the fact that the review courts lack the skill and expertise to decide on the appropriate way to 
deal with these accused persons have been spelt out by the Ontario Court of Appeal.  The court, 
however, reasserts his position as the final decision maker in appeals and states that, at [39]  “…if 
after due regard to the board's advantaged position and its expertise, the court concludes that the 
disposition is unreasonable, it must intervene.”  Also see Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in 
Canadian Criminal Law at 11-3.  Also see Harradence 2012 Crim.L.Q 511 at 514 where it is stated 
that the “significant expertise” of the Review Boards and their efforts in protecting the procedural 
rights of mentally ill accused persons are acknowledged.  
320  R v Packham (1994) (Peckham v. Attorney General of Ontario (1994), 93 C.C.C. (3d) 443 (Ont. 
C.A.) at [39]. 
321  Section 672.32(1) of the Criminal Code.  Also see Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in 
Canada at 177.  The party who alleges that the accused has regained his fitness to stand trial, bears 
the burden of proving same on a balance of probabilities. 
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accused who, even though fit to stand trial still suffers from a mental illness.322  The majority 
of those sent for fitness assessments are found fit to stand trial.323  The reason for this 
could possibly, at least partially, be due to the low threshold of the test for fitness, as 
explained earlier. 
Where an accused regains his fitness to stand trial, he shall be deemed fit to stand trial, 
and the criminal trial against such an accused may proceed as per normal.  The question 
as to if this accused will, in fact, be tried when he regains his fitness depends heavily on the 
discretion of the prosecution.324  Where the offence that the accused has been charged with 
is a minor offence, or where the accused was detained in a psychiatric hospital prior to 
regaining fitness, the prosecution may very well decide not to proceed if there has been a 
long lapse of time since the alleged offence and the account of witnesses are no longer 
reliable as a result of this.325 
 It should be mentioned at this stage that eligible mentally ill accused persons found fit to 
stand trial can be diverted away from the criminal justice system to the Mental Health Court 
for treatment programmes.  The eligibility criteria and other important aspects of the Mental 
Health Court are discussed later in this chapter as part of the procedural dynamics of 
Mental Health Courts. 
 Where an accused is found fit to stand trial and is not diverted to the Mental Health Court, 
the criminal proceedings continue as per usual as if the fitness issue was never raised.326  If 
                                                
322  See Van der Wolf et al 2010 International Journal of Forensic Mental Health 245 at 247 who reports 
on studies conducted that indicates that accused persons with psychosis can be perfectly capable of 
standing trial.  Also see Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General Criminal Law Division Practice 
memorandum:  Mentally Disordered/Developmentally Disabled Offenders: Diversion at 1 where it is 
acknowledged that persons with mental disorders and /or developmental disabilities are often found 
fit to stand trial and that this compels consideration of alternatives to formal adjudication of their 
cases in criminal court.  See the discussion of Mental Health Courts later in this chapter as an 
example of one such alternative employed on Ontario.  
323  O’Shaughnessy 2007 The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 505 at 507.  
Also see Zapf and Roesch 1998 Canadian Journal of Psychiatry 287-293 who’s study found that 
90% of all the accused sent for fitness evaluations in their study, was found fit to stand trial.  See 
further Newby and Faltin 2008 Journal of Offender Rehabilitation 185 at 188 where this figure is 
confirmed – although reported as 11% of all referrals being found not fit to stand trial.  See further in 
general Roesch et al 1997 Canadian Journal of Psychiatry 509-514 and O’Shaughnessy 2007 The 
Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 505 at 507 reported that 79% of those 
evaluated for fitness to stand trial on an inpatient basis, were found fit to stand trial and 74% of those 
evaluated for fitness on an outpatient basis, were found fit to stand trial.  Also see  Chaimowitz GA 
and Ferencz J “Cost savings associated with fitness to stand trial assessments in detention centres:  
A pilot program” 1999 (44) Canadian Journal of Psychiatry 808-810. 
324  Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 177. 
325  Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 177, 178. 
326  Section 672.28 of the Criminal Code.  Also see Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 292.  See further 
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there is a change in circumstances and it appears later in the trial that the accused might be 
unfit to stand trial, the issue may be raised again.327    
There is no provision made for an appeal against a finding of fit to stand trial as soon as it 
has been made.  The issue may, however, be raised on appeal together with an accused’s 
appeal against his conviction or the Crown’s appeal against his acquittal.328   
4.8 Conclusion 
 As is evident from the discussion above, a detailed system has been created to deal with 
those found unfit to stand trial in that the Review Boards have to review findings of 
unfitness and dispositions made in respect of such persons.  Every possible safety net has 
been built into the system to ensure that a person found unfit to stand trial is dealt with 
fairly. 
Accused persons with mental illnesses that are found fit to stand trial do not fall under the 
jurisdiction of the Review Boards and are theoretically exposed to the harsh realities of the 
traditional criminal justice system.  As pointed out earlier, the majority of accused persons 
sent for fitness assessments are found fit to stand trial, arguably due to the low threshold 
set for fitness.  The low threshold translates into persons being found fit to stand trial who 
would perhaps have been found unfit had another test for fitness been used.  Many of these 
persons, although found fit under the low threshold test, have a mental illness.  Once found 
fit to stand trial, no further consideration is given to the fact that the accused suffers from a 
mental illness in the traditional criminal justice process. 
Mental Health Courts, however, provide an alternative to traditional prosecution for those 
found fit but mentally ill.  In response to the unique challenges that mental illness brings to 
the criminal justice system, specialised solutions such as Mental Health Courts have been 
introduced to deal specifically with the fit but mentally ill accused in the Canadian criminal 
justice system.  It is necessary to explore the functioning of Mental Health Courts as they 
                                                                                                                                                   
Newby and Faltin 2008 Journal of Offender Rehabilitation 185 at 189.  Also see Barrett and Shandler 
Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-33.  See further Byrick and Walker-Renshaw A 
practical guide to Mental Health and the Law in Ontario at 81. 
327  Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 290.  See further Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health 
Courts at 141 who points out that fitness can arise at more than one point in the proceedings.  It is 
further observed that it is not unusual for fitness findings about an accused to differ on the various 
occasions of observation. 
328  This is in line with the rule against interlocutory appeals.  See Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder 
in Canadian Criminal Law at 11-4. 
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operate in Canada and the diversion option that they offer to mentally ill, but fit accused 
persons. 
Before the specific diversion programme as a component of the Canadian Mental Health 
Court is discussed, an overview of diversion in Canada is given. 
5  DIVERSION AWAY FROM THE CANADIAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
What follows is a general discussion of diversion in Canada and serves as background to 
the discussion of Mental Health Courts.  Mental Health Courts offers diversion programmes 
within their framework. 
The number of persons with mental illnesses entering the criminal justice system in Ontario, 
increased by 27% since 1995.329   This high number raised legitimate concerns.  One of the 
primary objectives of the 2012 Mental Health strategy for Canada is to reduce the number 
of persons with mental illness in the criminal justice system.330   Another objective is to 
ensure the availability of services and support for the mentally ill persons that encounter the 
criminal justice system.331 Alternatives to traditional prosecution could create an opportunity 
for the achievement of these objectives. 
Part XXIII of the Criminal Code makes provision for alternative sentencing measures.332  
Although the term “sentencing” is used, it relates to non-judicial proceedings such as 
diversion and would thus include post-charge diversion programmes such as Mental Health 
                                                
329  For more detail on the increase in the number of persons with mental illness that come into contact 
with the criminal justice system annually, see Ministry of Health and Long-term Care  
http://www.health.gov.on.ca/en/common/ministry/publications/reports/mentalhealth/framework.pdf   
(Date of use: 26 August 2015) at 4.  Also see National Judicial Institute Problem-solving in Canada’s 
courtrooms.  A guide to therapeutic justice (National Judicial Institute Canada, 2011) at 9 where it is 
confirmed that persons with mental illness are overrepresented in the Canadian criminal justice 
system.  See further Harradence 2012 Crim.L.Q 511 at 514 where the increase in the number of 
mentally ill persons in the criminal justice system is confirmed.  The author traces the increase back 
to the amendments to the Criminal Code in 1992. 
330  Mental Health Commission of Canada Changing Directions, Changing Lives: The Mental Health 
Strategy for Canada (Mental Health Commission of Canada Alberta 2012) at 46-55. 
331  Centre for addiction and mental health Evidence Summary:  Mental Health Diversion Framework in 
Canada (April 2014) http://eenet.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Mental-Health-Diversion-Policy-
Frameworks_April2014-Final.pdf  (Date of use: 12 August 2016) at 3.  Forensic services have been 
under pressure due to the increase in numbers of mentally ill persons in the criminal justice system.  
The need for increased availability of services and support for the mentally ill accused in the criminal 
justice system is acknowledged and discussed in Ministry of Health and Long-term Care  
http://www.health.gov.on.ca/en/common/ministry/publications/reports/mentalhealth/framework.pdf   
(Date of use: 26 August 2015) at 4.    
332  Section 716 of the Criminal Code defines alternative methods as:  “means measures other than 
judicial proceedings under this Act used to deal with a person who is eighteen years of age or over 
and alleged to have committed an offence”. 
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Courts.  An alternative to prosecution is a method of diverting an accused away from the 
criminal justice system and should not be seen as an extension of the criminal justice 
system.333   
The theory behind these alternative measures is that such an alternative programme rather 
than prosecution can adequately protect the interest of society.334  For this reason, the 
implementation of any diversion programme is subject to the requirement that the 
programme is appropriate given the interest of society and the victim.335    
 Diversion can take many forms depending on the stage of the criminal process at which it 
occurs.336  Diversion can occur prior to the accused’s first court appearance or thereafter, 
after a bail application or after an evaluation for fitness to stand trial.337  Diversion may aim 
to prevent contact with the criminal justice system altogether, or it may be in the form of 
court support services where assistance is rendered to persons with mental illness who are 
already in the criminal justice system.338  Potential benefits of diversion programmes include 
                                                
333  Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 281.  Also see Centre for addiction and mental health  
http://eenet.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Mental-Health-Diversion-Policy-Frameworks_April2014-
Final.pdf  (Date of use: 12 August 2016) at 4, 5 where the various types of diversion are discussed. 
334  Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 281. 
335  Section 717.(1) of the Criminal Code states  “Alternative measures may be used to deal with a 
person alleged to have committed an offence only if it is not inconsistent with the protection of 
society…”.  Also see  section  717(1)(b) of the Criminal Code which reads as follows:  “(b) the person 
who is considering whether to use the measures is satisfied that  they would be appropriate, having 
regard to the needs of the person alleged to have committed the offence and the interests of society 
and of the victim;” Also see Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 281.  This principle is also 
acknowledged in Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General Criminal Law Division Practice 
memorandum:  Mentally Disordered/Developmentally Disabled Offenders: Diversion at 5. 
336  Parliamentary Information and research service Current issues in Mental Health in Canada at 4 
where it is confirmed that diversion can occur at various stages during the criminal proceedings.  
See further in general Hartford K Best Practice in Four Cities in South-western Ontario:  The 
Interface between people with mental illness and the criminal justice system (2003) 
http://www.hsjcc.on.ca/Resource%20Library/Mental%20Health%20and%20Justice%20Reports/Best
%20Practices%20in%20Four%20Cities%20in%20Southwestern%20Ontario%20-%202003-05.pdf  
(Date of use:  12 March 2013) for the creative ways in which communities have responded to the 
issue of mentally ill persons in contact with the criminal justice system. 
337  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 35.  Also see Rieksts M “Mental health 
courts in Canada” LawNow 2008 (33) 31-34 at 33 where it is confirmed that diversion can occur at 
any stage of the criminal proceedings.  Diversion, however, mostly occurs before the trial begins 
according to Schizophrenia society of Ontario http://www.schizophrenia.on.ca/getmedia/d252fe01-
ab2a-429c-bd6b-5322115c4204/justice_process_guide.pdf.aspx (Date of use: 20 September 2016) 
at 6.  
338  The aim of a particular diversion programme depends largely on the stage in the criminal 
proceedings at which the programme intervenes.  See Ministry of Health and Long-term Care  
http://www.health.gov.on.ca/en/common/ministry/publications/reports/mentalhealth/framework.pdf   
(Date of use: 26 August 2015) at 3.    
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reduced recidivism and reduced caseloads on the criminal justice system.339 
As pointed out earlier, very low requirements are set for a person to be considered fit to 
stand trial.  This undoubtedly contributes to the fact that the majority of those sent for 
fitness assessments are found fit to stand trial.340  A finding of fitness does not imply that 
the accused does not have a mental illness, as suspicion of mental illness was the basis for 
the referral for assessment for fitness in the first place.  It may simply mean that his mental 
illness does not affect his fitness, as determined by the low threshold test (cognitive 
capacity test) explained above.  Consequently, there are a large number of persons who 
are found fit to stand trial who are nonetheless mentally ill. 
The case of fit but mentally ill accused would usually revert to the criminal court for the 
criminal trial to continue without further consideration being given to his existing mental 
illness unless he raises mental illness as a defence, of course.  This accused person is sent 
back to the correctional facility to await his trial.  The negative impact of the correctional 
setting on a person with a mental illness is explained earlier in this chapter.  In addition to 
the general negative effect of the correctional setting on a person with mental illness, these 
persons are at a higher risk of re-offending if their mental illness is not treated.341  Mental 
health resources in correctional facilities are not always available to those in need thereof.  
For these accused persons, alternative sentencing methods and diversion away from the 
criminal justice system are optimal.    
                                                
339  The reduced recidivism could be attributed to the improved access to mental health care services 
that is available through diversion programmes.  See Ministry of Health and Long-term Care  
http://www.health.gov.on.ca/en/common/ministry/publications/reports/mentalhealth/framework.pdf   
(Date of use: 26 August 2015) at 3.    
340  O’Shaughnessy 2007 The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 505 at 507.  
Also see Zapf and Roesch 1998 Canadian Journal of Psychiatry 287-293 who’s study  found that 
90% of all the accused sent for fitness evaluations in their study, was found fit to stand trial.  See 
further Newby and Faltin 2008 Journal of Offender Rehabilitation 185 at 188 where this figure is 
confirmed – although reported as 11% of all referrals being found not fit to stand trial.  Also see 
Viljoen, Ogloff and Zapf 2003 Canadian Psychology 369-514 and O’Shaughnessy 2007 The Journal 
of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 505 at 507 reported that 79% of those 
evaluated for fitness to stand trial on an inpatient basis, were found fit to stand trial and 74% of those 
evaluated for fitness on an outpatient basis, were found fit to stand trial.  Also see Chaimowitz and 
Ferencz 1999 Canadian Journal of Psychiatry 808-810 where the latter figure is confirmed. 
341  This is referred to as the revolving door principle where mentally ill accused persons move in and out 
of jail, committing petty crimes.  See Phuneuf v Ontario 2010 ONCA 901 at [28] where this 
phenomenon is explained.  Also see National Judicial Institute Problem-solving in Canada’s 
courtrooms.  A guide to therapeutic justice 10.  See further Ministry of Health and Long-term Care  
http://www.health.gov.on.ca/en/common/ministry/publications/reports/mentalhealth/framework.pdf   
(Date of use: 26 August 2015) at 4 where it is pointed out that persons with mental illness that is kept 
in a correctional setting is at higher risk of experiencing more severe symptoms of mental illness and 
are at a higher risk of homelessness once they are released.  These accused persons are further 
often isolated from mental health care for as long as they are kept in the correctional facility.  
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A requirement for an alternative measure to be used is that the accused must be legally 
represented and must consent freely to participate in the alternative programme.342  It must 
be certain that there is sufficient evidence to prosecute the accused, and the accused must, 
in order to be allowed to make use of such an alternative measure, accept responsibility for 
the act or omission that forms the basis of the charges against the accused.343  Where the 
diversion pertains to a mentally ill person, the acknowledgement of involvement in the 
alleged offence is not a prerequisite for admission to the diversion programme since the 
accused may not have the mental capacity to do so meaningfully.344 
Diversion is usually employed where the charges are minor or where the accused has very 
limited past contact with the criminal justice system.345  A distinction is made between 
                                                
342  Section 717(1)(c) and (d) of the Criminal Code reads as follows:  “(c) the person, having been 
informed of the alternative measures, fully and freely consents to participate therein;” and “ (d) the 
person has, before consenting to participate in the alternative measures, been advised of the right to 
be represented by counsel;”  Also see Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General Criminal Law Division 
Practice memorandum:  Mentally Disordered/Developmentally Disabled Offenders: Diversion at 6. 
343  Sections 717(e) to (g) of the Criminal Code reads as follows:  “(e) the person accepts responsibility 
for the act or omission that forms the basis of the offence that the person is alleged to have 
committed;” and “(f) there is, in the opinion of the Attorney General or the Attorney General’s agent, 
sufficient evidence to proceed with the prosecution of the offence; and””(g) the prosecution of the 
offence is not in any way barred at law.”  Also see Schizophrenia society of Ontario 
http://www.schizophrenia.on.ca/getmedia/d252fe01-ab2a-429c-bd6b-
5322115c4204/justice_process_guide.pdf.aspx (Date of use: 20 September 2016) at 6 where the 
basic requirements for diversion in Ontario is set out.  These are listed as: The accused suffers from 
a mental disorder that is treatable;  There is a reasonable prospect of conviction if the case were to 
go to trial;  The offence is eligible for diversion - only Class I and some Class II offences are eligible; 
A designated mental health facility and/or community support agency has been found that can 
accept the accused; and the accused consented to participating in the diversion programme (rather 
than going through trial).  Also see Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General Criminal Law Division 
Practice memorandum:  Mentally Disordered/Developmentally Disabled Offenders: Diversion at 5, 6 
where the requirements for diversion in Ontario is set out. 
344  Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General Criminal Law Division Practice memorandum:  Mentally 
Disordered/Developmentally Disabled Offenders: Diversion at 6.  See this source at 5, 6 where the 
requirements for diversion of the mentally ill accused in Ontario is set out as:  “(1) There is a 
reasonable prospect of conviction of the offence charged and that the prosecution is not barred at 
law; (2)  it is in the public interest, as defined in the practice memorandum on Charge Screening, to 
discontinue the prosecution;  (3)  The offender's involvement is voluntary, in that the accused, or 
substitute decision maker, knows of the right to counsel and the right to a trial on the merits; (4)  the 
accused, defence counsel, or substitute decision maker is aware that, if the accused is charged with 
subsequent offences, Crown counsel may seek to introduce evidence of the accused’s participation 
in the treatment or other alternative measures programme to which the accused is being diverted, as 
well as the allegations underlying the current charges; i.e. that in the event of subsequent charges, 
the Court may be informed of the prior diversion of the accused and the subject matter of the prior 
charges, subject to the usual rules of evidence; (5) if diversion measures include the mentally 
disordered offender attending at a mental health facility or physician's office or clinic, confirmation 
that the facility or physician considers the offender a suitable candidate and that the treatment plan 
can begin within a reasonable period of time.” 
345  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-47.  Also see Van der Wolf et al 
2010 International Journal of Forensic Mental Health 245 at 250 who encourages criminal justice 
systems to find solutions outside of the criminal law for cases involving minor crimes and where the 
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presumptively divertible, discretionary, and non-divertible offences.346  These categories 
correlate with the seriousness of the crime but do not necessarily exclude violence under 
divertible offences.347  Offences that fall within the discretionary category can be diverted if 
the Crown so decides after consideration of the type of offence and the circumstances of 
the accused, the community and the victim.348  Diversion for more serious offences is, 
however, less common.349 
Where diversion is employed, the charges against the accused are provisionally stayed, 
and the accused is offered the opportunity to make use of a treatment programme where 
appropriate.350 
Most jurisdictions in Canada employ diversion models, although only some are formally set 
out in policies.351  These diversion programmes are province-specific.  A formal diversion 
                                                                                                                                                   
accused has a mental illness. 
346  Ryan and Whelan 2012 Web Journal of Current Legal Issues 1 at 8.  The divertible, presumptively 
divertible and non-divertible offences are also set out in Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division Practice memorandum:  Mentally Disordered/Developmentally Disabled 
Offenders: Diversion 3, 4, 5.  For a detailed discussion of the relevant classes of offences, see 
Schizophrenia society of Ontario http://www.schizophrenia.on.ca/getmedia/d252fe01-ab2a-429c-
bd6b-5322115c4204/justice_process_guide.pdf.aspx (Date of use: 20 September 2016) at 5 where it 
is explained that these offences are also referred to as Class I, II, or III offences.  Class I is the very 
minor offences such as shoplifting, causing a disturbance and possession of a small amount of 
illegal substance.  Class II offences refer to breaking and entering, uttering of a threat, simple assault 
and public mischief.  Class III is the most serious offences and include sexual offences, murder and 
culpable homicide.  Class I offences are presumptively divertible, Class II, discretionary divertible 
and Class II is non-divertible.   
347  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 88. 
348  See Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General Criminal Law Division Practice memorandum: Mentally 
Disordered/Developmentally Disabled Offenders: Diversion at 5 where it is further stated that, the 
closer the offence resembles a divertible offence (Class I offence) the more likely it is that the Crown 
will agree to diversion.  Examples include assault where the victim was not a spouse or partner and 
where no weapon was used.  
349  See Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General Criminal Law Division Practice memorandum:  Mentally 
Disordered/Developmentally Disabled Offenders: Diversion at 3 where it is explicitly stated that in 
Ontario, Class III offences will not be considered for diversion, these are the very serious offences 
such as murder.  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-47.  The 
person accused of a more serious crime does however have an opportunity to apply for the stay of 
proceedings even if he is not diverted.  
350  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-47.  This is the case even if 
there is a prima facie case against the accused.  Also see Schizophrenia society of Ontario 
http://www.schizophrenia.on.ca/getmedia/d252fe01-ab2a-429c-bd6b-
5322115c4204/justice_process_guide.pdf.aspx (Date of use: 20 September 2016) at 6 where  it is 
pointed out that this is the case with participants of the Mental Health Court.  Also see Ontario 
Ministry of the Attorney General Criminal Law Division Practice memorandum:  Mentally 
Disordered/Developmentally Disabled Offenders: Diversion at 5 where the safety of the public, 
including the victim, is set as the paramount consideration in the decision regarding the stay of 
proceedings.  
351  Some diversion programmes operate on an informal basis.  See Barrett and Shandler Mental 
Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-47 where it is explained that diversion programmes for 
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programme to a Mental Health Court has been established in Ontario by way of the Crown 
practice memorandum on diversion duly authorised by the Attorney General of Ontario.352  
It is specifically aimed at mentally disordered accused persons who are fit to stand trial yet 
mentally ill to such an extent that their condition warrants access to alternatives to 
prosecution.353  The practice memorandum specifically states that protocols for diversion to 
Mental Health Court must be put in place where Mental Health Court support services do 
exist in the province, which is indeed the case in Ontario.354 
For this reason and for purposes of this research, the focus of the specific Mental Health 
Court models employed in Canada will fall on the province of Ontario.    
6  THE MENTAL HEALTH COURT MODEL IN CANADA  
6.1 Introduction and background 
Due to a better understanding of what mental illness is and the availability of new treatment 
methods,355 new solutions to the challenges that mental illness brings to the criminal justice 
system can be explored.  One such specialised solution is a Mental Health Court.  These 
courts acknowledge the principle that the criminal behaviour of persons with mental illness 
is mainly a health issue rather than a criminal law matter.356  Mental Health Courts offer a 
                                                                                                                                                   
accused persons with mental illness exist in for example Ontario and British Columbia.  Also see 
Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 at 33 where it is explained that Nova Scotia for example has an adult 
diversion programme in the absence of a specialised Mental Health Court. 
352  Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General Criminal Law Division Practice memorandum:  Mentally 
Disordered/Developmentally Disabled Offenders: Diversion at 1.  Also see Schneider Annotated 
Ontario Mental Health Statutes at 678 to 688.  These alternative programmes must be authorised by 
the Attorney General of the particular province.  Section 717(1)(a) of the Criminal Code states:  “(a) 
the measures are part of a programme of alternative measures authorized by the Attorney General 
or the Attorney General’s delegate or authorized by a person, or a person within a class of persons, 
designated by the lieutenant governor in council of a province;”  Diversion to Mental Health Courts is 
authorised by the Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General Criminal Law Division Practice 
memorandum:  Mentally Disordered/Developmentally Disabled Offenders: Diversion.  This practice 
memorandum is issued by the Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General and Mental Health Courts are 
thus an approved alternative measure as referred to in section 717 of the Criminal Code.  See 
further Schneider Annotated Ontario Mental Health Statutes at 678 to 688. 
353  Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General Criminal Law Division Practice memorandum:  Mentally 
Disordered/Developmentally Disabled Offenders: Diversion at 1.  Also see Schneider Annotated 
Ontario Mental Health Statutes at 678.    
354  Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General Criminal Law Division Practice memorandum:  Mentally 
Disordered/Developmentally Disabled Offenders: Diversion at 3.  Also see Schneider Annotated 
Ontario Mental Health Statutes at 679.     
355  This includes a wider variety of medication for mental illness being available.  McLachlin B 2010 
Dalhousie Law Journal 15 at 16, 17. 
356  Bakht N “Problem solving courts as agents of change” 2005 (50) Crim.L.Q 224-254 at 245.  Also see 
National Judicial Institute Problem-solving in Canada’s courtrooms.  A guide to therapeutic justice at 
9.  See further Slinger E and Roesch R “Problem-solving courts in Canada:   A review and a call for 
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unique justice process for persons with mental illness.357  The focus is therapeutic 
jurisprudence as opposed to retributive justice. 
Solutions such as Mental Health Courts contribute to the development of the law in as far 
as it relates to the mentally ill accused in the criminal justice system because specialised 
knowledge and skills are applied in these courts 358 , and the law has to adjust to 
incorporate such knowledge and skill.    
 In essence, Mental Health Courts provide an alternative to normal criminal sanctions by 
designing and providing unique programmes that focus on the individual’s specific mental 
health care needs.359  It is a form of diversion where the focus is less on guilt and 
punishment and more on the treatment of the mental illness.360  This approach is 
welcomed, especially since mental illness is the main cause of disability in Canada.361 
The first official diversion programme for mentally ill accused persons in Ontario was 
introduced in 1994 362 , and it closely resembled what is now known as Mental Health 
Courts.  The Mental Health Court in Ontario was the first in Canada and one of the first in 
                                                                                                                                                   
empirically-based evaluation methods” 2010 (33) International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 258-
264 at 258 who state that the idea of Mental Health Courts confirm the view that criminal behaviour 
is not always a consequence of choice, but may sometimes be a consequence of circumstance. 
357  Schizophrenia society of Ontario  http://www.schizophrenia.on.ca/getmedia/3392a3b5-43f1-4818-
8e8c-45fcb1c15603/diversion_-_a_guide_for_families__final_.pdf.aspx (Date of use:  31 August 
2015) at 3. 
358  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 1-29. 
359  Parliamentary Information and research service Current issues in Mental Health in Canada at 4.  
Also see Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 at 32 where it is stressed that the focus in the Mental Health 
Court is on the individual as opposed to the overall goal of the criminal justice system, namely, 
punishment.  
360  See Parliamentary Information and research service Current issues in Mental Health in Canada at 4 
where it is explained that the objective of diversion is to address the “root causes of crime through 
early intervention”.  Also see Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 at 32.  Also see National Judicial Institute 
Problem-solving in Canada’s courtrooms.  A guide to therapeutic justice at 9. 
361  World Health Organisation.  World Health Report: Mental Health: New Understanding, New Hope.  
http://www.who.int/whr/2001/en/whr01_en.pdf  (Date of use:  29 May 2014).  In Canada, it is 
estimated that approximately 20% of society will suffer from a mental illness at some point in their 
lives.  (See McLachlin B 2010 Dalhousie Law Journal 15 at 16 and see Health Canada A report on 
Mental Illness in Canada at 7.  It should be noted that the other 80% of society would not remain 
unaffected by the fact that 20% of the society has a mental illness.  The other 80% of society will be 
affected directly or indirectly by this fact when a friend, close relative, acquaintance or colleague 
suffer from a mental illness.  See Health Canada A report on Mental Illness in Canada 
http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/publicat/miic-mmac/sum-eng.php (Date of use:  24 July 2012) at 3. 
362  Byrick and Walker-Renshaw A practical guide to Mental Health and the Law in Ontario at 107 who 
explain that the first diversion programme in Canada was set out in the Crown Policy Manual of 
1994.  Also see Bloom and Schneider Mental Disorders and the Law at 102.  See further Schneider, 
Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 34, 103 where it is explained that Mental Health Courts 




the world.363  This court opened its doors on 11 May 1998 and is the only full-time Mental 
Health Court in Canada.364  In 2005, there were only two official Mental Health Courts in 
Canada.365  Many jurisdictions in Canada are developing diversion programmes for 
mentally ill accused persons or have pilot projects in place,366 suggesting that more Mental 
Health Courts will be established in Canada.  
The Toronto Mental Health Court was established because of the rise in the number of 
mentally ill persons entering the criminal justice system.367 Other motivators for the 
establishment of this particular Mental Health Court, was the fact that the mental illness of 
an accused was not properly considered in the traditional criminal justice system and the 
fact that there were serious delays in resolving pre-trial issues such as fitness to stand trial, 
assessment and treatment orders.368  Diversion was not fully explored by the traditional 
                                                
363  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 97.  Also see Slinger and Roesch 2010 
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 258.at 259.  This Court’s emergence has been attributed 
to the efforts of the founding judge, Justice Edward (Ted) Ormston.  His motto for this Court was 
“close the book and open your heart”.  See Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at 271. 
364  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 1-29 who confirms that the first 
Mental Health Court in Canada opened its doors in 1998.  Also see Toronto Mental Health Court  
http://www.mentalhealthcourt.ca/pages/2/Overview.htm (Date of use:  21 July 2015) at 1.  Also see 
Bakht 2005 Crim.L.Q 224 at 246.  Also see Slinger and Roesch 2010 International Journal of Law 
and Psychiatry 258 at 259 where it is pointed out that other Mental Health Courts such as the one in 
New Brunswick, operates on a part-time basis and only sits every second Friday.  See further Legal 
Aid Ontario http://lawfacts.ca/mental-health/court  (Date of use:  22 September 2016) where it is 
explained that some Mental Health Courts in Ontario sit every day whilst others sit once or twice a 
week.  Also see National Judicial Institute Problem-solving in Canada’s courtrooms.  A guide to 
therapeutic justice at 7 where it is confirmed that the Mental Health Court in Toronto opened its 
doors in 1998 and was the first of its kind in Canada.    
365  Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at 280.  See also Legal Aid Ontario http://lawfacts.ca/mental-
health/court  (Date of use:  22 September 2016) where it is pointed out that not all courts that 
perform the function of a Mental Health Court, is known as a Mental Health Court, they sometimes 
operate under a different name. 
366  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 107.  Some of these projects are formal 
whilst others are informal diversion programmes.  Also see Ministry of Health and Long-term Care  
http://www.health.gov.on.ca/en/common/ministry/publications/reports/mentalhealth/framework.pdf   
(Date of use: 26 August 2015) at 3.     
367  The rise in numbers is discussed in chapter 2 of this research where the emergence of Mental 
Health Courts in Canada is discussed in more detail.  Also see Ministry of Health and Long-term 
Care  
http://www.health.gov.on.ca/en/common/ministry/publications/reports/mentalhealth/framework.pdf   
(Date of use: 26 August 2015) at 4.    
368  Van de Veen S L  “Some Canadian Problem Solving Court Processes” paper presented at the 
Canadian Association of Provincial Court Judges Pre-Institute Conference, September 2003, St 
John’s, Newfoundland National Judicial Institute 2003.  Also available at 
http://www.aija.org.au/TherapJurisp06/Papers/VandeVeen2D.pdf at 19.  It is stated that many cases 
of persons with mental illness, do not belong in the criminal justice system to start with and this view 
was part of the impetus behind establishing the Toronto Mental Health Court.  Also see Slinger and 
Roesch 2010 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 258 at 260 who confirms that the concerns 
regarding delays in finalising pre-trial issues was a big force behind the establishment of the Toronto 
Mental Health Court and that it is in fact one of the goals of the court to reduce such delays.  Also 
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criminal court.  The Toronto Mental Health Court in Ontario was established to address 
these and other issues.   
The Toronto Mental Health Court has a comprehensive mandate illustrated by the goals of 
the Mental Health Court discussed below. 
6.2 Goals of the Mental Health Court in Canada  
The main objective of Mental Health Courts is to divert the mentally ill away from the 
criminal justice system and to reroute these individuals to the mental health care system.369  
Mental Health Courts are specially designed to address the needs of mentally ill accused 
persons and aim to balance the needs of the mentally ill accused and public safety.370    
Every Mental Health Court sets its own goals because the establishment of these courts 
are informed by the specific needs of the community that the Mental Health Court serves.371  
The specific goals of the Mental Health Court in Toronto form the basis of the discussion of 
the goals of a Mental Health Court in Canada.  Having said that, the description of the goals 
and features of Ottowa Mental Health Court as explained by the Chief Justice of the Ontario 
Court of Justice, at the opening of this Mental Health Court, resonated with the goals of the 
Toronto Mental Health Court and was explained as follows:  
The Ottawa Mental Health Court is an example of a progressive movement within criminal 
justice systems in North America and elsewhere in the world to create “problem solving 
courts”.  These courts, with collaborative interdisciplinary teams of professionals and 
community agencies, attempt to identify and to deal with some of the underlying factors 
contributing to criminal activity, which have often not been very well-addressed by the 
                                                                                                                                                   
see Toronto Mental Health Court  http://www.mentalhealthcourt.ca/pages/2/Overview.htm (Date of 
use:  21 July 2015) at 1.  Also see Slinger and Roesch 2010 International Journal of Law and 
Psychiatry 258 at 260. 
369  Parliamentary Information and research service Current issues in Mental Health in Canada at 4.  
Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 34.  See further Rieksts 2008 
LawNow 31 at 31-33 where it is explained that some jurisdictions have separate diversion 
programmes for mentally ill accused persons that do not take the form of a specialised court.  This is 
the case in Nova Scotia for example.  
370  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 1-29.  Also see Rieksts 2008 
LawNow 31 at 31, 32 who is of the view that if the mental health issues of accused persons are not 
addressed, the objective of serving the public interest, is not achieved. 
371  The Mental Health Court  in St Johns, New Brunswick, for example, set its specific goals as follows:   
i)  To offer an effective mechanism for dealing with those with a mental disability who are involved in 
the criminal justice, system;  ii)  To provide accused with the least restrictive intervention or 
treatment;  iii)  To protect the rights of the accused and society and the integrity of the justice 
system; and  iv)  To hold those accused accountable for their actions.  See Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 
255 at 273.  See further Slinger and Roesch 2010 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 258 at 
260 where it is pointed out that the goals of a specific Mental Health Court depends on, inter alia, the 
resources available in that particular community. 
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conventional criminal justice process.  The goal is to satisfy the traditional criminal law 
function of protection of the public by addressing in individual cases the real rather than the 
apparent causes that lead to conflict with the law.372 
Mental Health Courts serve to bridge the gap between the criminal justice system and the 
mental health care system to prevent those that encounter both systems from falling 
between the cracks of these two systems.  Mental Health Courts attempt to enhance the 
cooperation of the two systems with each other.373 
The two primary goals of the Toronto Mental Health Court are to expedite the finalisation of 
pre-trial issues, in particular, fitness to stand trial and to reduce recidivism.374  Assessments 
for fitness to stand trial should be dealt with expeditiously in the criminal justice system.  
According to the Criminal Code, the default period for conducting a fitness assessment is 
five days.375  Delays in fitness assessments in the traditional criminal justice system are, 
however, rife.  Mental Health Courts manage through on-site assessments to expedite 
fitness assessments.  Before this court came into operation, accused persons had to wait 
for long periods in prison before the issue of fitness to stand trial was heard.376  This 
                                                
372  McLachlin B 2010 Dalhousie Law Journal 15 at 26.  Also see Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 at 31 who 
agrees that the criminal courts are not equipped to identify and deal with mental health issues of 
accused persons.  This means that the underlying cause of criminal behaviour in these instances, 
namely mental illness, is not addressed and the primary objective of the criminal justice system to 
address the public safety, is not achieved. 
373  Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at 263.   Also see Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 at 32. 
374  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 92, 97.  Also see Toronto Mental Health 
Court  http://www.mentalhealthcourt.ca/pages/2/Overview.htm (Date of use:  21 July 2015) at 1 
where it is stated that the primary objectives of the Toronto Mental Health court is to address pre-trial 
issues of mentally ill accused persons and to slow down the revolving door phenomenon (The 
movement of mentally ill accused persons in and out of the criminal justice system, is referred to as 
the “revolving door” principle).  This is confirmed in National Judicial Institute Problem-solving in 
Canada’s courtrooms.  A guide to therapeutic justice at 10.  Also see Van de Veen “Some Canadian 
Problem Solving Court Processes” at 19 where it is pointed out that the function of assessing 
accused persons for fitness to stand trial was initially aimed at those accused persons in custody 
and whose fitness were in issue.  Also see Slinger and Roesch 2010 International Journal of Law 
and Psychiatry 258 at 260.  Also see Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 at 32.  Schneider who was one of the 
first Mental Health Court judges, explained that the primary objective of this particular Mental Health 
Court was to deal expeditiously with issues of fitness to stand trial.  A further goals of the Toronto 
Mental Health Court, is to put people with mental illness into the hands of the mental health care 
system and to reduce the criminalisation of people with mental disabilities.  See Schneider, Bloom 
and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 92, 97.  Also see Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at footnote 39, 
263 and footnote 81, 271.  Also see Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 at 32.  Also see National Judicial 
Institute Problem-solving in Canada’s courtrooms.  A guide to therapeutic justice at 7 where it is 
confirmed that the Mental Health Court in Toronto is characterised by the fact that it focusses in 
expediting pre-trial issues such as fitness assessments..  See further Ryan & Whelan 2012 (1) Web 
Journal of Current Legal Issues 1 at 8. 
375  Section 672.14(1) of the Criminal Code.  Also see Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian 
Criminal Law at 3-5.  
376  Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at 271 indicates that accused persons had to wait up to two weeks.  
See however Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 52, 53 who estimate that 
mentally ill accused had to wait up to four weeks in jail before they were assessed for fitness to 
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resulted in mentally ill accused spending more pre-trial days in custody than accused who 
did not present with mental health issues.377   
The goal to reduce recidivism of mentally ill accused persons 378 is achieved by, inter alia,  
providing assistance to the mentally ill accused after completion of the court programme 
through its court workers 379 to obtain the social assistance that he needs, including 
connection with a mental health facility.380  
It is a secondary objective of the Toronto Mental Health Court to process cases of those in 
respect of whose fitness to stand trial is not at issue but who wish to enter a plea of not 
criminally responsible.381  The full trial on the issue of criminal responsibility, especially if 
such plea is contested, is, however, conducted in the criminal court unless the parties agree 
to proceed with the trial in the Mental Health Court.382  Parties would opt for a trial in the 
Mental Health Court because of the specialised knowledge that the staff of this court have 
to offer.  Many accused enter the Mental Health Court in Toronto because they want to 
plead guilty or bring a bail application with the specialised assistance of the Mental Health 
Court personnel.383  The Mental Health Court provides assistance with these cases as part 
of the non-diversion component of its mandate. 
The goals of the Mental Health Court are achieved through implementing therapeutic 
jurisprudence in the procedures that it employs.  Therapeutic jurisprudence is one of the 
                                                                                                                                                   
stand trial.  These waiting periods are much longer in the South African context, anything from three 
months to two years.  See the discussion of the challenges in the South African forensic setting as 
discussed in chapter 2 of this research and the procedural challenges that contribute to the delays 
as discussed in chapter 3 of this research.  
377  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 92, 97. 
378  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 97.  Also referred to as the “revolving door” 
principle as explained above.  Also see Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 at 32. 
379  Also referred to as “court support workers”.  See Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health 
Courts at 119-121 for a list of duties entrusted to the court support worker, including consultation 
with the participant and his family and providing information about community resources.  Also see 
Centre for addiction and mental health Evidence Summary:  Mental Health Diversion Framework in 
Canada April 2014 at 4 where the court workers are described as “navigators of the legal system” 
since they help to connect the mentally ill with the available resources. 
380  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 6, 98. 
381  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 6, 98.  These cases may include persons 
whose fitness has been restored and who now wish to raise the insanity plea.  See Van der Wolf et 
al 2010 International Journal of Forensic Mental Health 245 at 251 who explains that 12% of persons 
who eventually succeeds with the insanity plea was found unfit to stand trial at some point prior in 
the proceedings. 
382  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 6 and further at 99,102. 
383  The Mental Health Court assists those who do not qualify for the diversion component of the court in 
various ways.  For more on this support, see Toronto Mental Health Court “Overview of the Court” 
available at http://www.mentalhealthcourt.ca/pages/2/Overview.htm (date of use 21 July 2015) at 1.  
Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 6 and further a 98, 99. 
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underlying principles of the Mental Health Court.  
6.3 Underlying principles of the Mental Health Court model in Canada  
Since there is no set model for a Mental Health Court, there is no recipe for a successful 
Mental Health Court.384  What Mental Health Courts in a particular jurisdiction, however, 
have in common is their underlying principles.  The following have been identified as 
underlying principles in various Mental Health Courts across Canada, including the Toronto 
Mental Health Court.  
6.3.1 Therapeutic jurisprudence 
Mental Health Courts see therapeutic jurisprudence as a way to use the law as a force to 
secure constructive rehabilitative outcomes.385  Mental Health Courts ultimately subscribe to 
the belief that some criminal acts are seen as manifestations of treatable conditions.386  
These courts are treatment orientated and focus on the future welfare of the accused.387  
The focus on treatment enables the court to implement therapeutic jurisprudence in ways 
that can uniquely contribute to the court’s aim to achieve therapeutic outcomes. 
What sets this court apart from traditional criminal courts, from a therapeutic perspective, is 
the atmosphere in the court.388  The manner in which the judicial officers conduct 
themselves can contribute enormously to the therapeutic outcomes of the court process.  A 
sense of dignity and respect for the accused is fostered.  The accused is addressed by his 
first name, and all attempts are made to humanise their experience of the specialised 
court.389  In the Toronto Mental Health Court, the judicial officers conduct the processes in a 
                                                
384  This is one of the major differences between the Mental Health Court and the Drug Court model.  
The latter has fixed procedures in place.  With Mental Health Courts, courts often differ with regard 
to procedure and even goals, depending on the objectives that the particular court chose to focus on.  
See Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 at 33 where it is stated that the general outline of Mental Health Court 
models are similar even though they might differ with regard to procedure and policies.  Also see 
Slinger and Roesch 2010 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 258 at 260 where it is 
confirmed that there is no “blueprint” for a Mental Health Court and that the concept in each region is 
guided by, for example,  the available resources in the specific area. 
385  Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 at 32. 
386  Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at 279. 
387  This focus is evident from the follow up programmes that Mental Health Courts often have to ensure 
that the accused does not re-offend.  See Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at 279. 
388  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 7.  Also see this source at 19 where it is 
stated that a health orientated atmosphere exists at the Toronto Mental Health Court.  Also see 
Bakht 2005 Crim.L.Q 224 at 246. 
389  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 53.  Also see Bakht 2005 Crim.L.Q 224 at 
247 who explains that the rules of evidence and procedure at the Toronto Mental Health Court are 
relaxed which contributes to a non-adversarial atmosphere at the court. 
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more informal manner and in a conversational tone.390  This contributes to the more relaxed 
and non-adversarial atmosphere, which encourages the mentally disordered accused to 
participate fully in the proceedings.391  This is in stark contrast to the adversarial style 
subscribed to in criminal court, where the accused is often the object of the process and not 
the subject of restorative justice. 
One of the goals of therapeutic jurisprudence is to benefit the accused by addressing 
mental illness as the underlying cause of criminal behaviour.392  This is achieved through 
court-monitored rehabilitation programmes and the involvement of a multi-disciplinary team 
at the Mental Health Court.393 
6.3.2 Voluntary participation 
In Toronto, diversion and participation in the Mental Health Court are voluntary,394 and for 
this reason, the court support worker for the diversion obtains consent from the participant 
for such participation.395    
An accused may opt-out of the Mental Health Court process at any point in time without 
being penalised for doing so, except during the parts of the process for which his consent is 
                                                
390  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 53.  Also see Legal Aid Ontario 
http://lawfacts.ca/mental-health/court  (Date of use:  22 September 2016) where it is stated that 
Mental Health Courts are generally less formal than traditional courts.  
391  Bakht 2005 Crim.L.Q 224 at 247.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 
53.  Also see National Judicial Institute Problem-solving in Canada’s courtrooms.  A guide to 
therapeutic justice at 10 where the non-adversarial nature of Mental Health Courts are confirmed.  
For more on the atmosphere in the court, see further Van de Veen “Some Canadian Problem 
Solving Court Processes” at 19.  Also see Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at 278 who stresses the fact 
that Mental Health Courts should not feel like normal court to the participant as that would 
completely defeat the therapeutic purpose of the court.    
392  National Judicial Institute Problem-solving in Canada’s courtrooms.  A guide to therapeutic justice  at 
10. 
393  Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 at 32. 
394  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 6, 100.  Also see Slinger and Roesch 2010 
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 258 at 259, 261 who also state that most diversions in 
other jurisdictions in Canada are voluntary.  This is a prescribed requirement for diversion of the 
mentally ill accused as set out in Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General Criminal Law Division 
Practice memorandum:  Mentally Disordered/Developmentally Disabled Offenders: Diversion at 6.  
395  Section 717(1)(c) of the Criminal Code sets as a requirement for any alternative measure to be used, 
that the accused must consent freely to such alternative measure.  Section 717(2) states that an 
accused person who expresses the wish to have his case dealt with by the court, shall not be 
subjected to alternative measures.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts 
at 120, 121 for a list of duties of the court support worker, one of which is to obtain consent from the 
participant.  The court support worker is involved throughout the criminal justice system, from 
consulting with the Crown or defence attorneys about the diversion of a potential client, to 
developing a sentencing plan or a bail release plan. 
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not required.396  The accused’s consent is not required to conduct an official fitness 
assessment.397  The accused’s consent is further not required where the accused is 
subjected to treatment as part of a treatment order, aimed at rendering him fit to stand trial 
and as provided for in the Criminal Code.398  Except for these parts of the assessment 
process, the accused can opt out of the Mental Health Court at any time.  His case would 
then revert to the criminal court for a traditional hearing. 
6.3.3  Multi-disciplinary court team 
The collaborative and multidisciplinary team approach acknowledges that specialised skills 
in the field of mental health can assist the criminal justice system to identify and deal with 
the mental health issues of accused persons.399  The multi-disciplinary team in Mental 
Health Courts consists of lawyers, the judge, probation officers, a psychiatrist, a 
psychologist, mental health nurse(s) and a caregiver(s) 400 , all with special training and/or 
extensive experience in the field of mental health. 401   
                                                
396  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 6 and further at 88, 89 where it is pointed 
out that the position in the New Brunswick Mental Health Court is exactly the same.  In order for an 
accused to gain access to the Mental Health Court programme in the first place, he has to 
acknowledge his involvement in the crime that he is accused of.  The fact that the accused initially 
accepted responsibility for the act or omission accused of in order to gain access to the alternative 
measure in the form of the diversion program, is not admissible in the criminal proceedings in the 
criminal court to which the accused’s case reverts in the event that he opts out of the Mental Health 
Court programme.  See section 717(3) of the Criminal Code. 
397  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 6, 92, 100.  One of the motivations for 
insisting that the mentally ill accused has legal representation during this stage of the proceedings, is 
probably because this part of the proceedings in the Mental Health Court is not voluntary and the 
accused hence needs to be legally represented to protect his rights.  They point out further that  this 
is one of the major differences between Canadian Mental Health Courts and those in North America.  
Also see Ryan & Whelan 2012 Web Journal of Current Legal Issues 1 at 8 where it is confirmed that 
the actual fitness assessment is not voluntary and the accused’s consent is not required, nor can he 
opt out at this point. 
398  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 6, 79, 100.  Also see section 672.58 of the 
Criminal Code that provides for a court to make a treatment order that lasts for a maximum of 60 
days in order to render the accused fit to stand trial.    
399  Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 at 32.  Accused persons benefit from therapy, education and care 
provided by the mental health care workers that form part of the multidisciplinary team.  Also see 
Schizophrenia society of Ontario http://www.schizophrenia.on.ca/getmedia/d252fe01-ab2a-429c-
bd6b-5322115c4204/justice_process_guide.pdf.aspx (Date of use: 20 September 2016) at 6 where 
the collaborative and non-adversarial approach of the team in the Mental Health Court is 
emphasised.  
400  Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at 273.  Also see  Van de Veen “Some Canadian Problem Solving 
Court Processes” at  20. 
401  Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at 265.  Also see Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 at 32.  See further 
Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 7 who opine that a professional from either 
the legal or mental health fields should only become involved in the Mental Health Court if he is 
philosophically orientated to a therapeutic outcome for the mentally ill accused.  The profiles of the 
judge and other members of the team should convey the specialised skills needed for this type of 
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Two permanent Crown attorneys and two duty counsel staff the Toronto Mental Health 
Court.402  Nine social workers serve as mental health workers.403  A psychiatrist attends 
court daily to perform assessments and is involved in diversion programmes housed in the 
court.404  The court support workers consisting of the administrative staff and court clerks 
are a crucial part of the Mental Health Court team as they meet face to face with court 
participants or potential participants for initial screening of fitness to stand trial, consult with 
the legal representatives, and draw up sentencing plans and bail release plans.405  They 
also liaise with community services to link the mentally ill accused with community-based 
treatment.406 
The aim of the multi-disciplinary team is to collectively draft a unique treatment plan that will 
best address the particular individual’s needs and challenges.407  Two very important traits 
that this team as a unit should have is perseverance and dedication as they often work in 
difficult circumstances with patience-trying accused persons within the criminal justice 
system.408    
The Toronto Mental Health Court has offices next to the court to provide space for the 
mental health workers, psychiatrists, and duty counsel to perform their duties within close 
proximity to the court.409  This Mental Health Court has its own holding cells so that mentally 
                                                                                                                                                   
court.  Also see National Judicial Institute Problem-solving in Canada’s courtrooms.  A guide to 
therapeutic justice at 10. 
402  Schizophrenia society of Ontario http://www.schizophrenia.on.ca/getmedia/d252fe01-ab2a-429c-
bd6b-5322115c4204/justice_process_guide.pdf.aspx (Date of use: 20 September 2016) at 1 
explains that Duty Counsel is a legal representative paid by the state and is present in most courts.  
403  See Van de Veen “Some Canadian Problem Solving Court Processes” at 21 where it is explained 
that the social workers are Mental Health Court workers with special knowledge of the mental health 
care system.  They assist the accused with referral to the most appropriate agency and assist with 
logistics such as securing an appointment.  Also see Bakht 2005 Crim.L.Q 224 at 247. 
404  Toronto Mental Health Court  http://www.mentalhealthcourt.ca/pages/2/Overview.htm (Date of use:  
21 July 2015) at 1.  Also see Court, Simpson and Webster 2014 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 
918 at 931 where it is explained that the Law and Mental Health Program in Canada deployed 
psychiatrists to the Mental Health Court and other courts on a daily basis to either conduct 
assessments or give testimony at trials.  See further Legal Aid Ontario http://lawfacts.ca/mental-
health/court  (Date of use:  22 September 2016)  where it is pointed out that not all Mental Health 
Court in Canada has a psychiatrist on site as it is especially rare in smaller communities.  
405  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts 120, 121. 
406  National Judicial Institute Problem-solving in Canada’s courtrooms.  A guide to therapeutic justice at 
10.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts 120, 121. 
407  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts 6.  Also see Attorney General Criminal Law 
Division Practice memorandum:  Mentally Disordered/Developmentally Disabled Offenders: 
Diversion at 6 where it is pointed out that a pure medical approach is not necessarily the best for all 
mentally ill individuals.  A pure medical approach entails taking of medication and/or undergoing 
psychiatric care.  Some persons may require additional social assistance such as housing. 
408  Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at 277. 
409  Bakht 2005 Crim.L.Q 224 at 246.  The psychiatrists are available at the Toronto Mental Health Court 
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ill accused persons can be kept close by but still safe.  Such holding cells at the court itself 
also address public safety concerns.410    
Diversion of the mentally ill accused requires multi-system coordination.411  The diversion 
component of the Ontario Mental Health Court, similarly, relies strongly on the existence 
and strength of the resource pool from which the court can draw for its rehabilitation 
programmes.  Where the diversion includes that the accused must attend a psychiatric 
facility or clinic, such facility or clinic must confirm that it is able to provide the specific 
service and that it can commence with the necessary treatment soon.412  Framework 
documents have been drafted to explain the role of various stakeholders in an attempt that 
the clarity that such documents bring will strengthen the collaboration between the various 
service providers.413  
The goals and underlying principles of Mental Health Courts set out above lay the 
foundation for the discussion of the procedural dynamics of the Mental Health Court.  The 
procedural dynamics of the Mental Health Court are discussed below.  
7 PROCEDURAL DYNAMICS OF A MENTAL HEALTH COURT IN CANADA 
7.1 Introduction 
Few publications have been produced on the procedure followed in the Canadian Mental 
Health Courts,414 and the researcher had to source this information from informal, often 
secondary sources.   
Diversion in Canada is reserved for non-violent offences, but the Mental Health Court is not 
                                                                                                                                                   
five days a week. 
410  Toronto Mental Health Court  http://www.mentalhealthcourt.ca/pages/2/Overview.htm (Date of use:  
21 July 2015) at 1.  Also see Bakht 2005 Crim.L.Q 224 at 246. 
411  Centre for addiction and mental health  http://eenet.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Mental-Health-
Diversion-Policy-Frameworks_April2014-Final.pdf  (Date of use: 12 August 2016) at 3.  The Mental 
Health Court is only as strong and efficient as its support services. 
412  Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General Criminal Law Division Practice memorandum:  Mentally 
Disordered/Developmentally Disabled Offenders: Diversion at 6 where such confirmation is set as a 
pre-requisite for diversion into a treatment program.  Also see Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at 277.  
Also see Court, Simpson and Webster 2014 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 918 at 931 that 
stresses the importance of collaboration between all the service providers involved in the forensic 
mental health care setting and that such collaboration becomes even more important when 
resources are strained.  The resources must be able to cater for all the types of services that those 
that come before the Mental Health Court might need, for example counselling, substance abuse, 
crisis intervention programmes, relationship counselling, assistance for housing and basic needs and 
assistance for acquiring social assistance. 
413  Ministry of Health and Long-term Care  A Program Framework for:  Mental Health Diversion at 4.    
414  Slinger and Roesch 2010 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 258 at 261.   
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barred from providing assistance, other than a diversion programme, to those accused 
persons who do not qualify for such diversion due to, for example, the seriousness of the 
offence.  Some Mental Health Courts only deal with fitness assessments whilst others also 
consider bail hearings and finalise the cases of those who enter a guilty plea.415  The 
Toronto Mental Health Court is one of the Mental Health Courts that consider bail hearings 
and provide assistance to those who do not necessarily qualify for the diversion component 
of the Mental Health Court.  Procedural rules are often relaxed to facilitate the meaningful 
participation of the mentally ill accused in the Mental Health Court process.416  The Mental 
Health Court, as such, is thus not a diversion programme, but it offers a diversion 
component within its framework.417   
The discussion that follows explores the junctures at which accused persons are referred to 
the Mental Health Court and the different phases of the Mental Health Court process.  The 
manner in which the court assists those accused persons who do not qualify for the 
diversion component of the Mental Health Court is discussed after the exposition of the 
different phases in the Mental Health Court process. 
7.2 Referral to a Mental Health Court 
 Referral to the Mental Health Court can occur at any stage of the criminal proceedings and 
can be requested by any party to the proceedings as soon as it becomes clear that there is 
a mental health issue.  The pre-requisite for a referral at any stage is that the accused 
indicates his willingness to participate in the Mental Health Court process.418      
Referral to the Mental Health Court is voluntary, and an accused may withdraw from the 
referral at any time prior to him entering the programme phase of the Mental Health Court 
proceedings.419  The individual has to be willing to accept responsibility for his part in the 
                                                
415  See also Legal Aid Ontario http://lawfacts.ca/mental-health/court  (Date of use:  22 September 
2016).   
416  National Judicial Institute Problem-solving in Canada’s courtrooms.  A guide to therapeutic justice at 
10. 
417  Schizophrenia society of Ontario  http://www.schizophrenia.on.ca/getmedia/3392a3b5-43f1-4818-
8e8c-45fcb1c15603/diversion_-_a_guide_for_families__final_.pdf.aspx (Date of use:  31 August 
2015) at 3 that states that Mental Health Courts are about more than diversion, it offers a unique 
justice process for persons with mental illness. 
418  Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 at 33.  Also see Schizophrenia society of Ontario 
http://www.schizophrenia.on.ca/getmedia/d252fe01-ab2a-429c-bd6b-
5322115c4204/justice_process_guide.pdf.aspx (Date of use: 20 September 2016) at 6 who explains 
that the Crown may suggest diversion but that it is mostly the defence attorney who suggests 
diversion and shows why the accused is eligible for it. 
419  Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 at 33.  The only exception to the rule prior to the programme phase, is that 
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criminal act that he stands accused of 420 and must be willing to participate and cooperate 
with the Mental Health Court team.  Whether diversion to a Mental Health Court is 
appropriate in a particular case is within the complete discretion of the Crown.421 
 There are generally two phases in the Mental Health Court, namely the admission phase 
and the programme phase.422  The eligibility criteria for each of these phases may differ.  
The remainder of the discussion on the Mental Health Court procedure will be dealt with 
under these two separate phases. 
7.3 Admission phase 
 The admission phase starts with the referral of the accused by the criminal court to the 
Mental Health Court.423  The trial court (criminal court) may, for example, refer the accused 
to the Mental Health Court for an assessment of fitness to stand trial.424  The Mental Health 
Court can deal with all issues of fitness to stand trial in the admission phase, regardless of 
                                                                                                                                                   
the accused cannot opt out of the Mental Health Court if the fitness assessment is in progress as his 
consent is not required for this part of the process.  See Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental 
Health Courts at 6. 
420  This requirement is in line with section 717(1)(e) of the Criminal Code that sets the acceptance of 
responsibility for the act or omission of accused of, as a requirement to participate in an alternative 
measure such as a diversion program.  If the accused is not capable of acknowledging his 
involvement as requested, he will not be referred to the Mental Health Court. 
421  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 6 and further at 88.  Also see Barrett and 
Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-47 where it is pointed out that this is an 
important part of the Crown’s prosecutorial discretion.  Also se Attorney General Criminal Law 
Division Practice memorandum:  Mentally Disordered/Developmentally Disabled Offenders: 
Diversion at 6 where this discretion is confirmed and where factors to be taken into account when 
exercising this discretion is discussed.  These include, the need to maintain public confidence in the 
administration of justice;  public safety, including the potential harm to the public posed by the 
offender's non-compliance with supervision or treatment;  the relative seriousness of the alleged 
offence (including considerations of the injury to victims and the number of victims); the victim's 
views and any information regarding victim impact, including a victim impact statement; the 
offender’s criminal record, including withdrawals, stays, outstanding charges, and prior diversions; 
any prior psychiatric record; current mental status and any current psychiatric assessment; in 
jurisdictions where there are Mental Health Court support workers, the likelihood of compliance with 
any direction or plan suggested by the worker; information from, and views of, the immediate family, 
substitute decision-maker and/or institutional care-giver;  frailties in the prosecution, e.g. staleness, 
technical nature of offence; whether the consequences of the prosecution would be unduly harsh to 
the offender, the victim or witnesses in the case, owing to factors such as age, health or relationship 
to other parties in the case.  Also see Legal Aid Ontario http://lawfacts.ca/mental-health/court  (Date 
of use:  22 September 2016) who points out that it is not the judge that decides if a case will be 
diverted or not, but the Crown.  
422  Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 at 33. 
423  Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 at 33.   
424  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 6, 90.  A court may only refer an accused 
for an assessment for fitness to stand trial if reasonable grounds exist that the accused is unable to 
follow the proceedings or is unable to instruct counsel in such a way as to properly conduct his 
defence.  See the discussion earlier in this chapter of what would constitute reasonable grounds for 
referral to a fitness assessment. 
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the seriousness of the offence 425 , since this phase is not the diversion component of the 
Mental Health Court which diversion is reserved for those accused of less serious offences.   
 The admission phase is the first phase in the Mental Health Court process, during which it 
is determined whether the accused is eligible for the programme phase.426  The admission 
phase itself consists of four stages, namely: presentation, eligibility, compliance and 
acceptance.427  The various stages and what they entail are discussed below. 
7.3.1 Presentation stage 
Presentation refers to the accused’s first appearance in the Mental Health Court after his 
referral from the criminal court.  The accused is provided with legal representation upon his 
first appearance in the Mental Health Court 428  
It can be confirmed at the presentation stage that the accused must undergo a fitness 
assessment, as fitness is a non-negotiable requirement for admission to the programme 
phase.429  Accused persons charged with violent crimes who will not qualify for the 
programme phase of the Mental Health Court may still be referred to the Mental Health 
Court for a fitness assessment/determination.  The assessment may be the only function 
that the Mental Health Court is required to fulfil in such a case.    
As mentioned earlier, one of the primary goals of the Mental Health Court is to expedite 
fitness assessments.  The Mental Health Court’s ability to expedite the evaluation is due to 
the multidisciplinary court team that is available at the Mental Health Court.  The Mental 
Health Court hears all matters referred to it by the trial court on the same day, and the 
fitness assessment is conducted on that same day.430  Psychiatrists work in this court every 
                                                
425  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 88.  This is also the case with the Nova 
Scotia Mental Health Court.  See Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 at 33.  Also see Rieksts 2008 LawNow 
31 at 33. 
426  Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 at 33. 
427  Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 at 33. 
428  This is also referred to as “presentation” of the accused to the Mental Health Court.  See Rieksts 
2008 LawNow 31 at 33.  The legal representative appointed is usually a member of the Mental 
Health Court team who provides information about the Mental Health Court programmes and 
provides legal advice.  The accused may also elect to make use of private counsel as long as 
continuity of the involvement of such private counsel can be confirmed. 
429  Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 at 33, 34. 
430  Bakht 2005 Crim.L.Q 224 at 247.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 
97.  See further Van de Veen “Some Canadian Problem Solving Court Processes” at 20.  See 
National Judicial Institute Problem-solving in Canada’s courtrooms.  A guide to therapeutic justice at 
10 where it is explained that in the Toronto Mental Health Court the multi-disciplinary team consisting 
of a forensic psychiatrists, on-site duty counsel, court  workers, and social workers are available to 
assess the fitness of the accused to stand trial immediately, thus eliminating delays in treatment that 
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day and assist with the assessment during the first court appearance.431  A fitness 
assessment is conducted, either by the Mental Health Court itself or by another agency on 
the Mental Health Courts request.  If the Mental Health Court is of the view that, after the 
initial screening during the accused’s appearance in the Mental Health Court, further 
assessment is required, the Mental Health Court team conducts a stand-down assessment 
that naturally takes longer.432   
If an accused is found fit to stand trial during the presentation stage, the proceedings 
continue to the next stage in the Mental Health Court.  The second stage of the admission 
phase considers the eligibility criteria for the specific Mental Health Court programme. 
7.3.2 Eligibility stage 
 The second stage of the admission phase concentrates on assessing the accused’s 
eligibility for the programme phase (the diversion component) of the Mental Health Court.  
The eligibility criteria for each specific Mental Health Court programme may differ from one 
court to another depending on the nature of the programme offered.433 
The Canadian Mental Health Court still accommodates any accused person with a mental 
illness at this stage in the proceedings, regardless of the seriousness of the offence.  Only 
those accused persons who committed non-violent offences are, however, allowed into the 
diversion programme offered in the Mental Health Court, which forms part of the 
                                                                                                                                                   
can have detrimental effects on the mentally ill offender.  Also see Ryan & Whelan 2012 Web 
Journal of Current Legal Issues 1 at 8 who points out that the same-day assessments is probably 
possible because the Toronto Mental Health Court is a full time Mental Health Court that means that 
it has forensic psychiatrists available on its premises on a daily basis.  
431  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 97. 
432  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 97.  Also see Barrett and Shandler Mental 
Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-5 who explains that even though fitness can be determined 
in a short time, there are instances in which a longer period is required to establish fitness with 
certainty.  Also see Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General Criminal Law Division Practice 
memorandum:  Mentally Disordered/Developmentally Disabled Offenders: Diversion at 10 where it is 
stated that the court may also be requested to make an order in terms of sections 21 or 22 of the 
Ontario Mental Health Act for the assessment of the accused in order to determine his 
appropriateness for diversion due to mental illness.  Where an accused is sent to a psychiatric 
facility for such an assessment or for assessment for fitness to stand trial, such an order is 
accompanied by a Form 8 in terms of the Ontario Mental Health Act to provide for the transport and 
admission of the accused to the psychiatric facility.  
433  Parliamentary Information and research service Current issues in Mental Health in Canada at 4.  
Also see Slinger and Roesch 2010 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 258 at 260.  See 
further Legal Aid Ontario http://lawfacts.ca/mental-health/court  (Date of use:  22 September 2016). 
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programme phase (the second phase) of the Mental Health Court.434   
The eligibility criteria for the Toronto Mental Health Court diversion programme is that the 
accused must be fit to stand trial,435  must admit his involvement in the alleged offence,436 
and must voluntarily consent to participate in the alternative programme.437  These 
requirements are in line with the provisions in the Criminal Code that provides for 
alternative sentencing methods.  Referral to such an alternative method, Mental Health 
Courts, in this case, will only be allowed if there is sufficient evidence to link the accused to 
the crime that he is charged with.438   
The eligibility criteria for the Toronto Mental Health Court can be divided into the mental 
health criteria and the legal criteria, although these are not specifically labelled as such in 
the literature consulted. 
7.3.2.1 Mental health criteria 
As stated above, the accused must be fit to stand trial.  The accused must, however, have 
a mental illness but must be capable of making a voluntary choice to participate in the 
Mental Health Court programme.439  The degree of mental illness required for acceptance 
into the Canadian Mental Health Court programme varies from court to court.  Some require 
a formal diagnosis, whilst others do not.440  Although mental illness is a primary requirement 
for diversion into a court-monitored mental health programme, not all persons suffering from 
a mental illness will qualify for diversion 441 since Mental Health Courts support a holistic 
approach.442   
                                                
434  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 100. 
435  An admission requirement for any Mental Health Court programme is that the accused must be fit to 
stand trial.  See Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 at 34.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental 
Health Courts at 127-129 where a modified fitness test is proposed that mental health care 
professionals could use to assess the accused’s fitness at the Mental Health Court. 
436  An admission of involvement cannot be used against the accused if criminal proceedings does 
commence at a later stage.  Section 7171(1)(3) of the Criminal Code.  Also see Coughlan Criminal 
Procedure at 281. 
437  Section 717(1) (c), (d) and (e) of the Criminal Code.  Also see Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 281.  
Also see Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 at 33 where it is explained that the consent to participate in such 
alternative programme, includes consent to mental health treatment and admission that treatment for 
the mental illness is necessary.  See further Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 at 34. 
438  See the general discussion on diversion in Canada earlier in this chapter.  Also see the provisions of 
section 717 of the Criminal Code where alternative sentencing methods are discussed. 
439  Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at 264. 
440  Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at 265. 
441  Parliamentary Information and research service Current issues in Mental Health in Canada at 4. 
442  Parliamentary Information and research service Current issues in Mental Health in Canada at 4. 
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If an accused is not fit to stand trial, the accused’s case is referred back to the criminal court 
for the proceedings in that court to take their course.443  An unfit accused does not qualify 
for the second phase of the Mental Health Court process.  The Mental Health Court may 
make a treatment order in terms of the provisions of the Criminal Code for the accused to 
become fit to stand trial.444  Where the accused is still unfit after such treatment period, the 
case of the accused will revert to the criminal court where the Review Board has jurisdiction 
to order an appropriate disposition in respect of such an accused in line with the provisions 
of the criminal code.445  The Mental Health Court may be requested to assist the Review 
Board with the determination of an appropriate disposition.  
7.3.2.2 Legal criteria 
Diversion into a court-monitored diversion programme in Canada can generally be 
accomplished where the offence is of a minor nature and does not involve violence.446  
Serious offences will not trigger diversion in Ontario.447  The practice memorandum states 
that offences such as murder, sexual offences, kidnapping, child abuse, and offences 
involving firearms are not eligible for diversion regardless of the circumstances of the 
accused.448  Admission into the Mental Health Court treatment programmes as the second 
phase of the Mental Health Court proceedings is, therefore, reserved for those charged with 
                                                
443  Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 at 34. 
444  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 97.  Also see section 672.58 of the Criminal 
Code that provides for a court to make a treatment order that lasts for a maximum of 60 days in 
order to render the accused fit to stand trial.  This is known as a “get fit” order.  Such treatment order 
may also be requested by the Crown. 
445  The dispositions that may be made are set out in section 672.54 of the Criminal Code.  A  permanent 
stay of proceedings may be ordered if the court or Review Board is of the opinion that the accused is 
permanently unfit to stand trial.  Also see Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 at 33.   
446  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 34, 35.  Other requirements for diversion 
are that the safety of the public must not be compromised by the diversion; his mental disorder must 
be amenable to treatment and the proposed mental health care facility or practitioner must agree to 
accept the individual for treatment.  Also see Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 at 34. 
447  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 35. 
448  Other offences that will not trigger diversion is manslaughter, causing death or bodily harm by 
dangerous or impaired driving, offences involving child pornography, specific hate offences, home 
invasions and perjury.  Also see Schneider Annotated Ontario Mental Health Statutes at 680.  See 
further Byrick and Walker-Renshaw A practical guide to Mental Health and the Law in Ontario at 107.  
Also see Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General Criminal Law Division Practice memorandum:  
Mentally Disordered/Developmentally Disabled Offenders: Diversion at 12, 13 that lists all the 
charges that will not trigger diversion, regardless of the circumstances of the accused.  These are:  
murder, manslaughter, infanticide, criminal negligence causing death; causing death or bodily harm 
by dangerous or impaired driving; any offence causing serious bodily harm;  simple impaired driving 
or driving with a prohibited blood alcohol concentration; offences involving firearms; criminal 
organisation offences; kidnapping; spouse/partner offences; child abuse; offences involving child 
pornography sexual offences including sexual assault, interference and exploitation, invitation to 
sexual touching and incest; specific hate offences; home invasions;  and perjury. 
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less serious offences.449 
The typical cases dealt with in the Toronto Mental Health Court, for example, include 
shoplifting, annoying passers-by on the street, or breaking into a home to retrieve 
belongings that were left behind after being evicted by the property owner.450  Offences 
such as theft and possession, mischief, fraud and false pretences, food and 
accommodation fraud as well as causing a disturbance are eligible for diversion.451  
Whether diversion will be allowed in these cases depends on the circumstances of the 
accused.452  
As part of the deliberations pertaining to the accused’s eligibility for the programme phase, 
the prosecutor must indicate that either the Crown is willing to withdraw the charges against 
the accused upon completion of the programme or that he is willing to agree to a non-
custodial sentence for the particular accused.453 
Since a mentally ill but fit person accused of a violent crime will not be eligible for the 
programme phase of the Mental Health Court, his case will revert back to the criminal court 
after the fitness assessment unless he wants to make use of the expertise in the Mental 
Health Court for purposes of resolving his case by entering a guilty plea or for purposes of a 
bail application that is discussed later in this chapter.  
 If the accused meets the eligibility criteria, the case proceeds in the Mental Health Court to 
                                                
449  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 6 and further at 100.  Also see   Toronto 
Mental Health Court  http://www.mentalhealthcourt.ca/pages/2/Overview.htm (Date of use:  21 July 
2015) at 1.  In New Brunswick, the criteria for eligibility for the Mental Health Court programme is 
that any accused; who is suffering from a mental illness or intellectual disability; who has been 
charged with a minor offence; Is fit to stand trial; and accepts responsibility for his actions will be 
allowed into the programme. 
450  Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at 266.  Also see the discussion under diversion earlier in this chapter 
where the various offences and their diversion criteria are discussed with reference to the three 
classes of offences. 
451  Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General Criminal Law Division Practice memorandum:  Mentally 
Disordered/Developmentally Disabled Offenders: Diversion at 4.  Also see Schneider Annotated 
Ontario Mental Health Statutes at 680.  Also refer to the three classes of offences as discussed 
earlier in the chapter.  The classification of an offence has an impact on if it can be the subject of 
diversion or not. 
452  Particular consideration is given to the question whether the accused before the court is a first 
offender, although diversion of these types of offences is not reserved for those who are first time 
offenders.  Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General Criminal Law Division Practice memorandum:  
Mentally Disordered/Developmentally Disabled Offenders: Diversion at 4.  Also see Schneider 
Annotated Ontario Mental Health Statutes at 680.     
453  Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 at 34.  The Crown may decide to withdraw the charges against the 
accused if the charge relates to a minor offence and there is no threat to public safety.  See 
Schizophrenia society of Ontario http://www.schizophrenia.on.ca/getmedia/d252fe01-ab2a-429c-
bd6b-5322115c4204/justice_process_guide.pdf.aspx (Date of use: 20 September 2016) at 6. 
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the last two stages, namely the compliance and acceptance stages. 
7.3.3 Compliance and acceptance stages 
Once it is established that the accused is fit to stand trial and meets the legal eligibility 
criteria for diversion, a joint decision is taken by the court and the accused pertaining to his 
willingness and ability to submit to a court-monitored treatment programme.454  The 
accused may, for example, at this point, decide to rather proceed with the trial in the 
criminal court, in which case the matter is referred back to the trial court for a trial.455    
 Should the accused, however, wish to participate in the programme phase, the accused 
formally applies to the Mental Health Court for admission to the treatment programme.  This 
application entails an acknowledgement that the accused suffers from a mental illness, that 
treatment, therefore, is necessary and confirms that the accused consents to such 
treatment, including the taking of medication.456  The orders that a Mental Health Court may 
make in the case of a mentally ill accused person are not limited to the taking of medication 
and psychiatric treatment.457 
The granting of the application for admission concludes the acceptance stage as the last 
stage in the admission phase.  Once the admission phase is complete, the accused may 
                                                
454  Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 at 34. 
455  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 90, 102.  Also see Rieksts 2008 LawNow 
31 at 32 where it is reiterated that the focus in the Mental Health Court falls on treatment and 
rehabilitation of the accused rather than punishment.  Also see Ryan & Whelan 2012 Web Journal of 
Current Legal Issues 1 at 8 where the voluntary nature of participation in the Mental Health Court is 
confirmed and in particular the fact that the accused may decide to opt out at any point in time – 
except for those part of the proceedings for which his consent is not required as pointed out earlier in 
this chapter.  
456  The consent to the treatment that will be offered in the court monitored programme, must be given 
voluntary as reiterated by Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at 266.  Also see Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 
at 34. 
457  Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General Criminal Law Division Practice memorandum:  Mentally 
Disordered/Developmentally Disabled Offenders: Diversion at 7, 8 where the dispositions that a 
court may make when dealing with the case of a mentally ill accused are set out.  These are: 
admission to a hospital for assessment; referral to a psychiatrist/mental health worker, or to an 
agency with expertise in mental disorders/developmental disabilities; a supervision, care or 
treatment plan, including a community treatment order under the Mental Health Act (see section 7, 
infra) offered by family, legal guardian, substitute decision-maker, community facility, or counsel; 
admission to a programme suited to the developmentally disabled offender which addresses the 
need for individual deterrence and rehabilitation; establishing support in the community, including 
adequate housing and on-going contact with social/community worker; counselling sessions which 
focus on individual deterrence and rehabilitation; community service work; an apology to the victim 
or others affected; restitution or compensation to the victim or the community;  stay of the charge, if 
the apprehension/charge has had sufficient impact on the offender, or the offender has already taken 
restorative measures, or intervention such as treatment or counselling, and/or the offence(s) is(are) 
being adequately addressed in the community.   
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now move on to the programme phase (the diversion component).458 
7.4 Programme phase of the Mental Health Court 
 The diversion component found in the Canadian Mental Health Courts is post-charge but 
pre-plea diversion programmes.459  It is identified as a post-charge model because the 
accused has already been arrested and charged but is a pre-plea model as the accused is 
never arraigned, nor is a guilty plea required for access to the Mental Health Court 
programme.460    
Since this phase of the court programme not only differs from court to court but from one 
case to another, only a general discussion of the elements of this phase is possible.  The 
discussion will focus on the unique treatment programme and the sanctions imposed in the 
event of non-compliance with the treatment programme. 
7.4.1 Unique treatment programme 
 Since the accused consented to treatment, including taking medication during the 
acceptance stage of the admission phase, a unique treatment programme is designed for 
him by the multi-disciplinary team.  Court proceedings may be adjourned to afford the court 
workers time to develop the treatment plan.461 
                                                
458  Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 at 34. 
459  Hartford, Carey and Mendonca 2007 Journal of Behavioral Health Services and Research 198 at 
199.  A distinction is drawn between pre-plea and post-plea diversion programmes that both fall into 
the post-charge diversion category.  See Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 
76.  Also see Schizophrenia society of Ontario http://www.schizophrenia.on.ca/getmedia/d252fe01-
ab2a-429c-bd6b-5322115c4204/justice_process_guide.pdf.aspx (Date of use: 20 September 2016) 
at 5 where diversion after arrest but before the trial is labelled as pre-trial diversion or court diversion 
(see 25 of this source).  Also see Ryan & Whelan 2012 Web Journal of Current Legal Issues 1 at 8 
where the Canadian Mental Health Court model is labelled as a pre-adjudication model. 
460  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 76.  These authors point out that most 
American models of the Mental Health Court, is characterised as “post-plea” models as a guilty plea 
is often a prerequisite for admission into the diversion program.  See chapter 5 of this research for a 
detailed discussion of American Mental Health Courts.  The Supreme Court of Queensland 
established a Mental Health Court that closely resembles the Canadian model and more in particular 
the model of the Toronto Mental Health Court in Canada.  See Schneider Bloom and Heerema 
Mental Health Courts at 108.  Where the accused is referred to the Mental Health Court for a hearing 
on criminal capacity or where the Mental Health Court is requested to assist with such hearing, there 
must be prima facie evidence that there is a link between the mental disorder and the alleged 
criminal offence.  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 88.  See however 
Hartford, Carey and Mendonca 2007 Journal of Behavioral Health Services and Research 198 at 
198 where Mental Health Courts (in Alberta, Canada) are described as a post-plea diversion 
programme.   
461  Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General Criminal Law Division Practice memorandum:  Mentally 
Disordered/Developmentally Disabled Offenders: Diversion at 8 where it is stated that an 
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 The court team converses with the accused to determine the nature of the accused’s 
mental health care needs.  This discussion is led by the judge and added to by the other 
multi-disciplinary team members.  After the discussion, the team develops a unique and 
suitable treatment plan for the accused, lasting anything from 6 weeks to two years.462  The 
treatment plan can include psychological treatment, occupational training, access to 
housing and other social services 463 or any combination of services or treatment that the 
particular individual requires to re-integrate into the community.   
 The accused is required to sign an acceptance form indicating his agreement to the 
programme specifically designed to address his mental health care needs.464  The accused 
must report to the Mental Health Court periodically on the progress with the treatment 
programme.465 
Where the accused successfully completed the Mental Health Court programme, the 
charges against him may be dismissed,466 or prosecution may be stayed.467   In the event 
                                                                                                                                                   
adjournment can be requested in order for the treatment team to organise the treatment plan, to 
stabilise the accused or to secure, for example, housing for the accused if needed.  More than one 
adjournment may be required, depending on the unique circumstances of the accused and his 
treatment needs.  
462  The specific treatment programme depends on various factors such as the seriousness of the 
offence.  See Parliamentary Information and research service Current issues in Mental Health in 
Canada at 4.  Also see Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General Criminal Law Division Practice 
memorandum:  Mentally Disordered/Developmentally Disabled Offenders: Diversion at 2.  Also see 
Schneider Annotated Ontario Mental Health Statutes at 6 where it is stated that the medical model, 
which entails the use of medication and psychiatric treatment, is not necessarily sufficient for all 
mentally ill accused as some may also require some form of social assistance such as housing.  
463  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 6.  Also see Ontario Ministry of the Attorney 
General Criminal Law Division Practice memorandum:  Mentally Disordered/Developmentally 
Disabled Offenders: Diversion at 7, 8 for the various dispositions that the court can make.  Also see 
Schizophrenia society of Ontario http://www.schizophrenia.on.ca/getmedia/d252fe01-ab2a-429c-
bd6b-5322115c4204/justice_process_guide.pdf.aspx (Date of use: 20 September 2016) at 6 where it 
is explained that not all Mental Health Court programmes involve the taking of medication but it may 
form part of the treatment programme.    
464  Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at 273.  Also see Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 at 33.   
465  The accused must return to court periodically during the treatment period (between 7 and 12 months 
long) to give progress reports.  Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at 267.  In New Brunswick the accused 
is required to sign an admission form should he opt to participate in the Mental Health Court 
programme.  Also see Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 at 33 who reports that at the St John Mental Health 
Court, the accused must report to the court every 2 weeks. 
466  Section 717(4)(a) of the Criminal Code.  Also see Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 282.  See further 
Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General Criminal Law Division Practice memorandum:  Mentally 
Disordered/Developmentally Disabled Offenders: Diversion at 2.  Also see Schneider Annotated 
Ontario Mental Health Statutes at 679.  The Crown Policy states that where the offence is a minor 
offence and no risk to public safety exists, it may very well be in the public interest to simply 
withdraw the charges.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 6 and 
further at 89.  See further Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at 272 who points out that the decision as to 
if the charges are dropped or stayed, depends on the province that he accused finds himself in.  In 
New Brunswick Upon completion and “graduation” from the programme the charges could be 
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that the charges are dismissed or stayed, the accused is free and no longer subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Mental Health Court.  There is no conviction in such a case.468    
Not all accused persons that enrol for the programme phase of the Mental Health Court 
complete the programme.  Sanctions for non-compliance with the treatment programme are 
discussed below. 
7.4.2 Sanctions for non-compliance 
 Where an accused failed to comply with the treatment conditions, certain sanctions can be 
employed, for instance, he can be ordered to appear in front of the Mental Health Court 
more frequently than initially agreed upon.469  The treatment plan is often adjusted in an 
attempt to ensure compliance with the treatment plan.470  Generally, jail time as a sanction 
is avoided in the Canadian Mental Health Courts.471 
                                                                                                                                                   
dropped by the Crown.  If the Crown decides to proceed with the case, the court will usually impose 
a non-custodial sentence.  Also see Slinger and Roesch 2010 International Journal of Law and 
Psychiatry 258 at 261 who confirm that the general practice in Canada is to have charges against an 
accused dropped upon successful completion of the Mental Health Court programme.    
467  The Attorney General delegated his authority to stay proceedings i.t.o Section 579 of the Criminal 
Code to all Crown Counsel.  Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General Criminal Law Division Practice 
memorandum:  Mentally Disordered/Developmentally Disabled Offenders: Diversion at 8 where it is 
stated that the court may order a stay of proceedings if the accused has undergone treatment and/or 
the offence has been adequately addressed in the community.  It is further explained here that, while 
the completion of the treatment programme should not be set as condition for the stay of 
proceedings, I might very well be in the public interest to ensure that the accused is stabilized   The 
Crown should therefore be satisfied that the accused has been accepted into a treatment 
programme or has been stabilised I the community before the charges are stayed.  The final 
decision about the stay of proceedings is only made once it is sure that the accused is stabilised.  
See the discussion of R v Demers earlier in this chapter where the court held that a stay of 
proceedings might be ordered in respect of a permanently unfit accused provided that such an 
accused does not pose a threat to public safety.  An accused that successfully completed the Mental 
Health Court programme will be in the same position procedurally as a permanently unfit accused 
who does not pose a threat to public safety. 
468  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 6 and further at 89.  This is so because no 
guilty plea is required for admission into the Mental Health Court programme.   
469   Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 at 34.  Also see Slinger and Roesch 2010 International Journal of Law 
and Psychiatry 258 at 261.  See further Ryan & Whelan 2012 Web Journal of Current Legal Issues 1 
at 8.   
470  Ryan & Whelan 2012 Web Journal of Current Legal Issues 1 at 8. 
471  Slinger and Roesch 2010 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 258 at 261.  In the United 
States jail time is more often used as a sanction for non-compliance.  Obvious criticism can be levied 
against this practice having regard to the research that shows the negative impact that a correctional 
setting may have on a person with a mental illness.  This point is canvassed in more detail in chapter 
5 where the American Mental Health Court model is discussed.  Also see Ryan & Whelan 2012 Web 
Journal of Current Legal Issues 1 at 8 where it is confirmed that Canadian Mental Health Courts 
generally avoid using jail time as a sanction.  Mental Health Courts in the United States of America 
sometimes use jail time as a sanction for non-compliance.  See chapter 5 for more on sanctions for 
non-compliance within the American Mental Health Court 
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 The “ultimate” sanction for non-compliance of a court ordered treatment programme is that 
the case of the accused reverts to the criminal court for the matter to be tried.  The fact that 
the accused participated in the programme may be taken into consideration for motivating 
that the charges be dismissed.472  Where, however, the state decides to proceed with the 
charges, the sentence will be reduced to acknowledge participation in the Mental Health 
Court programme.473  The accused’s admission to his involvement in the crime that he is 
charged with when he entered the programme phase of the Mental Health Court cannot be 
used against the accused in future criminal proceedings.474  
7.5 Mental Health Courts role in respect of accused who do not qualify for the programme 
phase 
The Toronto Mental Health Court assists accused persons who do not qualify for the 
programme phase of the Mental Health Court or who chose not to participate in the Mental 
Health Court programme.  Assistance is offered in the instance of bail hearings, disposition 
hearings, and guilty pleas. 
Once the participant is found fit to stand trial, he may not want to participate in the 
programme phase of the Mental Health Court or may not qualify for the programme phase 
due to the violent nature of the offence with which he has been charged.  He may choose 
for his case to revert to the criminal court for a traditional bail hearing.475  Alternatively, the 
accused may remain within the Mental Health Court for a bail hearing or resolve the matter 
with a guilty plea.476   
                                                
472  Section 717(4)(b) of the Criminal Code.  Also see Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 282. 
473  Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at 267. Also see Rieksts 2008 LawNow 31 at 33 who is of the view that 
the decision that the Crown will either withdraw the charges or agree to a non-custodial sentence, 
has to be taken as early as during the admission phase of the Mental Health Court.   
474  Section 7171(1)(3) of the Criminal Code.  Also see Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 281. 
475  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 6, 102.  Also see Ryan & Whelan 2012 
Web Journal of Current Legal Issues 1 at 8. 
476  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 6, 90, 98.  It often happened that mentally 
ill accused persons pleaded guilty to a minor offence in a desperate attempt to get out of jail.  Also 
see Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 12 who explains that a guilty plea 
has many advantages for the state in that it saves time and costs because an investigation into the 
crime is made unnecessary by a guilty plea and it saves witnesses the effort to come to court to 
testify and many procedural difficulties are avoided.  Also see Schizophrenia society of Ontario  
http://www.schizophrenia.on.ca/getmedia/3392a3b5-43f1-4818-8e8c-45fcb1c15603/diversion_-
_a_guide_for_families__final_.pdf.aspx (Date of use:  31 August 2015) at 3 where it is confirmed that 
mentally ill accused persons sometimes enter the Mental Health Court only to resolve the matter with 
a guilty plea.  This is preferred since their mental condition is taken into consideration.  Also see 
Ryan & Whelan 2012 Web Journal of Current Legal Issues 1 at 6 where the option to remain in the 
Mental Health Court to resolve the case with a guilty plea is confirmed.  See further Legal Aid 
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If bail is granted by the Mental Health Court, the bail conditions will usually contain some 
conditions for compliance with a treatment plan whilst out on bail.477  An accused assessed 
for fitness at the Mental Health Court and who was found fit to stand trial can be released 
on bail even on the same day that he was so assessed.478 
If the accused chooses to resolve his case in the Mental Health Court with a guilty plea, 
rehabilitation rather than punishment is the focus during sentencing.479  It is trite that “A just 
sentence must fit the offender as well as the offence”.480  Sentencing is a delicate process 
of weighing up the societal goals of sentencing and the moral blameworthiness of the 
offence against the backdrop of the needs and conditions of the community.481  Mental 
disorder is generally regarded as a mitigating factor during the sentencing process.482  
It should be noted that the court does not have any jurisdiction to order that the accused 
serve his sentence in a psychiatric hospital.483  This may, however, be possible as part of a 
conditional sentence, where the hospital agrees to accommodate the accused.484  Persons 
with mental illness generally cope poorly in prison 485 hence, if possible, an alternative to 
incarceration for those accused persons should be considered.  
                                                                                                                                                   
Ontario http://lawfacts.ca/mental-health/court  (Date of use:  22 September 2016) where it is pointed 
out that not all Mental Health Courts provide assistance beyond the fitness assessment.   
477  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 6 and further at 102. 
478  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-5 where submissions by 
presiding officers of the Ontario Mental Health Court made at the meetings of the Standing 
committee on Justice and Human Rights are discussed.    
479  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 93.  Also see Ryan & Whelan 2012 Web 
Journal of Current Legal Issues 1 at 8. 
480  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 99. 
481  R v C.A.M (1996) 1 S C R 500 Lamer C.J.C.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental 
Health Courts at 99. 
482  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 99, 100.  Reasons for this practice are inter 
alia that a reduced sentence may ensure that the accused receives much needed psychiatric 
treatment.  This has to be contrasted with the consideration that sentences may not be lengthened to 
facilitate treatment in custody.  Also see R v Wallace (1973) II C.C.C (2d) 95 (Ont C.A.) and R v 
Luther (1971) 5 C.C.C (2d)  354 (Ont C.A.), R v Lee (1985) N.S J No. 421 (C.A.)  Other reasons for 
considering mental illness during sentencing is that the accused is viewed as less reprehensible.  
See R v Pegg (1987) 24 O.A.C 74 (C.A.); R v Barker (1995) M.J No. 154 (Prov. Ct.).  Also see 
Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General Criminal Law Division Practice memorandum:  Mentally 
Disordered/Developmentally Disabled Offenders: Diversion at 9 where it is indicated that the court 
must consider community planning, treatment or observation options for such accused persons.   
Involvement in a treatment programme will serve as mitigation during sentencing.  
483  R v Deans (1977) 37 C.C.C (2d) 221 (Ont C.A.)  Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental 
Health Courts at 100. 
484  R v Jacobish (1997) N. J  No. 225 (C.A.); R v McCullough (1983) A.J  No. 858 (C.A.). Also see 
Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 100. 
485  R v Brown (1972) 8 C.C.C. (2d) 13 (Ont C.A.); R v Shanawaz (2000) 40 C.R. 5th 195 (Ont C.A.).  
Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 99. 
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Bearing this in mind, the Toronto Mental Health Court gives due consideration to the 
possibility that even though the mental illness was present during the commission of the 
offence, its effect is not such that it should impact the verdict.486  On the other hand, the 
mental disorder should be taken into consideration during the sentencing process, 
especially where it becomes apparent that the accused did not raise the issue of mental 
illness during his trial, despite the fact that such an issue could have had a significant 
impact on his plea or trial.487 
The parties may agree to hold the hearing on the criminal capacity of the accused in the 
Mental Health Court because of the special skills that it houses.488  The Mental Health Court 
may also be of assistance to the criminal court during a disposition hearing of an accused 
who is found unfit or not criminally responsible as provided for in the Criminal Code.489   
7.6 Conclusion 
The Toronto Mental Health Court phases and stages therein follow a logical flow in line with 
the underlying logic associated with Mental Health Court, as mentioned earlier.  The 
Toronto Mental Health Court provides assistance to every accused person in respect of 
whom mental illness is at issue, except those who do not agree to their referral to the 
Mental Health Court in the first place. 
Once in the Mental Health Court process, accused persons are free to opt-out at any time.  
This practice confirms the voluntary nature of the Mental Health Court process.  This choice 
is only limited during the official fitness assessment and whilst undergoing a treatment order 
made by the criminal court. 
The Toronto Mental Health Court provides an opportunity for mentally ill accused persons 
charged with divertible offences to avoid the traditional criminal justice process.  These 
persons draw the greatest advantage from these courts since their charges can be 
dismissed upon completion of the Mental Health Court treatment programme. 
The Toronto Mental Health Court, however, also assists those who do not qualify for 
diversion due to, for instance, the serious nature of the charges against the accused.  This 
practice ensures that the specialised knowledge and skill in the Mental Health Court is 
                                                
486  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 99. 
487  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 99. 
488  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 6 and further at 98. 
489  Section 672.54 of the Criminal Code provides for a court to hold disposition hearings. 
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available to all mentally ill accused persons and not only those who committed minor 
offences.  Although those charged with serious offences will not qualify for a Mental Health 
Court treatment programme, they do indeed qualify for the court’s assistance during a bail 
hearing and/or during a hearing involving a lack of criminal capacity.  A mentally ill person 
charged with a serious offence can also resolve his case with a guilty plea in the Mental 
Health Court, where his mental illness will be taken into account during sentencing that 
would not necessarily have been the case in a traditional criminal court. 
Mental Health Courts succeed in making specialised services and skills available to 
accused persons who would otherwise not have had access to it had their cases been 
processed through the traditional criminal justice system.  The Toronto Mental Health Court 
offers an effective therapeutic response to persons with mental illness in the Canadian 
criminal justice system. 
8 EVALUATING THE SUCCESS OF THE MENTAL HEALTH COURTS IN CANADA 
8.1 Introduction 
Mental Health Courts are still in their infancy.  Few studies have been done on the 
effectiveness of the Mental Health Court in Canada, as this has to be measured over a 
period and follow up studies are not always conducted for this purpose.490  Some may 
argue that the lack of proof of effectiveness should discourage further development of 
Mental Health Courts.  The opposite may then also be argued, namely that, in the absence 
of studies disproving the effectiveness of Mental Health Courts, there is no reason why 
Mental Health Courts should not be promoted as a therapeutic response to mentally ill 
accused persons in the criminal justice system.    
The only measure currently available to assess the effectiveness of Canadian Mental 
Health Courts is to consider whether the Mental Health Court achieved its main objectives 
that are discussed earlier in this chapter. 
  Preliminary findings on the effectiveness of the Mental Health Court in Canada are 
presented here.491  Existing concerns about some aspects of the Mental Health Court 
model employed in Canada are highlighted, and responses thereto are included under the 
                                                
490  Hartford, Carey and Mendonca 2007 Journal of Behavioral Health Services and Research 198 at 
200.  Also see Slinger and Roesch 2010 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 258.at 259 who 
points out that most of the effectiveness studies have not been published. 
491  Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at 268-270. 
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discussion of each of these concerns. 
8.2 Successes 
 As stated previously, the two main goals of the Toronto Mental Health Court is to expedite 
pre-trial issues, particularly fitness to stand trial, and to reduce recidivism amongst mentally 
ill offenders.  These goals seem to have been achieved and can be labelled as a success of 
the Mental Health Court.  In addition, the Mental Health Court has proved to result in cost 
saving to the criminal justice system.  Each of these successes is briefly discussed below.   
8.2.1 Reduced delays in trial 
Prior to the establishment of the Toronto Mental Health Court, mentally ill accused persons 
spent unnecessary time in custody awaiting psychiatric assessment.492  These waiting 
periods caused unnecessary delays in the finalisation of the accused trial.    
With the implementation of the Toronto Mental Health Court, these waiting periods have 
been significantly reduced if not eliminated due to the fact that fitness assessments are 
conducted by psychiatrists on-site 493 at the Mental Health Court within approximately half 
an hour.494  Referral for assessment to a psychiatric institution is no longer the default 
position but rather reserved for those more complex cases that warrant a longer 
assessment period.  The liberty of the accused is not infringed unnecessary, and he may 
even be released on bail on the same day of his assessment, provided he was found fit to 
stand trial and does not pose a danger to society.495   
These expeditious assessments by the Mental Health Court result in enormous savings as 
hospital beds are no longer occupied by these accused for several days for purposes of 
assessment.496  These speedy assessments have also pacified some criticism against the 
                                                
492  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 6 and further at 98.  Also see this source at 
52, 53 where it is pointed out that prior to the establishment of the Ontario Mental Health Court, had 
to wait approximately 4 weeks in jail before they could be assessed for fitness to stand trial.  See, 
however, Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at 271 who estimates the average time that mentally ill 
accused had to wait to be assessed for fitness to stand trial, at two weeks and not four weeks. 
493  Schneider RD “Mental disorder in the court” 1998 Criminal Law Association Newsletter 57-57 at 57. 
494  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-5 where submissions by 
presiding officers of the Ontario Mental Health Court made at the meetings of the Standing 
committee on Justice and Human Rights are discussed.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema 
Mental Health Courts at 127-129 where an amended fitness test is proposed to test fitness for trial 
and fitness for diversion. 
495  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-5. 
496  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 98. 
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unreasonable infringement upon the liberty of mentally ill accused when having to attend 
lengthy hospital-based fitness assessments.497 In fact, the same day assessments 
conducted by the Mental Health Court team should eradicate these concerns altogether. 
8.2.2 Lower recidivism 
Before Mental Health Courts were established, the mentally ill accused was released back 
into society without any social assistance such as housing or connection with a mental 
health facility and was at greater risk of re-offending. 498  The possibility of re-offending 
posed a threat to public safety.   
The Toronto Mental Health Court is reducing recidivism of its Mental Health Court 
participants by closing the gap between the criminal justice system and the mental health 
care system.499  Mental Health Courts aim to reduce recidivism by ensuring that the 
accused receives the particular treatment required for his condition.  An evaluation of the 
pilot project phase of the Mental Health Court in New Brunswick, being the first three years, 
has shown that 71% of the individuals, who completed the programme through the court, 
have not reoffended.500       
In addition, persons with mental illness that come into contact with the criminal justice 
system have better access to mental health care through court support programmes, and 
this has resulted in better care and quality of life of mentally ill accused persons.501 
It should be reiterated, however, that reduction in recidivism could only really be measured 
over an extended period as the “rehabilitated” offenders, even though they have not re-
offended in the period that formed the subject of a particular research project might re-
offend after the study is concluded.   
                                                
497  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 98. 
498  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 6, 98 where it is pointed out that where an 
accused is released in this manner without a connection to community mental health services, all the 
progress that had been made during the treatment of the accused in order to render him fit to stand 
trial, was lost as the treatment ceased upon release from custody.     
499  Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at 272, footnote 90.  Also see Toronto Mental Health Court  
http://www.mentalhealthcourt.ca/pages/2/Overview.htm (Date of use:  21 July 2015) at 2.  Also see 
Ministry of Health and Long-term Care  A Program Framework for:  Mental Health Diversion at 3.    
500  Recidivism, although not stated as a specific objective of this particular Mental Health Court, is in line 
with the overall objectives of the Mental Health Court movement.  Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at 
267 at footnote 62 and at 274 footnote 92. 
501  Ministry of Health and Long-term Care  A Program Framework for:  Mental Health Diversion at 3.  
This report also indicates that court support services such as those offered in the Mental Health 
Court reduced hospitalisation of mentally ill persons in contact with the criminal justice system.  Also 




These courts not only appear to be financially viable but actually succeed in saving costs.  
Cost-saving for the correctional facilities has been identified due to the fact that Mental 
Health Courts succeed in expediting pre-trial issues as fewer accused persons are kept in 
detention awaiting psychiatric assessment.502    
Expeditious fitness assessments by the Mental Health Court result in enormous savings as 
hospital beds are no longer occupied for several days for purposes of assessment.503  
Mentally ill accused persons whose cases are channelled through the Mental Health Court 
receive treatment in, mostly, community-based programmes that mean that they do not rely 
on the correctional facility to provide mental health services.    
If it is accepted that Mental Health Courts reduce recidivism, a further cost-saving could be 
identified as fewer persons with mental illnesses will be re-arrested, and the revolving door 
phenomenon would have been limited. 
From the successes highlighted above, it appears that the Toronto Mental Health Court is 
reaching its goals. 
8.3 Concerns 
 The two main points of concern levied against the Canadian Mental Health Court model is 
with regard to voluntary participation in the court programme and the preferential treatment 
of persons in the Mental Health Court programme. 
8.3.1 Voluntary participation 
It is argued that incentives such as the prospect of a possible stay of proceedings upon 
completion of the Mental Health Court programme serve as a tool to coerce the accused to 
participate in the Mental Health Court programme and consequently renders the 
participation in the Toronto Mental Health Court programme non-voluntary.504   
                                                
502  Slinger and Roesch 2010 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 258.at 259 who points out that 
it costs twice as much to incarcerate an accused with a mental illness than one without such mental 
illness. 
503  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 98. 
504  Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at 266.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health 
Courts at 6 and further at 89. 
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Schneider et all’s 505 response to this criticism is simply to emphasize that participation in 
the Canadian Mental Health Court model is completely optional.  They add further that the 
decision to stay the proceedings against an accused is in any event completely within the 
Crown’s discretion 506 and therefore not guaranteed at all.    
The fact that the accused can opt-out of the Mental Health Court programme at any given 
time, except during a fitness assessment and a treatment order, confirms the voluntary 
nature of participation therein.  The voluntariness of the Mental Health Court programme 
has, however, been found not to be stressed enough at the point where the accused is 
placed before the choice between participating in the Mental Health Court programme or 
having the case processed through the traditional criminal justice system.507  In an attempt 
to address this criticism, the voluntary nature of the accused’s participation in the Mental 
Health Court programme should be stressed to the accused, initially when he enters the 
programme and throughout the programme 508 to empower him to take his own decision 
about continuation therewith.  This should reduce concerns about coercion. 
8.3.2 Preferential treatment of offenders by the mental health care system 
Concerns have been raised that Mental Health Court participants will skip the line to receive 
services first, ahead of those equally entitled thereto but who are outside the Mental Health 
Court programme and/or the criminal justice system.509  In an already overtaxed mental 
health care system, it is seen as a real risk that these participants may absorb the mental 
health care services that should be equally available to those outside of the system.510  It is 
unsure if Mental Health Courts have indeed had this effect.511 
Canadian courts take a strict approach to resource availability when it comes to the 
treatment of a mentally ill accused released conditionally, where part of their conditional 
release is to receive treatment.  The court emphasises that such conditional release cannot 
                                                
505  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 6 and further at 90. 
506  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 88, 89.  Also see Barrett and Shandler 
Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 3-47 where it is pointed out that where a decision is 
taken to withdraw the charges against the accused, it is usually done based on public policy where 
the public would generally not require criminal charges to remain over such an accused.   
507  Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at 268 footnote 66 and further at 270.  
508  Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at 280. 
509  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 32.  Also see Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 
at 270.  See further Luther and Mela 2006 Sask L Rev 401 at 424 who discusses this phenomenon 
as queue-jumping in the forensic mental health setting. 
510  Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at 270. 
511  Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at 270. 
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be denied because of a lack of resources within the particular province.512 
More resources should be made available, and perhaps specific resources should be 
allocated to individuals in the Mental Health Court programme.513  This will ensure that 
there are sufficient resources for all in need thereof.  To this end, Heerema states that the 
funding for the social services used by the Mental Health Courts should increase.514   
8.4 Suggested improvements to the Canadian Mental Health Court model 
Having regard to the concerns above and other considerations regarding diversion in 
Canada and the effectiveness of the Mental Health Court model, it has been suggested that 
the model be supplemented by a pre-booking programme. 
 The current design of the Mental Health Court framework results in the accused’s first 
interaction with the Mental Health Court only after arrest, thus, after he encountered the 
criminal justice system, he is arrested and incarcerated.  The contact of the mentally ill 
accused with the criminal justice system can be limited even further by employing pre-
booking diversion.  A pre-booking diversion programme aims to completely avoid contact 
with the criminal justice system, thus be diverted away from it before charges are laid.515 
Pre-booking diversion programmes require the co-operation and sensitisation of the 
police.516  Training in this regard may be necessary.  Police need to acquire skills that will 
                                                
512  Luther and Mela 2006 Sask L Rev 401 at 425 where case law from different provinces are discussed 
and where it is clear that the courts expect provinces to make treatment services available where 
needed.  See in particular the judgment of the Supreme Court of Ontario in R v Nault (2002) 59 O.R 
(3d) 388, 159 O.A.C, 391 (C.A) at [17]] where it was held that:  “It cannot be up to the will of any 
province to effectively preclude the imposition of conditional sentences by failing to provide sufficient 
supervisory resources”.  The same argument could apply to diversion programmes. 
513  This would be in line with the objective set by the Mental Health Commission of Canada in their 2012 
Mental Health Strategy for Canada where the availability of resources and services to mentally ill 
persons in the criminal justice system, was identified as a priority together with the goal of reducing 
the number of mentally ill persons in the criminal justice system.  See Centre for addiction and 
mental health Evidence Summary: Mental Health Diversion Framework in Canada at 3. 
514  Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at 277. 
515  Centre for addiction and mental health Evidence Summary: Mental Health Diversion Framework in 
Canada at 4.  Also see Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at 275.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and 
Heerema Mental Health Courts at 72-74 for a discussion on the various pre-booking programmes 
available in Canada. 
516  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 35.  When the accused is arrested and the 
police observe strange behaviour, they may request that the accused be examined by a physician as 
a method of informal assessment and as an initial indicator of the accused’s state of mind.  Arresting 
an accused is usually only necessary where a serious offence is committed, or where the accused 
fails to identify himself, or where it is believed that the accused will intimidate witnesses or tamper 
with evidence.  Arrest and detention is not the preferred method of ensuring a persons’ appearance 
at trial and is only employed as a last resort.  Where the accused is arrested, however, and not 
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equip them to identify a person with a mental illness, how to deal with such persons and 
which resources are available to assist with the relevant mental health services.  Lack of 
training can lead to unfortunate consequences for the mentally ill accused.  In one instance, 
for example, the police killed a mentally ill person during an arrest.517  A need was identified 
to prevent the mentally ill from encountering the law in the first place.518  In response to this 
need, it is now a requirement that all new police officers in Ontario undergo mental health 
training where they learn to respond to situations involving possible mental illness.519   
Even where training is provided, the practicalities of adequately dealing with cases involving 
mental illness remains a challenge.  The police can, for example, according to the Ontario 
Mental Health Act, upon encountering a person that committed an offence who appears to 
be mentally ill, accompany the person to a psychiatric institution to have the individual 
assessed instead of filing criminal charges.520  The obstacle that police officers face, 
however, is that according to the Act, they have to wait for the assessment to be complete 
                                                                                                                                                   
released for such informal assessment or any other reason, a bail hearing will have to take place.  
See Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 32 and 176.  Also see 
Schizophrenia society of Ontario http://www.schizophrenia.on.ca/getmedia/d252fe01-ab2a-429c-
bd6b-5322115c4204/justice_process_guide.pdf.aspx (Date of use: 20 September 2016) at 2 where 
this type of diversion is referred to as “pre-arrest diversion”. 
517  McLachlin B 2010 Dalhousie Law Journal 15 at 30, 31.  One such person, Byron DeBassige, 
suffered from Schizophrenia but had stopped taking his medication.  The police picked him up for 
sniffing glue, an incident of which his probation officer was unaware.  Byron later stole two lemons 
for which he paid with his life, as police shot him after he failed to put down his knife upon demands 
to do so by the Police.  There were at least nine similar cases in the previous 2 decades in Canada 
and improvements have been made with regard to Police training in this regard.  Anon “Corronor’s 
inquest: System fails mentally ill” Editorial, 13 October 2010 Toronto Star.  Also available at 
http://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorials/article/874295--coroner-s-inquest-system-fails-mentally-ill 
(Date of use 25 July 2012). 
518  Anon “Corronor’s inquest: System fails mentally ill” Editorial, 13 October 2010 Toronto Star.  Also 
available at http://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorials/article/874295--coroner-s-inquest-system-fails-
mentally-ill (Date of use 25 July 2012). 
519  Centre for addiction and mental health Evidence Summary: Mental Health Diversion Framework in 
Canada at 4. 
520  Section 17 of the Ontario Mental Health Act.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental 
Health Courts at 35.  Also see Mewett An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada at 14, 15 
where it is explained that Canada has various police forces.  Many provinces such as Ontario and 
Quebec have their own police force.  Police forces can also be established at municipal level.  See 
further Byrick and Walker-Renshaw A practical guide to Mental Health and the Law in Ontario at 107 
who confirms the discretion that the police has in these circumstances.  Also see Lastly, see 
Schizophrenia society of Ontario http://www.schizophrenia.on.ca/getmedia/d252fe01-ab2a-429c-
bd6b-5322115c4204/justice_process_guide.pdf.aspx (Date of use: 20 September 2016) at 3 where it 
is explained that the police may decide to take the accused to a doctor for medical attention.  The 
doctor may then decide to issue a Form 1 Application for Psychiatric Assessment in which case the 
accused will be admitted to hospital for a period of 72 hours for a more in depth assessment.  If the 
doctor finds that the person is not a threat to himself or others, the doctor may discharge him after 
the 72 hour assessment period.  Note that South Africa has a similar provision in its Mental Health 
Care Act 17 of 2002.  See chapter 3 of this research for discussion thereon. 
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before they can relinquish custody to the psychiatric facility.521 These officers are often 
frustrated as these individuals are released from the psychiatric institution shortly after 
being admitted, only to commit the same offence again.522 
Pre-booking programmes will allow the police to take only those who merit criminal law 
interventions into the system and not those that primarily require other forms of social 
assistance.523  Police may, for example, decide to merely take the person home, or connect 
the person with community mental health services, depending on its availability.524   
Pre-booking programmes can further assist in avoiding stigmatisation in that a mentally ill 
person is labelled as a “forensic patient” if he enters the mental health care system through 
the criminal justice system, whereas this is not the case if he enters the mental health care 
system prior to arrest.525 
Some minor offences, whilst technically crimes, are more a product of issues stemming 
from mental disabilities rather than from criminal intentions.526  From this perspective, pre-
booking programmes make perfect sense, as these individuals do not belong in the criminal 
justice system to start with. 
9  COMPARISON OF CANADIAN SYSTEM WITH SOUTH AFRICAN SYSTEM 
9.1 Introduction 
 The purpose of this section is to highlight the major differences between the manner in 
which the Canadian criminal justice system approaches cases involving accused persons 
                                                
521  Section 17 of the Ontario Mental Health Act.  Also see Byrick and Walker-Renshaw A practical guide 
to Mental Health and the Law in Ontario at 35.  See further Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental 
Health Courts at 35.   
522  Read A 2009 UBCMJ 25 at 25 where it is stated that many persons in psychiatric hospitals are 
released before they are stabilised (between 10 and 20 percent) and these persons are often 
admitted to hospital again within 30 days.  Also see Canadian Mental Health Association 
http://www.cmha.bc.ca/files/policesheets_all.pdf  (Date of use: 13 March 2015) at 1.  See further 
Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 34, 35.   
523  Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at  261. 
524  Centre for addiction and mental health Evidence Summary: Mental Health Diversion Framework in 
Canada at 4.  Police may also decide to involve emergency response teams or accompanying the 
accused person to hospital after arresting the person in terms of the provincial Mental Health Act.  
Also see Schizophrenia society of Ontario http://www.schizophrenia.on.ca/getmedia/d252fe01-ab2a-
429c-bd6b-5322115c4204/justice_process_guide.pdf.aspx (Date of use: 20 September 2016) at 2 
where it is explained that the police can consider alternatives to arrest for the mentally ill accused, 
for instance, the police may warn the accused or call in a crisis team to assist. 
525  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 72.  Also see Centre for addiction and 
mental health Evidence Summary: Mental Health Diversion Framework in Canada at 4. 
526  Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 255 at 256, 276.  
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with mental illness and the approach that the South African criminal justice system follows 
in this regard. 
The processes and their purposes will not be repeated here, and this section serves as a 
summary of what has already been discussed in this chapter and chapter 3, but in the 
context of differences between the two systems.  Only major differences will be pointed out, 
or those that have or could potentially have a major impact on the mentally ill accused in 
the criminal justice process. 
9.2 Legislation 
 The Canadian Criminal Code contains elaborate provisions relevant to mentally ill accused 
persons.  The strength in this lies therein that multiple pieces of legislation need not be 
consulted in this regard, possibly limiting confusion.  Assessments are, however, often 
conducted in terms of the provincial mental health legislation such as the Ontario Mental 
Health Act in this instance. 
 In South Africa, the position pertaining to fitness assessments are contained in the Criminal 
Procedure Act as well as the Mental Health Care Act and the Correctional Services Act.  All 
these pieces of legislation operate on a national level and are administered by different 
government departments, with the possible result being that the pieces of legislation are not 
necessarily integrated in practice.  
 Canadian legislation contains a presumption of fitness to stand trial, something that is 
absent from South African legislation.  This may have an impact on the burden of proof.  In 
Canada, because the legislation creates the presumption of fitness, the burden of proof to 
rebut the presumption is on the party that raises the issue. 
Both Canadian and South African legislation makes provision, in its mental health 
legislation, for the police to take a mentally ill person to a hospital for treatment rather than 
arresting him, which could be seen as a form of pre-trial diversion.  In both jurisdictions, it 
does not seem to be used very often. 
9.3 Review Boards 
 Canadian Review Boards play a very active role in reviewing the decisions of the courts 
with regard to persons found not fit to stand trial and not criminally responsible.  Canadian 
Review Boards have the authority to make dispositions and to order assessments of 
accused persons found unfit or not criminally responsible by a court.  Review Boards form 
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an integral part of the criminal justice proceedings.  The role and duties of the Review 
Board are spelt out in the Criminal Code that confirms its integral role in the criminal justice 
proceedings.  
 South African Review Boards play a very limited part in the criminal justice process.  They 
cannot order assessments for purposes of fitness to stand trial or criminal capacity.  South 
African Review Boards merely review findings for assisted and involuntary detention in the 
civil and mental health care context and not the criminal justice context.  The only 
jurisdiction that Review Boards have in the criminal justice setting is to review the transfer 
of a person to and from maximum security facility and the periodic review of mentally ill 
prisoners.  Decisions of heads of health establishments are reviewed after the fact.  Review 
Boards are not an integral part of the criminal justice system.  The finding by a court that a 
person is unfit to stand trial or not criminally responsible is not reviewed by the Review 
Board.  No mention is made of the Review Board in the Criminal Procedure Act. 
The constituency of the Review Boards in both jurisdictions, however, seem to be similar in 
that it must consist of 5 members drawn from the legal field and the mental health field, 
respectively.  Meetings must be attended by at least three.  
9.4 Treatment orders 
 The Canadian system makes provision for a treatment order, known as a “get fit” order 
lasting no longer than 60-days in order for the accused to receive treatment aimed at 
rendering him fit to stand trial.  Although the South African legislation makes provision for a 
person to be tried once he regains fitness to stand trial, there is no specific provision for an 
order for treatment aimed specifically at rendering an accused fit to stand trial.   
 The Canadian system also provides for a “keep fit” order which entails that an accused who 
has been found fit to stand trial can be detained in a psychiatric hospital awaiting his 
hearing if the Review Board is concerned about the mental health of the accused whilst 
awaiting the trial date.  South African legislation lacks such a provision. 
9.5 Persons conducting assessments 
In Canada, only one mental health professional is required to assess an accused for fitness 
regardless of the seriousness of the charges against the accused. 
 In South Africa, one mental health care professional need only assess accused persons 
charged with non-violent offences, whereas those accused of violent offences must be 
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assessed by more than one mental health care professional.  The latter arrangement is 
resource-intensive and time consuming for obvious reasons.   
9.6 Referral for fitness assessment 
 In the Canadian system, it is discretionary to refer an accused for a fitness assessment.  An 
assessment may even be discarded if the court reckons that an assessment will be 
superfluous since the presence of a mental illness is clear.  This built-in discretion may 
prevent huge numbers of accused persons with suspected mental illnesses from being sent 
for observation.  It may, however, also have the consequence that not all accused persons 
are sent for observation who should have ideally been sent for observation. 
In contrast to the above, a South African court is obliged to refer an accused for a fitness 
assessment once a suspicion arises that the accused may suffer from a mental illness that 
may have an impact on his ability to follow the proceedings.  This may lead to a huge 
number of mentally ill accused persons being referred for observation.  A backlog may arise 
if resources are not allocated accordingly to deal with the huge number of referrals.  These 
backlogs may cause delays in the finalisation of the trial and may further contribute to 
overcrowding in correctional facilities since accused persons awaiting psychiatric 
observation are most often kept in correctional facilities whilst awaiting assessment. 
 An interesting difference between the Canadian and the South African system with regard 
to fitness assessments is that it is not compulsory in the Canadian system to file a written 
report after an assessment (although this is mostly done), whereas this is mandatory in the 
South African system.  Lack of written reports may lead to delays and duplicate 
assessments where the same mental health professionals are not available to report on 
their findings. 
9.7 Option of diversion 
 A glaring gap in the South African legislative framework, compared to that of Canada, is the 
provision made in the Canadian Criminal Code for alternatives to the traditional criminal 
justice process for mentally ill accused persons, which provision enables the establishment 
of Mental Health Courts.  There is no formal diversion programme in place in South Africa 
for mentally ill accused persons, except for the provision included in the mental health 
legislation that provides for the police to take a presumably mentally ill person to a 
psychiatric hospital for observation.  The observation is an alternative to arrest and 
incarceration.   
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The lack of formal diversion measures for the mentally ill accused means that the fit but 
mentally ill accused will face a traditional criminal trial and be incarcerated in a correctional 
setting that is particularly counter-therapeutic for the mentally ill person, as pointed out 
earlier.  Diversion creates an opportunity to employ therapeutic jurisprudence, which is not 
an option within the current South African framework. 
10  CONCLUSION 
It is evident from the discussion of the legal framework and procedures for assessment for 
fitness to stand trial that Mental Health Courts are well established in the Canadian criminal 
justice system.  The specialised skill and knowledge that these courts have to offer are 
acknowledged by the criminal justice system and notably by the Ontario Court of Appeal, as 
discussed above. 
The test for fitness employed in Canada is critiqued for setting the bar too low, with the 
result that the majority of those sent for fitness assessments are found fit to stand trial.  
Mental illness, which was the basis for the fitness referral in the first place, may still be 
present and affect the functioning of the accused, although not his ability to stand trial.   
Mental Health Courts aim to assist with the high number of fitness assessments and to 
provide an alternative to traditional prosecution in the form of diversion.  The diversion 
component of the Mental Health Court is reserved for those who committed non-violent 
crimes.  The Mental Health Court, however, still assists those accused persons with mental 
illness who may, for whatever reason, not qualify for the diversion component of the Mental 
Health Court. 
Mental Health Courts provide essential support to mentally ill but fit accused persons in the 
Canadian criminal justice system.  As pointed out above, ample structures and safety nets 
are in place for unfit accused persons in the form of the Review Board.  The Mental Health 
Court is an attempt to provide a safety net for the mentally ill but fit accused, who would 
otherwise have been channelled through the traditional criminal court system without his 
mental illness being considered at all once he has been found fit to stand trial.  Ignoring the 
mental illness of the fit accused raises the risk of recidivism and endangers public safety. 
What is clear is that the Canadian criminal justice system acknowledges the need for and 
makes use of mental health professionals in cases where mental illness is involved.  Where 
an accused is found unfit to stand trial, the expertise of the Review Board is relied upon to 
determine the appropriate disposition.  The Review Board may even call on the assistance 
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of the Mental Health Court at times.  Where an accused is fit to stand trial, diversion to the 
Mental Health Court is provided for where the multidisciplinary team can assist in 
determining the best way forward for the particular accused. 
It appears, from the discussion above, that the Mental Health Court has achieved its main 
objectives, namely to expedite fitness assessments and to reduce recidivism and that this in 
itself constitutes the success of the particular model employed in Canada.  It is 
acknowledged that Canadian Mental Health Courts is not the ultimate solution to the issues 
affecting mentally ill persons in the Canadian criminal justice system, but it is a step in the 
right direction to ensure that specialised skills are utilised in cases involving mental 
illness.527 
Since there is no fixed model for a Mental Health Court, the model in the United States of 
America will be analysed and compared with the one employed in Canada.  This analysis 
will enable the researcher to identify the most suitable model or desirable aspects of the 
model for possible implementation in South Africa.  The Mental Health Court model in the 







                                                
527  Barrett and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 1-29 where it is pointed out that 
society should aim for crime prevention and social integration if it is to ensure the fair and respectful 
treatment of persons with mental disorders.  Also see Nolan JL “The international problem solving 
court movement:  A comparative perspective” 2011 (37)  Monash University Law Review 259-279 at 
270 where the differences between approaches and attitudes to problem solving courts in and 
outside the United States of America is discussed and where it is acknowledged that those involved 
in Mental Health Courts in Canada are willing to acknowledge that Mental Health Courts are not the 
ultimate solution but only part thereof, this is different to the radical approach held by those involved 
in the problem solving court movement in the United States of America who believe that it is a much 




MENTAL HEALTH COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 
1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores the Mental Health Court model in the United States of America.  The 
structure and legal framework of the American criminal justice system are briefly examined.  
This examination includes a brief overview of the American legislative framework as it 
pertains to the mentally ill accused in the American criminal justice system with specific 
reference to the Constitution of the United States of America 1 and relevant criminal 
procedure legislation.  The American court structure is explained briefly in order to 
contextualise the jurisdiction of Mental Health Courts. 
The focus of this chapter falls mainly on procedural issues affecting the mentally ill accused 
in the American criminal justice system.  The focus of the procedural issues is further 
narrowed down to those relevant to fitness to stand trial.  Considerations relating to criminal 
capacity are not of pertinent importance to this research and will only be referred to in 
passing or where the specific context calls for it.  
The extent to which diversion for mentally ill accused persons is provided for in the 
American criminal justice system is considered before exploring the relevant model of the 
Mental Health Court employed in the United States of America.  The goals and underlying 
principles of the American Mental Health Court are explained. 
The procedural dynamics of Mental Health Courts are studied, including the juncture at 
which diversion to the Mental Health Court occurs, the eligibility criteria, and the sanctions 
employed by the Mental Health Court for non-compliance with a court-ordered treatment 
programme.  The Brooklyn Mental Health Court in New York is used to illustrate the 
processes of a Mental Health Court in the United States of America.  The choice to focus 
on the Brooklyn Mental Health Court is informed by the fact that it is a very dynamic court 
that also considers cases involving violence.  This model can thus be fruitfully contrasted 
with the one employed in Canada because of the procedural and conceptual differences 
                                                




between the two jurisdictions.   
The choice of the Brooklyn Mental Health Court is further informed by the fact that one of 
the goals of this court was to establish a Mental Health Court model that could be replicated 
in other jurisdictions that wish to establish a Mental Health Court.2  The planning and 
implementation processes for this court were thus undertaken with great care, and these 
are relatively well documented. 
A short analysis of the successes and challenges of the American Mental Health Court 
model is undertaken.  Suggestions for improving the American model are briefly explored.  
A brief comparison between the South African position and the American Mental Health 
Court model is included, followed by a comparison between the American Mental Health 
Court model and the Canadian Mental Health Court model, which concludes this chapter. 
2  LEGAL FRAMEWORK RELATING TO MENTALLY ILL ACCUSED UNDER 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 
2.1 Introduction and background 
In the latter part of the 17th century, individuals with mental illness in the United States of 
America were mostly cared for by their families.3   Where these individuals showed signs of 
violence, they were transferred to jails.4  State hospitals later accommodated mentally ill 
individuals to the extent that half of all beds in state hospitals were occupied by psychiatric 
                                                
2  See in general O’Keefie K The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation:  Planning, Implementation, 
Courtroom Dynamics, and Participant Outcomes (Centre for Court Innovation New York 2006).  
3  Torrey EF, Stieber J, Ezekiel J, Wolfe SM, Sharfstein J, Noble JH and Flynn LM Criminalizing the 
Seriously Mentally Ill.  The Abuse of Jails as Mental Hospitals (Public Citizen’s Health Research 
Group and the National Alliance for the Mentally ill 1992) at 9, 10 explain that “Lunatics” were 
allowed into general hospitals for treatment in the middle of the 18th century.  The first general 
hospital to treat a “lunatic” with the Pennsylvania hospital in Philadelphia.  The Eastern Lunatic 
Asylum in Williamsburg, Virginia was the first hospital that catered exclusively for individuals with 
serious mental illnesses and opened its doors in 1773.  Private Asylums were established in the 
early 19th century but operated on the principle that patients were discharged from these Asylums if 
they could no longer afford it, regardless of if they still required treatment.  Examples of such 
institutions are the McLean Asylum outside Boston, which opened in 1818, Bloomingdale Asylum in 
New York, which opened in 1821, and the Hartford Retreat that opened its doors in 1824. 
4  Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 9, 12.  An Act passed in Massachusetts in 1694 
entitled “An Act for the Relief of Idiots and Distracted Persons” provided for this.  Also see this 
source at 45 that explains that the states of Idaho and Montana are among the states that have most 
frequently used jails to keep the seriously mentally ill in need of involuntary hospitalisation until such 
time as a psychologist examined him and confirmed that he needed involuntary care, after which the 
person remained in jail until a bed in a psychiatric institution became available. 
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patients.5   
The above notwithstanding, it was common and cost-effective for the mentally ill to be 
housed in jails with convicted offenders.6  Jails and prisons became “surrogate mental 
hospitals” for the mentally ill.7 
                                                
5  Slate RN, Buffington-Vollum JK and Johnson WW The Criminalization of Mental Illness:  Crisis and 
Opportunity for the Justice System 2nd ed (Carolina Academic Press North Carolina 2013) at 29.  
State psychiatric hospitals were eventually established in the 1800’s.  75 public psychiatric hospitals 
were built by the year 1880.  See Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 11.  The first 
efforts towards the organised treatment of the mentally ill were the establishment of the Eastern 
Lunatic Asylum in Williamsburg in Virginia in 1773.  See Slate, Buffington-Vollum and Johnson 
Criminalization of Mental Illness at 24, 25.  The first psychiatric hospital that accommodated mentally 
ill accused persons was the State Lunatic Asylum at Worcester.  More than half the patients this 
hospital received in its first year was from jails and prisons.  See Torrey et al Criminalizing the 
Seriously Mentally Ill at 10, 11.  There were various other public asylums that opened their doors but 
the one in Worcester was considered the model to be followed by other institutions that opened their 
doors in the 10 years subsequent to the establishment of the Asylum at Worcester.  Public 
psychiatric hospitals were opened in 8 states (for example Georgia, Ohio, New Hampshire and New 
York) subsequent to the Asylum in Worcester opening its doors.  The work of Reverend Dwight was 
a strong imputes for the change that came about in the manner that mentally ill individuals were 
treated in the United States of America.  He pleaded that the mentally ill should be treated in 
hospitals, rather than in jails and prisons.  Another person that was responsible for early reform of 
the treatment of the mentally ill, was Dorothy Dix, a passionate retired teacher who made it her 
mission to ensure better conditions for the mentally ill who were by default detained in jails.  Ms Dix 
visited prisons, jails and almshouses, recorded her findings and reported it to the legislature.   
6  Deutch A The Mentally Ill in America.  A History of Their Care and Treatment from Colonial Times 
3rd ed (Columbia University Press New York 1946) at 172.  There were few public hospitals and it 
was cheaper to confine the mentally ill in jail.  For example in 1820 in New York it cost $0.50 cents to 
$1.00 per day to hold an individual in jail whilst it cost over $2.00 per day to house that same 
individual in an Asylum.  See Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 55.  The authors 
further  explain that the first complete mental illness census in America, was done in 1880 during 
which 91 959 people were identified as “insane”.  Only 0.7% of all prisoners were mentally ill at the 
time.  It is cheaper for a mentally ill person to be kept in jail, rather than in a state psychiatric 
hospital.  To treat a mentally ill person in a state psychiatric hospital, cost approximately $250 per 
day whereas it costs approximately $46 for such a person to be kept in a county jail.  The cost per 
day for a mentally ill person to be treated in a shelter is approximately $44.  Shelters generally do not 
offer psychiatric services and a person in need of mental health care would therefore not benefit 
from this option.  It is therefore most defiantly cost effective for a state to discharge mentally ill 
persons from state psychiatric hospitals into the community where the costs are absorbed by 
shelters or in many instances unfortunately, jails.  See in particular Torrey et al Criminalizing the 
Seriously Mentally Ill at 12, 40, 55 Table 4.1 that sets out the costs for different types of Medical and 
Psychiatric services.  The fiscal benefit of refusing to admit mentally ill individuals into state 
psychiatric hospitals in the first place is clear.    
7  Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 45, 50.  Also see Slate, Buffington-Vollum and 
Johnson Criminalization of Mental Illness at 43 where it is suggested that prisons filled up as 
psychiatric hospitals were closing down, suggesting a direct link between the closing down of 
hospitals and the increased number of mentally ill persons in the criminal justice system.  Also see 
Rich WJ “The path of mentally ill offenders” 2009 (89) Fordham Urban Law Journal 89-119 at 100 
who is of the view that the jails in Los Angeles, New York and Chicago are presently, the three 
largest mental health care institutions in the United States of America.  He points out further that the 
very fact that the person has been incarcerated, which is characterised by disruption of the person’s 
life and a high stress environment complicates mental health care treatment.  For purposes of 
diagnosis and treatment, time, stability and sustained therapy is required.  This is simply not possible 
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As the number of hospitals decreased as a consequence of the deinstitutionalisation 
movement, the number of mentally ill persons in jails increased.8  The figure of mentally ill 
offenders in contact with the criminal justice system has been increasing by approximately 
10% per annum.9  In the general population of the United States of America, mental illness 
is the main cause of disability.10 
Up to 15% of all criminal cases involve mental illness.11 Cases involving fitness to stand 
trial increased in recent years while those involving the insanity defence decreased.12  
There are approximately 60 000.00 (sixty thousand) competency hearings in the United 
States of America annually.13  The increase in fitness referrals can be ascribed to various 
                                                                                                                                                   
in a jail or prison setting due to the very nature of incarceration.  Mental Health treatment does not 
reach all mentally ill inmates.  See Lerner-Wren G “Mental health courts:  Serving justice and 
promoting recovery” Annals Health L 2010 (19) 577-593.at 581 where she points out that only one in 
three state prisoners, one in four federal prisoners and one in six jail inmates receive mental health 
treatment whilst incarcerated.  The most common form of treatment being prescription medication.  
Also see Odegaard AM “Therapeutic jurisprudence:  The impact of mental health courts on the 
criminal justice system” 2007 (83) North Dakota Law Review 225-259.at 225 who confirms the 
increase in numbers of mentally ill persons in the United States of America. 
8  Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 41.  Also see Rossman SB, Willison JB, Mallik-
Kane K, Kim K, Debus-Sherrill S and Downey PM Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with 
Mental Illness:  Evaluation of Mental Health Courts in Bronx and Brooklyn, New York (USA National 
Institute of Justice 2012) at 1.  In 1999, it was estimated and reported by the Department of Justice 
that there were over 250 000.00 mentally ill offenders in prison in the United States of America.  See 
Department of Justice “Mental health and treatment of inmates and probationers” 
http://www.churchandprison.org/files/3483016/uploaded/Mental%20Health-%20mhtip.pdf (Date of 
use:  2 July 2012) at 1.  It was reported in 2005, that his number has grown to 310 000.00 and to 
700 000.00 in 2009.  Frailing K “Issues affecting outcomes for mental health court participants” 2009 
C.S.L.R 145-157 at 147.  Also see Lerner-Wren 2010 Annals Health L 577 at 580 for a breakdown of 
the percentages of federal and state inmates as well as local jail prisoners who suffered from mental 
illnesses as at 2006. 
9  Schneider RD, Bloom H and Heerema M Mental Health Courts – Decriminalizing the Mentally Ill 
(Irwin Law Canada 2007) at 22.  This is the same percentage as in Canada.  See chapter 4 of this 
research for more detail on the Canadian statistics.  Also see Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously 
Mentally Ill at 9 where it is explained that the first survey that was done in 1880 during which survey 
it was found that persons with serious mental illnesses comprise 0.7% of the prison population.  This 
number grew to 7.2% in a survey done in 1992. 
10  This is also the case in Canada.  See in general World Health Organisation.  World Health Report: 
Mental Health: New Understanding, New Hope.  http://www.who.int/whr/2001/en/whr01_en.pdf (Date 
of use:  29 May 2014). 
11  Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 151. 
12  Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 84.  Also see Slovenko R Psychiatry in Law / Law 
in Psychiatry 2nd ed (Routledge New York 2009) at 171. 
13  Helfgott JB (Ed) Criminal Psychology, Volume 3 (Praeger California 2013) at 286.  Also see Melton 
GB, Petrila J, Poythress NG, Slobogin C, Lyons PM Jr and Otto RK Psychological Evaluations for 
the Courts:  A Handbook for Mental Health Professionals and Lawyers 3rd ed (Guilford Press New 
York 2007) at 82.  See further Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 151 where 
it is indicated that competency assessments vary from between 50 000 to 60 000 annually.  See also 
Shea SE “Representing clients with mental disabilities” 2013 (XXVIII) Public Defence Backup Centre 
Report 8-16 at 8 who sets the number of fitness referrals at 60 000. 
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reasons, among which is the use of these assessments as a tactical delay of the trial.14 
The increase in numbers, as stated above, results in courts having to deal more often with 
cases involving mental illness.  The criminal justice system is an adversarial and 
accusatorial system.15  It has to find ways to deal with cases involving mental illness within 
its existing legislative and procedural framework. 
The relevant legislative framework, within which the cases of mentally ill accused are dealt 
with, is discussed below, starting with the American Constitution, followed by criminal 
procedure legislation and mental health legislation.   
2.2 The American Constitution 
The American Constitution contains a Bill of Rights, which provide for the protection of 
individual rights.16  The Bill of Rights comprises the first ten amendments to the American 
Constitution.17  Further amendments to the Constitution are also relevant, although they do 
not form part of the Bill of Rights.18  The most relevant amendments for purposes of the 
mentally ill accused in the criminal justice system are discussed below. 
                                                
14  Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 1020, 1021.  Other reasons are 
that accused persons are sent for these assessments in a hope that they will get some interim 
mental health treatment, which they were not entitled to in the civil system because they lacked the 
dangerousness requirement.  A factor that might be contributing to the increases may also be the 
fact that judges generally grant motions for fitness referrals regardless of whether there is evidence 
that such an assessment is indeed necessary. 
15  Welch C and Fuller JR American Criminal Courts.  Legal Process and Social Context (Elsevier 
Amsterdam 2014) at 155.  Also see Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the 
United States at 80, 269.  Adversarial refers to the requirement that the state should “shoulder the 
entire load “in a criminal case, where as accusatorial refers to the fact that the prosecutor, as the 
representative of the state, presents the entire case against the accused.   
16  Hemmens C, Brody DC and Spohn CC Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary Perspective (Sage Los 
Angelas 2013) at 34, 35.  The Bill of Rights consist of all the amendment rights that pertain to 
individuals and are set out in articles I to X of the Bill of Rights.  These amendments did not form part 
of the initial Constitution but was added later and was part of the Constitution when it was ratified in 
1791.  Contributors to the Constitution included Federalists who were strongly in favour of a 
centralised government, and states rightists who were less in favour of a strong centralised 
government.  This is possibly part of the reason why there is a federal system that co-exists with a 
state system in the United States today.  Also see Albanese JS Criminal Justice 5th ed (Pearson 
Boston 2013) at 106 where it is pointed out that one of the main goals of the Bill of Rights is protect 
individuals against the arbitrary use of power by the state. 
17  Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 35. 23.  Individual 
rights are protected under the first 8 amendments.  These individual rights were added to address 
the concern of state rightists that a centralised government might infringe the rights of the 
individuals.  It was only in the 20th century that these individual rights contained in the amendments, 
were made applicable to actions of the state.  Also see Albanese Criminal Justice at 106. 
18  Amendments 11 to 15 were added after the Civil War to protect slaves from the government 
interfering in their individual rights.  These amendments that implicate individual rights are 
collectively referred to as Reconstruction Amendments.  See Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal 
Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 44. 
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The 5th and 14th Amendments provide for the protection of the due process rights of the 
accused.19  Due process is concerned with procedural justice that is due to all persons 
whenever they are threatened with the loss of life, liberty, or property at the hands of the 
state.20   
The 6th Amendment provides for the accused’s right to be legally represented during the 
trial.21  This not only means the right to have a lawyer present during the trial but also for 
the accused to be represented by a lawyer during all the important stages of the criminal 
proceedings, which includes the period between being charged and appearing on trial.22  It 
is during this time that the fitness issue may arise.  An accused must therefore have legal 
                                                
19  Article V (5th amendment) of the Bill of Rights of the American Constitution reads as follows:  “No 
person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, 
when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,  or property, without due process of law; nor 
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”  The 14th Amendment also 
protects the due process rights of the accused and section 1 thereof reads as follows:  “All persons 
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the State wherein they reside.  No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  The 14th Amendment was added after the civil war and 
made the due process clause enforceable on state level and not just against the federal government.  
See Albanese Criminal Justice at 106. 
20  Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 11. 
21  Slobogin C, Rai A and Reisner R Law and the Mental Health System Civil and Criminal Aspects 5th 
ed (Thomson West United States of America 2009) at 1006 where it is pointed out that the 6th 
Amendment also provides for the right to confront one’s accusers and to present evidence and 
points out how important fitness is in order to be able to properly exercise these rights.  The 6th 
amendment is contained in article VI of the American Constitution and reads as follows:  “In all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have 
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in 
his favour, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”  Also see Albanese Criminal 
Justice at 254.  The 6th Amendment further guarantees a trial by jury for persons accused of all 
offences that are not petty crimes - these are crimes punishable by a prison sentence of more than 6 
months.  See Burnham W Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States 5th ed 
(West United States of America 2006) at 309.  The federal jury consists of 12 jurors whereas the jury 
in state courts may be not less than 6.  Currently, 33 states use a jury system where there must be 
at least 6 jurors.  Although the prosecution also has a right to a jury trial even if the accused does not 
particularly want such a trial.  See in general Singer v United States 380 US 24,34 (1965).  The 6th 
Amendment further states that a trial shall take place in public, unless the accused waives this right.  
The First amendment provides the press and the public with a corresponding right to have access to 
trial proceedings. 
22  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 302.  Also see 
Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 42 where some of the 
important phases are identified as the preliminary hearing, the arraignment, the trial itself and any 
appeal that may follow.  See further Albanese Criminal Justice at 256 who adds the first appearance 
to the stages during which an accused is entitled to legal representation. 
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representation at the time when the fitness issue is raised pre-trial.23  The right to counsel 
during trial exists for persons accused of felonies as well as for those accused of 
misdemeanours where a conviction could result in a single day in jail.24  Where an accused 
cannot afford legal representation, an appointment must be made at the state’s expense.25 
 The 6th Amendment further guarantees each accused the right to a speedy trial.26  The 
purpose of this right, which attaches once the accused is arrested or charged, is three-fold:  
to prevent “undue and oppressive” incarceration prior to trial; to minimise concern and 
anxiety about public accusations and lastly, to limit the possibility that the accused will not 
be able to defend himself because of undue and long pre-trial delays.27  If it can be proved 
that this right was violated, the relief available to the accused is that the charges are 
dropped.28  Mentally ill accused persons are often detained for prolonged periods of time 
                                                
23  Marks LK, Dean RS, Dwyer M, Girese A and Yates JA New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure 2nd ed 
(Thomson West 2007) at 522, 523 where the argument is explored that because competency 
assessments are not “interrogations”, the right to legal representation arguably does not apply to 
competency proceedings.  The fact that evidence can come forth from a fitness assessment is the 
main reason why the right to legal representation during these assessments are said to apply. 
24  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 312.  Also see Albanese 
Criminal Justice at 256 where it is explained that this right was initially only available to persons 
accused of felonies under federal law.  It was extended to persons accused of misdemeanours in the 
late 90’s and to other stages of the criminal proceedings including police questioning and preliminary 
hearings. 
25  Albanese Criminal Justice at 256, 258 points out that this is very significant as the majority of jail 
inmates are indigent.  The cost to provide indigent defendants with legal representation amounts to 
approximately 2.3 billion dollars annually.  
26  The relevant part of the 6th amendment states that:  “the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial”.  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 307.  
Also see Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 41.  See 
further Albanese Criminal Justice 254, 265 where it is explained that  the Speedy Trial Act was 
introduced to ensure that criminal trials proceed to court within 100 days – the Act does not apply to 
civil cases which results in the fact that civil cases currently take much longer to finalise.    
27  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 307.  If, after arrest, the 
prosecutor convinces the judge during an initial ex parte review of the case, that there are sufficient 
grounds for a prosecution, a complaint is filed which serves as the charging instrument throughout 
the trial, whereas the complaint is replaced with an indictment or information in the case of a felony.  
Also see the source at 272 where it is explained that the review must take place within 48 hours after 
arrest.  The judge doing the review may get further information from the victim or the prosecutor but 
not the legal representative of the accused.  Also see Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  
A Contemporary perspective at 116, 290 where it is explained that proceeding by way of Information 
instead of a grand jury indictment is more efficient since it eliminates the need to compile a jury and 
to present evidence.  The information contains the official charge in the case of a felony where no 
grand jury is to be used.  See Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 134.  Also see 
Albanese Criminal Justice at 110. 
28  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 307.  In order to succeed 
with this relief, it has to be considered whether the time of detention was uncommonly lengthy, 
whether the delay was caused more by the accused or by the prosecution, and whether the accused 
suffered prejudice because of the delay.  See Doggett v United States 505 U. S 647, 651 (1992).  
Also see Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 41, 42 
where it is explained that each case is assessed on its own merit to determine if the accused was 
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pre-trial awaiting assessment for fitness to stand trial.  These waiting periods can have a 
negative impact on the accused’s right to a speedy trial.29  
 The 8th Amendment states that excessive bail shall not be required.  The same Amendment 
further protects citizens from cruel and unusual punishments.30  This right ties in with the 
right to liberty in that deprivation of freedom through the denial of bail limits the mentally ill 
accused’s freedom of movement. 
In addition to the Federal Constitution, every state has its own Constitution.31  If there are 
discrepancies between federal law and state law, including the state’s constitution, the 
federal law will enjoy preference, and the state law will have to be amended to bring it in 
line with the federal law.32   
Since the discussion of the procedural dynamics of the Mental Health Courts later in this 
chapter is based on the Brooklyn Mental Health Court, New York, relevant provisions of the 
New York Constitution and statutes will be discussed in this chapter as required. 
The Constitutional rights set out above must be respected within the criminal justice system 
where issues pertaining to fitness to stand trial arise.  The relevant criminal procedure 
legislation is considered below. 
2.3 Criminal Procedure legislation 
The United States Code 33 is the federal guide to criminal law and procedure, whereas each 
state may enact its own legislation with regard to criminal and criminal procedural law.  An 
overview of the Federal legal instruments and those relevant to the state of New York is 
provided below. 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Criminal law in the United States of America is mostly enacted at state level.34  Every state 
creates crimes through statute, which may inevitably mean that some definitions of crimes 
                                                                                                                                                   
indeed brought to trial without unnecessary or unreasonable delays and various factors can be 
considered as relevant in a particular case.  
29  Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 1021.   
30  Article VIII (8th amendment) to the Bill of Rights in the American Constitution states that:  “Excessive 
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” 
31  Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 114, 281.  Also see Albanese Criminal Justice at 86. 
32  Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 116.  Also see Albanese Criminal Justice at 86, 87.  
33  Hereinafter referred to as “the US Code”. 
34  Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 115.  Also see Albanese Criminal Justice at 87, 106. 
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may differ from one state to the next, as well as the penalty that may be imposed in the 
event of a conviction.35  Every county within a state can further create ordinances that are 
contained in a criminal or penal code that applies to that particular county only.36  Further 
sources of criminal law in the United States of America are case law and administrative 
regulations.37 
Each state governs its own Criminal Procedure.  In the case of New York, the criminal 
procedure is governed by the New York Criminal Procedure Law.38  Criminal procedures 
safeguard the rights of persons in the adjudication process whilst also safeguarding the 
interests of the community.39  Criminal procedure, which embodies the ideal of due 
process, prescribes what the police may and may not do when processing a criminal case 
and further aims to protect constitutional rights to liberty and freedom of speech.40  The 
procedures in courts vary depending on the type of offence that is under consideration.41  
The main stages of the overall process can, however, be identified.42 
The definitions of fitness to stand trial and non-criminal responsible are set out in the US 
Code, and the New York CPL are explored below. 
2.3.2 Fitness to stand trial 
The US Code contains provisions regarding fitness to stand trial and states that an inquiry 
into the competence of the accused to stand trial shall be held if: 
 
                                                
35  Albanese Criminal Justice at 227 point out that the definitions of murder and robbery for example are 
similar across states but that the penalties for these crimes may vary from state to state. 
36  Albanese Criminal Justice at 87. 
37  Albanese Criminal Justice at 87.  The precedent system is applied in the US but judges sometimes 
deviate from it when they are of the view that the decision was incorrect or that it is time to develop 
the law in a new judgment.  Administrative regulations may contain provisions that create criminal 
offences when there is non-adherence to the regulations.  Regulations made by the Environmental 
Protection Agency is one such example. 
38  New York Criminal Procedure Law (available at http://ypdcrime.com/cpl/article10.htm)  (Hereinafter 
referred to as New York CPL). 
39  Albanese Criminal Justice at 92, 109.  This is particularly important in criminal cases since the states 
resources is vast compared to that of an individual. 
40  Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 119.  Procedural due process is concerned with police 
powers during the processing of a criminal case whereas substantive due process is concerned with 
the protection of Constitutional rights. 
41  Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 132. 
42  Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 132.  Some courts tend to combine some of the main 
stages such as the preliminary hearing stage and the bail stage.  Other courts use additional stages, 




The court shall grant the motion, or shall order such a hearing on its own motion, if there is 
reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental 
disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is 
unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him 
or to assist properly in his defence.43 
                                                
43  18, U.S.C, § 4241 (2006).  The entire section 4241 reads “§4241.  Determination of mental 
competency to stand trial to undergo post release proceedings  
 (a) Motion To Determine Competency of Defendant.-At any time after the commencement of a 
prosecution for an offense and prior to the sentencing of the defendant, or at any time after the 
commencement of probation or supervised release and prior to the completion of the sentence, the 
defendant or the attorney for the Government may file a motion for a hearing to determine the mental 
competency of the defendant.  The court shall grant the motion, or shall order such a hearing on its 
own motion, if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering 
from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is 
unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist 
properly in his defence. 
 (b) Psychiatric or Psychological Examination and Report.-Prior to the date of the hearing, the court 
may order that a psychiatric or psychological examination of the defendant be conducted, and that a 
psychiatric or psychological report be filed with the court, pursuant to the provisions of section 
4247(b) and (c). 
 (c) Hearing.-The hearing shall be conducted pursuant to the provisions of section 4247(d). 
 (d) Determination and Disposition.-If, after the hearing, the court finds by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the defendant is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him 
mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of 
the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defence, the court shall commit the 
defendant to the custody of the Attorney General.  The Attorney General shall hospitalise the 
defendant for treatment in a suitable facility- 
 (1) for such a reasonable period of time, not to exceed four months, as is necessary to determine 
whether there is a substantial probability that in the foreseeable future he will attain the 
capacity to permit the proceedings to go forward; and 
 (2) for an additional reasonable period of time until- 
 (A) his mental condition is so improved that trial may proceed, if the court finds that there is a 
substantial probability that within such additional period of time he will attain the capacity to permit 
the proceedings to go forward; or 
 (B) the pending charges against him are disposed of according to law; 
 whichever is earlier. 
 If, at the end of the time period specified, it is determined that the defendant's mental condition has 
not so improved as to permit the proceedings to go forward, the defendant is subject to the 
provisions of sections 4246 and 4248. 
 (e) Discharge.-When the director of the facility in which a defendant is hospitalised 
pursuant to subsection (d) determines that the defendant has recovered to such an extent that he is 
able to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him and to assist 
properly in his defence, he shall promptly file a certificate to that effect with the clerk of the court that 
ordered the commitment.  The clerk shall send a copy of the certificate to the defendant's counsel 
and to the attorney for the Government.  The court shall hold a hearing, conducted pursuant to the 
provisions of section 4247(d), to determine the competency of the defendant.  If, after the hearing, 
the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has recovered to such an 
extent that he is able to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him 
and to assist properly in his defence, the court shall order his immediate discharge from the facility in 
which he is hospitalized and shall set the date for trial or other proceedings.  Upon discharge, the 
defendant is subject to the provisions of chapters 207 and 227. 
 (f) Admissibility of Finding of Competency.-A finding by the court that the defendant is 




At state level, the New York CPL refers to an “incapacitated person” as: 
…a defendant who as a result of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to understand the 
proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense.44 
Once doubt about the accused’s fitness arises, a referral to determine his fitness must be 
ordered; there is no discretion in this regard.45 
2.3.3 Not criminally responsible 
The US Code makes provision for the insanity defence to be entered where an accused: 
…as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and 
quality or the wrongfulness of his acts.46   
The accused bears the burden of proving that he suffered from a mental illness at the time 
of the offence.47 
New York CPL makes provision for a plea of not criminally responsible by reason of mental 
                                                                                                                                                   
as a defence to the offense charged, and shall not be admissible as evidence in a trial for the 
offense charged.” 
44  New York CPL section 730.10(1).  Also see Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 
510. 
45  This is evident from the use of the word “shall” in 18 U.S.C § 4241 (2006).  “…the defendant or the 
attorney for the Government may file a motion for a hearing to determine the mental competency of 
the defendant.  The court shall grant the motion, or shall order such a hearing on its own motion, if 
there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental 
disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand 
the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defence.”  
This obligation also exists on state level according to New York CPL 730.30(1) that states, “...the 
court wherein the criminal action is pending must issue an order of examination when it is of the 
opinion that the defendant may be an incapacitated person.”  See further Seigal 
http://ybseigel.tripod.com/cpl730.pdf  (Date of use:  23 January 2016) at 1. 
46  18 U.S.C §17 (2006).  Section 17 states   
  “§17.  Insanity defence 
 (a) Affirmative Defense.-It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute that, 
at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a 
severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the 
wrongfulness of his acts.  Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense. 
 (b) Burden of Proof.-The defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by clear and 
convincing evidence.” 
47  18 U.S.C §17(b).  The insanity defence sparked controversy when John Hinkley was acquitted on 
account of mental illness, for attempted murder of President Reagan in 1982.  See Winslade and 
Ross The Insanity Plea (New York 1983) at 181, 182.  See further Du Toit E, De Jager, FJ, Paizes 
A, Skeen A St Q and Van der Merwe SE, Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act (Juta Cape 
Town 2012) at 13-1.    
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disease or defect and prescribes the procedure to be followed in such a case.48   
As pointed out earlier, this research is mainly concerned with pre-trial issues, and thus 
criminal capacity issues, which are considered at the sentencing phase, will therefore not 
be discussed in detail in this chapter. 
2.4 Mental Health Legislation 
In terms of the Americans with Disabilities Act,49 states and municipalities are prohibited 
from discriminating against any person based on disability and must ensure that persons 
with disabilities are reasonably accommodated.50  This obligation to provide reasonable 
accommodation applies to courts and diversion programmes as well.51  Mental Health 
Courts fulfil part of this responsibility since they provide for the processing of cases 
involving those with mental illnesses in the criminal justice system. 
America’s Law Enforcement and Mental Health Project Act 52 was passed in 2000, which 
made federal funding available to states which wished to implement Mental Health Courts 
or mental health diversion programmes.53  The Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime 
Reduction Act54 was introduced in 2004 to encourage better collaboration between the 
criminal justice system and the mental health care system.55 
Since this chapter focuses on the dynamics of the Brooklyn Mental Health Court, the 
legislation and procedure of New York will be incorporated in this chapter where necessary.  
The New York Mental Hygiene Law 56 is sometimes referred to in the context of fitness 
assessments and will be referred to where necessary. 
The basic legal framework as discussed above sets the background for the discussion of 
                                                
48  New York CPL section 220.15.    
49  Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.  42, U.S.C Chapter 126. 
50  Bernstein R and Seltzer T “Criminalization of people with mental illness:  The role of Mental Health 
Courts in system reform” 2003 (7) D C L Review 143-162 at 145, 146. 
51  Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 146. 
52  Pub.  L. No. 106-515, 114 Stat. 2399 (2000) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.) 
53  Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 144.  Also see Rossman et al Criminal Justice 
Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 12.  See further Lurigio RJ and Snowden J “Putting 
therapeutic jurisprudence into practice: The growth, operations, and effectiveness of mental health 
courts” 2009 (2) The Justice System Journal 196-218 at 204. 
54  (S 194) of 2004. 
55  42 U.S.C.  section 3797aa (2006).  Also see Odegaard 2007 North Dakota Law Review 225.at 248. 
56  This piece of legislation provides for various types of admissions under various types of 
circumstances.  Nowhere in the Act is the word “fitness” or “competency” found and it is unclear 
whether this Act is used as a vehicle to conduct fitness assessments or not.  
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the structure of the American criminal justice system below. The below synoptic overview is 
included to contextualise the jurisdiction of Mental Health Courts in the American system of 
criminal law and procedure.  
3  STRUCTURE OF THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM  
3.1 Introduction 
This section explains the American criminal justice system with a particular focus on the 
dual court system.  A brief explanation of the state court system followed by the federal 
court system is included.  Reference is made to the New York state courts where 
appropriate as the relevant state for purposes of the analyses of the Mental Health Court 
model later in this chapter.  It should be noted that the American criminal justice system 
does not make use of Review Boards, as is the case in the Canadian system; hence, no 
discussion on Review Boards is included under this section. 
3.2 Criminal Courts 
There are two court systems in the United States of America, the federal system and the 
state court system consisting of 50 separate judicial systems in various states.57  Each 
state has its own court of last resort that ultimately determines what the law in that 
particular state is.  The United States Supreme Court has the final say about the federal law 
that applies to all states.58  
In principle, all hearings take place in open court, as this is a requirement of federal 
constitutional law.59  One judge, on the other hand, adjudicates pre-trial motions, which take 
place in chambers.60 
                                                
57  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 167.  Also see 
Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 92.  This type of 
system is also referred to as the dual court system.  See further Welch and Fuller American Criminal 
Courts at 96.  Also see Albanese Criminal Justice at 90, 228 where reference is made to the term 
dual court system. 
58  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 167. 
59  The 6th amendment to the Constitution states that:  “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and 
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favour, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”  Also see Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal 
System of the United States at 168. 
60  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 167, 168.  These include 
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Before the state and federal court structures are discussed, it is necessary to distinguish 
between the types of offences that could come before the courts for adjudication. 
There are two types of offences over which courts have jurisdiction.  Misdemeanours are 
less serious crimes that attract a sentence of less than a year,61 and felonies are the more 
serious offences that are punishable by death or imprisonment of more than one year.62  
Certain courts only have jurisdiction to hear one or the other type of offence, as will be 
explained below.  Whether the accused is charged with a felony or a misdemeanour has an 
impact on the pre-trial procedures available to the accused.63    
The state court structure differs from the federal court structure.  These two structures will 
be discussed below, starting with the state court structure. 
3.2.1 State Court structure 
The state court structure differs from state to state, with some being more complicated than 
others.64  State courts, in their various forms, have jurisdiction over every conceivable 
cause of action, only limited by that which constitutes federal law.65  Since crimes are 
defined in state laws, the majority of criminal cases are heard in the state courts.66  The 
                                                                                                                                                   
arraignments and bail hearings as well as motions for a determination of competency for fitness to 
stand trial. 
61 Offences lower than felonies and generally those punishable by fine, penalty forfeiture, or 
imprisonment other than in a penitentiary.  Under federal law, and most state laws, any offence other 
than a felony is classified as a misdemeanour.  Certain states also have various classes of 
misdemeanours.  Also see Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 129.  Burnham 
Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 173.  Also see this source at 269 
where a third type of offence is explained namely the “high misdemeanours”.  These crimes are 
punishable with imprisonment of up to two years.  Another category of offences is “civil infractions”.  
These are typically not punishable by imprisonment but can be resolved by the payment of a fine – 
this is often the case in traffic violations.   
62  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 173, 269.  Also see 
Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 129.  Felonies are defined as “A serious crime, 
characterized under federal law and many state statutes as any offense punishable by death or 
imprisonment in excess of one year”.   Also see Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 129. 
63  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 269. 
64  Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 103 who uses New 
York as an example of a state that has a complicated court structure, where the structure even 
differs from county to county.  Also see Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 96 where it is 
pointed out that the state court structure is not prescribed in the Constitution, for this reason, every 
state may choose its own and it may differ dramatically from one state to the next. 
65  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 188.  Also see Welch and 
Fuller American Criminal Courts at 96. 
66  Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 102.  Indicate that 
98% of all cases in the American criminal justice system are heard in state courts.  Also see Welch 
and Fuller American Criminal Courts 96 who confirms that the majority of the cases in America are 
heard by the state courts.  See further Albanese Criminal Justice at 227 where it is confirmed that 
the majority of criminal cases are heard in state courts because most felonies are defined by state 
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state prosecutors, sometimes referred to as the District Attorney, represent states.67  The 
typical state court structure consists of four tiers of courts: court of limited jurisdiction, a 
court of general jurisdiction, intermediate appellate courts and the final appellate court.68   
Firstly, the lowest level of courts in a state is the courts of limited original jurisdiction that 
only has jurisdiction to hear misdemeanours.69  The jurisdiction in some of these courts has 
been extended to lighten the load on the superior courts.70  As a result, these courts also 
handle preliminary hearings and arraignments in felony cases.71     
These courts also hear bail applications and take decisions on if an accused should be held 
                                                                                                                                                   
laws. 
67  Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 132.  The physical 
court work is done by the assistant prosecuting attorneys. 
68  Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 103.  Also see 
Albanese Criminal Justice at 227 who classifies the level of courts according to jurisdiction rather 
than hierarchy, thus stating that there are three types of courts in a state namely those with limited 
jurisdiction (such as domestic violence and small claims court), those with general jurisdiction 
(Circuit courts) and those with appellate jurisdiction (courts of appeal and Supreme court of the 
state).  Also see Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 167 who 
explains that there are two main types of courts in the United States of America, the trial courts that 
are the lowest courts and the appellate courts. 
69  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 173.  Also see Welch and 
Fuller American Criminal Courts at 83 where it is explained that courts with limited jurisdiction may 
only hear misdemeanour cases and less serious felonies.  Courts with general jurisdiction are tasked 
with hearing cases involving felonies.  See further Albanese Criminal Justice at 227 where it is stated 
that courts of limited jurisdiction hear cases involving minor criminal offences, traffic and motor 
vehicle violations as well as ordinance violations.  These courts are also referred to as magistrate 
courts, county courts, local courts and municipal courts.  See Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal 
Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 103.  Also see Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal 
Procedure at 530.  Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 96.  Sometimes states create 
specialised courts at this lower level of courts, such as a Small Claims Courts.  These courts are 
also referred to as “Justice of the Peace” since the person presiding is not necessarily a judge or a 
lawyer, but often a layman.  Generally it is not permissible for parties to be presented by legal 
practitioners in this court.  Procedure is very informal and there is no option of appeal from a 
decision reached in this court.  See Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United 
States at 174.  An aggrieved party does however have the right to apply for a trial to run afresh in a 
higher court. 
70  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 173. 
71  Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 103.  Also see Welch 
and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 132 where it is pointed out that no preliminary hearing takes 
place in misdemeanour cases, this process takes place in felony cases only.  Defendants in cases 
involving misdemeanours further have no right to a jury and the process of arraignment does not 
apply to them.  Also see this source at 133 where it is explained that a court of limited jurisdiction 
does not have jurisdiction to accept a guilty plea in a felony case but may handle the case up to this 
point, which includes the initial appearance or pre-trial hearing.  Arraignment is the part of the 
process where the charges are put to the accused and he is asked to plea to it.  See Burnham 
Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 275.  See further Albanese 
Criminal Justice at 111 where it is explained that the judge explains the charges to the accused from 
the information or grand jury indictment in front of him in terms whereof it was found that there is 
enough evidence to bind the accused over for trial. 
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over for trial.72  An accused’s first appearance is usually in a lower court at which point he 
may apply for bail or be diverted to the Mental Health Court.73   A bail hearing may be held 
even where an accused was found incompetent to stand trial, as long as the defence 
counsel could provide sufficient facts to allow a judge to set bail.74 
Where the charge against the accused is a misdemeanour, the accused may enter a plea 
at his first court appearance, and the case may proceed to trial immediately in the event 
that the accused pleads not guilty.75  Where the accused pleads guilty to a misdemeanour 
charge, the sentence may be handed down immediately, or a date is set for a sentencing 
hearing.76   
                                                
72  Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 104.  Also see Welch 
and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 132. 
73  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 272, 273 where the 
nature of financial bail and non-financial bail is discussed.  The inability of an accused to pay bail 
should not disqualify him from qualifying for it, but the presiding officer must then still consider his 
financial position during such process.  The right to be released on bail is provided for in the eighth 
amendment to the Constitution that states that: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. “  Also see Hemmens, Brody and Spohn 
Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 42, 43, 291 where it is stressed that there is no 
Constitutional right to bail but that the Eight Amendment merely states that an excessive amount 
shall not be required in order to be released on bail.  Many indigent criminal defendants remain in jail 
until their trials since they cannot afford any amount of bail.  Also see Welch and Fuller American 
Criminal Courts at 133 where it is pointed out that bail is often set during the first appearance of the 
defendant in misdemeanour cases.  Also see Albanese Criminal Justice at 109 who points out that 
the first appearance is usually in a lower court such as a municipal court.  See further Rogers R and 
Shuman DW Fundamentals of Forensic Practice:  Mental Health and Criminal Law (Springer USA 
2005) at 89.  Also see Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 133, although reference is not 
made to Mental Health Courts per se, the fact that the defendant can be diverted to a court 
monitored programme at this juncture is confirmed. 
74  Parry J Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law, Evidence and Testimony (American Bar 
Association United States of America 2009) at 92.  This was for instance the case in Massachusetts 
v Torres 806 N.E 2nd 895 (Mass 2004).  Also see Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic 
Practice at 86 where it is pointed out that research regarding evaluative issues for purposes of bail 
determinations are lacking.  What is clear is that issues of non-appearance and community safety 
have to be considered during the evaluative process.  See however Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C 
L Review 143 at 146 where the observation is made that persons with mental illness are generally 
less likely to be released on bail.  Bail will not be granted if the accused is a flight risk or a risk to the 
safety of the community.  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 
307.  This is referred to as “preventive detention “and has been used more since the 1980’s.  See 
further Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 115, 134.  Also see Hemmens, Brody and 
Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 291.  For more details on bail 
determinations see in general Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 89-92.  
Also see Albanese Criminal Justice at 109. 
75  Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 291.  See further 
Albanese Criminal Justice at 110.  In practice, however, the trial does not proceed immediately; 
rather a date is set for a trial on some future date.  See Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal 
System of the United States at 273. 
76  Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 291.  If the accused 
is found guilty, or if he pleaded guilty, a date will be set for a sentencing hearing.  A pre-sentence 
report is drafted by a probation officer with regard to all the factors that could impact the sentence of 
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The judges that preside over first appearances 77 usually do not have jurisdiction to accept 
a plea in felony cases, and for this reason, when the proceedings reach the stage where a 
plea has to be entered, a date is set for a preliminary hearing, a process that only takes 
place in felony cases.78    
Some states, such as New York, have as many as 2 500 local trial courts of limited 
jurisdiction, whilst other states have none.79  Mental Health Courts are limited jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                                                   
the accused, including his criminal history.  A victim impact statement is often allowed as part of this 
process.  See Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 277.  This 
report addresses issues in the accused’s background that could impact the sentencing and is drafted 
by an agency that is separate from the court, often called the “probation department”.  The allowance 
of a victim impact statement is a recent development in the US criminal justice system and is being 
used in more and more states. 
77  Judges in courts of general jurisdiction.  See Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A 
Contemporary perspective at 291.  Also see Albanese Criminal Justice at 109 where it is explained 
that most first appearances take place in municipal court, which is the lower tier of the court system. 
78  Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 291.  Also see Welch 
and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 133 where it is confirmed that courts of limited jurisdiction do 
not have jurisdiction to accept a plea in felony cases.  See further Albanese Criminal Justice at 110.  
The first appearance constitutes a screening of the charge.  Burnham Introduction to the Law and 
Legal System of the United States at 27, 275.  Also see Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts 
at 133 where the other important developments in a pre-trial hearing is explained as including that 
the charges are explained to the defendant and that the defendant is informed of his rights.  See 
further Albanese Criminal Justice at 109.  It has to be shown at the preliminary hearing that there is 
enough evidence to proceed to trial.  See Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the 
United States at 275.  Also see Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary 
perspective at 116.  This is also referred to as being “bound over” for trial.  See further Welch and 
Fuller American Criminal Courts at 133.  Also see Albanese Criminal Justice at 110.  This 
preliminary examination/pre-trial hearing may however be waived by the accused and the case can 
proceed to arraignment from there.  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the 
United States at 274.  The accused may for example be aware of a defect in the prosecutor’s case 
and does not want to alarm him to it during the preliminary examination.  The accused may also 
want to waive the preliminary hearing because he does not want the prosecution’s witnesses to put 
their testimony on record at this point.  These preliminary examinations or hearings have good 
discovery value but is most often waived by the accused.  Also see Welch and Fuller American 
Criminal Courts at 135 where it is explained that in misdemeanour cases where the defendant 
pleads not guilty, there is no preliminary hearing and the case may proceed directly from the initial 
appearance to the arraignment phase.  The prosecution often secures a grand jury indictment, which 
makes the holding of a preliminary enquiry unnecessary.  The indictment contains the formal 
charges against the accused.  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United 
States at 275.  Every accused has the right to be indicted by a grand jury as provided for in the 5th 
amendment to the American Constitution.  The right does not apply to state criminal courts although 
some states prefer to obtain a grand jury indictment rather than an Information, which is the 
alternative to a grand jury indictment and filed directly with the court by the prosecutor.  Also see 
Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 39 where it is 
explained that the purpose of this right is to ensure that the accused is only prosecuted if there is 
sufficient evidence to do so.  The grand jury is a mechanism to protect the individual from baseless 
prosecutions by the state.  Grand juries usually consist of anything between 6 and 23 members.  
See Albanese Criminal Justice at 110.  Where a preliminary examination or hearing is held, the 
charges are very seldom dropped.  See Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the 
United States at 274. 
79  Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 103.  California and 
Illinois are examples of states that do not have any trial courts of limited jurisdiction.  These courts 
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courts that only have jurisdiction over specific cases and aim to address a specific 
problem.80  It is compulsory to refer the case to the Brooklyn Mental Health Court if a 
competency examination is ordered in this district.81 
Secondly, there are the trial courts of general original jurisdiction.82  This court has 
jurisdiction over all felonies and appeals from lower courts.83  Some states have trial courts 
with specialised jurisdiction that adjudicate over matters of a particular type.84  Specialised 
courts are considered equal in jurisdiction to the circuit courts, although this is not the case 
in all states.85     
Cases in intermediate appellate courts, also known as “courts of appeal”, are heard by 
                                                                                                                                                   
sometimes do not form part of the state court structure as they are established and funded by local 
county authorities.  Also see Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 4 where it is 
explained that the courts in the state of New York are referred to as “local courts” and “supreme 
courts”. 
80  Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 437.  Also see Welch 
and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 448 where it is explained that specialised courts in the United 
States are limited jurisdiction courts that seek to solve specific problems of the criminal justice 
system that require focussed expertise.  
81  Steadman HJ, Redlich AD, Griffin P, Petrila J and Monahan J ”From referral to disposition: Case 
processing in seven mental health courts” 2005 (23) Behavioural Science and Law 215-226 at 219.  
In Brooklyn, all individuals referred for competency evaluations to determine fitness to stand trial or 
criminal capacity, must be referred to the Mental Health Court. 
82  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 169, 173.  Trial courts 
constitute the biggest number of courts in the USA with 1498 judges that staff the California trial 
courts for example.  Also see Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 98.  See further 
Albanese Criminal Justice at 228 who states that generally, there is a court of general jurisdiction in 
every County.  This amounts to more than 3 200 of these courts nationwide.  They are also referred 
to as district courts, superior courts, circuit courts or, in the case of New York, “Supreme courts”.  
See Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 173.  The highest 
court in New York for which the name Supreme Court is usually reserved, is referred to as the “Court 
of Appeals”.  Also see Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective 
at 104.  See further Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 98.  See also Albanese Criminal 
Justice at 227.  Also see Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 4.  One judge presides 
over this court of first instance in a state and must make a finding on the facts and arguments 
presented.  See Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 167 who 
explains that the trial is presided over by one judge with or without a jury depending on the type of 
the case and the choice of the parties. 
83  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 173.  Also see Welch and 
Fuller American Criminal Courts at 98, 83 where it is explained that courts of general jurisdiction 
concern themselves with serious felonies.  See further Albanese Criminal Justice at 228.  Also see 
Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 104.   
84  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the (United States at 173.  Examples of these 
are surrogate’s courts (These courts hear mental commitment and guardianship matters of adults 
who are not able to handle their own affairs) juvenile courts (If a case involving a juvenile is not 
heard by the surrogate’s court (also known as the probate court) then the juvenile court hears the 
matter) and courts of claim (These courts handle all money claims against the state). 
85  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 173.  In some states the 
specialised courts are considered inferior to Circuit Courts. 
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three judges.86  There is a right of appeal to this court from a trial court as this court has the 
task of correcting errors made by the trial court.87  These courts have mandatory jurisdiction 
when it comes to appeals, meaning that they must hear all appeals lodged with them from 
lower courts.88  The majority of states have intermediate appellate courts.89 
The final appellate court, which is the court of last resort in the state, is referred to as the 
“Supreme Court” and is usually provided for in a state’s constitution.90  Cases in these 
courts are heard by between 5 and 9 justices.91  The Supreme Court has the task of 
overseeing the development of the law and hears appeals from lower courts.92  The state 
appellate court has the last say on the law of the state.93   Where the state in which the 
Supreme Court is situated has an intermediate appellate court, this Supreme Court has 
discretionary jurisdiction and can choose which appeals it wishes to hear.94  Not all states 
have the double layer appeal system.95  For a party that loses in this court, their only option 
                                                
86  Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 98 where it is explained that these courts are also 
referred to as appellate courts, superior courts and courts of special appeals.  Also see Burnham 
Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 169. 
87  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 169.  Also see Albanese 
Criminal Justice at 228 who confirms that these courts hear appeals from the courts of general 
jurisdiction and have the duty to correct errors made by lower courts.  Where an error is detected the 
case is usually referred back to the trial court for reconsideration. 
88  Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 105. 
89  Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 104 explain that 39 of 
the states do have intermediate appellate courts.  Also see Welch and Fuller American Criminal 
Courts at 98 where it is pointed out that states such as Delaware and Nevada do not have 
intermediate appellate courts.  Also see Albanese Criminal Justice at 228 who specifies that 11 
states have no intermediate courts of appeal. 
90  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 169.  The judges 
presiding in a Supreme Court is referred to as “Justices “whereas those that preside in a trial court or 
appeal court is referred to as “Judge“.  Also see Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A 
Contemporary perspective at 105.  See further Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 98 
where it is pointed out that some states refer to this court as the court of appeals.  Also see 
Albanese Criminal Justice at 228. 
91  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 169.  See however 
Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 105 who states that 
the number of judges vary between 3 and 9. 
92  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 169.  Also see 
Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 104, 105.  See further 
Albanese Criminal Justice at 228 who confirms that these courts hear appeals from courts of general 
jurisdiction.  In some cases appeals are mandatory such as in cases where the death penalty is 
imposed. 
93  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 174.  Also see Albanese 
Criminal Justice at 228.  Supreme Courts in states where there are no intermediate appellate courts 
have mandatory jurisdiction, meaning that they must hear all appeals lodged with them.  See 
Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 105. 
94  Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 105.  Also see 
Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 169. 
95  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 169 who points out that 
New York has the double appeal system in place.  Also see Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal 
Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 105 where it is explained that the less populated states do 
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is to appeal to the US supreme court of appeal but may only appeal to such court if their 
case involves a constitutional issue or a matter of federal law.96 
3.2.2 Federal court structure 
Since Mental Health Courts form part of the state court structure in New York, the federal 
court structure is discussed in less detail.  The purpose of this brief overview of federal 
courts is mainly to show the hierarchy of federal courts. 
Federal courts have limited jurisdiction as they may only draw their powers of jurisdiction 
from the Constitution.97  These courts have exclusive jurisdiction over federal criminal law 
cases and cases involving a violation of the American Constitution.98  The federal 
government is represented in these courts by the US Attorney’s Office.99 
The federal court system has jurisdiction over all the states.100  When state law claims are 
                                                                                                                                                   
not have intermediate appellate courts, which result in these states not having the double appeal 
layer.  See further Albanese Criminal Justice at 228 where it is pointed out that there are 11 states 
that do not have the double layer of appeal as they do not have the intermediate appellate courts. 
96  Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 106.  Also see 
Albanese Criminal Justice at 228 where it is explained that the only way that a state case can ever 
be heard in a federal court is on appeal when there is a federal Constitutional issue that remains 
unsettled and that the US Supreme Court decides to hear. 
97  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 188.  Also see 
Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 96, 98.  The federal 
court jurisdiction is divided into federal question jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction.  Federal 
question jurisdiction involves cases where the plaintiff relies on a federal law question to succeed 
with his case and includes disputes between states or where the Constitution conferred the 
jurisdiction on the court.  Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over matters involving cases 
where the US is a party to the case or where the case involves different states.  See further 
Albanese Criminal Justice at 228.  Diversity jurisdiction involves cases between citizens from 
different states or between a citizen and a foreigner.  There must however be a minimum amount of 
claim of $75 000 involved.  See Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United 
States at 174, 188-190.  Diversity jurisdiction was mainly created to ensure the fair treatment of the 
party who is not a citizen of the state of the other party to which court he would naturally have 
wanted to go.    
98  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 189.  These courts 
further have exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters as well as copyright infringement matters.  
Also see Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 99, 96 
where it is pointed out that Congress increased the number of federal crimes leading to an increase 
in the criminal matters heard by Federal courts, which previously mainly heard civil matters.  Only 
about a third of the cases are criminal cases.  Also see Albanese Criminal Justice at 228.  Burnham 
Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 174.    
99  Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 132.  Attorney’s 
general are political appointments and likely to change with the appointment of a new president.  The 
work of the Attorney General is mostly conducted by the Assistant Attorney whose appointment is 
not politically motivated.  Every district has an Attorney General allocated to them.  Also see Welch 
and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 279. 
100  The Federal state structure is much smaller if compared to all the state court structures.  Burnham 
Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 174.  To illustrate this, the author 
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adjudicated in the federal court, the state law is applied with regard to all substantive 
matters, but federal procedural law applies.101 
The lowest level of courts in the federal system is the courts of limited jurisdiction, also 
known as magistrate courts and are often established to assist the district court with its 
caseload by, for instance, handling the bulk of pre-trial issues for the district judges.102   The 
United States Claims Court, Tax Court and Military Court and Court of Veterans Appeal are 
some examples of specialised (limited) jurisdiction courts.103 
The next layer of courts in the federal system is the federal trial courts of general 
jurisdiction, which consists of the 94 United States District Courts, more or less one per 
state.104  The majority of federal cases are heard in these courts.105  These courts do not 
                                                                                                                                                   
points out that there are about 29 000 state judges whilst there are only 850 federal judges.  The 
difference in the number of cases heard by the state courts versus the federal courts is astronomical 
in that more than 100 million cases were heard in state trial courts in 2008, whereas only 58 000 
were heard by the Federal Appeals court in that same year. 
101  This is in line with the conflict-of-laws notion where the forum hearing the dispute is allowed to follow 
its own procedure.  See Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 
192. 
102  Albanese Criminal Justice at 228.  See further Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 91 that 
states that pre-trial issues handled by Magistrates on behalf of the District court judges include bail 
applications and search warrants.  These courts are presided over by Magistrates and form a layer 
of trial courts that fall under the district courts.  District judges appoint Magistrates and assign judicial 
tasks to them.  The Magistrates are allocated cases from the district courts and assist in fulfilling the 
duties of the district court.  
103  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 175.  The United States 
Claims Court handles claims against the federal government.  The Tax Court hears matters involving 
federal tax.  Also see Albanese Criminal Justice at 228 where it is stated that courts such as the Tax 
Court are courts of limited jurisdiction as indicated by the name of the court, which implies that they 
only hear cases involving certain subject matter.  Other examples are the veterans appeal court that 
hears matters regarding benefits for veterans and the foreign intelligence surveillance court who 
hears applications by the attorney general to use wiretaps in the interest of national security.  Also 
see Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 97 who adds 
Federal Administrative Agencies and Boards to the list of forums with specialised court jurisdiction 
on the federal court level.  These courts are often referred to as “article 1 courts” as they are 
presided over by “article 1 judges” who are appointed for a specific period of time only.  Also see 
Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 88, 89 these courts are also referred to as “legislative” 
courts as they are created by statute and not the Constitution.  They are presided over by judges 
that are appointed for a limited period of time, often 8 years.  There is a reluctance to create more 
courts with specialised jurisdiction with a preference being that federal cases of all kinds should be 
heard by “article 111 judges” who preside over all types of cases and are appointed for life.  Also see 
Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 98 where it is 
confirmed that federal judges are appointed for life whereas state court judges are appointed for a 
limited period of time.  Also see Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 88, 89 where it is 
explained that these judges preside over courts created in the Constitution and are appointed to do 
so for life.  These courts include the U. S District courts, circuit courts of appeals and the U. S 
Supreme court. 
104  The US Bankruptcy Court also falls on this tier.  The U S Court of International Trade and the US 
court of Federal Claims are also trial Courts.  See Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A 
Contemporary perspective at 97, 98.  Some bigger states such as California have up to four district 
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hear as many cases as the state trial courts as they only hear cases where the federal 
Constitution or congressional statute is applied.106  These courts also have jurisdiction over 
petitions for habeas corpus.107 
The federal courts of appeal, also known as circuit courts, form the next layer of federal 
courts.108  They consist of 12 regional circuit courts and one court of appeal for the federal 
circuit.109  These courts hear civil and criminal appeals from the various district courts, 
specialised federal courts, such as the US Court of International Trade and from some 
administrative agencies such as the Department of Health and Human Services.110  These 
courts also hear habeas corpus petitions.111  Every appeal court, or circuit court, is 
allocated a number of states over which they have jurisdiction.112  Appeals are heard by a 
                                                                                                                                                   
courts.  Also see Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 90.  Also see Albanese Criminal 
Justice at 229.  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 174.  
These courts are found in 94 districts across America.  Where a state has a bigger population, such 
a state might have more than one district.  New York, for example, has four districts.  (north, east, 
south and west).  Smaller, less populated states such as Montana constitute a district on its own.    
105  Albanese Criminal Justice at 229.  These courts have 2 judges per court, although only 1 judge 
presides over a trial.  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 
174.  Some larger districts such as the Southern district of New York, has 28 judges at its district 
court.  Also see Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 98 
where it is pointed out that each district also have magistrate judges that assists the federal judges in 
trials.  Also see Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 92 where it is stated that criminal 
cases start in the District Court although they refer some of their functions, particularly the pre-trial 
issues, to the Magistrates Courts. 
106  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 175.  Also see 
Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 99. 
107  Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 99.  In 2006, this 
court heard approximately 55 000 habeas corpus petitions.  In the same year, a total of 
approximately 88 000 criminal matter served before this court. 
108  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 175.  Also see 
Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 97, 99. 
109  Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 97, 99.  See also 
Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 175.  The author explains 
in footnote 37 that the reason for this name is because of the fact that judges used to travel a 
specific route through the country, usually on horseback and held court sessions in particular 
districts as they went along their route.  Also see Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 90, 
92.  See further Albanese Criminal Justice at 229. 
110  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 175.  Also see 
Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 99.  District courts 
are the courts of first instance in the federal court system.  One third of the approximately 50 000 
appeals heard by these courts in 2005 were criminal cases.  Also see Welch and Fuller American 
Criminal Courts at 93.  Also see Albanese Criminal Justice at 229 and in particular the diagram on 
this page that shows the Federal courts from which appeals are lodged to the courts of appeals.  
These courts include the US Tax Court,, US court of Federal /Claims,, and US court of Veterans 
appeals to name a few. 
111  Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective a 99. 
112  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 175.  The division is not 
determined geographically.  Also see Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A 
Contemporary perspective at 99.  Also see Albanese Criminal Justice at 229. 
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bench of 3 judges.113  These courts are intermediate courts of appeal, which lighten the 
load on the Supreme Court and hear most appeals in the United States of America.114  
Since one circuit court need not follow the decision of another,115 a ruling on a federal issue 
in one state may differ from that in another.116  These discrepancies can be addressed by 
the United States Supreme Court, which has jurisdiction to review decisions by the federal 
circuit courts.117 
The United States Supreme Court is the highest court in the United States of America and 
is the only court that is specifically created by the federal Constitution.118  Its function is to 
hear appeals from the federal courts of appeal and to hear appeals from state courts where 
a federal matter is concerned.119  The court consists of nine (9) justices.120  The court can 
                                                
113  Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 99, 100.  Also see 
Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 93. 
114  Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 93.  Also see Albanese Criminal Justice at 229. 
115  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 175, 176.  The decisions 
of these courts only have persuasive value for another circuit court.  The effect is that there may be 
various decisions pertaining to federal law, depending on the circuit court that handed down the 
decision. 
116  A ruling on a federal issue in New York, which forms part of the second circuit, may differ from that in 
California that forms part of the ninth circuit.  See Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal 
System of the United States at 176.  Also see Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A 
Contemporary perspective at 101. 
117  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 176.  Also see 
Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 100, 101 where it is 
explained, however, that the Supreme Court only takes approximately 100 cases of the 9000 cases 
that they receive to review.  If the case does not involve a difference in opinion between state circuit 
courts or does not involve an issue of federal Constitutional law, the Supreme Court may decide not 
to hear the case. 
118  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 176.  The court is 
situated in Washington D.C.  Although it is created by the Constitution, its composition and 
jurisdiction is determined by Congress.  Also see Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A 
Contemporary perspective at 97, 100.  Also see Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 94.  
The other courts were created through statutes.  See further Albanese Criminal Justice at 229. 
119  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 176.  Also see 
Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 100, 101.  See further 
Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 93 where it is explained that these courts do not hear 
cases afresh but its function is mainly to review decisions taken by lower courts.  Cases affecting 
Ambassadors or other foreign ministers are heard by this court Burnham Introduction to the Law and 
Legal System of the United States at 176.  Jurisdiction over this particular issue is assigned to the 
court by Article III Section 2 of the Constitution of the USA.  Also see Hemmens, Brody and Spohn 
Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 100 where it is explained that these courts have 
original jurisdiction to hear matters between the US and foreigners.  Also see Welch and Fuller 
American Criminal Courts at 83 where it is explained that original jurisdiction implies that a court may 
hear a case from the start and make a ruling on the facts.  Courts of limited and general jurisdiction 
both have original jurisdiction. 
120  All the justices sit together to hear all matters.  See Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal 
System of the United States at 176.  In the history of the court it had as little as 5 and as many as 10 
Justices.  One of the justices is the Chief Justice of the United States Burnham Introduction to the 
Law and Legal System of the United States at 176.  The other 8 justices are referred to as “associate 
justices“.  Also see Albanese Criminal Justice at 229.  See further Hemmens, Brody and Spohn 
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decide which cases it will accept and accepts a relatively small number annually.121  The 
court takes cases involving disputes between states, cases involving conflicts between the 
findings of state and federal courts, and cases that aim to resolve constitutional 
questions.122   
The legislative framework within which cases involving mentally ill accused persons are 
considered and the rather complicated American court structure creates the framework 
within which procedural issues pertaining to mentally ill accused persons must be 
considered.  The discussion of the procedural aspects that follow focuses on issues 
pertaining to fitness to stand trial, and reference to assessments for criminal capacity will 
only be made where the context so requires. 
4  PROCEDURAL ASPECTS RELATING TO FITNESS TO STAND TRIAL UNDER 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 
4.1 Introduction 
The procedural prescripts regarding fitness to stand trial are set out below.  The discussion 
commences with an overview of the concept of fitness and assessment thereof in the 
American criminal justice system.  The discussion will further focus on the order for 
assessment of fitness to stand trial, the test employed to determine fitness to stand trial and 
the actual assessment.  The findings that can be made after the fitness assessment are 
discussed with consideration to the consequences of such findings. 
4.2 Overview 
It is a prerequisite in every state, as part of the due process protection, that an accused 
                                                                                                                                                   
Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 101, 102 where it is pointed out that the number of 
justices are decided by Congress and that the number of judges have not been changed in 100 
years.  The author reckons it is unlikely that it will change in the near future.  
121  The decision to accept a case is not based on merit and has no binding precedential value.  See 
Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 101.  It accepts 
approximately 100 of 9000 applications for review annually.  A petition to the Supreme court to 
review a case is done by a petition called a “writ of certiorari”.  This is effectively an instruction sent 
from the Supreme court to a lower court to furnish the Supreme Court with the record of proceedings 
so that the Supreme court may consider it – once they have decided to review the case.  Also see 
Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 95 who confirm that the court hears approximately 1 
percentage of the cases filed with it that amounts to approximately 100 cases a year.  See further 
Albanese Criminal Justice at 229 who states that of the 5 000 cases that reaches the Supreme court, 
less than a quarter of them are heard. 
122  Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 101.  Also see 
Albanese Criminal Justice at 229. 
  
333 
must be fit to stand trial in order for any criminal proceedings against him to continue.123   
The idea of fitness to stand trial is also referred to as; “triability”,124 “competency to stand 
trial,” or “adjudicative competency” 125 and has its origin in English common law.126  The 
rules on fitness originated in cases where the accused had a physical condition, for 
example, a heart attack, that rendered him incapable of coming to court to stand trial.127  A 
person that is absent mentally should similarly not be put on trial,128 as this would simply be 
unfair and immoral.129  Fitness to stand trial thus refers to an accused’s physical and mental 
presence.  
The requirement that an accused should be physically and mentally present during the trial 
aims to preserve the fairness and dignity of the criminal justice system in the United States 
of America.130  The competency requirement further serves one of the goals of the criminal 
justice system, namely specific deterrence.131  If the individual is unfit to stand trial and, 
                                                
123  Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 509, 510.  Also see in general Pate v Robinson 
406 US 715 (1972).where this principle is confirmed. 
124  Slovenko Psychiatry in Law / Law in Psychiatry at 171. 
125  Helfgott Criminal Psychology at 281. 
126  Slate, Buffington-Vollum and Johnson Criminalization of Mental Illness at 303.  Also see Helfgott 
Criminal Psychology at 281.  See further Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health 
System at 1005 who adds that the concept of fitness dates back to the 17th century.  Also see this 
source in general where fitness to stand trial is viewed as part of “competency to proceed”.  See also 
Albanese Criminal Justice at 89 where it is explained that the American criminal law and justice 
system is generally derived from the English common law.  See further Marks et al New York Pretrial 
Criminal Procedure at 510.  Lastly, see Shea 2013 Public Defence Backup Centre Report 8 at 8. 
127  Slovenko Psychiatry in Law / Law in Psychiatry at 171.  Also see Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and 
the Mental Health System at 1005 where the development of the fitness concept is discussed.  The 
English courts had to determine if an accused was “mute by malice” and thus refusing to co-operate 
or ‘mute by visitation of God” which made the accused incapable of participating.  In the first 
instance, weight on the accused’s chest was increased to the point where he will become willing to 
co-operate, in the latter case, the accused was spared this torture.  
128  Slovenko Psychiatry in Law / Law in Psychiatry at 171.  Also see Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and 
the Mental Health System at 1005 where it is explained that unfitness were at first only applied to 
those who were physically mute or deaf but later also applied to the “lunatics”. 
129  Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 1005, 1006 where it is emphasised 
that the moral aspect of the fitness requirements underlies many of the substantive and procedural 
aspects pertaining to mentally ill accused persons and assists in preserving the dignity and integrity 
of the criminal justice system. 
130  Helfgott Criminal Psychology at 282. Also see Slovenko Psychiatry in Law / Law in Psychiatry at 
171.  See further Slate, Buffington-Vollum and Johnson Criminalization of Mental Illness at 302 
where the question of relevance of a person’s capacity to stand trial is questioned against the 
backdrop of having committed a crime against society.  The authors state that the importance of 
capacity or competence in this context is to secure the moral dignity of the criminal justice system 
and to safeguard individuals’ rights within the system.  See further Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law 
and the Mental Health System at 1006 where it is explained that the fitness requirement aims to 
protect the dignity of the criminal justice system on the one hand and the rights of the accused on 
the other.  The rights of society are also considered through striving to keep the integrity of the 
criminal justice system intact.  
131  Slate, Buffington-Vollum and Johnson Criminalization of Mental Illness at 302. 
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consequently, incapable of understanding why he is being punished, he will not be deterred 
from further criminal acts, and the criminal justice system would have failed in reaching its 
goal of deterrence. 
Fitness entails that an accused must be able to understand the nature and purpose of the 
proceedings,132 the charges against him and be able to participate meaningfully in 
conducting his defence.133  The mere fact that someone who suffers from a mental illness 
has amnesia134 or has a particularly low IQ does not automatically render him unfit to stand 
trial.135  Triability is determined by legal criteria and not by medical or psychological 
standards meaning that the court is the final decision maker in fitness cases.136   
                                                
132  The accused must have a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings in order to be 
regarded fit to stand trial.  See Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 91.  These 
requirements were set in the case of Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).  Also see Rogers 
and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 152. 
133  Helfgott Criminal Psychology at 282.  Also see Slate, Buffington-Vollum and Johnson Criminalization 
of Mental Illness at 302. 
134 State v Pellerin 286 So.  2d 639 (La. 1973).  Also see Slovenko Psychiatry in Law / Law in 
Psychiatry 179.  See further Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 102.  There are 
various factors that have to be considered by a court in the case of an accused who allegedly suffers 
from amnesia in order to determine if he is fit to stand trial, inter alia, the temporary or permanent 
nature of the amnesia.  The level of prejudice to the accused if he is tried without being able to 
retrieve his memories, is an important focus point in cases involving amnesia.  Where an accused 
with amnesia is tried and is convicted, it might have to be determined after such conviction, whether 
the trial was fair to the accused.  Also see Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice 
at 155.  See further Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 1009.  Also see 
Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 543 where it is stated that an accused who 
suffers from amnesia will likely go through the entire process of determining his fitness, which may 
include a fitness hearing but that amnesia per se, does not automatically render n accused unfit to 
stand trial. 
135  Slate, Buffington-Vollum and Johnson Criminalization of Mental Illness at 301.  Also see Rogers and 
Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 154.  See further Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and 
the Mental Health System at 931, these authors refer to incompetence in general but also discuss 
competency in the criminal law context at 1007 They promote a narrow interpretation of 
incompetence.  Also see Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 516. 
136  Slovenko Psychiatry in Law / Law in Psychiatry at 181.  Also see Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and 
the Mental Health System at 932-934 where the opinion that different levels of competency should 
apply depending on the decision to be taken (medical treatment, making of a will, standing trial or 
pleading guilty).  The opposite view, that the type of decision to be taken should not matter in the 
level of competency required, is also analysed with a strong focus on equality of the rights that stand 
to be impacted by the decision.  The concern is also raised that, if there is a ranking of competency, 
then the competency standard for some of these decisions will have to be lowered which in itself 
brings new concerns with it.  Opinions by psychologists and psychiatrists of course inform this 
decision and the courts tend to agree with the opinions of the mental health professionals in 90% of 
cases.  See further this source at 1025, 1026 where it is reiterated that it is the mental health 
professionals and not the lawyers that has the specialised skills to actually determine if a particular 
accused is fit to stand trial or not.  Also see Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 538 
where it is explained that fitness hearings are “fact-specific” meaning that it is required of the court to 
consider various opinions on the accused’s fitness.  The court ultimately has to take a decision on 
the fitness issue having due regard to all the facts (including the expert opinions) before it.  The court 
is not bound by the expert opinions (see this source at 542).  Lastly, see Shea 2013 Public Defence 
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To allow a person who is mentally ill to stand trial, will impact on his right to take decisions 
regarding his liberty 137 and will impact his right to due process 138 as provided for in the 5th  
and 14th Amendment to the American Constitution.139 
Under American law, an accused is presumed fit to stand trial until the contrary is proven.140  
An accused consequently does not have a right to a hearing on fitness unless the issue is 
raised specifically.141  Section 730 of New York CPL 142 sets out the rules to be applied to 
ensure that an unfit accused does not stand trial.  
The discussion that follows will be general discussions of the order for assessment, the test 
employed, the actual assessment, and the consequences of the court’s finding with 
                                                                                                                                                   
Backup Centre Report 8 at 10 who confirms that it is the court that makes the final decision on 
triability. 
137  Helfgott Criminal Psychology at 282 who states that by doing so, the person will in actual fact be 
prevented from taking decisions concerning their liberty.  Also see Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law 
and the Mental Health System at 930, 931 where the importance of respecting a person’s autonomy 
to make decisions are emphasised.  Such autonomy is however, sometimes, affected by a mental 
condition that impacts on such true autonomy and it is in such cases that the state is justified to 
intervene and limit the liberty of such person in his own best interests. 
138  Due process can be defined as “procedural justice that is due to all persons whenever they are 
threatened with the loss of life, liberty or property at the hands of the state.”  See Hemmens, Brody 
and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 11.  Also see Albanese Criminal Justice 
at 91 where the growing importance of due process, due to the growth of the population and the fact 
that the law is enforced by strangers, is stressed. 
139  Slate, Buffington-Vollum and Johnson Criminalization of Mental Illness at 302.  Also see Slovenko 
Psychiatry in Law / Law in Psychiatry at 171 where it is pointed out that the fitness rules aim to 
protect the accused’s right to a fair trial.  Article V (5th amendment) of the Bill of Rights of the 
American Constitution reads as follows:  “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.” The 14th Amendment (section 1 thereof) reads as follows:  “All persons 
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the State wherein they reside.  No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  Also see Albanese Criminal Justice at 91 who confirms 
that due process is provided for in the 5th and 14th amendment of the American Constitution. 
140  Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 100.  The United States Supreme Court ruled in 
Cooper v Oklahoma 517 U.S 348 (1996) 20 MPDLR 314 that this presumption stands and 
overturned any scheme that places a burden on the accused to prove his incompetence with clear 
and convincing evidence.  Also see Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 155 
where it is pointed out that a court may require an accused to prove incompetence but only on a 
preponderance of probabilities and not a standard higher than that.  Also see Slobogin, Rai and 
Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 1024 where the standard of proof is confirmed.  
Further see this source at 931 where it is stated that fitness should always be presumed until the 
contrary is proven.  Also see Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 512, 542. 
141  Shea 2013 Public Defence Backup Centre Report 8 at 9. 
142  Hereinafter referred to as “New York CPL”. 
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particular reference to New York criminal procedure law. 
4.3 The order for assessment of fitness to stand trial 
The discussion of the order for assessment will focus on the juncture in the criminal 
proceedings at which this order can be made, on whose request it can be made and what 
the content of the order should be.   
The issue of competency to stand trial can be raised at any time during the proceedings 
prior to sentencing.143   
The judge, the prosecution, the defence attorney, or the defendant himself can raise the 
issue.144  The prosecution may request an enquiry into the fitness of the accused in 
fulfilment of its duty to seek justice and to protect society.145  An accused may not oppose 
such a request brought by the prosecution.146  The defence attorney may raise the fitness 
issue even where the accused objects to it being raised.147  The burden to prove, on a 
                                                
143  18 U.S.C §4241 states that the issue may be raised at any time prior to sentencing.  
“(a) Motion To Determine Competency of Defendant.-At any time after the commencement of a 
prosecution for an offense and prior to the sentencing of the defendant, or at any time after the 
commencement of probation or supervised release and prior to the completion of the sentence, the 
defendant or the attorney for the Government may file a motion for a hearing to determine the mental 
competency of the defendant.”  Also see section 730.30(1) of the New York CPL which states that 
“At any time after a defendant is arraigned upon an accusatory instrument other than a felony 
complaint and before the imposition of sentence, or at any time after a defendant is arraigned upon a 
felony complaint and before he is held for the action of the grand jury, the court wherein the criminal 
action is pending must issue an order of examination when it is of the opinion that the defendant may 
be an incapacitated person.”  Also see Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 511.  
See however Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 99 and also see Helfgott Criminal 
Psychology at 282 who indicate that the fitness issue may be raised at any time prior to conviction 
and not sentencing.  See further Shea 2013 Public Defence Backup Centre Report 8 at 10. 
144  Slate, Buffington-Vollum and Johnson Criminalization of Mental Illness.at 301.  Also see Slovenko 
Psychiatry in Law / Law in Psychiatry at 172, 173 where he explains that, where the fitness issue is 
raised by the prosecution it is referred to as “preventive detention” whereas the term ‘medical 
immunity” is used where the issue of triability is raised by the defence.  Also see Slobogin, Rai and 
Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 1019.  Also see 18 U.S C §4241 where it is spelled 
out that, “the defendant or the attorney for the Government may file a motion for a 
hearing to determine the mental competency of the defendant.  The court shall grant the motion, or 
shall order such a hearing on its own motion, if there is reasonable cause to believe that the 
defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally 
incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the 
proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.” 
145  Slovenko Psychiatry in Law / Law in Psychiatry at 173. 
146  Slovenko Psychiatry in Law / Law in Psychiatry at 173. 
147  Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 1022.  This is in line with the 
standards set by the American Bar Association and is allowed as part of the attorney’s duty to 
safeguard the integrity of the judicial system.  Also see this source at 1023 for criticism of this 
approach.  See further Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 510 where it is pointed 
out that where the accused’s attorney insists on an examination of his client’s mental state, an order 
for such an examination will not be granted unless there is evidence in support of the suspicion that 
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preponderance of probability, that the accused is indeed unfit rests with the party that 
raised the issue.148    
Triability is sometimes used strategically in criminal proceedings as a delay tactic by the 
defence or as a way to lay the foundation for mitigating circumstances where the prospect 
of succeeding with the insanity defence looks bleak.149  The prosecution, on the other hand, 
may raise the triability issue in an attempt to ensure a lengthy commitment of the accused 
in controversial cases and to avoid the pre-trial release of an accused.150       
Whatever the motive behind bringing an application for a fitness assessment might be, the 
US Code and New York CPL place an obligation on the court to grant a motion for a 
determination of competency where there is reasonable cause to believe that the accused 
is suffering from a mental illness which affects his ability to understand the proceedings and 
conduct a proper defence.151   The obligation to hold an inquiry arises from the fact that the 
                                                                                                                                                   
the particular defendant may be incompetent to proceed to trial. 
148  Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 1020 where it is stated that the 
tendency seems to be that incompetence has to be proved by the party raising the issue, it is not 
stated as a given that this is necessarily the case in all states.  Also see Marks et al New York 
Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 542 where it is confirmed that the burden of proof for purposes of 
unfitness is on a preponderance of probability.  See, however, Shea 2013 Public Defence Backup 
Centre Report 8 at 10 who opines that the burden of proof is on the state to show on a 
preponderance of probabilities that the accused is indeed fit to proceed to trial. 
149  Slovenko R Psychiatry in Law / Law in Psychiatry at 171.  Also see Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law 
and the Mental Health System at 1021 where this strategic use of fitness referrals have been cited 
as one of the reasons contributing to the increase in the number of fitness referrals over the last 
number of years. 
150  Slovenko R Psychiatry in Law / Law in Psychiatry at 171.  Also see Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law 
and the Mental Health System at 1020, 1021. 
151  U. S Code Title 18, section 4241 (a) reads as follows:  “(a)Motion To Determine Competency of 
Defendant.  - At any time after the commencement of a prosecution for an offense and prior to the 
sentencing of the defendant, or at any time after the commencement of probation or supervised 
release and prior to the completion of the sentence, the defendant or the attorney for the 
Government may file a motion for a hearing to determine the mental competency of the defendant.  
The court shall grant the motion, or shall order such a hearing on its own motion, if there is 
reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or 
defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature 
and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.”  Also see 
Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 296.  Section 730.3 
of the New York CPL contains a similar provision.  Where the court is satisfied that there is a bona 
fide concern about the accused’s mental state the judge is obliged to hold an inquiry with regard 
thereto although there is no obligation to put the issue to a jury.  See Parry Criminal Mental Health 
and Disability Law at 84.  Also see 18 U.S.C §4241 which sets “reasonable cause to believe that the 
defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally 
incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the 
proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense” as a requirement for ordering a 
competency assessment.  Slovenko Psychiatry in Law / Law in Psychiatry at 171.  Also see Rogers 
and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 155, 156.  See further Parry Criminal Mental 
Health and Disability Law at 98.  Also see Pate v Robinson 406 US 715 (1972).  The legal 
representative of the accused has a duty to draw the possible incompetence of the accused to the 
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conviction of an incompetent person will be a serious violation of due process.152   
The belief that the accused suffers from a mental illness must be the foundation for the 
court to order a fitness assessment.  The court should, however, not order an assessment 
merely because an accused has a history of psychiatric treatment.  The court should rather 
consider whether the accused is orientated to time and place, understands the roles of the 
parties in court and whether he can establish a working relationship with his legal 
representative.153  If the court doubts the accused’s ability on any of these basic 
understanding requirements, there could be said to be grounds for an examination of the 
accused’s mental state.  The fact that an accused uses psychiatric medication or has 
attempted to commit suicide, for example, is not sufficient proof of incompetence to stand 
trial or that an examination of fitness is necessary.154 
A court may not waive the competency issue just because an accused appears rational and 
alert during the trial.155  An accused, however, does not have the right to have his mental 
                                                                                                                                                   
court’s attention, failing which the accused might appeal stating that the legal representation was 
ineffective.  See further Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 1018 where 
it is pointed out that such an obligation is in line with the due process clause.  Also see this source at 
1023 where it is pointed out that such an obligation, which is also in line with the American Bar 
Association Standards, could prove to be very costly for the justice system if every accused in 
respect of whom a concern about his mental illness is raised has to be assessed for fitness.  It also 
means hospitalisation, delays and extra court time.  The option of appealing against a process where 
the fitness issue was not raised is open to the accused to safeguard his rights and it is put forward in 
this source that an appeal in these instances is cheaper to the system rather than raising the fitness 
issue in every single possible case.  Lastly, see Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A 
Contemporary perspective at 296.  Also see Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 512 
who emphasises the use of the word “must” in section 730.30 of the New York CPL that directs that 
the court must order an examination of the accused’ mental state where it appears that the accused 
may be incompetent.  Also see Slovenko Psychiatry in Law / Law in Psychiatry at 180.  Also see 
Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 932.  Also see this source at 1026 
where it is pointed out that California is one of the few states where fitness issues are put to a jury on 
the request of the accused. 
152  Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 155.  Due process entails inter alia the 
protection of the procedural rights of an individual when he stands to lose his liberty in the criminal 
process and is protected under the 5th and 14th Amendment to the American Constitution.  See 
Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 39. 
153  Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 513.  Other issues that the court should 
consider before ordering an assessment is whether the accused has sufficient intelligence and 
judgment to listen to the advice of counsel and, based on that advice, appreciate the fact that one 
course of conduct may be more beneficial to him than another; and whether the accused is 
sufficiently stable to withstand the stresses of the trial without suffering a serious prolonged or 
permanent breakdown. 
154  See Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 515, 516 where reference is made to 
various cases in which these facts are confirmed.  The authors also add that the mere fact that an 
accused is disruptive during court proceedings does not mean that an accused must be assessed for 
fitness.  A very low IQ is also not necessarily sufficient grounds to order a fitness examination. 
155  Slovenko Psychiatry in Law / Law in Psychiatry at 173.  Also see Pate v Robinson 406 US 715 
(1972) where the Supreme Court held that the trial court could not dispense with the issue of 
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state investigated if there is no evidence suggesting that such an investigation is 
necessary.156  An accused will not be entitled to a competency hearing where he 
deliberately tries to become incompetent by taking an overdose of medication or refusing to 
eat.157    
Where the judge is satisfied that grounds for a fitness assessment exist, the judge may 
decide that mental health experts should assess the accused.158  The order for assessment 
in the state of New York is addressed to the Director of the relevant institution where the 
assessment is to take place.159  Two mental health practitioners must be appointed to 
perform the assessment.160   The assessment shall last for a period of 30-days 161 and can 
be conducted on an outpatient basis in cases where the accused was not in custody when 
the order for assessment was made.162 
Judges reported that they generally grant a motion for a fitness referral, often without even 
requiring evidence that such an assessment is necessary.163  This could be a contributing 
                                                                                                                                                   
competency just because the accused appeared rational during the trial.  In this case, the accused 
committed a number of violent acts including murdering his wife and baby where after he tried to 
commit suicide.  The court held that, considering the violent nature of his actions and the fact that he 
had a history of irrational behaviour, the competency issue had to be investigated. 
156  Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 512 who adds that the insistence by defense 
counsel that his client’s mental state needs to be investigated is not enough to secure such an 
investigation if there is no evidence supporting it. 
157  Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 98. 
158  18 U.S.C §4241(b) which reads as follows: “Psychiatric or Psychological  Examination and Report.— 
Prior to the date of the hearing, the court may order that a psychiatric or psychological examination 
of the defendant be conducted, and that a psychiatric or psychological report be filed with the court, 
pursuant to the provisions of section 4247(b) and (c).”  Also see Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and 
the Mental Health System 1019.  See further Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 84 
who explains that the judge determines the need for a competency hearing through conversations 
with the accused and his counsel.  Also see Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 
513, 514 where the importance of the judge personally observing the behaviour of the accused in the 
courtroom is stressed.   
159  Section 730.10(4) of the New York CPL defines director as:  “"Director"  means (a) the director of a 
state hospital operated by the office of mental health or the director of a developmental centre 
operated by the office of mental retardation and developmental disabilities, or (b) the director of a 
hospital operated by any local government  of  the state that has been certified by the commissioner 
as having adequate facilities to examine a defendant to determine if he  is  an  incapacitated person, 
or (c) the director of community mental health  services.” 
160  Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 521.  Section 730.20(1) of the New York CPL 
states that: ”…Upon receipt of an examination order, the director must designate two qualified 
psychiatric examiners, of whom he may be one, to examine the defendant to determine if he is an 
incapacitated person.  In conducting their examination, the psychiatric examiners may employ any 
method that is accepted by the medical profession for the examination of persons alleged to be 
mentally ill or mentally defective.  The court may authorize a psychiatrist or psychologist retained by 
the defendant to be present at such examination.” 
161  New York CPL 730.20(4). 
162  New York CPL 730.20(2). 
163  Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 1021, referring to a study done of 
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factor to the increase in the number of fitness assessments observed recently in New York.    
The requirements to be considered fit to stand trial have been alluded to above.  The exact 
test employed to determine fitness requires closer examination. 
4.4 Test for fitness to stand trial 
The initial goal of the test for triability was to identify only those with serious cases of mental 
illnesses and to excuse only those from the trial.164  The opinion of a mental health 
practitioner was not required, a common-sense approach was used instead, an approach 
that is still advocated.165 
The test for fitness assessments was established in 1960 in the case of Dusky v United 
States 166 , and the court has not deviated from the standard set in this case.167  The court 
focussed on the fact that an accused must be able to consult with his legal representative 
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and must have a rational and factual 
understanding of the proceedings against him.168  Slovenko 169 labels these requirements 
as the communicative and cognitive ability of the accused.  He stresses that the court must 
acquaint itself with the mental condition of the accused and not merely establish that the 
accused is orientated to time and place.  This test established in the Dusky case represents 
a minimal constitutional standard on competency that generally applies in all states.170  
Failure by the accused to meet any part of the test will render him unfit to stand trial.171 
                                                                                                                                                   
judges in North Carolina.  See however Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 512, 
513 where it is stressed that this should not be the case.  Fitness examinations should not be 
ordered without evidence indicating that such an examination is warranted. 
164  Slovenko Psychiatry in Law / Law in Psychiatry at 181. 
165  Slovenko Psychiatry in Law / Law in Psychiatry at 181. 
166  Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).  (Hereinafter referred to as the “Dusky case”).  Also 
see Albanese Criminal Justice at 98.  Also see Slate, Buffington-Vollum and Johnson Criminalization 
of Mental Illness at 303 where it is confirmed that the test for fitness was established in the case 
even though it was incorporated into American law much earlier through the English common law as 
explained above.  Also see Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 1006.  
See further Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 509, 510. 
167  Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 151.  Also see Slovenko Psychiatry in 
Law / Law in Psychiatry 172.  
168  See in general the Dusky case.  Also see Slate, Buffington-Vollum and Johnson Criminalization of 
Mental Illness at 303.  See further Slovenko Psychiatry in Law / Law in Psychiatry at 172 who points 
out that the requirement that the accused must be able to put forward a rational defence stems from 
the 17th century.  See further Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 91. 
169  Slovenko Psychiatry in Law / Law in Psychiatry at 173. 
170  Slovenko Psychiatry in Law / Law in Psychiatry at 172.   Also see Parry Criminal Mental Health and 
Disability Law at 98.  See further Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 
1006. 
171  Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 152. 
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The first part of the test focuses on the accused’s ability to consult with counsel 
rationally.172  The basic capacity of the accused to communicate coherently is under 
investigation here.173  The accused must be able to identify tangible evidence and provide 
information pertaining to viable defences such as an alibi.174  This prong of the test does not 
require a certain ideal level of intellectual capacity but merely a reasonable degree of 
rational understanding.175  A higher level of rational understanding is, however, required 
when the alleged offence is more complex, such as securities fraud, as opposed to a less 
complex crime such as assault.176  The focus of this part of the test falls on the capacity to 
consult rather than the choice to consult since an accused can delay his trial by refusing to 
co-operate with a lawyer, regardless of his capacity to do so.177  For this reason, courts are 
hesitant to find that an accused lacks the capacity to stand trial merely because of 
disruptive courtroom behaviour.178 
The second part of the test, as laid down in the Dusky case, is to examine the extent to 
which the accused has a factual and rational understanding of the proceedings, including 
the charges against him.179  The factual understanding requirement refers to the accused’s 
                                                
172  Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 152, 153.  Also see this source at 178 
where it is pointed out that this part of the test is particularly challenging for forensic mental health 
practitioners because they never get the opportunity to observe the interaction between the accused 
and the legal representative.  Also see Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health 
System at 1006 who is of the view that this part of the tests assesses the accused’s ability to 
function within the criminal process, consulting with counsel is only part of such assessment. 
173  Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 164.  This question investigates the 
accused’s ability to communicate understandably, whether he functions as an autonomous person 
motivated by self-interest and whether the accused has a “reality-based working relationship” with 
his legal representative.  
174  Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 1009 where it is stated that the 
accused must for instance be able to explain their side of the story to their legal representative.  The 
accused must be able to, for example, assist his lawyer in handling the case through considering 
settlement options.  Also see Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 153.  Also 
see this source at 163 where the prototypical items that would indicate an inability to consult with 
counsel are discussed.  These include inability to convey one’s thoughts coherently, incapacity to 
make decisions, and irrational perceptions about the case or defence counsel.  These inabilities 
could be caused by an array of reasons, inter alia, thought disorders and psychosis.   
175  Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 153. 
176  Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 1007.  Also see Rogers and 
Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 153.  
177  Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 153.  Also see Slobogin, Rai and Reisner 
Law and the Mental Health System at 1007 where it is explained that the choice not to consult a 
legal representative is a rational choice and unless such choice is influenced by irrational thoughts, 
such refusal not a reason for a finding of unfitness. 
178  Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 516.  See further Rogers and Shuman 
Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 153.  Also see United States v Holmes (1987).  
179  Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 1006, 1008 where it is explained 
that the accused’s understanding of the charges against him forms part of the assessment of the 
accused’s ability to function within the criminal process.  Also see Rogers and Shuman 
Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 154.  There is a view that this second part of the test should 
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basic knowledge of proceedings and the role players in the courts.180  The accused has to 
understand the circumstances he finds himself in and the consequences of a possible 
conviction.181  Factual understanding only is insufficient and must be supplemented by 
rational understanding.182  The assessment of a rational understanding of the proceedings 
centres on whether the accused has “reality-based” perceptions about the legal system and 
whether he can take decisions based on reality.183  A mental disorder does not necessarily 
impair one’s perception of reality.  The Dusky standard for lack of rational understanding 
requires a serious impairment of cognitive abilities due to mental disorder.184  The Dusky 
standard is based on functional abilities and the impact that the mental disorder has on the 
accused’s competency related capacities.185  The level of understanding required in order 
to be found fit to stand trial is not very high.186   
It was argued that a higher degree of fitness is required when an accused intends to 
represent himself, which implies that the accused is waiving his right to legal 
                                                                                                                                                   
be subdivided into two separate prongs.  The benefits of dividing the test into three separate parts, 
would mostly be for purposes of clinical evaluation and will not impact the legal consequence of the 
separate findings much.     
180  Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 154.  Also see this source at 163 where it 
is indicated that the accused’s lack of understanding of the role of the judge or defence counsel, or 
the charges against him will indicate a lack of factual understanding of the proceedings.  An 
unawareness of the seriousness of the charges against him and the possible penalties will also be 
an indication of lack of factual knowledge of the proceedings.  See Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law 
and the Mental Health System at 1007 where it is pointed out that an accused’s refusal to be 
informed of the functions of the role players in order to gain an understanding thereof, is not 
sufficient for a finding of unfitness. 
181  Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 154. 
182  Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 1007.  Also see Shea 2013 Public 
Defence Backup Centre Report 8 at 9.  The rational understanding requirement is in contrast with 
the fitness test used in Canada where a rational understanding is not necessarily required for fitness.  
The test employed in Canada requires “true understanding” which does not necessarily mean 
rational understanding.  See the discussion of the fitness test utilised in Canada in chapter 4 of this 
research. 
183  Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 154, 164 where it is indicated that the 
lack of awareness of the accused’s involvement in the proceedings is an indication that the accused 
lacks rational understanding of the proceedings.  This might be evident if the accused denies the 
possibility of being found guilty or if the accused appears uninterested in the verdict and its possible 
impact.  
184  Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 155.  Also see Slobogin, Rai and Reisner 
Law and the Mental Health System at 935, 1007 where other competency tests are discussed and 
where it is pointed out that most of them focus on the cognitive ability of the decision-maker.  
185  Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 155, 161, 162 where different models 
that can be used by forensic mental health professionals to operationalise the Dusky test are 
discussed.  The discrete abilities model that divides the Dusky standard into three separate but 
related prongs seems preferable.  
186  Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 1007 point out that the accused 
need not understand everything perfectly in order to be fit to stand trial.  The threshold to be found fit 
to stand trial is not very high.  A similar position exists in Canada (see chapter 4 of this research) 
with the result that some accused persons who are in fact not fit to stand trial are eventually put on 
trial because of the low threshold set for fitness. 
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representation.187  It was, however, held that the constitutional standard of fitness as set out 
in the Dusky case applies regardless of if an accused intends to represent himself or not.188  
States are, however, free to impose additional due process standards to protect the rights 
of such an accused.189 
The legal standard for fitness in the USA is regarded as clear, consistent and uniform, 
which in turn gives professionals conducting these assessments certainty with regard to 
exactly what it is that should be measured for purposes of fitness.190  Slovenko 191 opines 
that the minimum standard for fitness set by the Dusky case is vague but that this, in actual 
fact, allows the judge to exercise discretion in each case, guided by the particular 
circumstances of each mentally ill accused.    
The assessment for fitness to stand trial that is conducted by mental health professionals is 
investigated below. 
4.5 Assessment of fitness to stand trial 
The discussion of the fitness assessment includes an investigation into the purpose of the 
assessment, what exactly the assessment entails, where the assessment may be 
conducted, and the duration thereof and by whom they are conducted. 
The assessment aims to test the general ability of the accused to follow the proceedings 
                                                
187  Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 91 where reference is made to circuit court 
decisions where the constitutional standard for fitness was interpreted in a way that supports a 
higher degree of fitness requirement where accused persons intend to represent themselves.  See 
also Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 1034 where case law is 
discussed that supports the view that the standard is the same for fitness as for competency to take 
the decision to waive the right to counsel or to plead guilty.  See in general the case of Godinez v 
Moran 509 U. S 389 (1993).  (Hereinafter referred to as the “Godinez case”). 
188  See in general the Godinez case.  Also see Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 91.  
Also see Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 160, 161 where the Godinez 
case is discussed where the argument was raised that a higher standard of competency is required 
to plead guilty or to waive counsel than for fitness to stand trial.  This argument was ultimately 
rejected by the court, although the court acknowledged that there are differences in the assessments 
for these various types of competencies.  Also see Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental 
Health System at 1056, 1057. 
189  Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 91.  Resultantly differences apply across 
jurisdiction with regard to due process to follow with regard to establishing fitness to stand trial on the 
one hand and fitness to waive legal representation or to plead guilty on the other.  See this source at 
95-97 for a discussion of the position in the various states within the United States of America. 
190  Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 151. 
191  Slovenko Psychiatry in Law / Law in Psychiatry at 172.  Some states such as New Jersey and 
Florida refined the meaning of competency for purposes of fitness hearings in their particular state 




rather than the competence of the accused to take a particular procedural decision, such as 
waiving his right to legal representation.192  The assessment focuses on the actual capacity 
rather than on the willingness of the accused to demonstrate his ability to follow the 
proceedings and communicate with his legal representative.193 
The assessment pertains to the current mental state of the accused and is, therefore, 
“forward-looking” as opposed to “backwards-looking”, as is the case with assessment for 
criminal capacity, which concerns itself with the mental state of the accused at the time of 
the commission of the alleged offence.194  Information disclosed by an accused during a 
mental health assessment is inadmissible in subsequent proceedings pertaining to the 
question of guilt.195 
Some argue that a prediction of the accused’s future capabilities is irrelevant in 
investigating his current fitness to stand trial.196  Slovenko,197 however, opines that the true 
question pertaining to triability and where the diagnosis is truly relevant is in determining 
the restorability of the accused’s mental state that pertains to future capabilities.  Triability, 
he argues, can be achieved by educating the accused or managing his anxiety with 
medication.   
The fitness status of an accused, which is treated with medication, may change over time 
                                                
192  Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 92.  This is in line with the decision in the Dusky 
case and the later judgment in the Godinez case.  Some states however still focus the assessments 
on the competence of the accused to take the particular decision, such as the decision to plead 
guilty or waive legal representation, rather than on the general competence of the accused to follow 
the proceedings. 
193  Slate, Buffington-Vollum and Johnson Criminalization of Mental Illness at 303.  Also see Slobogin, 
Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 1007. 
194  Slovenko Psychiatry in Law / Law in Psychiatry at 171.  Also see Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals 
of Forensic Practice at 153.  See further Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health 
System at 1007 where it is clarified that the assessment will therefore look at the accused’s present 
ability to consult with counsel and to understand the proceedings.  The authors are of the view that a 
prediction of the accused’s future behaviour is not relevant for purposes of this assessment, 
although it may become relevant if the accused’s ability to testify for example or to display 
appropriate courtroom behaviour throughout the trial will impact on his right to a fair trial.  Also see 
Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 510. 
195  Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 86.  Except in certain limited circumstances 
where it may be used to rebut evidence relating to a mental state defence.  Also see Marks et al 
New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 549.  See further section 730.20(6) of the New York CPL.  
Also see Seigal http://ybseigel.tripod.com/cpl730.pdf  (Date of use:  23 January 2016) at 1. 
196  Slate, Buffington-Vollum and Johnson Criminalization of Mental Illness at 303.  See, however,   
Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 1008 where the ability of the 
accused to testify and display appropriate courtroom behaviour throughout the trial are future 
considerations that may impact on the accused’s right to a fair trial if he is found fit to stand trial 
knowing that he may encounter difficulties in these areas during the trial. 
197  Slovenko Psychiatry in Law / Law in Psychiatry at 181. 
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due to the effect of the medication.198  Regular and or abrupt changes in medication causes 
trauma and could cause long-term negative effects to the mental stability of an accused.199  
The condition of an accused with mental retardation is more static as the condition will not 
improve with treatment and is permanent.200    
Assessments are done by way of psychological testing, which includes intelligence testing, 
combined with a neurological examination and a clinical interview.201  The objective of the 
interview is, inter alia, to diagnose the accused since a diagnosis sets the parameters for 
the interview and assessment.202  The accused’s abilities are evaluated in line with the 
                                                
198  Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 103. 
199  Rich 2009 Fordham Urban Law Journal 89 at 102.  When inmates are transferred from prison to jail 
or between prisons, their medication is often discontinued, even if just temporarily or changed as 
each correctional facility have their own rules regarding medication provision, subject to budgetary 
constraints and policy regulations.  Also see Lerner-Wren 2010 Annals Health L 577 at 581 who 
confirms that medication is the most common form of treatment for those suffering from mental 
illness in the criminal justice system.  Even so, this form of treatment is only provided to one in three 
state prisoners, one in four federal prisoners and one in six jail inmates. 
200  Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 103.  Unique methods have developed to assess 
the fitness of an accused with mental retardation.  One such technique is the CAST-MR technique 
(Competence Assessment for Standing Trial for Defendants with Mental Retardation).  See this 
source at 269 where it is stated that the theoretical focus of an assessment for mental retardation 
should be a developmental one.  Specialised training is required to employ these assessment 
techniques on persons with mental retardation.  Forensic professionals have mostly gained the 
knowledge and experience to assess mental retardation for purposes of fitness to stand trial.  A court 
found that a state psychologist lacks the “experience and familiarity” to properly assess an accused 
with mental retardation for fitness.  See New Jersey v M.J K 849 A.2nd 1105 (N.J Super Ci.  App. Div. 
2004).  Also see Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 543 who explains that an 
accused with mental retardation will, however, not necessarily be regarded as unfit to stand trial.  
According to Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 116 some states allow judges to find 
an accused with mental retardation, whose mental condition is irreversible, permanently unfit without 
them having to undergo further evaluations. 
201  Psychological tests essentially aim to measure the behaviour of the person being assessed against 
that of persons in a similar group.  Such tests provide useful information on the accused’s cognitive 
functioning and can provide a more detailed analysis of the accused’s mental state than a clinical 
interview done in isolation from other methods of assessment.  The neurological testing tests the 
reflexes, sensory perception and motor abilities and can detect medical conditions that influence the 
overall mental condition of the person being assessed.  See Parry Criminal Mental Health and 
Disability Law at 285.  The interview entails taking down the history of the accused and a mental 
status examination.  The history taken includes information about the development of the accused 
and the aim is to determine when certain conditions or behaviour started to emerge.  The 
employment history and mental health treatment history is also obtained.  The information gathered 
in the interview is subjective from the perspective of the person being assessed and concern has 
been voiced about this aspect of the clinical interview.  Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability 
Law at 285, 286.  Also see Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 168, 169 
where the goal of an interview with the accused is discussed.  One such goal is to diagnose the 
accused which diagnosis gives structure to the clinical assessment that the forensic professional has 
to do. 
202  Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 11, 168, 169.  Another goal with the 
interview is to determine the response style of the accused that could indicate malingering.  The 
authors caution however that, some accused persons with mental illness may choose to limit their 
exposure to mental health practitioners hoping to “hide” a current episode for example.  Malingering 
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prongs identified in the Dusky case.203  The forensic mental health practitioner examines 
the ability of the accused to communicate, make decisions, and establish relationships.204  
These interviews are generally regarded as very reliable.205  The clinical assessment tools 
to assess fitness may vary depending on the mental state of the accused.206 
Assessments for fitness to stand trial were historically conducted at hospitals over lengthy 
periods.207  Today, however, fitness assessments may take place on an inpatient or 
outpatient basis.208  Recently, assessments have been taking place on an outpatient 
basis.209  The New York CPL specifically provides for outpatient assessments where the 
director is of the opinion that admission to hospital is not essential for purposes of the 
assessment.210  Assessments can be conducted at the correctional facility where the 
                                                                                                                                                   
should be validated by concrete evidence rather than deduced from “oddities” in the accused’s 
clinical presentation.  Also see Slovenko Psychiatry in Law / Law in Psychiatry at 174 who points out 
that before proper models for assessment of triability was employed, the court was mainly interested 
to determine the dangerousness of the accused as that would determine if detention was required. 
203  Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 169.  The accused is also assessed 
through methods that comprise of personality profiling, cognitive ability testing and detection of 
malingering.  See Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 285. 
204  Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 288 who explain that during the interview, the 
mental status of the accused is assessed by considering inter alia, general appearance, mood and 
responsiveness, quality and quantity of speech, clarity of thinking, alertness and concentration and 
impulse control.  Also see Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 168. 
205  Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 11.  The reliability of unstructured 
interviews is questionable as it was found that misdiagnosis occurs about 50% of the time where 
unstructured interviews are used.  A number of structured interview techniques could be employed.  
See Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 287 for a list of structured interview 
techniques that may be used.  Also see Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 
168 who point out that many forensic mental health practitioners prefer to gather some background 
information on an accused referred for assessment but cautions against such background check as 
the psychiatric history of the accused might be irrelevant to the current referral.  The gathering of 
such background information may raise ethical and privacy concerns as well. 
206  Shea 2013 Public Defence Backup Centre Report 8 at 9 where the standardised test for fitness 
utilised for persons with mental retardation is discussed. 
207  Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 1019. 
208  The New York CPL at 730.20(2) provides for outpatient care and states, ”2.When the defendant is 
not in custody at the time a court issues an order of examination, because he was theretofore 
released on bail or on his own recognizance, the court may direct that the examination be conducted 
on an outpatient basis and at such time and place as the director shall designate.   If, however, the 
director informs the court that hospital confinement of the defendant is necessary for an effective 
examination, the court may direct that the defendant be confined in a hospital designated by the 
director until the examination is completed.”  Section 730.20(3) provides for the assessment to be 
conducted at the correctional facility if the accused is still in custody and states, ” When the 
defendant is in custody at the time a court issues an order of examination, the examination must be 
conducted at the place where the defendant is being held in custody.  If, however, the director 
determines that hospital confinement of the defendant is necessary for an effective examination, the 
sheriff must deliver the defendant to a hospital designated by the director and hold him in custody 
therein, under sufficient guard, until the examination is completed”. 
209  Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 1019.  Also see Seigal 
http://ybseigel.tripod.com/cpl730.pdf  (Date of use:  23 January 2016) at 1. 
210  See section 730.20(3) of the New York CPL.  Also see Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal 
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accused is detained.211 If the accused is out on bail, for example, the assessment is 
conducted at a local clinic unless the director is of the opinion that the accused must be 
admitted to the hospital for purposes of the examination.212  Conducting fitness 
assessments at community clinics on an outpatient basis may eliminate the tactical use of 
fitness assessments as delaying tactics since such assessments will be conducted much 
faster than those done in psychiatric hospitals will.213     
The court may, however, order that an accused be admitted to a psychiatric hospital for the 
fitness assessment to be conducted on an inpatient basis.214  Such an assessment shall 
last for no longer than 30-days 215 with the option to extend the period by a further 30-
days.216  This period is earmarked for the initial determination of fitness and a prediction of 
the possibility of restoration of fitness.217 
Fitness assessments are conducted by two mental health care professionals.218  The 
                                                                                                                                                   
Procedure at 523. 
211  Shea 2013 Public Defence Backup Centre Report 8 at 9. 
212  Section 730.20(2) of the New York CPL.  Also see Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental 
Health System at 1019.  See further Seigal http://ybseigel.tripod.com/cpl730.pdf  (Date of use:  23 
January 2016) at 1. 
213  Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 1021 where research results show 
that a fitness assessment conducted in a short period of time is likely to reach the same conclusion 
as a fitness assessment conducted over a long period of time in a psychiatric hospital.  For this 
reason, outpatient fitness assessments are promoted.  Also see Slovenko Psychiatry in Law / Law in 
Psychiatry at 182 who points out that on-site assessments of accused persons detained in a 
correctional facility is promoted as it would avoid long periods of detention for the mentally ill 
accused all together and would result in ultimate cost saving. 
214  Section 730.20(3) of the New York CPL.  Also see Seigal http://ybseigel.tripod.com/cpl730.pdf  (Date 
of use:  23 January 2016) at 1.  This would be the situation where the accused is out on bail but the 
needs to be assessed on an inpatient basis (see section 730.20(2) of the New York CPL) or where 
the accused is detained in a correctional facility the court is of the view that assessment cannot be 
conducted on site at the facility but that hospitalisation is required for the assessment - see section 
730.20(3) of the New York CPL. 
215  Section 730.20(4) of the New York CPL states:  “Hospital confinement under subdivisions two and 
three shall be for a period not exceeding thirty days, except that, upon application of the director, the 
court may authorize confinement for an additional period not exceeding thirty days if it is satisfied 
that a longer period is necessary to complete the examination.  During the period  of  hospital  
confinement,  the  physician in charge of the hospital may administer or cause to be administered to 
the defendant  such  emergency  psychiatric, medical  or  other  therapeutic  treatment  as in his 
judgment should be administered.” 
216  Section 730.20(4) of the CPL.  Also see Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 523, 
524.  See further Seigal http://ybseigel.tripod.com/cpl730.pdf  (Date of use:  23 January 2016) at 1. 
217  Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 115. 
218  Section 730.20(1) of the CPL refers to the assessors as “psychiatric examiners”.  Also see Seigal 
http://ybseigel.tripod.com/cpl730.pdf  (Date of use:  23 January 2016) at 1 who confirms that two 
psychiatric examiners must be appointed by the director of the relevant facility to conduct the 
assessment.  The director may designate himself as one of the psychiatric examiners conducts the 
assessment.  Also see Shea 2013 Public Defence Backup Centre Report 8 at 9 who explains that 




capabilities of psychologists to conduct forensic assessments were acknowledged by the 
courts in 1962 219 and legislated in the late 1980’s.220  The New York CPL specifically 
authorise both psychiatrists and psychologist to conduct assessments for fitness to stand 
trial in the state of New York.221  The court may further order that a mental health 
practitioner of the accused’s choice is also present at the fitness assessment.222 
An accused who refuses to co-operate with the mental health examiners may forfeit his 
right to a competency hearing.223   
Mental health care practitioners who conducted a fitness assessment of the accused must 
                                                
219  This was acknowledged in the case of Jenkins v United States 307 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1962).  The 
court held that the competency of a psychologist to assist the court with an assessment as to if an 
accused suffers from a mental illness, does not depend on whether the person can be called a 
psychologist.  It rather depends on the question if he completed the relevant course offered on 
forensic psychology and if he has the appropriate practical experience that followed after completion 
of such a course.  If so, there is no reason to exclude the expert opinion of psychologists pertaining 
to whether an accused suffers from a mental illness or not.  (see the Jenkins case at 645).  Even 
though the United States government has invested generously in the development of psychiatrists 
and psychologists, these professional services are not available to those in most need thereof.  In 
1990, there were 200 000.00 psychologists, psychiatrists and psychiatric social workers in the United 
States of America.  The majority of these professionals are however concentrated in affluent areas 
where there is approximately 1 psychiatrist for every 250 citizens.  In less affluent areas such as 
Jersey City, there is only 1 psychiatrist for every 13 000.00 residents.  See Torrey et al Criminalizing 
the Seriously Mentally Ill at 52.  Also see Torrey EF Nowhere to Go:  The Tragic Odyssey of the 
Homeless Mentally Ill (Harper and Row New York 1988) at 4. 
220  See Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 521, 522 for details of the relevant 
legislation.  Prior to this statute, only psychiatrists could conduct assessments with the exception of 
cases where it was believed that the accused was mentally “defective” rather than “mentally ill”. 
221  Some other health care professionals are also sometimes permitted to conduct these assessments.  
Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 85.  Also see this source at 269-273 for the 
different theoretical approaches that mental health professionals might employ depending on their 
training.  The focus areas may include cognitive behavioural, biological, development (especially 
important when assessing persons with mental retardation) and psychodynamic.  Also see Marks et 
al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 521.  Section 730.20(1) of the New York CPL indicates 
that psychiatrists and psychologists may be used for these assessments and states, ”The 
appropriate director to whom a criminal court issues an order of examination must be determined in 
accordance with rules jointly adopted by the judicial conference and the commissioner.  Upon receipt 
of an examination order, the director must designate two qualified psychiatric examiners, of whom he 
may be one, to examine the defendant to determine if he is an incapacitated person.  In conducting 
their examination, the psychiatric examiners may employ any method that is accepted by the 
medical profession for the examination of persons alleged to be mentally ill or mentally defective.  
The court may authorize a psychiatrist or psychologist retained by the defendant to be present at 
such examination.”  Also see Seigal http://ybseigel.tripod.com/cpl730.pdf  (Date of use:  23 January 
2016) at 1 who point out that in New York under the CPL, psychologists and psychiatrists are used 
for assessments.  Also see Shea 2013 Public Defence Backup Centre Report 8 at 9. 
222  Section 730.20(1) of the New York CPL.  Also see Shea 2013 Public Defence Backup Centre Report 
8 at 9. 
223  See Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 545 at footnote 23 and 24 where cases are 
mentioned where the accused forfeited his right to a competency hearing because of repeated 
refusal to co-operate with the mental health examiners.  This approach by the courts is criticised for 
the fact that such refusal could possibly be a by-product of a mental illness.    
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draft a report containing their findings, which is submitted to court.224  If the experts that 
assessed the accused are in disagreement, a third mental health professional must be 
appointed to conduct an assessment and file a report. 225  The reports must be provided to 
the defendant and the district attorney.226  Even though it is accepted that courts and not 
mental health practitioners are the final decision-makers on competency issues, courts tend 
to follow the recommendations contained in these reports,227 hence many states make 
                                                
224  Section 730.20(5) compels the filing of reports by the psychiatric examiners to the director of the 
relevant facility.  Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 524 who explains that specific 
forms have been developed for the experts to submit their opinions to the court.  The forms provide 
for a declaration by the psychologist /psychiatrist that they are properly qualified and duly registered 
as such and provide a space to indicate the diagnosis and the prognosis of the accused.  The 
psychologist / Psychiatrist is expected to indicate whether in their opinion the accused is competent 
to stand trial or not.  They are further required to specify the aspects of the proceedings in respect 
whereof the accused lacks capacity.  The order for an assessment is done with a form 16(a) and the 
report is contained in a form 16(b).  See Annexure C to this research for an example of the form 
used for the assessment order.  Also see section 730.10(8) of the New York CPL which reads as 
follows:  “8. "Examination report" means a report made by a psychiatric  examiner  wherein  he  sets 
forth his opinion as to whether the defendant is or is not an incapacitated person, the nature and 
extent of his examination and, if he finds that the defendant is an incapacitated person, his diagnosis 
and prognosis and a detailed statement of the reasons for his opinion by making particular reference 
to those aspects of the proceedings wherein the defendant lacks capacity to understand or to assist 
in his own defense.” 
225  Section 730.20(5) of the New York CPL.  The section reads as follows:  “Each psychiatric examiner, 
after he has completed his examination of the defendant, must promptly prepare an examination 
report and submit it to the director.  If the psychiatric examiners are not unanimous in their opinion as 
to whether the defendant is or is not an incapacitated person, the director must designate another 
qualified psychiatric examiner to examine the defendant to determine if he is an incapacitated 
person.  Upon receipt of the examination reports, the director must submit them to the court that 
issued the order of examination.  The court must furnish a copy of the reports to counsel for the 
defendant and to the district attorney”.  Also see Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 
522.  Also see Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 1019.  See further 
Seigal http://ybseigel.tripod.com/cpl730.pdf  (Date of use:  23 January 2016) at 1 who explains that 
the reports are first submitted to the director who then appoints a third psychiatrist if the initial two 
reports are note unanimous.  Only once all the reports are received are they submitted to the court.  
Also see Shea 2013 Public Defence Backup Centre Report 8 at 10 where the appointment of a third 
mental health practitioner in the event that there is a disagreement pertaining to fitness between the 
first two mental health practitioners so appointed, is confirmed. 
226  Section 730.20(5) of the New York CPL.    
227  Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 1019 where studies conducted at 
various courts are discussed and it is concluded that the majority of the courts follow the 
recommendations in the reports.  These studies also found that actual hearings to determine the 
fitness of the accused were rarely held and where they were held, they were very informal.  Parry 
Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 273 explains that the conclusions that mental health 
practitioners reach after assessment, are often confusing because of the terminology used by them.  
Also, terms such as illness, disorder and disability are often used interchangeably, creating 
interpretation problems for the court.  Courts on the other hand, are also not consistent in the use of 
descriptive terminology and often use words such as mental illness, mental retardation and disability 
and handicap interchangeably.  The author makes reference to case law and statues about mental 
illness that do not employ the same terminology as far as mental health issues are concerned.  
Tension may exist between the roles of mental health professionals and the rules of the law 
particularly because the law aims to work with definitive standards whereas psychology and 
psychiatry are used to working with ambiguity, unpredictabilities and variety.  See this source at 292 
where it is explained that mental health practitioners may further feel the subtle pressure to testify in 
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provision for a finding on fitness to be made based on this report only, unless any party to 
the proceedings objects thereto.228   
                                                                                                                                                   
favour of the “side” that recruited them to conduct the assessment of the accused.  This pressure 
has to be managed.  See further Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice.at 10 
where differences in approach of mental health practitioners to human behaviour versus the 
approach of lawyers are highlighted.  The law assumes that it is appropriate to hold individuals 
accountable for their actions whereas psychology and psychiatry follows a more individual approach 
to behaviour acknowledging that behaviour differs from one person to the next.  Parry Criminal 
Mental Health and Disability Law at 294.  The mental health practitioner might experience conflicts 
between the confidentiality rules that apply in a normal therapeutic relationship with his patient, 
versus those that apply in a forensic setting.  The mental health practitioner may have difficulty 
marrying the dual liability that he faces towards his patient on the one hand and the court on the 
other.  Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 15 who point out that there is 
often a gap between the theoretical research in forensic psychology and practice because mental 
health practitioners struggle to stay up the date with developments and, in addition, acceptance of 
new methods are slow as practitioners tend to continue with methods which has been tried and 
tested.  See Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 57-81 for a detailed 
discussion on the nature of the mental health profession and the expert testimony given by them. 
228  Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 1019.  This is the case in 24 of the 
states.  This is also the position in the state of New York.  Often, these reports are the only 
information that the court has on the mental state of the accused   See in general Marks et al New 
York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 522.  In the state of New York, where the mental health 
practitioners agree on the competency or incompetency of the accused to proceed to trial and where 
these findings are not contested by either party to the proceedings, the court may accept these 
findings without holding a hearing on the fitness issue.  Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal 
Procedure at 525, 526.  Also see section 730.50(1) of the New York CPL which states that: “When a 
superior court, following a hearing conducted pursuant to subdivision three or four of section  730.30  
of  this  article,  is satisfied  that  the  defendant  is not an incapacitated  person, the criminal action 
against him or her must proceed.  If it is satisfied that the defendant is an incapacitated person, or if 
no motion for such a hearing is made, it must adjudicate him or her an incapacitated person, and 
must issue a final order of observation or an order of commitment.  When the indictment does not 
charge a felony or when the defendant has been convicted of an offense other than a felony, such 
court  (a)  must issue a final order of observation committing the defendant to the custody of the 
commissioner for care and treatment in an appropriate institution for a period not to exceed ninety 
days from the date of such order,  provided,  however,  that  the  commissioner  may  designate an 
appropriate hospital for placement of a defendant for whom a final order of observation has been 
issued, where such hospital is licensed  by  the office of  mental health and has agreed to accept, 
upon referral by the commissioner, defendants subject to final orders of  observation  issued  under  
this  subdivision,  and  (b) must dismiss the indictment filed in such court against the defendant, and 
such dismissal constitutes a bar to any further  prosecution of the charge or charges contained in 
such indictment… When the indictment charges a felony or when the defendant has been convicted 
of a felony, it must issue an order of commitment committing the defendant to the custody of the 
commissioner for care and treatment in an appropriate institution or, upon the consent of the district 
attorney, committing him or her to the custody of the commissioner for care and treatment on an 
outpatient basis, for a period not to exceed one year from the date of such order.  Upon the issuance 
of an order of commitment, the court must exonerate the defendant's bail if he or she was previously 
at liberty on bail; provided, however, that exoneration of  bail  is  not  required when a defendant is 
committed to the custody of the commissioner for care and  treatment on an outpatient basis.  When 
the defendant is in the custody of the commissioner pursuant to a final order of observation, the 
commissioner or his or her designee, which may include the director of an appropriate institution, 
immediately upon the discharge of the defendant, must certify to such court that he or she has 
complied with the notice provisions set forth in paragraph (a) of subdivision six of section 730.60 of 
this article.  Also see Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 1019.  Often, 
these reports are the only information that the court has on the mental state of the accused. 
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Where the findings are not unanimous or are contested, or the court deems it necessary, 
then a hearing on the fitness issue must be held.229  The accused has a right to be present 
at such a hearing, and either party may call witnesses.230  This hearing takes place in open 
court.231    
If, after this hearing, the court finds that the accused is fit to stand trial, the criminal trial 
continues as per usual.232  These persons may also be diverted to the Mental Health Court, 
as discussed later in this chapter. 
If, after the competency hearing, the court is unable to conclude that the accused is fit to 
stand trial, a new order for assessment (examination) for fitness to stand trial is issued, and 
new mental health practitioners must be appointed for this purpose.233 
Where the court concludes that an accused is unfit to stand trial, such finding holds certain 
personal and procedural consequences for the accused.  Some of these are set out below. 
4.6 Personal and procedural consequences of finding of unfit to stand trial  
Generally, the guilt phase of the criminal proceedings is suspended once an accused is 
found unfit to stand trial.234  The prosecution can agree to withdraw the charges against an 
unfit accused, especially where he is charged with a minor transgression, on the condition 
that the accused undergoes mental health treatment as an in or outpatient.235   
                                                
229  Section 730.30(4) of the New York CPL which states that:  “When the examination reports submitted 
to the court show that the psychiatric examiners are not unanimous in their opinion as to whether the 
defendant is or is not an incapacitated person, or when the examination reports submitted to the 
superior court show that the psychiatric examiners are not unanimous in their opinion as to whether 
the defendant is or is not a dangerous incapacitated person, the court must conduct a hearing to 
determine the issue of capacity or dangerousness.”  Also see Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal 
Procedure at 525, 527.  Also see Section 730.30(2) of the New York CPL that deals with the 
scenario where the accused was found fit to stand trial but where this finding is contested by either 
party.  Also see Seigal http://ybseigel.tripod.com/cpl730.pdf  (Date of use:  23 January 2016) at 2. 
230  Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 540. 
231  There are circumstances where this will not be the case.  See Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal 
Procedure at 541 at footnote 25 for some examples of cases where this was the case. 
232  Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 525.  Also see Section 730.40(1) of the New 
York CPL.  See further Seigal http://ybseigel.tripod.com/cpl730.pdf  (Date of use:  23 January 2016) 
at 2. 
233  Section 730.30(2).  Also see Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 525. 
234  Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 114.  Also see Marks et al New York Pretrial 
Criminal Procedure at 510 who states that the normal criminal proceedings as such are suspended 
pending the assessment of the fitness issue.  The consequences of a finding of incompetence to 
stand trial may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  See Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of 
Forensic Practice at 156.    
235  Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 114.  Also see Rogers and Shuman 
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Where charges are not withdrawn, the court must make an observation order or an order of 
commitment.236  The purpose of such orders is to return the accused to a state of fitness.237  
The detention orders that the court may make in the event that an accused is found unfit to 
stand trial are discussed below.  
A local criminal court in New York may make a final or temporary order of observation.  
Where the accused is charged with an offence other than a felony and is found incompetent 
to proceed to trial, the court makes a final observation order with the effect that the accused 
is detained in a psychiatric institution for a period not exceeding 90-days.238  The charges 
against this accused are dismissed, and the accused may be discharged from the 
psychiatric institution at any time.239  A local New York court may only make a temporary 
observation order in respect of an accused charged with a felony.240  A temporary 
observation order lasts for no longer than 90-days and does not end the prosecution 
against the accused but merely suspends the charges.241   
The New York Superior Court may make a final observation order or an order of 
commitment.  The Superior Court may, in respect of an accused charged with an offence 
other than a felony and after a hearing on the fitness of the accused, issue a final 
                                                                                                                                                   
Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 156. 
236  Where the charges are not dropped the accused is sent to a public health facility for further 
evaluation and treatment with a view on restoring the accused’s fitness.  Parry Criminal Mental 
Health and Disability Law at 114.  Also see Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health 
System at 1031 where it is pointed out that there is no uniformity across states pertaining to when 
charges should be dropped.  Where charges are indeed dropped, it is often done without prejudice.  
This time period of treatment with the view on restoring the accused’s fitness is similar to the “get fit” 
order provided for in the Canadian system where such an order can be made for a period of 60 days 
to provide treatment to the accused to become fit to stand trial.  If he regains fitness in that time the 
criminal proceedings may resume.  See chapter 4 of this research for a discussion of this order. 
237  Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 113.  Also see Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law 
and the Mental Health System at 1020.  See further Albanese Criminal Justice at 98. 
238  Section 730.40(1) and 730.60(1) of the New York CPL.  Also see Marks et al New York Pretrial 
Criminal Procedure at 526, 527, 531.  Also see Seigal http://ybseigel.tripod.com/cpl730.pdf  (Date of 
use:  23 January 2016) at 2.  See further Shea 2013 Public Defence Backup Centre Report 8 at 10. 
239  Section 730.60(3) and 730.40(2) of the New York CPL.  Also see Marks et al New York Pretrial 
Criminal Procedure at 531. 
240  Section 730.40(1) and (2) of the New York CPL.  Also see Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal 
Procedure at 531.  Also see Seigal http://ybseigel.tripod.com/cpl730.pdf  (Date of use:  23 January 
2016) at 2 where it is pointed out further that this local court may make a final observation order in 
this instance with consent from the District Attorney.  Also see Shea 2013 Public Defence Backup 
Centre Report 8 at 10. 
241  Section 730.60(2) of the New York CPL.  Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 531.  
The effect of the temporary order of observation made by the local court is the same as a 
commitment order made by the superior court.  Also see Seigal http://ybseigel.tripod.com/cpl730.pdf  
(Date of use:  23 January 2016) at 2 who explains that charges may be dropped after the expiration 
of the temporary observation order once it has expired and the accused is still under care. 
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observation order, lasting for no longer than 90-days.242   Where the accused is charged 
with a felony, the Superior Court must issue a commitment order that shall not last for more 
than one year.243  The charges against the accused must be dismissed.244  Treatment 
aimed at restoring the accused to a state of fitness can be done on an inpatient or 
outpatient basis.245   
The automatic 90-day detention period that follows a temporary and final observation order 
was challenged in court in the case of Ritter v Surles.246  The 90-day period was struck 
down in this case.  The CPL has not been amended subsequent to this judgment, but the 
relevant authority implemented a policy in terms whereof an accused remanded by the 
court on a final or temporary observation order must be released within 72-hours if that 
accused does not meet the admission requirements for a voluntary or involuntary user in 
terms of Mental Hygiene Law which is the relevant mental health legislation in this case.247 
Procedures are put in place in the event that the accused does not regain fitness after the 
temporary observation order period or after the initial order of commitment.  The court must 
be informed within 60-days from the expiration of the initial detention period if the accused 
has regained his fitness or not.  If the opinion of the superintendent is that the accused is 
still incompetent, an order for retention is granted for a further period of one year.248  If, after 
this second retention period, the accused is still incompetent, further retention orders may 
be granted for up to two years at a time.249  The total time of commitment may not exceed 
two-thirds of the maximum sentence that an accused charged with the particular felony 
would have served if found guilty.250  Upon expiration of this two-thirds period, the charges 
                                                
242  Section 730.50(1) of the New York CPL.  Also see Seigal http://ybseigel.tripod.com/cpl730.pdf  (Date 
of use:  23 January 2016) at 2. 
243  Section 730.50(1) of the New York CPL.  Also see Seigal http://ybseigel.tripod.com/cpl730.pdf  (Date 
of use:  23 January 2016) at 2.  Also see Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 525, 
526. 
244  Section 730.50(1) of the New York CPL.  Also see Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure 
at 526.  Also see section 730.60(2) of the New York CPL. 
245  Section 730.50 of the New York CPL.  Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health System 
at 1020.  Also see Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 113.  See further Albanese 
Criminal Justice at 98. 
246  144 Misc.2d 945 (1988). 
247  See Shea 2013 Public Defence Backup Centre Report 8 at 10, 11. 
248  Section 730.50(2) of the New York CPL.  Also see Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure 
at 525, 527.  Also see section 730.50(3) of the New York CPL.  Also see Seigal 
http://ybseigel.tripod.com/cpl730.pdf  (Date of use:  23 January 2016) at 2.  The application for a 
retention order is brought by the superintendent of the facility where the accused receives treatment. 
249  Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 525, 527.  Also see section 730.50(3) of the 
New York CPL. See further Section 730.50(5) of the New York CPL.  Also see Seigal 
http://ybseigel.tripod.com/cpl730.pdf  (Date of use:  23 January 2016) at 2. 
250  Section 730.50(3) of the New York CPL.  Also see Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure 
  
354 
against the accused must be dropped.251 
An accused found incompetent by a federal court can be detained for up to four months in 
an attempt to restore fitness.252  It has been suggested that an accused found unfit to stand 
trial should not be detained for a period longer than six months, and if competence is not 
restored within this time, it is accepted as unlikely that it will be restored at all.253  Some are 
of the view that a mentally ill accused can regain fitness within as little as 90-days with the 
use of medication.254 
The US Supreme Court held in 1972 in the case of Jackson v Indiana 255 that there must be 
a time limit on an accused’s detention for these purposes.  In this case, a deaf-mute man 
who was unable to speak, write, or communicate intelligently was charged with robbery.  
During the trial, it transpired that there was almost no possibility of the accused “recovering” 
to a state where he would be able to understand the proceedings and was consequently 
detained for incompetence.  The Court held that indefinite detention is not allowed and that, 
where an accused is detained with the hope that he will become fit to stand trial, such 
detention must be justified by improvement of the accused towards such a state.256   
Before the United States Supreme Court’s decision in the Jackson case, 257 a finding of 
                                                                                                                                                   
at 525, 527. 
251  Shea 2013 Public Defence Backup Centre Report 8 at 11. 
252  Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 156.  See the statutory requirement in 
this regard contained in  18 U.S.C.A. § 4241, 2003 which states that: 
 “whether there is a substantial probability that in the foreseeable future he will attain the capacity to 
permit the trial to proceed” and thereafter “for an additional reasonable period of time until— 
 (A) his mental condition is so improved that trial may proceed, if the court finds that there is a 
substantial probability that within such additional period of time he will attain the capacity to permit 
the trial to proceed; or  
 (B) the pending charges against him are disposed of according to law; whichever is earlier.” 
253  Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 1031.  An opinion is discussed here 
that explains that after the 6 month period, the accused detained for incompetence should either 
have restored competence, or it will be clear that such a person suffers from mental retardation or 
brain damages that will not be “cured”.  Such a person will need further treatment in a different 
setting.  Where there are still cases where fitness is doubtful, a further detention period of up to 6 
months is suggested to determine in which of these two categories such a person falls. 
254  Slovenko Psychiatry in Law / Law in Psychiatry at 182.  See chapter 4 of this research for a 
discussion of the position in Canada where the “get fit” order is made for a period of 60 days 
implying that there is a belief that fitness can be restored within 60 days. 
255  Jackson v Indiana 406 US 715 (1972) (Hereinafter referred to as the “Jackson case”). 
256  The Jackson case at 738.  Also see Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 
932.  Also see this source at 1027, 1028 for a discussion of the case.  See further Marks et al New 
York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 543 where it is stated that a person that is deaf will not 
necessarily be deemed unfit to stand trial but if it is clear that such a person will not understand the 
proceedings, however, he cannot be tried. 
257  406 U. S 715 (1972).  The accused was charged with petty theft and suffered from mental 
retardation coupled with deafness and muteness.  The accused was found unfit and detained in a 
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unfitness often resulted in long periods of commitment to secure psychiatric facilities where 
the focus was not purely on treatment and restoration.258  The court found in the Jackson 
case that the accused could not be held for longer than is necessary to determine if there is 
a chance of reasonable recovery in the near future.259  Where this is not the aim of the 
detention, the accused must be released, or the proceedings for civil commitment should 
be started.260  Subsequent to the case, two types of dispositions were made in respect of 
unfit accused persons.  They were either committed in order for their fitness to be restored 
or released if restoration seemed unlikely.261    
Some states implemented legislation in line with the Jackson principle that provides for a 
period of detention to regain fitness to range from anything between 20-days and a year.262  
Other states have yet to implement such limitations.263  A practice of periodic review of an 
accused’s mental state after a period of 90-days exists in approximately a third of the 
states.  Some states do periodic reviews annually.264  Most states do not address the 
periodic review of unfit accused persons in statutes, but a formal procedure exists for the 
facility where the accused was treated to inform the court that the accused has regained 
fitness.265 
An accused who remains unfit may not be detained indefinitely, but proceedings to detain 
such person in accordance with civil commitment rules must be instituted as soon as it is 
                                                                                                                                                   
psychiatric institution indefinitely.  Also see Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice 
at 156. 
258  Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 114. 
259  Jackson v Indiana 406 U. S 715 (1972) at 738.  Also see Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the 
Mental Health System at 1020, 1029.  See further Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure 
at 528. 
260  Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 115.  Also see Rogers and Shuman 
Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 156 for a discussion of the case.  See further Slobogin, Rai 
and Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 1028, 1029. 
261  Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 113, 115. 
262  Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 115 where reference is made to the specific 
pieces of legislation in selected states that incorporated provisions for guidance on the maximum 
time allowed keeping an accused for evaluation for purposes of regaining fitness to stand trial.  The 
period that applies in most states is a period of between 6 months and a year – especially to 
determine restoration of fitness.  (see this source at 116).  Some states merely indicate a maximum 
period of detention.  Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 1030.  Some 
states required the immediate civil commitment of an accused person found unfit to stand trial whilst 
others limited the time for commitment of 18 months.  Also see Marks et al New York Pretrial 
Criminal Procedure at 528 for the position in New York where limitations have been implemented in 
accordance with the Jackson ruling. 
263  Slovenko Psychiatry in Law / Law in Psychiatry at 174.  Also see Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and 
the Mental Health System at 1031 where it is stated that the majority of the states have not 
implemented the Jackson provisions or found some way to circumvent it. 
264  Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 117. 
265  Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 117. 
  
356 
clear that there is no prospect of the accused ever regaining fitness.266 
Once the accused regains fitness, the district attorney is informed accordingly, and the trial 
may proceed.267  The standards applied to determine if an accused regained fitness are the 
same as those used in the initial assessment of fitness, where the minimum constitutional 
standards as laid down in the Dusky case apply.268  States may, however, impose 
additional requirements to safeguard the rights of the accused during fitness 
assessments.269 
Historically, where an accused regained fitness after treatment, he could only return to 
court if his fitness meant that he did not have to use medication to stay fit.270  Later, it was 
permissible to try an accused whilst on medication.271  An accused, however, had the right 
to refuse medication and could only be forced to take medication where it could be shown 
that it was essential for his health or where he posed a danger to himself or others.272 
                                                
266  Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 528.  This is one interpretation of the Jackson 
judgment, namely that the charges against the accused must not necessarily be dropped but that the 
accused should be detained according to civil commitment rules rather than kept in the criminal 
justice system.  Also see section 730.70 of the New York CPL that states that, if after the retention 
periods or period of committal or temporary observation order the superintendent is of the view that 
the accused is so mentally ill that he requires permanent care in a psychiatric facility, the 
proceedings as provided for in the Mental Hygiene Law, section 31.33 must be followed. 
267  Section 730.60(2) of the New York CPL.  Also see Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure 
at 531, 533 If an indictment is filed during the temporary order for detention, the accused must be 
arraigned in the Superior Court and the temporary order of observation comes to an end.  Also see 
section 730.40(5) of the New York CPL.  Also see Albanese Criminal Justice at 98. 
268  Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 115-116. 
269  Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 152. 
270  Slovenko Psychiatry in Law / Law in Psychiatry at 174.  This was the case where the fitness issue 
was raised by the prosecutor or judge.  An accused who averred that he should not be deemed 
competent to stand trial because he is using psychiatric medication, was rarely successful with such 
an argument.  Also see Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 1033. 
271  Later it was allowed for an accused taking medication for anxiety for example to be tried.  The 
accused person, however, had the right to refuse such medication, especially in cases where it was 
argued that it would affect the “true’ mental state” of the accused who is planning on raising the 
insanity defence to such an extent that the jury might not believe that he truly suffered from a mental 
condition at the time of commission of the offence – because of, for example the calming effect that 
anti-anxiety medication may have on him during the trial.  Slovenko Psychiatry in Law / Law in 
Psychiatry at 176, 177 where a number of cases are discussed where accused persons had to use 
anti-anxiety or anti-psychotic medication for therapeutic purposes but where this impacted on their 
ability to demonstrate at trial that they were indeed incompetent at the time of commission of the 
offence.  Also see Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 1033. 
272  Slovenko Psychiatry in Law / Law in Psychiatry at 178.  A high standard for forced medication is set.  
It has to be shown that the taking of such medication and the side effects thereof will not affect the 
fairness of the trial, that it is the least restrictive way of treatment.  Also see Parry Criminal Mental 
Health and Disability Law at 118.  Also see Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice 
at 156 where all the factors that have to be considered before administering medication to a mentally 
ill accused person against his will, are discussed.  Also see Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the 
Mental Health System at 963-991 for a detailed discussion of the right to refuse psychiatric 
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4.7 Consequence of a finding of fit to stand trial 
Most accused persons that are assessed for fitness are found fit to stand trial, including 
persons with serious mental illnesses such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder and major 
depression.273    
Where the two mental health practitioners agree that the accused is fit to stand trial, and 
such findings are not contested by any party to the proceedings, the criminal trial may 
simply continue.274  The fitness issue may be raised again later in the proceedings if there 
are grounds to believe that the accused is incompetent to proceed.275  
It may happen that a marginally incompetent accused person proceeds to trial after a 
                                                                                                                                                   
treatment, including the taking of anti-psychotic medication against their will.  Those who did find 
themselves institutionalised in Boston in 1975, won a case to confirm that they still have the right to 
refuse treatment, including taking psychiatric medication.  The court in this particular case, confirmed 
that the mere fact that they were institutionalised, does not mean that they are incompetent to take 
decisions regarding their care.  See Frailing K “The genesis of mental health courts in the United 
States and their possible applicability for the United Kingdom” 2008 C.S.L.R 63-73 at 63-65.  The 
court found that the have the same rights to give informed consent as those individuals not suffering 
from a mental illness.  This case came about after it became known that patients treated for mental 
illnesses, are often forced to take antipsychotic medication which caused patients to feel heavily 
sedated and had negative side effects in the long run.  Also see Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and 
the Mental Health System at 963-991 for a detailed discussion on the right to refuse psychiatric 
treatment where the discussion also focusses on those detained after conviction who were initially 
forced to take psychiatric medication against their will. 
273  Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 1020 who explain that studies 
revealed that in approximately 30% of matters, those sent for observation are found fit to stand trial.  
The authors indicate that the number may actually be lower since mental health professionals err on 
the side of caution with findings of fitness.  Concerns have been raised about possible unnecessary 
referrals.  Also see Lurigio and Snowden 2009 The Justice System Journal 196 at 198 who 
specifically mention that persons with serious mental illness do not always meet the incompetence to 
stand trial criteria and are, consequently, found fit to stand trial and sent to prison.  See further Shea 
2013 Public Defence Backup Centre Report 8 at 8 who indicate that, of the 60 000 fitness referrals 
annually, only 12 000 are found unfit to stand trial. 
274  Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 525.  See further Slobogin, Rai and Reisner 
Law and the Mental Health System at 1020.  Also see section 730.30(2) of the New York CPL which 
reads that:   “When the examination reports submitted to the court show that each psychiatric 
examiner is of the opinion that the defendant is not an incapacitated person, the court may, on its 
own motion, conduct a hearing to determine the issue of capacity, and it must conduct a hearing 
upon motion therefor by the defendant or by the district attorney.  If no motion for a hearing is made, 
the criminal action   against the defendant must proceed.  If, following a hearing, the court is satisfied 
that the defendant is not an incapacitated person, the criminal action against him must proceed...”  
Also see section 730.40(1) which reads:  ”1. When a local criminal court, following a hearing 
conducted pursuant to subdivision three or four of section 730.30, is satisfied that the defendant is 
not an incapacitated person, the criminal action against him or her must  proceed...”  Also see 
section 730.50(1) that has the same wording.    
275  Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 517 confirms that fitness is a variable state and 
for this reason the finding of fitness is not final and does not bar further orders for the assessment of 
fitness during the trial. 
  
358 
fitness finding.276  This category of persons is fit to stand trial but mentally ill.277  This is the 
group of accused persons who can be diverted away from the criminal justice system 
towards the Mental Health Court for treatment.  This initiative is discussed later in this 
chapter. 
An accused who was refused a competency hearing and consequently proceeded through 
trial presumed to be competent may appeal against such a finding.278  If it is found that the 
accused should have received a fitness hearing, the appeal court will order that the matter 
returns to the court a quo for a competency hearing.279  If the accused is found to be 
competent, the initial sentence handed down will stand.  If it is found that the accused is 
unfit, he is entitled to a new trial with regard to guilt or innocence unless the accused 
remains unfit, in which case fitness has to be established before the trial may proceed.280  
The appeal court may, however, find that a retrospective competency hearing is not fair, 
mainly due to the lapse of time from the initial trial, which may impact the accused’s right to 
a fair trial.281  In these cases, the conviction must be reversed, and the accused must be 
                                                
276  Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 1026 where a view is expressed 
that this could possibly be viewed as a positive result since a person fount fit to stand trial is not 
subjected to the stigmatisation of a fitness assessment and is spared the delays that is brought 
about by such assessments.  An opinion is also expressed that allowing marginally incompetent 
accused persons to stand trial ensures that the unfitness standard is applied and reserved for those 
with serious mental illnesses.  Also see Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 543 who 
explains that an accused may for example suffer from a mental illness such as depression but may 
be found fit to stand trial. 
277  See Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 543 who explains that an accused with 
depression, or multiple personality disorder, or schizophrenia is not necessarily incompetent to stand 
trial as they may be able to, despite their mental illness, understand the proceedings and be able to 
follow them. 
278  Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 1023 where the possibility is 
discussed that a defence lawyer may decide for strategic reasons not to raise the fitness issue.  The 
view is expressed that it is less costly to the system to manage appeals against cases where the 
fitness issue was not raised at all, rather than to send each and every accused for a fitness 
assessment.  Also see Marks et al New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure at 513, 514 where 
reference is made to various cases and it is indicated that only where the trial judge failed to 
exercise his discretion reasonably, will the appeal against the refusal for a competency hearing 
succeed.  It is further pointed out that the trial judge is really in the best position to determine if there 
is a need for a fitness assessment since he has the benefit of seeing the accused personally, a 
benefit that the trial judge has over the appeal judges.  
279  See the discussion of case law in Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 
1019 where an appeal against a conviction was allowed on the basis that the accused had to be 
found unfit to stand trial based on inter alia the psychiatric report that was submitted to the court. 
280  Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 99.  Also see Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals 
of Forensic Practice at 152 where it is pointed out that failure to address the fitness issue during trial 
is a well-established ground for appeal. 
281  Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 99.  Also see Marks et al New York Pretrial 
Criminal Procedure at 545.  See further in general the case of Pate v Robinson 383 U.S.  375 86 S. 
Ct.  836, 15  L. Ed .  2d 815  (1966). 
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retried, if possible, or released.282 
For the accused person suffering from a mental illness yet deemed fit to stand trial, 
alternatives to traditional prosecution are available in the criminal justice system.  Diversion 
options in the form of Mental Health Courts are explored below. 
5  DIVERSION AWAY FROM THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM  
Some writers are of the view that the criminal defence model where decision-makers in the 
process are often more concerned with the fairness of the process than with the result is 
not conducive to meeting the treatment needs of individuals with mental illness and could 
even be considered anti-therapeutic.283   
Prior to the emergence of problem-solving courts in the mid 1990’s, an accused person with 
mental illness had very little other options than having his case processed through the 
traditional criminal court 284 unless law enforcement exercised their discretion not to arrest 
the mentally ill person.285  
                                                
282  Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 99.  Also see Marks et al New York Pretrial 
Criminal Procedure at 545. 
283 Slate RN “Mental Health Courts” in Mays LG and Gregware PR Court and Justice 3rd ed (Waveland 
Press Inc Long Grove Illinois 2004) at 425.  
284  Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 6.  The court could 
divert an accused into some avenue that the court deemed more suitable or considered alternative 
sentencing but this was not necessarily aimed at mentally ill persons.  See Seltzer T ““Mental health 
courts:  A misguided attempt to address the criminal justice system’s unfair treatment of people with 
mental illnesses” 2005 (11) Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570-586 at 584.  Also see Albanese 
Criminal Justice at 261. 
285  Police decide not to file charges in between 10 and 15% of misdemeanour charges and decide not 
to continue with felony cases in between 30 and 50% of the time.  See Burnham Introduction to the 
Law and Legal System of the United States at 270.  In apprehending a mentally ill individual, the 
Police has a discretion as to if the individual will be arrested, or taken to hospital or an emergency 
room for treatment.  See Lamberti and Weisman 2004 Psychiatr Q 151 at 153.  Also see Rossman 
et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 7.  The limits of this discretion 
are contained in the particular laws of the state.  A police officer responding to a domestic violence 
incident in the state of New York for example is obliged to arrest the suspect.  See Lamberti and 
Weisman 2004 Psychiatr Q 151 at 154.  Prosecutors have a wide discretion to either drop the 
charges against an accused or dismiss the case.  See Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal 
System of the United States at 271-272.  Also see Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A 
Contemporary perspective at 285 where a study is discussed that indicates that in New York, 43% of 
felony cases are dismissed by prosecutors.  See further Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts 
at 133, 211 where the wide discretion of prosecutors are confirmed.  Also see Albanese Criminal 
Justice at 261.  Part of prosecutorial discretion is that there is no obligation on a prosecutor to 
prosecute a case, even if there is enough evidence to secure a conviction.  This wide discretion 
could lead to abuse and where a defendant finds that the prosecutor’s decision to prosecute is 
based on prejudice based on religion, race or gender, the accused can challenge the particular 
decision to prosecute on equality grounds.  See Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System 
of the United States at 272.  Also see Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A 
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The criminal court possibly became the default avenue for persons with mental illness 
because of misconceptions about the dangerousness of individuals with mental illnesses or 
due to ignorance on the part of the judiciary regarding the accommodation of the needs of 
the mentally ill.286 
The alternative to prosecution in the American adversarial system is to waive litigation and 
be diverted away from the criminal justice system.287  Diversion makes an alternative path 
in the criminal justice system available to the accused.288  Diversion acknowledges that 
treatment and rehabilitation rather than incarceration and punishment are a more 
appropriate response to an accused with a mental illness.289  Diversion in the United States 
of America exists for, for example, first-time offenders, youth offenders, and mentally ill 
accused persons in order to alleviate the harshness of incarceration for them.290  Diversion 
programmes for mentally ill accused persons became more popular because referral to a 
suitable community-based treatment facility is preferred over-incarceration.291  This is a 
welcome development, especially since the safety of mentally ill persons in detention raises 
serious concerns.292   
                                                                                                                                                   
Contemporary perspective at 283, 288.  See further Albanese Criminal Justice at 261 who explains 
that the sentencing discretion that lies with the prosecutors have been criticised for giving them too 
much power in the criminal justice process. 
286  Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 584. 
287  Albanese Criminal Justice at 262.  Also see Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of 
the United States at 282 who point out that diversion can also serve as a substitute for incarceration 
for convicted offenders.    
288  Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 250.  Also see Albanese Criminal Justice at 262 who 
opines that diversion can take place at any stage of the criminal proceedings between the accused 
being charged and the case being adjudicated.  Also see Albanese Criminal Justice at 262 who 
explains that diversions such as these are only allowed if there is no risk to the community.  If the 
accused fails to complete the diversion programme or gets into trouble with the law within the one-
year period, the prosecution resumes through the normal court process.  This is also referred to as 
pre-trial intervention (PTI). 
289  Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 143.  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal 
System of the United States 282.  Where drug abuse was a contributing factor to the accused’s 
contact with the criminal justice system, rehabilitation programmes would for instance entail that the 
accused attends counselling or drug treatment as a condition for dropping the charges against him.  
Also see Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 250 where it is pointed out that the charges 
against the accused are held in abeyance pending completion of the treatment programme.  Upon 
completion, the charges may be dismissed.  Also see Odegaard 2007 North Dakota Law Review 
225.at 250 who argues that processing cases through the Mental Health Court is equally more 
appropriate than processing cases through the traditional criminal justice system. 
290  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 282.  Also see Albanese 
Criminal Justice at 262. 
291  Lamberti and Weisman 2004 Psychiatr Q 151 at 161. 
292  Especially in the first 24 hours of detention as 50% of all suicides committed in jails and prisons, take 
place within the first 24 hours of incarceration.  See Lamberti JS and Weisman RL ”Persons with 
severe mental disorders in the criminal justice system:  Challenges and opportunities” 2004 (75) 
Psychiatr Q 151-164 at 151 157.  Mentally ill offenders pose a higher suicide risk than other 
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A driving force behind diversion is therapeutic jurisprudence that considers the benefit for 
the accused and the community in providing an alternative to prosecution.293  Diversion 
programmes in the United States of America assist in reducing case backlogs in courts and 
alleviating overcrowding in prisons.294    
Diversion can occur informally or formally at various stages of the court process.295  Three 
types of diversions exist in the United States for persons with mental illness in the criminal 
justice system, namely: police-based diversion, Mental Health Courts and re-entry 
services.296  Ideally, intervention should occur at the earliest possible opportunity.297  Police-
based diversion is preventative community-based care where individuals at risk will be 
identified and provided with treatment before they come into contact with the criminal 
justice system.298  These diversions are also referred to as pre-booking diversions, which 
are aimed at ensuring that the mentally ill individual avoids further contact with the criminal 
justice system after their first interaction therewith.299  Pre-booking diversion programmes 
mostly make use of community mental health services and require the intervention by 
police officers or crisis intervention teams at the accused’s first contact with the criminal 
justice system.300  Communities searching for alternatives to criminalising conduct induced 
                                                                                                                                                   
offenders.  Despite guidelines on suicide assessments and monitoring of high-risk inmates having 
been drafted, these are rarely followed, resulting in the safety of mentally ill offenders, including 
protection from themselves, being compromised.  Lamberti and Weisman 2004 Psychiatr Q 151 at 
159.  Half of all suicides in the California prison and New York jails, occurred in inmates with 
histories of mental illness.  Also see Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with 
Mental Illness at 12 where the heightened suicide risk of incarcerated persons with mental illness is 
also mentioned as one of the reasons that motivated the establishment of a Mental Health Court so 
that these persons can be diverted away from such incarceration into treatment. 
293  Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 87. 
294  Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States 282.  Also see Albanese 
Criminal Justice 254.  Some diversion programmes have been very successful and reported a 
decrease in the number of arrests after completion of the diversion programme.  See Lamberti and 
Weisman 2004 Psychiatr Q 151 161. 
295  Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice 86.  The mentally ill accused will usually 
pass through four general stages in the criminal justice system, namely entry phase, processing 
phase, corrections- and release phase.  See Lamberti and Weisman 2004 Psychiatr Q 151 at 152. 
296  Draine J, Wilson AB and Pogorzelski W “Limitations and potential in current research on services for 
people with mental illness in the Criminal Justice system” 2007 (45) Journal of Offender 
Rehabilitation 159-177 at 169.  These methods of diversion can in turn be divided into pre-and post-
booking diversion programmes. 
297  Fiducia CE and Rogers R “Final stage diversion:  A safety net for offenders with Mental Disorders” 
2012 Crim Justice Behav 1-13 at 1.  This type of intervention at this very early stage has been 
described as the “ultimate intercept”. 
298  Fiducia and Rogers 2012 Crim Justice Behav 1 at 1 
299  Lamberti and Weisman 2004 Psychiatr Q 151 at 154.  Also see Draine, Wilson and Pogorzelski 2007 
Journal of Offender Rehabilitation 159 at 162. 
300  Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 86.  Also see Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 
D C L Review 143 at 148 where the importance of availability of community mental health services is 
stressed as a factor for the success of any diversion programme.  Also see Rossman et al Criminal 
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by mental illness, formed “Crisis intervention Teams” (CIT’s) 301 which consisted of  mental 
health professionals as well as members of the police and social services who received 
training in mental illnesses and substance use disorders.302    
The aim of these teams is to offer immediate diversion for those in need of mental health 
care.303  Some of the advantages of diversion by the CIT team are the avoidance of 
potential psychological harm that could be caused by the trauma of incarceration and the 
speeding up of the provision of much needed mental health services to the mentally ill who 
come into conflict with the law.304  This programme resulted in fewer mentally ill individuals 
being arrested and fewer injuries to the mentally ill person involved as well as the police 
officer who responded to the relevant call.305  Mental Health Courts developed in many 
                                                                                                                                                   
Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 7.  Also see Draine, Wilson and Pogorzelski 
2007 Journal of Offender Rehabilitation 159 at 162 where it is stressed that pre-booking 
programmes rely heavily on police involvement.  They add that the aim with pre-booking diversion 
programmes is to avoid arrest where possible.  Diversion at the crime prevention stage, is the 
earliest juncture at which diversion programmes can operate.  At this stage, high risk individuals who 
may come into contact with the law as a result of their mental illness is identified, and assistance 
such as medication or social assistance provided in order to prevent interaction with the criminal 
justice system.  Prior to these programmes, an arrest was seen as a positive development in the 
lives of mentally ill offenders, as they then received mental health care treatment that they could not 
access prior to their contact with the criminal justice system.  See Schneider, Bloom and Heerema 
Mental Health Courts at 70.  Pre-booking diversion programmes, entails that a police officer who 
responds to a call where a mentally ill person is involved, may exercise his discretion in deciding if 
the person will be charged or not.  If not, the particular diversion model will determine how the officer 
is to deal with the individual for example accompanies him to hospital for emergency psychiatric 
assessment.  See Sirotich F “The criminal justice outcomes of jail diversion programmes for persons 
with mental illness:  A review of the evidence” 2009 (37) J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry Law 461-472 at 
462.  Also see Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 581. 
301  Rich 2009 Fordham Urban Law Journal 89 at 98.  This initiative originated from Memphis where 
training to police and community health departments are still offered.  Also see Lamberti and 
Weisman 2004 Psychiatr Q 151 at 154, 183 where it is for example pointed out that Las Vegas has 
such a CIT (Crisis intervention team). 
302  Lamberti and Weisman 2004 Psychiatr Q 151 at 153, 155.  Lack of training of police officers on 
issues relating to mental illness, have led to unfortunate incidents where lethal force was used to 
apprehend a mentally ill individual.  This emphasises the importance of proper training to avoid 
casualties such as these.  Also see Slate, Buffington-Vollum and Johnson Criminalization of Mental 
Illness at 185 however indicate that very few police departments provide training to their police 
officers on how to deal with persons who might have a mental illness.  In some states, such as Los 
Vagas, specialised training is provided.  Also see Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 
161 where the importance of training of police officials in dealing with mental health issues is 
emphasised.  They also receive empathy training from persons suffering from mental illnesses and 
are informed of available community mental health care programmes.  See Lamberti and Weisman 
2004 Psychiatr Q 151 at 155. 
303  Rich 2009 Fordham Urban Law Journal 89 at 98.  The mentally ill would hence avoid being 
incarcerated whilst waiting for an assessment of his mental state via the criminal justice system.   
304  Rich 2009 Fordham Urban Law Journal 89 at 98.  As a result of its success, similar programmes 
were introduced in Houston, Portland, Seattle and Albuquerque.  See Lamberti and Weisman 2004 
Psychiatr Q 151 at 155-156.  For more information on similar diversion programmes, see this source 
at 156. 
305  Lamberti and Weisman 2004 Psychiatr Q 151 at 155. 
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states as an alternative to the CIT teams.306  
Mental Health Courts are classified as a “mid-stage” interception model because the Mental 
Health Court intervenes after formal involvement with the criminal justice system has 
already occurred through arrest or charges being filed against the mentally ill individual.307  
Mid-stage diversion programmes are implemented at either the pre-booking stage 308 or at 
the post-booking stage.309  The latter stage is further divided into the pre-arraignment and 
post-arraignment stages.310  Accused persons that qualify for pre-arraignment diversion 
services are identified by jail staff, pre-trial services, or specialised mental health 
programmes.311  Post-arraignment diversion programmes involve a determination of an 
appropriate disposition and often involve suspension of the criminal charges pending the 
accused’s completion of the treatment programme.312   
Lastly, mental health services are provided to convicted offenders who are out on probation 
                                                
306  Rich 2009 Fordham Urban Law Journal 89 at 99. 
307  Fiducia and Rogers 2012 Crim Justice Behav 1 at 2.  Mental Health Courts are among the most 
publicised mid-stage interventions. 
308  “Booking” refers to the part of the process after arrest where the details of the accused are entered 
into the books of the police and the fingerprints of the accused taken.  See Hemmens, Brody and 
Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 97, 116. 
309  There are currently post-booking diversion programmes in place in the United States of America, 
which does not make use of the Mental Health Court model.  These post-booking models focus on 
controlled release from custody and access to psychiatric services.  See Draine, Wilson and 
Pogorzelski 2007 Journal of Offender Rehabilitation 159 at 162   Examples of such programmes are 
the Jefferson County Kentucky, Mental Health Diversion programme that is aimed at non-violent 
offenders, charged with either misdemeanours or felonies, has a history of treatment for mental 
illness and suffers from a chronic mental illness.  Participants are sent for pre-trial diversion on a 
treatment programme that ranges from between 6 months to 1 year upon successful completion of 
which the charges against him are dropped.  See Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 
155.  Another example is the New York National Project, run by the Centre for Alternative 
Sentencing and Employment Services.  This programme is aimed at prison bound offenders with 
serious mental illnesses, charges with serious offences.  The programme entails an intensive 2-year 
case management and community supervision programme as an alternative to incarceration upon 
completion whereof charges are dropped.  The National Project also implemented a programme 
aimed at probationers who default on their probation conditions.  Instead of being incarcerated for 
such violation, they have to complete an intense treatment programme that may include anything 
from taking medication to attending vocational training   See Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy 
and Law 570 at 585.  
310  Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 86.  Also see Draine, Wilson and 
Pogorzelski 2007 Journal of Offender Rehabilitation 159 at 162 where diversion is divided into two 
broader categories, namely pre-booking and post-booking diversion options. 
311  Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 86.  Also see D’Emic MJ “The promise of 
mental health courts:  Brooklyn criminal justice system experiments with treatment as an alternative 
to prison” 2007 Criminal Justice 25-29 at 27 where the view is expressed that pre-arraignment 
diversion programmes are ideal but that it is not practical in the case of felonies since the justice 
system has to maintain a balance between the treatment needs of the accused and the interest of 
society who expects justice, especially in the case of violent felonies. 
312  Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 86.  Also see Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 
D C L Review 143 at 153. 
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and who face incarceration should they fail to meet probation conditions.313  Part of the 
release process is to ensure that the mentally ill individual is put into contact with the 
relevant service providers that can provide the mental health treatment needed by the 
mentally ill individual coming out of the criminal justice system.314  Such linkages are 
essential in reducing recidivism by these mentally ill individuals.315   
Diversion instead of a trial is motivated by pragmatic considerations and is not a 
constitutional right that an accused can demand.316  Involvement in any diversion 
programme is by its very nature voluntary.317  Diversion determinations and standards for 
diversion are not necessarily determined by statute or case law but are rather based on 
discretion.318  States do, however, have their own legislation that authorises mechanisms 
for diversion that does not necessarily involve a special court-monitored programme such 
as a Mental Health Court.319    
The mentally ill are the group of individuals whose contact with the courts present the most 
obstacles and are the most problematic.320  Mental Health Courts aim to overcome at least 
some of these obstacles.  
The remainder of the discussion will focus on diversion to the Mental Health Court with a 
specific focus on the Brooklyn Mental Health Court.   
 
                                                
313  Fiducia and Rogers 2012 Crim Justice Behav 1 at 4.  Some inmates are released on parole after a 
period of good behaviour, or are sentenced to probation rather than jail time.  These releases are 
often done conditionally and encompass court mandated treatment orders that the parole- or 
probation officer has the authority to enforce.  The success of enforcing such treatment orders are 
however often limited by the caseload of the probation officers.  See Lamberti and Weisman 2004 
Psychiatr Q 151 at 160.  In some jurisdictions the mentally ill would be convicted and then placed on 
probation, sometimes with a suspended sentence.  Slate Mental Health Courts at 429. 
314  Lamberti and Weisman 2004 Psychiatr Q 151 at 160, 161 where the availability of these services in 
the community is identified as a problem by probation- and parole officers. 
315  Lamberti and Weisman 2004 Psychiatr Q 151 at 161.  Also see Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L 
Review 143 at 184. 
316  Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 87. 
317  Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 449. 
318  Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 92.  Also see Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 
D C L Review 143 at 146 where it is explained that every jurisdiction has the ability to divert mentally 
ill accused persons away from the criminal justice system, either through the discretion not to arrest 
and prosecute or through a formal diversion programme. 
319  Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 87 where details of legislation in selected 
states are discussed.  Mechanisms for diversion to either a specialised court or other diversion 
programmes include dropping of the criminal charges, treatment as a condition for probation or bail 
(see this source at 95) 
320  Schneider RD Annotated Ontario Mental Health Statutes 4th ed (Irwin Law Toronto 2007) at xiii. 
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6  THE MENTAL HEALTH COURT MODEL IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
6.1  Introduction  
Most Mental Health Court in the United States of America began operations under the 
auspices of drug courts.321  The focus on treatment rather than punishment in these courts 
resulted in reduced recidivism of drug-related offences among the participants of the drug 
court programme.322  Mental illness is often a result of substance abuse.323  Following 
reports by drug court practitioners that those who battle with mental illnesses do not always 
fare well in the drug court programmes, the idea of separate Mental Health Courts to deal 
with mental illness gained momentum.324   
Although there are many similarities between drug courts and Mental Health Courts, such 
                                                
321 Slate Mental Health Courts at 423.  Also see Frailing 2009 C.S.L.R 145 at 145.  Also see Hemmens, 
Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 436.  See further Steadman HJ, 
Davidson S and Brown C “Law and Psychiatry:  Mental health courts:  Their promise and 
unanswered questions” 2001 (52) Psych Serv 457-458 at 457.  Also see Rossman et al Criminal 
Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 11.  Drug courts emerged in the United 
States of America in the late 1980’s to offer accused persons with substance addictions the 
opportunity to complete a drug court programme in lieu of serving a sentence for a drug related 
offence.  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 4, 103.  Also see Frailing K 2008 
C.S.L.R 63 at 68 who reports that as at 2004, there were 1183 drug courts in operation in the United 
States of America, with 248 in California alone.  Also see National Drug Court Institute Painting the 
Current Picture:  National Report Card on Drug Courts and Other Problem Solving Court Programs 
in the United States (Bureau of Justice Assistance and National Drug Court Institute 2011) at 40 
(Table 9) where it is reported that this number has grown to 256 drug Courts in California alone.  
Also see this source at 27 where it is indicated that as at 31 December 2009, drug courts across the 
United States of America, had 116 300.00 participants in their programmes.  Also see Rogers and 
Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 88 for detail about the emergence of drug courts and 
where it is reported that the number of drug courts across the United States of America exceeds one 
thousand.   
322  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 5.  Also see Frailing K 2008 C.S.L.R 63 at 
68 who confirms that drug courts resulted in reduced recidivism amongst the participants of the drug 
court programmes in comparison to those who did not participate and whose cases were processed 
through the traditional criminal justice system.  See further Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of 
Forensic Practice at 88.  
323  Frailing 2009 C.S.L.R 145 at 152.  Also see Sacks S and Pearson FS “Co-occurring substance use 
and mental disorders in offenders:  Approaches, findings and recommendations” 2003 (67) Federal 
Probation 32-39 at 32 who points out that research on offenders with co-occurring mental illness and 
substance abuse disorders are scares and need to be conducted in order to establish prevalence 
and determine cost effectiveness of treatment.  Frailing 2009 C.S.L.R 145 at 153 seems to suggest 
that there might be a need for another specialised court, focussing on those with co-occurring mental 
illness and substance abuse problems, as this group poses unique challenges to the criminal justice 
system.  Frailing at 153 stresses that, where there is co-occurring conditions, both must be treated, 
failing which, it will result in an ineffective use of resources as optimal progress will not be achieved. 
324 The success of the drug courts sparked the idea to create similar courts for those individuals 
suffering from mental illnesses.  Frailing K 2008 C.S.L.R 63 at 68.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and 
Heerema Mental Health Courts at 5.  See further Fisher C “Towards a new understanding of mental 
health courts“ 2015 (54) The Judge’s Journal 8-13 at 8.  Also see Rossman et al Criminal Justice 
Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 11. 
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as that both follow the therapeutic jurisprudence approach,325  the target groups that they 
aim to infiltrate are very different.  Drug court participants are involved in the drug court 
because involvement with drugs is illegal, whereas having a mental illness in itself, of 
course, is not illegal.326  Drug courts are in many ways a more straightforward solution than 
Mental Health Courts because they consider only drug-related offences, whereas this is not 
the case with a Mental Health Court, 327 as discussed below.   
There is no single recipe for how a Mental Health Court operates 328 or should operate.  As 
a result, no two Mental Health Courts function the same.329  Each Mental Health Court 
adjusts to the needs of their specific jurisdiction.330   
                                                
325 Slate Mental Health Courts at 424.  Also see Frailing K 2008 C.S.L.R 63 at 68 for more similarities 
between drug courts and Mental Health Courts.  Also see Welch and Fuller American Criminal 
Courts 99 where the courts with specialised jurisdiction are described as alternative courts that are 
also known as problem solving courts where therapeutic jurisprudence is applied.    
326  Frailing K 2008 C.S.L.R 63 at 68.  Also see Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for 
Offenders with Mental Illness at 11 where it is pointed out that drug courts have more formalised 
goals and flow processes and may be more willing to employ sanctions than the Mental Health Court  
due to the different type of defendants that the court deals with (those accused of drug related 
offences versus those with mental illness). 
327  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 6, 103.  Also see Steadman, Davidson and 
Brown 2001 Psych Serv 457 at 458.  Also see Frailing 2009 C.S.L.R 145 at 155 who points out that 
one of the major differences between drug courts and Mental Health Courts is that jail time is more 
frequently used as a sanction in the drug court than in a Mental Health Court.  See further Lurigio 
and Snowden 2009 The Justice System Journal 196 at 214 who states that Mental Health Court 
issues are more complex than those encountered in the Drug Courts. 
328  Steadman et al 2005 Behavoural Science and Law 215 at 224.  Also see Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 
D C L Review 143 at 147 where a study of 20 Mental Health Courts is discussed and the conclusion 
reached that there is no single model for how Mental Health Courts operate.  Also see Fisher 2015 
The Judge’s Journal 8 at 9.  Also see O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 3 
where it is reiterated that each Mental Health Court determines its own processes. 
329  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 104.  Also see Fisher 2015 The Judge’s 
Journal 8 at 3 where it is stated that Mental Health Courts vary greatly with regard to the juncture at 
which a defendant may enter the court monitored programme, with regard to the treatment 
programmes and the length of treatment as well as the eligibility criteria in the sense that some allow 
defendants with developmental disorders to enter the programme whereas others do not.  See 
further O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 3 where it is stated that even 
Mental Health Courts in the same state do not function the same.  Lastly, see Rossman et al 
Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 13, 14 for aspects in which courts 
may differ. 
330 Watson A, Hanrahan P, Luchins D and Lurigio A “Mental health courts and the complex issue of 
mentally ill offenders” April 2001 (52) 4 Psych Serv 477-481 at 477.  Also see Frailing K “How mental 
health courts function:  Outcomes and observations” 2010 (33) Int J Law Psychiat 207-213 at 207.  
Also see Redlich AD, Steadman HJ, Monahan J, Robbins PC and Petrila J. “Patterns of practice in 
mental health courts:  A national survey” 2006 (30) Law and Human Behaviour 347-362 at 354 who 
point out that Mental Health Courts in operation in the same state seem to be very similar as those 
planning to open a new Mental Health Court, often replicate the existing model in the particular state.  
The model of the Mental Health Court used, will also depend on if it is initiated by leadership from 
the community mental health program, police department or legal professionals.  See Rich 2009 
Fordham Urban Law Journal 89 at 100.  Also see Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for 
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Despite the fact that each Mental Health Court operates differently as guided by the unique 
issues in its particular jurisdiction, it appears that a court in the United States of America 
must have certain minimum characteristics in order to be regarded as a Mental Health 
Court.331  These include a separate docket for mentally ill offenders;332 a multi-disciplinary 
team consisting of mental health and criminal justice practitioners designing treatment 
plans for mentally ill offenders;333  relationships with community service providers in order to 
ensure availability of recommended community treatment services,334 and court-monitored 
                                                                                                                                                   
Offenders with Mental Illness at 13. 
331  Frailing 2009 C.S.L.R 145 at 149.  Also see Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 150 
where these general characteristics of the earliest Mental Health Courts are discussed.  Also see 
O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 2, 3..  Also see Slate Mental Health Court 
at 424, 428.  See further Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 88.  Typical 
elements of a Mental Health Court has been identified as:  planning and administration during which 
stage all the relevant stakeholders (judge and prosecutor as well as community members and 
mental health care practitioners) should be involved, eligibility criteria (Not every person that is 
mentally ill will be suitable for a Mental Health Court program.  The eligibility criteria has to be clear 
with reference to the type of offence and whether the court will accept mentally ill persons charged 
with violent offences), timely processing (Those that are eligible for the programme should be 
identified as soon as possible and treatment options should be identified without delay.), terms of 
participation (The mentally ill accused person should not be subjected to excessive court intervention 
and should not spend more time in the system than he would have had he not had a mental illness.  
Participants should not be expected to show that they have recovered from the mental illness in 
order to be released from the program), informed choice (The participant must be placed in 
possession of all relevant information in order to take an informed and voluntary decision as to his 
participation in the programme and should also be provided with counsel to assist in the process.),  
treatment supports and services (The treatment programme for the accused should be individualised 
and he should not merely be accommodated in a programme where there is space for him without 
having regard to his particular treatment needs), confidentiality (Only information that is necessary 
for the treatment staff to properly treat the accused should be made available to the staff.),  trained 
staff (Staff from the criminal justice system must be informed about the role and purpose of the 
treatment staff positions and visa versa.  Staff from the two systems must be able to agree on the 
treatment goals for a particular accused.), monitored treatment plan (The treatment plan should be 
monitored by all staff involved and must be adjusted as the treatment needs of the accused 
changes) and programme evaluation (The programme itself as an instrument through which the 
accused receives treatments should be monitored and evaluated from time to time.  Areas where 
improvements are necessary should be identified by all stakeholders involved.).  See Welch and 
Fuller American Criminal Courts 465, 466 for the ideal elements suggested by the United States 
Department of Justice.  See further Frailing K 2008 C.S.L.R 63 at 68. 
332  The special dockets usually consist of non-violent misdemeanours.  According to Redlich et al 2006 
Law and Human Behaviour 347 at 349 this is a definitive feature of the Mental Health Court.  Also 
see Slate Mental Health Courts at 428.  Also see Redlich et al 2006 Law and Human Behaviour 347 
at 362.  Also see O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 2 where reference is 
made to this study of 100 Mental Health Courts where they found that it is mostly one judge 
presiding over cases in the Mental Health Courts. 
333  All Mental Health Courts follow a team approach.  Hiday VA, and Ray B ”Arrests two years after 
exiting a well-established mental health court” 2010 (61) Psych Serv 463-468 at 463.  Also see  
Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 441 who explain that 
all problem-solving courts are non-adversarial in nature.  Also see Fisher 2015 The Judge’s Journal 
8 at 13. 
334  There is co-operation by way of memorandums of understanding between agencies in the criminal 
justice system and those in the mental health care system to ensure co-operation and service 
delivery to the user.  Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 162 point out the importance 
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treatment programmes and imposition of sanctions for non-compliance.335   
 A non-adversarial approach is a uniform trait in all Mental Health Courts, and the courts 
function using a team approach.336  They apply therapeutic jurisprudence, and the 
participants appear before the Mental Health Court judge frequently. 337  Variables between 
Mental Health Courts include variations in the admission process to these courts, treatment 
programmes offered as well as variations in compliance and completion consequences.338 
Specialised courts such as Mental Health Courts came into existence as it became clear 
                                                                                                                                                   
of such co-operation in order to achieve successful treatment and reintegration of mentally ill 
accused persons.  Also see Slate Mental Health Courts at 428.  Also see O’Keefie The Brooklyn 
Mental Health Court Evaluation at 2 where reference is made to this study of 100 Mental Health 
Courts where it was found that these courts typically mandate community mental health treatment 
that involves inter alia taking medication and adhering to any other requirements set by the court.  
These other requirements may include obtaining and keeping employment and even doing physical 
exercises.  See Redlich et al 2006 Law and Human Behaviour 347 at 349.  Also see Bernstein and 
Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 148 where the availability of community mental health services is 
stressed as an indispensable factor for ensuring the success of any diversion programme aimed at 
persons with mental illness. 
335  The Courtroom process involves clinicians who try to identify signs of mental illness in which event 
the person is transferred voluntarily from the criminal justice system to the mental health care system 
for treatment.  See Slate Mental Health Courts at 428.  There is constant judicial supervision and 
community supervision of the court participants.  This entails that the participant appears in front of 
the Mental Health Court judge at regular intervals at which occasion the participant is then praised or 
sanctioned, depending on his compliance or not with the prescribed treatment programme.  See 
Redlich et al 2006 Law and Human Behaviour 347 at 349.  With regard to the imposition of sanctions 
see Redlich et al 2006 Law and Human Behaviour 347-362.    
336  Hiday and Ray 2010 Psych Serv 463 at 463.  Also see Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal 
Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 441 who explain that all problem-solving courts are non-
adversarial in nature.  Also see Fisher 2015 The Judge’s Journal 8 at 13. 
337  Part of therapeutic jurisprudence according to Redlich et al is the discretion to have the charges 
against the participant dropped.  Redlich et al 2006 Law and Human Behaviour 347 at 349 Judges 
give voices to the mentally ill by employing the therapeutic jurisprudence approach.  Problem solving 
court judges, are activist judges who are very aware of the discretion that they have in the problem 
solving court and who are not afraid to use it.  See Nolan JL “The international problem solving court 
movement:  A comparative perspective” 2011 (37) Monash University Law Review 259-279 at 263.  
Also see this source at 264 for some comments by speciality court judges who caution against giving 
speciality court judges too much discretion and who emphasises that the judge should still maintain 
some distance from the case and the people involved therein, in order to fairly and impartially 
dispense justice.  See Frailing 2010 Int J Law Psychiat 207 at 207.  Most Mental Health Courts 
would require their participants to appear in court at least once a week after enrolment where after 
the frequency is adjusted depending on the participants progress.  If the participants are doing well 
in the treatment programme, less frequent appearances are required whereas more frequent 
appearances occur if the participant is doing poorly or not complying with the treatment program.  
See Redlich et al 2006 Law and Human Behaviour 347 at 355.  Also see this source at 357 who 
indicate that the bigger Mental Health Courts with more participants, generally required the 
participants to appear before the judge less frequently.  See further Fisher 2015 The Judge’s Journal 
8 at 9. 
338  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 104, 105.  The authors list the variables 
with regard to eligibility, admission process, treatment-, compliance- and completion variations in 
Mental Health Courts across the United States of America.  Also see Redlich et al 2006 Law and 
Human Behaviour 347 at 349. 
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that criminal courts are ill equipped to deal with the complex issues that mentally ill accused 
persons present to the criminal justice system.339    
The Broward County Mental Health Court was the first nationally recognised Mental Health 
Court in the United States of America.340  Many Mental Health Courts opened their doors 
                                                
339  Frailing 2010 Int J Law Psychiat 207 at 207.  Also see Draine, Wilson and Pogorzelski 2007 Journal 
of Offender Rehabilitation 159 at 164 who ascribes the emergence of Mental Health Courts to the 
lack of effectiveness of traditional court proceedings.  Also see Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L 
Review 143 at 162.  See further Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 464.  Also see 
Odegaard 2007 North Dakota Law Review 225.at 225.  The case of Mr Aaron Wynn motivated the 
establishment of this particular Mental Health Court.  Mr Wynn was suffering from brain damage 
after a motorcycle accident and was institutionalised for a period of 2 years.  Upon his release during 
a visit to a convenient store, he accidentally knocked over an elderly lady and her groceries.  In an 
attempt to assist the elderly lady, he picked up her groceries and her purse.  At this point it was 
assumed that he was robbing her and the police was called in.  The elderly lady eventually died of 
her fall and Mr Wynn was charged with murder.  The grand jury decided to indict him for 
manslaughter.  The grand jury also ordered an investigation that resulted in a report condemning 
both the criminal justice and the mental health care system for their failure to deal property with 
persons with mental illness.  The charges against Mr Wynn was dropped once the negligence and 
“deliberate indifference” in both these systems in dealing with Mr Wynn was exposed.  See 
discussion of this case in Slate Mental Health Court at 433, 439.  His treatment consisted of inter alia 
seclusion where he would be placed in constraints sometimes for days at a time, left to urinate on 
himself.  His attorney reported that he lost his ability to walk while institutionalised as a result of the 
constraints.  The conditions in earlier times when the mentally ill was confined to prison without 
necessarily having committed a crime, was much worse.  See for example Torrey et al Criminalizing 
the Seriously Mentally Ill at 10 where the work of Reverent Dwight is discussed.  He explains that he 
visited a mentally ill person in prison who had no bed or chair, but was left with a heap of hay like 
that a pig would sleep on.   
340  Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 465.  It is often reported that the first Mental Health 
Court in America was established in 1997 in Broward County.  See Slate, Mental Health Courts at 
423.  Also see Denckla D and Berman G “Rethinking the revolving door” 2001 Centre for Court 
innovation, New York.  www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/rethinkingtherevolvingdoor.pdf 
(Date of use:  7 March 2011) at 1.  See Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 4.  
See further Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 88.  Some authors are, 
however, of the view that the first Mental Health Court in actual fact opened in Marion County, 
Indiana.  See for instance Steadman, Davidson and Brown 2001 Psych Serv 457 at 457 who opine 
that the first Mental Health Court was established in 1980 in Marion County, Indiana, although it is 
not generally so acknowledged.  This specialised court existed till 1992 at which time it was 
temporarily suspended.  In 1996 it started operating as the PAIR Mental Health Diversion project.  
The Mental Health Court in Marion County was established in January 1997 whilst the Mental Health 
Court in Broward County opened its doors in June 1997.  See Redlich et al 2006 Law and Human 
Behaviour 347 at 353 who indicate that the first Mental Health Court was established in Marion 
County, Indiana in January 1997, followed by the Broward County Mental Health Court in Florida, in 
June of 1997.  Also see Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective 
439 where it is explained that the PAIR programme that was launched in Marion County was in fact 
the first Mental Health Court in the United States and that it started in 1996.  Prior to the baptism of 
court monitored mental health treatment programmes as “Mental Health Courts”, there were 
programmes in place that had the same goal as the Mental Health Courts as we know them today.  
The PAIR (psychiatric Assertive Identification and Referral) programme is one such example.  See 
Luskin ML “Who is diverted?  Case selection for court-monitored mental health treatment” 2001 (23) 
Law and Policy 217-236 at 219, 224.  This programme was authorised by a 1992 Statute that 
authorised conditional deferment of criminal proceedings where mental illness was a “contributing 
factor” to the crime.  All the new arrestees at the local jail were assessed by a Psychiatric social 
worker who also consulted the prison personnel in identifying possible participants for the PAIR 
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after the Broward County Court commenced its functions.341  The Brooklyn Mental Health 
Court opened its doors in 2002 and is regarded as a second-generation Mental Health 
Court because it considers felonies, and court staff is tasked with monitoring the progress 
of the accused persons in the court programmes.342 
From the year 2000, the United States government allocated more funds for the 
establishment of more Mental Health Courts.343  In 2003, there were more than 60 Mental 
Health Courts in North America, including Juvenile Mental Health Courts.344  In September 
                                                                                                                                                   
program.  Defendants, who showed signs of mental illness, were not automatically considered for 
diversion, they had to be referred for consideration.  The participants had to have a primary 
diagnosis of a serious mental illness (at 220).  Also see Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal 
Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 438.  The aim of PAIR was very much the same as that of 
the Mental Health Court, namely to divert mentally ill defendants (in this case only those charged 
with minor offences) away from the criminal justice system, into court monitored treatment 
programmes.  Within the ambit of minor offences, offences committed against the person reduced a 
defendant’s chances of diversion mainly since crimes against the person implied that there was a 
victim who would want to see justice rather than treatment for the perpetrators.  The longer the list of 
prior convictions, the smaller the chances of diversion as such a person was viewed as a criminal 
rather than mentally ill.  See Luskin 2001 Law and Policy 217 at 219, 225.  Also see Torrey et al 
Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 40 where the details of a study of 500 mentally ill persons 
in San Francisco who have been arrested during the 1970’s are discussed.  The finding of this study 
was that these 500 individuals had on average 3 prior convictions.  A decision to allow diversion or 
not, was taken at a weekly roundtable meeting where all relevant parties or their representatives 
were present, these include the prosecutor, community mental health centre, the public defendant 
and the Mental Health Association.  Luskin 2001 Law and Policy 217 at 220.  Diversions could not 
proceed without the agreement of the prosecutor.  The progress of the participants was monitored 
bi-monthly by way of compliance hearings in front of a Magistrate on a special docket.  Once 
diverted, the treatment programmes of PAIR lasted a year, upon completion whereof criminal 
charges were dropped.  Non-compliance with the treatment programme resulted in the criminal 
proceedings against the defendant going its normal course.  See Luskin 2001 Law and Policy 217 at 
220.  Also see Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 251 where it is explained that this is 
the general principle of diversion – to refer cases back to the traditional criminal court where the 
accused failed to comply with the treatment programme of the diversion programme. 
341  These include the King County Mental Health Court in Seattle, Washington, established in 1999, the 
Anchorage Mental Health Court in Anchorage, Alaska and the Mental Health Court establish in San 
Bernardino, California in 1999.  See Lamberti and Weisman 2004 Psychiatr Q 151 at 158.  Also see 
Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 11. 
342  O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 4.  Also see Frailing 2009 C.S.L.R 145 at 
155 who discuss the Washoe County Mental Health Court as a second generation Mental Health 
Court where felonies are considered as opposed to the original Mental Health Courts who only 
considered misdemeanours.  See Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 106.  
Second generation Mental Health Court rely on court staff to monitor treatment programmes, 
whereas the initial Mental Health Courts relied on supervision by community treatment programmes.    
343  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 103.  Funding for Mental Health Courts in 
America was made possible by the passing of legislation namely the “America’s Law Enforcement 
and Mental Health Project Bill” passed in 2000 that resulted in $10 million being made available to 
establish 100 Mental Health Courts.  In 2004 the “Mentally Ill Offender and Crime Reduction Act of 
2004” resulted in another $50 million being made available for further Mental Health Courts, training 
of law enforcement officers and the enhancement of treatment available to mentally ill offenders in 
and outside of prison.  See Frailing K 2008 C.S.L.R 63 at 70 for more detail on the passing of the 
relevant legislation. 
344 Slate Mental Health Courts at 424.  As at July 2004, the number had grown to 98.  See Frailing 2009 
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2005, there were 111 Mental Health Courts.345  As of December 2009, there were 
approximately 300 Mental Health Courts in operation across the United States of 
America.346  The United States of America has clearly taken hold of the Mental Health Court 
movement faster than Canada.347  Problem-solving courts such as Mental Health Courts 
have been described as “the future of justice”.348 The establishment of problem-solving 
courts in the United States of America is generally met with great enthusiasm.349    
The goals of Mental Health Courts as problem-solving courts in the United States of 
America with a particular focus on the goals of the Brooklyn Mental Health Court are 
explored below. 
                                                                                                                                                   
C.S.L.R 145 at 149.   
345  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 5, 41, 103.  The number of courts has 
grown from 90 in January 2005, see Redlich et al 2006 Law and Human Behaviour 347 at 352.  Also 
see Lurigio and Snowden 2009 The Justice System Journal 196 at 204.  See further Redlich et al 
2006 Law and Human Behaviour 347 at 352 that indicate that 34 States across the United States of 
America as at 2005, had at least one Mental Health Court.   
346  The exact number as at 31 December 2009 stood at 288.  See National Drug Court Institute Painting 
the Current Picture at 39.  See however Wollf N, Fabrikant N and Belenko S “Mental health courts 
and their selection processes:  Modelling variation for consistency” 2011 (35) Law and Human 
Behavior 402-412 at 402 who reported that there were only 170 operational Mental Health Courts at 
the time.  See however Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 464 where it is reported that 
there were about 150 Mental Health Courts in operation in the United States of America, a number 
much smaller than the 288 alluded to above.  Also see Albanese Criminal Justice at 243 where it is 
indicated that there are approximately 200 Mental Health Courts in operation across America.  
Lastly, see Fisher 2015 The Judge’s Journal 8 at 8 who reports that there were over 300 operational 
Mental Health Courts in 2010 in 40 states across the United States of America. 
347 Heerema M “An introduction to the mental health court movement and its status in Canada” 2005 
(50) Crim.L.Q 255-282 at 274.  Also see the discussion of the Mental Health Court movement in 
Canada in chapter 4 of this research. 
348  It was also described as ““radical, revolutionary, the trend of the future” and further that it is “ These 
were the words used by one of the judges responsible for the establishment of the Phoenix Mental 
Health Court.  See Nolan 2011 Monash University Law Review 259 at 262.  Another judge involved 
in the establishment of a problem solving court, described the movement as “a complete revolution 
in jurisprudence”.   
349  Nolan 2011 Monash University Law Review 259 at 262, 263.  This enthusiasm is not always shared 
by those in other jurisdictions, in this particular instance, an Irish judge had reservations about the 
almost “evangelical approach” towards problem solving courts that is followed in the United States of 
America.  See O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 6 who confirms that all the 
stakeholders in the state of New York for instance, welcomed the establishment of Mental Health 
Courts as it already had a number of problem solving courts in the state.  See, however, Welch and 
Fuller American Criminal Courts  at 102 where Mental Health Courts are specifically listed as a court 
with specialised jurisdiction.  It is pointed out here that specialised courts sometimes has the effect of 
blurring the line between criminal and non-criminal jurisdiction which creates quasi-judicial systems 
that could potentially reduce due-process protection and in which state coercion can be disguised as 
social welfare.  Also see Frailing 2009 C.S.L.R 145 at 145.  See further Frailing K 2008 C.S.L.R 63 
at 67 for the main characteristics of problem solving courts.  See further Hemmens, Brody and 
Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective 436, 437 where domestic violence courts, re-




6.2 Goals of the Mental Health Court in the United States of America 
As specialised criminal courts for the mentally ill accused,350 these courts are aimed at 
addressing the underlying cause for the criminal behaviour,351 which in turn reduces 
recidivism 352 and protects public safety in the process. 
Mental Health Courts aim to respond to the illness that may have been the underlying 
cause of the criminal behaviour 353 by diverting the mentally ill accused away from the 
criminal justice system towards treatment and support from the mental health care 
system.354  An underlying supposition upon which the Brooklyn Mental Health Court is 
established is that criminal behaviour is often a symptom or result of untreated or 
insufficiently treated mental illness.355  The court’s focus is on treatment rather than 
incarceration.356  This focus is evident in the fact that they link mentally ill accused persons 
to treatment 357 as an alternative to incarceration, resulting in improved psychiatric stability 
(and hopefully a crime-free life) for the offender and improved public safety by focusing on 
                                                
350  Redlich et al 2006 Law and Human Behaviour 347 at 347. 
351  Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 148.  Also see Hemmens, Brody and Spohn 
Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 462.  Also see Albanese Criminal Justice at 244.   
352  Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 144, 148 where it is stated that the extent to which 
community mental health care facilities provide access and treatment to the mentally ill, has a big 
role to play in reducing re-offending.  Lack of treatment may lead to re-offending.  Also see 
Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 440 where it is 
reiterated that the goal of all problem-solving courts is to reduce recidivism and to produce 
productive members of society.  Also see Albanese Criminal Justice at 244.  See further in general 
Redlich et al 2006 Law and Human Behaviour 347-362.  Also see O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental 
Health Court Evaluation at 2 where reference is made to this study of 100 Mental Health Courts 
where it is stated that All Mental Health Courts aim to reduce recidivism by diverting the mentally ill 
accused away from the criminal justice system into treatment. 
353  Rich 2009 Fordham Urban Law Journal 89 at 99.  Also see Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L 
Review 143 at 160.  The aim is to divert the mentally ill accused away from the criminal justice 
system and to provide the necessary treatment to address the mental illness that might have been 
the underlying cause of the criminal behaviour.  Also see Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal 
Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 437.  See further Albanese Criminal Justice at 263.  See 
Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 57 where this is 
stated as one of the underlying principles upon which the Brooklyn Mental Health Court is 
established. 
354  Frailing 2010 Int J Law Psychiat 207 at 207.  Also see Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability 
Law at 191.  See further D’Emic 2007 Criminal Justice 25 at 25 with regard to the Brooklyn Mental 
Health Court in particular.  Sirotich 2009 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry Law 461 at 461.  Also see 
Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 69 who points out that diversion does not 
require a speciality court, although the objective of a Mental Health Court is to “divert”. 
355  Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 58. 
356  Rich 2009 Fordham Urban Law Journal 89 at 98.  Also see Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L 
Review 143 at 148.  The court aims to address the mental health needs of the accused as well as 
public safety issues by linking the mentally ill accused with treatment services instead of 
incarcerating them.  See O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 1, 5.  Also see 
Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 57. 
357  Draine, Wilson and Pogorzelski 2007 Journal of Offender Rehabilitation 159 at 165. 
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the rehabilitation of the offender instead of focusing on his punishment.358  The focus on the 
treatment of the illness can limit the revolving door effect, which in turn can lead to reduced 
recidivism and, ultimately, a safer society. 359   
Mental Health Courts aim to improve collaboration between the criminal justice system and 
the mental health care system since these two systems have not been close collaborators 
in the past.360  Effective community health care treatment is essential 361 in order for the 
Mental Health Court to achieve its reintegration goals.362   
The initial goal of the Brooklyn Mental Health Court was to divert persons with serious and 
persistent mental illness away from prison into treatment programmes.363  The Brooklyn 
Mental Health Court further aimed to determine eligibility for a court-monitored treatment 
programme within 21-days from the first court appearance.364  These were the main goals 
                                                
358  Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 148. 
359  Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 6, 57, 58.  Also see 
O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at iii, 2.  The revolving door phenomenon 
entails that persons with mental illness flow in and out of the criminal justice system. 
360  Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 454.  A reason for 
this might be because a big difference between these two systems, is that the mental health care 
system focusses on patient centred treatment and care whilst the criminal justice system is driven by 
public safety and individual responsibility.  See Draine, Wilson and Pogorzelski 2007 Journal of 
Offender Rehabilitation 159 at 170.  Also see Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for 
Offenders with Mental Illness at 7, 57 where better collaboration between these two systems is set 
as an objective that the Brooklyn Mental Health Court wish to achieve. 
361  Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 161 point out that practices that could hinder the 
achievement of these goals, is the use of counter-therapeutic practices by Mental Health Courts 
such as insisting on a guilty plea for entrance into the Mental Health Court programme since this will 
hinder the accused’s reintegration and chances on housing and employment.  Also see Lurigio and 
Snowden 2009 The Justice System Journal 196 at 212 where the availability of community 
resources for purposes of the Mental Health Court programmes is stressed.  
362  These courts also aim for the successful reintegration of the mentally ill accused person into the 
community.  In order to achieve these goals, effective community health care treatment is essential.  
See Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 161.  The author also mentions reduced 
recidivism as another important goal. 
363  D’Emic 2007 Criminal Justice 25 at 25.  Also see O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court 
Evaluation at v where it is stated that in the implementation phase of the court (28 months) the court 
received 262 referrals.  Also see this source at 5 where it is stated that the goals of this court should 
be revised once it’s been in operation for a number of years to ensure that it is achieving its intended 
objectives and to establish the exact scope of its operations.  See further Rossman et al Criminal 
Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 13 where it is indicated that the requirement 
of having a serious or persistent mental illness, is regarded as the legally defined eligibility 
requirement.  The clinical approach to eligibility will refer to, for instance, Axis 1 disorders or other 
terminology generally use for diagnostic purposes. 
364  The average amount of days from the first court appearance to the eligibility determination is 21 
days.  The determination period for those found not eligible, were 18 days, whereas it was 24 days 
for those eventually found eligible.  See O’Keefie K The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 
21.  The eligibility determination date is the date upon which the psychosocial and psychiatric reports 
are made available to all the parties involved in the matter.  See, however Steadman et al 2005 
Behavoural Science and Law 215 at 221 who reports that the average time it takes for a Mental 
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of the Brooklyn Mental Health Court.     
A secondary goal of this court was to create a Mental Health Court model that could be 
replicated in other jurisdictions that wished to implement a Mental Health Court.365  The 
objectives of the court were to improve the ability of the criminal justice system to identify, 
assess, and monitor accused persons with mental illness in the criminal justice system.366    
6.3 Underlying principles of the Mental Health Court model in the United States of America 
Whilst the dynamics of each particular Mental Health Court across the United States of 
America may differ, there are some underlying principles that are observed across all the 
American Mental Health Courts.  The most prominent of these are briefly discussed below.  
Where the underlying principles overlap with that of the Canadian Mental Health Court’s, 
this fact will be pointed out, and the discussion of the particular underlying principle limited 
in order to avoid duplication. 
6.3.1 Therapeutic jurisprudence 
All Mental Health Courts employ therapeutic jurisprudence practices.  Therapeutic 
jurisprudence acknowledges that the law affects the mental and physical health of those in 
contact with it and seeks to apply social science to examine its current and future impact on 
these persons, their relationships, and society.367  
Therapeutic jurisprudence as it pertains to the mentally ill accused is discussed in detail in 
chapter 2 and 4 of this research, and the principles highlighted during those discussions 
apply to the American context as well and will not be repeated here. 
6.3.2 Voluntary participation 
Participation in the Brooklyn Mental Health Court programme is voluntary in that the 
                                                                                                                                                   
Health Court to reach a decision on if the accused is eligible for the Mental Health Court program, is 
32 days.  See this source at 218 for a list of the Mental Health Courts that formed part of the study. 
365  O’Keefie K The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 5. 
366  O’Keefie K The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 5.  Also see Rossman et al Criminal 
Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 57. 
367 Slate Mental Health Court at 424 where therapeutic jurisprudence is defined as “Therapeutic 
jurisprudence analyses the process of how “substantive rules, legal procedures, and the roles of 
lawyers and judges produce therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences”.  Also see this source at 
15 where therapeutic jurisprudence is defined as “decisions within the therapeutic jurisprudence 
framework are made with consideration of future ramifications for individuals, relationships and 
society long after a person’s contact with the criminal justice system has ceased”.  Also see 
Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 11. 
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decision to enrol in the Mental Health Court programme is completely up to the 
participant.368     
Mental Health Court participants in the United States of America are offered a choice 
between participating in the treatment programme of the Mental Health Court, upon 
completion whereof the charges against them are either reduced or dropped or to proceed 
with the case through the normal criminal justice system.369  The dropping of charges 
serves as an incentive to complete the programme.370    
Because participation is voluntary, the participants are able to opt-out of the treatment 
programme 371 and have their case processed by the traditional criminal court at any point 
in time.372  The provision for opting out is because these accused persons came to the 
knowledge of the criminal justice system because they have been charged with criminal 
conduct and not because they require involuntary mental health care treatment.  Forcing 
them to continue with the court-monitored programme would amount to involuntary mental 
health care treatment for which they would not have qualified otherwise.373 
The fact that the accused must be competent to participate in the Mental Health Court 
                                                
368  Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 191.  Also see in general Redlich et al 2006 Law 
and Human Behaviour 347-362.  Also see O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 
2 where reference is made to this study of 100 Mental Health Courts.  Also see Odegaard 2007 
North Dakota Law Review 225 at 251 where the importance of voluntary participation is stressed as 
something that proponents of Mental Health Courts support.  The eligible accused may also decline 
to enrol in the Mental Health Court programme in the first place.  Rossman et al Criminal Justice 
Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 70.  See further Lurigio and Snowden 2009 The 
Justice System Journal 196 at 211 who warns that if transfer to the Mental Health Court is not 
voluntary, it will amount to an infringement of the 6th amendment.  Where an accused declines to be 
enrolled in the Mental Health Court programme, his case will revert back to the traditional criminal 
court.  See Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 58. 
369  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 6.  Also see Seltzer 2005 Psychology, 
Public Policy and Law 570 at 576 where it is highlighted that such dismissal of charges does not 
happen automatically in all Mental Health Courts and that in the mentally ill accused is often required 
to request such dismissal of charges that is a complicated process in itself.  Some Mental Health 
Courts would drop the charges immediately once the accused agrees to participate.  See however 
Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 250 who explain that with any diversion, the charges 
are held in abeyance, which implies that the charges are only dropped once the treatment 
programme has been successfully completed. 
370  See Frailing 2009 C.S.L.R 145 at 154.  Also see Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for 
Offenders with Mental Illness at 68 where it is explained that, in the Brooklyn Mental Health Court, 
charges are dropped where the accused was charged with a misdemeanour of a first time felony 
offence.  Where the charge was a violent felony, the charges are not dropped upon completion but 
the charges are reduced to misdemeanour charges. 
371  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 6.  Also see this source at 90 where it is 
reiterated that participation in the Mental Health Court programme is completely optional. 
372  O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 27.  Also see Rossman et al Criminal 
Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 64. 
373  Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 151. 
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programme, further speaks to the voluntariness of the involvement.  The “competence” to 
participate in the Mental Health Court programme means that an accused must be able to 
distinguish between the advantages and disadvantages of participation and must be 
distinguished from “competence” for purposes of standing trial.374 Competency 
assessments (for purposes of participating in the Mental Health Court programme) are not 
done on all intended participants of the Mental Health Court programme, but only if a 
participant appears “grossly incompetent”.375   
Criticism has been levelled against the purported voluntariness of participation in the 
American Mental Health Courts because of the requirement in the Mental Health Court to 
enter a guilty plea in order to enrol in the programme.  This criticism is discussed later in 
this chapter.  
6.3.3 Multidisciplinary court team 
The Mental Health Court necessitates decisions to be made by members of various 
professions at different stages in the process,376 depending on whether the legal or 
psychiatric aspects are being considered.  
The judge,377 prosecutor, defence attorney and other court staff are all specially trained and 
have knowledge of the public mental health care system.378  Case managers and social 
workers are instrumental in monitoring the compliance of the participants with their 
particular treatment programmes.379  The exact staff composition of each Mental Health 
                                                
374  In some Mental Health Courts, it is compulsory to refer all matters relating to fitness to stand trial to 
the Mental Health Court for consideration.  The Brooklyn Mental Health Court is an example hereof.  
See Steadman et al 2005 Behavoural Science and Law 215 at 219 
375  Frailing 2009 C.S.L.R 145 at 152.  If an accused who is deemed to be not fit to stand trial, 
participates in the Mental Health Court programme the risk exists that critics may say that such 
participation is coerced in the sense that the participant was not in a position to truly “choose” to 
participate in the Mental Health Court programme or not.  
376  Luskin 2001 Law and Policy 217 at 219. 
377  Nolan observes that Judges presiding over problem solving courts are generally more creative, 
result-orientated and compassionate.  These judges are identified as “romantic judges” as opposed 
to the “classical judges” who tend to be more modest and impartial, focussing on interpreting the law.  
See Nolan 2011 Monash University Law Review 259 at 263.  See further Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 
D C L Review 143 at 150. 
378 Watson et al 2001 Psychiatric Services 477.  Also see Rich 2009 Fordham Urban Law Journal 89 at 
99 who points out that Judges must be trained to understand the mental illnesses that they will come 
across in the Mental Health Court over which they are presiding and the treatment modalities for 
these illnesses.  Also see Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 150.  Also see Lurigio 
and Snowden 2009 The Justice System Journal 196 at 211. 
379  Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 580.  Also see Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D 
C L Review 143 at 152, 158.  See further Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A 
Contemporary perspective at 439. 
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Court may differ from court to court.380 
The Brooklyn Mental Health Court team is multidisciplinary and comprises members from 
the mental health profession and the legal profession.  The Brooklyn Mental Health Court 
has an in-house clinical team consisting of a clinical director, social worker and three case 
coordinators.381  The court team meets daily to discuss the progress of participants.382  The 
clinical director is responsible for the final clinical eligibility decision at the Mental Health 
Court and regularly communicates with the judge, the district attorney, and the community 
partners where treatments to the court participants are provided.383  The psychosocial 
assessments are conducted by the social workers at the court during which the psychiatric 
history of the accused, his support structure, his employment history etc., is considered and 
reported on.384  
Forensic co-ordinators at the court have a number of accused’ persons dedicated to their 
care and are responsible for arranging placement for the accused at the relevant 
community establishment, regularly communicating with that establishment, monitoring the 
compliance of the defendant with the treatment programme and acting as a liaison between 
the court and the community treatment establishment.385  The Brooklyn Mental Health Court 
employs a psychiatrist on contract who conducts all the psychiatric evaluations of 
defendants at the court and drafts reports about their psychiatric state to the court.386  The 
evaluation lasts approximately 60-minutes and primarily aims to identify a diagnosis and the 
most appropriate treatment in order to see if the accused is eligible for the court in 
accordance with the eligibility criteria.387   
Representatives from the legal profession also form part of the court team.  A prosecutor is 
                                                
380  O’Keefie K The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 3. 
381  D’Emic 2007 Criminal Justice 25 at 27.  Also see Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for 
Offenders with Mental Illness at 58. 
382  D’Emic 2007 Criminal Justice 25 at 27. 
383  O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 13.  Also see this source at 19 where it is 
explained that the clinical director has the final say about if an accused meets the psychiatric 
eligibility criteria for the Brooklyn Mental Health Court.  Also see Rossman et al Criminal Justice 
Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 60. 
384  Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 58, 60.  D’Emic 
2007 Criminal Justice 25 at 27.  Also see O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 
13.  She also takes on the responsibility of forensic co-ordinator for female clients if the need arises. 
385  O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 14.  Also see Rossman et al Criminal 
Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 58, 59 where it is pointed out that the 
Brooklyn Mental Health Court has three forensic co-ordinators.  D’Emic 2007 Criminal Justice 25 at 
27.    
386  O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation 14. 
387  Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 59. 
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dedicated to the Brooklyn Mental Health Court who serves as the liaison from the District 
Attorney’s office and makes the official referral to the Mental Health Court.388  The 
prosecutor, on behalf of the Assistant District Attorney, does the initial legal screening, 
drafts the plea agreements, and has the authority to decline cases.389  The defence 
attorneys have to explain the plea agreement to the accused and make sure he 
understands it and that his participation in the court is truly voluntary.390  One judge 
presides over the Mental Health Court and has prior experience of problem-solving court 
processes.391 
On the administrative side of the court proceedings, the judge’s law secretary and Mental 
Health Court clerks contribute to the smooth daily operations of the court.392  The court has 
a project director that is very active during the planning phase of the court and who is also 
responsible for staff administration, developing templates of court documents and designing 
the process of referrals from criminal courts.393        
The procedural dynamics of the Mental Health Court with a particular focus on the Brooklyn 
Mental Health Court are discussed next.  
7  PROCEDURAL DYNAMICS OF A MENTAL HEALTH COURT IN THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 
7.1 Introduction 
Each Mental Health Court must put procedures in place that exhibit a balance between the 
constitutional rights of the accused to a fair trial and a legal representative on the one hand 
                                                
388  Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 58. 
389  Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 58.  The prosecutor 
also contacts the complainant to enquire whether he has an objection against the accused 
participating in the Mental Health Court programme instead of incarceration.  Also see O’Keefie The 
Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 14.  The Assistant District attorney was very involved in 
the planning stage of the court to develop the criminal eligibility criteria and appropriate dispositions 
for mentally ill accused persons diverted to the Mental Health Court.  He is also responsible for 
discussing cases regularly with the defense attorney and the clinical director. 
390  Defense attorneys representing mentally ill defendants are often from agencies that represent 
indigent persons.  See O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 14.  These include 
the Legal Aid Society and the Brooklyn Defender Services.  Also see Rossman et al Criminal Justice 
Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 59 where it is explained that these attorneys 
represent the accused throughout the court proceedings. 
391  O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 13. 
392  O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 14. 
393  O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 13.  The programme director is also 
responsible for networking and promoting the work of the court at conferences 
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and the public safety and public health on the other.394   
There does not seem to be a standard method of case management in Mental Health 
Courts for the process from the point of referral to the Mental Health Court to the point 
where a decision is made about whether the accused will be allowed to participate in the 
Mental Health Court programme.395  Most Mental Health Court processes do not appear in 
writing.396  The procedures of a Mental Health Court are further not static and may change 
over time.397   
 Mental Health Courts in the United States of America are post-charge diversion 
programmes that steer mentally ill persons away from the criminal justice system towards 
court-supervised treatment programmes.398  Most American Mental Health Court 
programmes are post-plea programmes since a guilty plea 399 is often a condition for 
                                                
394  Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 151.  Also see Hemmens, Brody and Spohn 
Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 437 where it is reiterated that problem solving 
courts function on the premise that the accused should accept responsibility for his actions.  These 
courts also aim to improve the safety of the community. 
395  Steadman et al 2005 Behavoural Science and Law 215 at 224. 
396  Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 156. 
397  Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 150.  Also see O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental 
Health Court Evaluation at 5 who opines that the goals of a Mental Health Court should also be 
adjusted if necessary once the court has been in operation for a number of years and the exact 
scope of its operations etched out. 
398  Frailing 2010 Int J Law Psychiat 207 at 207.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental 
Health Courts at 76 where they indicate that specialised Mental Health Courts, is the diversion 
programme most often used in the United States.  American Mental Health Courts are identified as 
“post-plea” diversion programmes where a guilty plea is mostly required for admission into the 
Mental Health Court programme.  This is in contrast with the Canadian Mental Health Court model 
that is typified as “pre-plea” diversion as the accused is never arraigned, nor is an admission of guilt 
required.  See chapter 4 of this research for a more detailed discussion on the nature of the 
Canadian Mental Health Court. 
399  The defendant may plead guilty, not guilty, no contest  or standing mute.  A plea of “no contest”  
results in the accused being found guilty but his admission is not admissible to prove any element of 
an offence in a civil claim.  Such a plea is, however, only possible with the consent of the prosecutor 
and the judge.  See Hemmens, Brody and Spohn Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 
116, 292.  Also see Albanese Criminal Justice at 111.  This type of plea is also referred to as 
collateral estoppel.  This plea is also known as nolo contendre.  Lastly, see Burnham Introduction to 
the Law and Legal System of the United States at 281.  “Standing mute” means that the accused is 
refusing to plead to the charges against him.  In this instance the court will enter a not guilty plea on 
the defendant’s behalf to preserve his Constitutional rights.  See Hemmens, Brody and Spohn 
Criminal Courts.  A Contemporary perspective at 292.  Also see Albanese Criminal Justice at 112.  
The majority of cases are resolved by a guilty plea.  Very few cases proceed to trial.  See Burnham 
Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 275, 280.  In 1995, of the 47 556 
persons convicted in the federal court, 91.7% of them, pleaded guilty to their charges.  When a guilty 
plea is entered, the judge has to be convinced that the accused’s decision to plead guilty is voluntary 
and fully informed and further has to be satisfied that the accused did indeed commit the crime.  If 
this cannot be established, the guilty plea will not be accepted and the matter must proceed to trial.  
Also see Draine, Wilson and Pogorzelski 2007 Journal of Offender Rehabilitation 159 at 166 who 
indicates that as many as 95% of all persons plead guilty in order to limit their time in the criminal 
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admission into this diversion programme.400  The guilty plea requirement presupposes two 
basic psycho-legal considerations, namely fitness to stand trial and criminal 
responsibility.401  The court can thus not accept a guilty plea if the offender was not fit to 
stand trial or if there was a clear defence of insanity or lack of criminal responsibility.402  The 
main motivation for requiring a guilty plea is to better enforce compliance with treatment in 
the diversion programme.403  
                                                                                                                                                   
justice system.  Also see Slobogin, Rai and Reisner Law and the Mental Health System at 1060.  A 
guilty plea can also form part of a plea bargain where the accused pleads guilty in exchange for a 
reduction in the charges or a special disposition regarding sentencing.  See Burnham Introduction to 
the Law and Legal System of the United States at 281.  The accused who is charged with armed 
robbery may for example be allowed to plead guilty to a charge of non-armed robbery.  With regard 
to sentencing, an agreement may be reached on a particular sentence range in exchange for a guilty 
plea.  Plea bargaining has been criticised as being too lenient on the offender.  It is still an integral 
part of the American criminal justice system and withstood constitutional challenges as well.  The 
burden of proof in a criminal trial is beyond a reasonable doubt as pointed out by Burnham 
Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States at 276. 
400  Lurigio and Snowden 2009 The Justice System Journal 196 at 211 who confirms that many Mental 
Health Courts require a guilty plea as a requirement to enter the Mental Health Court programme.  
Also see Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 88.  Also see Schneider Bloom 
and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 76 and 104.  This differs from the Canadian model of Mental 
Health Courts, since the Canadian courts are “pre-plea” post-charge diversion programmes where 
the accused is never arraigned, nor is an admission of guilt required.  See chapter 4 of this research 
for a detailed discussion on the Canadian model of the Mental Health Court.  South Australia’s 
diversion program, known as the “Magistrate’s Court Diversion Program” is in many respects similar 
to the American model of the Mental Health Court.  (See Schneider Bloom and Heerema Mental 
Health Courts at 108).  The regrettable outcome of this programme is that mentally ill offenders may 
still leave the programme with a criminal record, a consequence that should technically be avoided 
having regard to the goal of the Mental Health Court movement, namely to decriminalise the 
mentally ill.  Also see Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 191 where it is pointed out 
that a guilty plea is a requirement for admission to the Nevada Mental Health Court.  See further 
Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 153 where it is confirmed that most of the initial 
Mental Health Courts required a guilty plea or a no contest plea for entrance into the Mental Health 
Court program.  Also see Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental 
Illness at 57 where the Brooklyn Mental Health Court for instance is described as a post-indictment 
Mental Health Court.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 76.  Also 
see Stafford KP and Wygant DB “The role of competency to stand trial in mental health courts” 2005 
(23) Behav.  Sci Law 245-258 at 246.  See further Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 
570 at 576 where it is pointed out that many Mental Health Courts required a “no-contest” plea 
where a guilty plea was not obtained.  Also see Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for 
Offenders with Mental Illness at 57 where the Brooklyn Mental Health Court is identified as a post-
indictment Mental Health Court. 
401  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 86, 87.    
402  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 86, 87. 
403  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 87.  Also see Hora PF and Schma WC 
“Therapeutic jurisprudence” 1998 (82) Judicature 8-12 at 10.  See further Seltzer 2005 Psychology, 
Public Policy and Law 570 at 576.  Also see Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 153.  
Some Mental Health Courts follow a “pre-adjudication model” which entails that the charges are held 
in abeyance pending the mental health treatment of the accused.  In many Mental Health Courts the 
charges are dismissed after successful completion of the treatment programme.  Questions have 
been raised about the meaning of “successful completion” as some mental illnesses which are 
serious, are of a long term nature and may require years of treatment.  Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D 
C L Review 143 at 153.  In some instances dismissal of the charges do not happen automatically 
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Some Mental Health Courts sit once a week, others twice a week depending on the need in 
the particular region.404  The Brooklyn Mental Health Court is housed in the Kings County 
Supreme Court and hears cases every Tuesday, with cases not yet finalised rolling over to 
a Thursday.405  The court is presided over by the same judge every time, one with special 
training in the field of mental health.406  The Brooklyn Mental Health Court operates a 
dedicated Mental Health Court docket.407  The atmosphere in the Brooklyn Mental Health 
Court is very relaxed and informal, with the judge often addressing the defendant directly 
rather than speaking to him through his attorney.408 
Before the different phases in the American Mental Health Court model are explained, the 
eligibility criteria are discussed since the phases in the court process refers to the eligibility 
criteria throughout. 
7.2 Eligibility criteria 
7.2.1 Introduction 
 The eligibility criteria differ from court to court, where some Mental Health Courts, for 
example, do not take cases from mentally ill accused who allegedly committed crimes 
involving serious violence.409  Some Mental Health Courts only consider cases of those 
suffering from a serious mental illness.410    
 The eligibility criteria for Mental Health Court programmes are more suggestive than 
                                                                                                                                                   
and it is a long process to apply for it.  Also see Lurigio and Snowden 2009 The Justice System 
Journal 196 at 211 where this is confirmed. 
404  Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 149. 
405  Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 58. 
406  Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 58.  Also see Slate 
Mental Health Courts at 431 who stresses the importance of training in order to guarantee the 
success of a Mental Health Court. 
407  Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 70.  Only mental 
health matters appear on the court roll. 
408  O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 35.  The judge would for instance have a 
conversation with the accused, make eye contact or ask questions to the accused in open court.  
Also see Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 72.  See 
further Lurigio and Snowden 2009 The Justice System Journal 196 at 208 where it is pointed out that 
judges often have conversations with participants which contributes to the more informal 
atmosphere.  
409  Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice at 88.  Also see O’Keefie The Brooklyn 
Mental Health Court Evaluation at 3. 
410  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 104.  Also see Redlich et al 2006 Law and 
Human Behaviour 347 at 349. 
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deterministic.411  The process has also been identified as complicated and variable.412   The 
selection process that a Mental Health Court chooses to follow may have a direct impact on 
the performance of the interventions that it offers. 413 For example, if, when the selection 
takes place, most focus is placed on “treatability”, 414 the performance outcomes of Mental 
Health Court will be higher than when the focus is placed on diagnosis, for example, as not 
all diagnosed mental illnesses will react equally well to treatment within a certain period of 
time.  
The structure of the decision to allow an accused to participate in the Mental Health Court 
programme is complex because the Mental Health Court participant must meet certain 
psychiatric and legal criteria.415  These criteria are discussed below, with a particular focus 
on the eligibility criteria of the Brooklyn Mental Health Court. 
7.2.2 Clinical/psychiatric eligibility criteria 
The mere fact that an accused suffers from a mental illness and is charged with a crime 
that falls within the eligibility criteria of the Mental Health Court will not ensure acceptance 
of the accused into the Mental Health Court programme.416  The psychiatric criteria entail 
that the accused must suffer from a serious or persistent mental illness for which there is a 
known treatment, such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or major depression.417  The 
                                                
411  Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 403.  The fact that the 
eligibility criteria for Mental Health Courts are more suggestive than deterministic, means that 
possibility of bias exists in that the tendency might be to only allow accused who has a good chance 
of success in the programme.  This concern has also been picked up by Albanese Criminal Justice 
at 262.  Also see Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 15 
where this concern is also raised and the practice is labelled as “creaming” it is further pointed out 
that this may lead to distorted research results with regard to the successful outcomes of these 
courts. 
412  Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 402. 
413  Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 403. 
414  See Frailing 2009 C.S.L.R 145 at 150 where she points out that the accessibility criteria to the 
Mental Health Court programmes, was more focused on age and gender than on any legal aspect 
and that there is a possibility that these courts seem to accept participants not based on the offence 
committed by the mentally ill offender, but based on the likelihood of the participant benefiting from 
the treatment.  Also see Steadman et al 2005 Behavoural Science and Law 215 at 220.  Who 
confirms that Mental Health Court staff may be accepting only those referrals that have a high 
likelihood of successfully completing the treatment, rather than basing such acceptance on diagnosis 
or any other factor. 
415  Luskin 2001 Law and Policy 217 at 219.  The complexity of the decision is contrasted with the 
simplicity of the decision to allow an accused to participate in a drug court programme.  Also see 
Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 13, 63.    
416  Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 402.  See the criticism against 
the Mental Health Court movement for the criticism against the impact that this approach may have. 
417  O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 1,19.  These typically include depression, 
bipolar disorder, schizophrenia and schizo-affective disorder.  Also see Rossman et al Criminal 
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accused must suffer from a mental illness and must have criminal charges against him.418  
Whether an accused suffers from a mental illness or not is determined by the mental health 
care practitioner using the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM).419    
Persons with developmental disabilities, personality disorders, brain injury, and dementia 
are not eligible for the Brooklyn Mental Health Court if this is their only diagnosis.420  Some 
other Mental Health Courts accepted individuals diagnosed with mental retardation 
provided that an arrangement for treatment can be made with the local, regional centre.421  
Individuals who had no mental health history at all are also accepted by some courts to 
make provision for those cases where the individuals had their first break down.422 
Clinicians who recommend that an accused be diverted into a Mental Health Court 
treatment programme have to be objective in their assessment of whether the accused is 
suited for diversion.423  What impacts this is the ability of the accused to be treated.424  
Presiding officers may become opposed to diversion if a clinician indiscriminately 
recommends that every single accused be diverted, despite the repeated failure of prior 
treatment programmes.425 
                                                                                                                                                   
Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness 13 where it is explained that the eligibility 
criteria of “serious and persistent mental illness” is the legally defined requirement.  The clinically 
defined requirement for the psychiatric criteria would refer to Axis 1 disorders for example.  See this 
source at 63 for detail on which conditions would typically be considered to be serious and persistent 
mental illness and which conditions are excluded for purposes of eligibility to the Brooklyn Mental 
Health Court. 
418  Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 403. 
419  Known as the DSM.  The DSM has been transformed through various editions of which the most 
recent is the DSM-V.  The DSM is mostly used by mental health practitioners in America to diagnose 
mental health issues.  See Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 273-374 at 374.  The 
DSM is recognised by courts as an accepted standard to be used to diagnose mental conditions. 
420  Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 63.  Also see 
O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at iii, 5, 6.  This inevitably meant that the 
court took in fewer people than it would have had it been open to any accused with a mental defect 
that was not necessarily susceptible to treatment.  Also see Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law 
and Human Behaviour 402 at 411, see the details in Table 1 where it is stated that these conditions 
were accepted in the majority of Mental Health Courts that formed part of this particular study.  The 
fourth court in the sample that did take mental health histories of their applicants, had detailed 
selection criteria and allowed individuals with an Axis I diagnosis or a diagnosis of borderline 
personality disorder, provided that the borderline personality disorder is assessed to drive criminal 
behaviour. 
421  Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 411, see the details in Table 1 
for Court 6 that formed part of the study. 
422  Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 411, see the details in Table 1 
for Court 6 that formed part of the study. 
423  Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice 92. 
424  Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice 92. 
425  Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic Practice 92. 
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 The accused must further be stabilised and fit to stand trial.426 
7.2.3 Legal eligibility criteria 
 The legal eligibility criteria pertaining to the type of offence that the accused is charged 
with.427  The eligibility criteria have to be clear with reference to the type of offence and 
whether the court will accept mentally ill persons charged with violent offences.428  
The eligibility of a case for the Mental Health Court is determined by the Assistant District 
Attorney before it comes to the Mental Health Court, where a separate assessment for 
eligibility is conducted.429  The Assistant District Attorney has a veto right to prevent an 
accused from participating in a Mental Health Court.430  
The Mental Health Courts in the United States of America usually only hear cases 
pertaining to non-violent (misdemeanour) offences.431  Those who committed more serious 
offences (felonies) have to be processed through the normal criminal justice system.  The 
recent trend, however, seems to be for Mental Health Courts to consider more serious 
offences, both in seriousness and type.432  Some advocate that Mental Health Courts 
should, in fact, focus on felonies as these specialised courts should focus their resources 
on offenders who are not suitable for other types of diversion.433  This, they argue, will 
                                                
426  Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 63.  Also see 
Lurigio and Snowden 2009 The Justice System Journal 196 at 206 who confirms the fitness 
requirement for eligibility for a Mental Health Court programme.  Also see the discussion of the test 
for fitness earlier in this chapter. 
427  Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 63. 
428  Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 465. 
429  O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 20.  The type of cases over which a 
particular Mental Health Court has jurisdiction, is further determined by the particular court that 
houses the Mental Health Court.  See Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 88. 
430  O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 20. 
431  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 88.  Also see Parry Criminal Mental Health 
and Disability Law at 191 where it is indicated that this was the initial focus of the Mental Health 
Court but that the goals have changed over time as the justice department became more involved.  
See however Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 152,153 where this practice is 
questioned as it might exclude accused persons in need of mental health treatment who, because of 
their mental illnesses committed more serious offences. 
432  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 88.  Also see Seltzer 2005 Psychology, 
Public Policy and Law 570 at 576, 577.  Also see Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 
155.  Mental Health Courts consider crimes against the person, property and public order.  See 
Luskin 2001 Law and Policy 217 at 219. 
433  This is the case with the Brooklyn Mental Health court in the early 2000’s.  Some older Mental Health 
Courts that are more established, handle more serious offences, such as the Department 95 Court in 
Los Angeles and the Broward County Mental Health Court in Florida.  See Heerema 2005 Crim.L.Q 
255 at 265.  Also see Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 577.  Also see 
Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 155.  The view that Mental Health Courts should 
focus on serious crime is also expressed by the Bazelon Centre for Mental Health Law 
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prevent Mental Health Courts from becoming the entry point to mental health services for 
those who committed quality of life offences and who have been abandoned by the mental 
health care system.434      
The Brooklyn Mental Health Court agreed to also hear violent felony cases, but only on a 
case-by-case basis with the understanding that the prosecutor can veto the offender’s 
participation in the Mental Health Court.435   
The Brooklyn Mental Health Court opened its doors in 2002 and was initially intended to 
focus on adult offenders who committed non-violent felonies.436  Violent felonies were 
initially excluded due to public safety concerns.437  Later, the court included violent felonies 
and “chronic” misdemeanour offenders on a case-by-case basis.438  Public safety was 
raised as a major concern by, particularly, the district attorney’s office.439  These concerns 
were addressed by ensuring that a detailed psychiatric evaluation is done on the accused 
to assess risk and future violent behaviour.440  In addition, the judge and prosecutor had the 
right to reject referral in cases that they believed were not appropriate.441   
                                                                                                                                                   
“Criminalization of people with mental illness:  The role of mental health courts in system reform” 
http://www.bazelon.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=xQf5_1grKcI%3D&tabid=104  (Date of use:  17 
March 2013) at 3.  Also see Christy A, Poythress NG, Boothroyd RA, Petrila J and Mehra S 
“Evaluating the efficiency and community safety goals of the Broward County mental health court” 
2005 (23) Behav.  Sci Law 227-243 at 299.     
434  Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 577.  Also see Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D 
C L Review 143 at 155. 
435 Fisher  
http://www.courtinnovation.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.ViewPageandPageID=603andcurrentTop 
Tier2=true (Date of use:  7 March 2011) at 6.  Also see O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court 
Evaluation at 6. 
436  D’Emic 2007 Criminal Justice 25 at 25.   Also see O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court 
Evaluation at iii.  See further Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental 
Illness at 57. 
437  D’Emic 2007 Criminal Justice 25 at 25.  Also see Fisher 2015 The Judge’s Journal 8 at 10 where it is 
stated that this was a general exclusion across all Mental Health Courts in the United States of 
America.  Often the funding instrument for a particular court would prohibit the inclusion of violent 
offences in the programmes that the funding is intended for. 
438  O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at iii, v, 6, 19.  Also see Rossman et al 
Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 57 where it is stated that the 80% 
of the cases heard by Mental Health Court involves felonies.  Also see this source at 13, 63 where it 
is indicated that more and more Mental Health Courts in America are accepting referrals in cases 
where the offence was of a more serious nature.  Also see O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health 
Court Evaluation at 1 who points out that violent felonies are presumed ineligible, but are allowed on 
a case-by-case basis. 
439  O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at iv. 
440  O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 9. 
441  O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at iv.  Also see this source at 9 where it is 
explained that the District Attorney’s office initially insisted on restricted housing for persons in the 
Mental Health Court programme but this proved unrealistic due to shortage of housing possibilities.  
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The Brooklyn Mental Health Court was one of the first Mental Health Courts to also 
consider cases of those suffering from a mental illness charged with a felony.442  One of the 
motivations for this decision was “problem-solving justice”, which is practiced in problem-
solving courts such as Mental Health Courts, where creative solutions are given for cases 
where social, human, and legal problems interact.443  Another motivation for dealing with 
felonies was that research done in a drug court that handled felonies showed that offenders 
charged with felonies have better outcomes than the offenders charged with a 
misdemeanour.444  The Brooklyn Mental Health Court’s focus on handling cases involving 
felonies, including those involving assault, robbery and burglary,445 are contributing to 
making treatment available to accused persons who would probably not have received 
treatment otherwise.446 Charges involving murder and rape are excluded, regardless of the 
type of mental illness of the accused.447 
All misdemeanours are eligible, but these accused persons must be willing to accept a 12- 
month treatment programme and a possible jail sentence in the event of non-compliance.448  
                                                                                                                                                   
Restricted housing is also against mental health care principles as the aim is to ensure independent 
living of those living with mental illnesses.  The compromise was struck that the District attorney 
could veto any decision to refer a particular case to the Mental Health Court. 
442 Fisher C “Building Trust and managing risk:  a look at a felony mental health Court” (Centre for Court 
Innovation) 
http://www.courtinnovation.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.ViewPageandPageID=603andcurrentTop 
Tier2=true (Date of use:  7 March 2011) at 2. 
443 Fisher  
http://www.courtinnovation.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.ViewPageandPageID=603andcurrentTop 
Tier2=true (Date of use:  7 March 2011) at 2. 
444  One of the main reasons for this is simply that of the stakes are higher, compliance with a court 
mandate will improve.  Someone facing several years in prison is much more motivated to avoid 
sentencing and will rather work through the programme.  Someone who committed a misdemeanour 
who faces a sentence of a couple of weeks or months, is much more likely to opt for the jail time just 
for the sake of getting out on the streets again to have access to drugs.  See Fisher  
http://www.courtinnovation.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.ViewPageandPageID=603andcurrentTop 
Tier2=true (Date of use:  7 March 2011) at 4.  Also see O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court 
Evaluation at 53 where it was found that this was also the case with Brooklyn Mental Health Court 
participants. 
445  Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 63.  Also see 
O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 1. 
446  During the process of the Brooklyn Mental Health Court considering handling felonies, the mental 
health care users whose cases were heard by this court before, gave their input.  Some of the users 
reported that they didn’t realise their own need for treatment even after being arrested and that short 
terms in jail where preferable to treatment for them as they did not believe that they needed 
treatment or that they could benefit from it.  A number of the mental health care users thought that 
the Brooklyn Mental Health Court should only handle felonies because misdemeanours didn’t carry 
enough of a threat of incarceration to motivate an offender to engage in treatment.  See Fisher  
http://www.courtinnovation.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.ViewPageandPageID=603andcurrentTop 
Tier2=true (Date of use:  7 March 2011) at 4. 
447  Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 63. 
448  Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 63.  Also see 
O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 1. 
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Misdemeanour offenders generally spend short periods in jail and may not be willing to 
agree to a period of treatment that could be longer than the time they would be incarcerated 
if their case were processed through the traditional criminal court.449  
Now that the eligibility criterion is clear, we have to consider the actual referral of an eligible 
accused to the Mental Health Court.  
7.3 Referral to the Mental Health Court   
 Referrals to the Mental Health Court are received from judges, defence attorneys, district 
attorneys, police officers, probation officers, family members and advocacy groups.450  
 A large number of referrals to the Brooklyn Mental Health Court originate from competency 
to stand trial examination orders.451  It is compulsory to refer the case to the Brooklyn 
Mental Health Court if a competency examination is ordered in this district.452  Where an 
accused who was found unfit to stand trial has regained fitness, his case is automatically 
referred to the Brooklyn Mental Health Court unless the prosecutor objects thereto.453  Most 
referrals to the Brooklyn Mental Health Court occur after indictment in the criminal court.454    
Where Mental Health Courts in a particular area are not well known or respected, there will 
be fewer referrals.455  Courts that are more integrated into referral sources, such as prisons, 
                                                
449  Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 63.  Also see 
Lurigio and Snowden 2009 The Justice System Journal 196 at 206.  They authors add that what may 
further deter an accused to sign up for the Mental Health Court programme is the fact that a guilty 
plea is required. 
450  Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 405.  Defence attorneys were 
found to be the largest referral source.  In two of the six courts that formed the subject of this 
comparative study, defence attorneys were not the biggest source of referral but they relied on the 
Mental Health Court clinical staff to identify possible candidates and further relied on a wider variety 
of referral sources.  Also see D’Emic 2007 Criminal Justice 25 at 26.  Also see Rossman et al 
Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 67.  Some other sources of referral 
are other Judges or Magistrates, the public defender’s office and the Forensic diversion programme.  
See Steadman et al 2005 Behavoural Science and Law 215 at 218. 
451  Steadman et al 2005 Behavoural Science and Law 215 at 222.  Also see O’Keefie The Brooklyn 
Mental Health Court Evaluation 17 where it is indicated that in the first 2 years of the Brooklyn 
Mental Health Courts operations, 30% of the referrals were from competency matters. 
452  Steadman et al 2005 Behavoural Science and Law 215 at 219.  In Brooklyn, all individuals referred 
for competency evaluations to determine fitness to stand trial or criminal capacity, must be referred 
to the Mental Health Court. 
453  Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 67. 
454  Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 67.  This is after 
arraignment where misdemeanour offences are formally charged and felony offences are transferred 
to the Supreme Court for indictment. 
455  Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 405.  Also see Rich 2009 
Fordham Urban Law Journal 89 at 100 who points out that referral to Mental Health Courts from the 
rural areas, are not as popular.  Reasons for this phenomenon might be the fact that rural areas 
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will result in them having more sources of referral.456  A good referral rate is proof that the 
target population of the Mental Health Courts are being reached.457    
Despite the Brooklyn Mental Health Court’s initial idea to focus on non-violent felony 
offences, a large number of referrals to the court entail violent offences.458  The practice 
emerged that, where an accused who is charged with a violent offence wants to enter the 
treatment programme, the victim’s consent is sought.459  The victim thus endorses the idea 
of treatment instead of prison.  Although consent is not a requirement, the majority of 
victims usually agree to treatment rather than jail time for the mentally ill offender.460    
The average Mental Health Court participant (53% of the sample group) was age 35 or 
older.461  Women are more likely to be referred to Mental Health Courts than men are.462  
                                                                                                                                                   
simply lack alternative treatment options such as Mental Health Courts. 
456  Some Mental Health Courts rely on the clinical staff to identify candidates for the Mental Health 
Court programme.  See Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 405  
This was the case with two out of the six Mental Health Courts that formed the subject of this 
comparative study.  These courts had to actively “recruit” suitable candidates for the Mental Health 
Court programme.  Reasons attributed to low referrals are lack of training to recognise mental 
illnesses and the cost involved to transfer a mentally ill accused to a facility for observation, which is 
often far away.  See Rich 2009 Fordham Urban Law Journal 89 at 100.  This may result in the cases 
of accused persons with mental illness being processed through the traditional criminal justice 
system.    
457  Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 405. 
458  According to D’Emic 2007 Criminal Justice 25 at 26, 40% of all referrals entail a violent offence.  
Also see O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at v.  Research emerged that violent 
felons can be properly maintained in the community with the necessary support services.  See 
Fisher 2015 The Judge’s Journal 8 at 10. 
459  Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 59.  The prosecutor 
who is the liaison for the District attorney’s office at the Mental Health Court, is tasked with 
contacting the complainant to enquire if there is an objection against the diversion.  D’Emic 2007 
Criminal Justice 25 at 26.  See however this source at 27 where a case is discussed where the 
victim of assault refused such consent (a young girl who wanted to escape from a life of prostitution, 
assaulted her pimp who then refused consent for her to enter a treatment programme rather than 
prison).  The district attorney nonetheless allowed the girl to enter the treatment programme. 
460  D’Emic 2007 Criminal Justice 25 at 26.  Also see Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for 
Offenders with Mental Illness at 58 who explain that the consent is not a requirement. 
461  This was the result in a study conducted of 7 Mental Health Courts across America 285 participants 
formed part of this study.  These seven courts were situated at Santa Clara County CA, Orange 
County NC, Allegheny County PA, Washoe County NV, Brooklyn NY, Bonneville County ID and 
Orange County CA.  For details of the study of these seven Mental Health Courts, see generally 
Steadman et al 2005 Behavoural Science and Law 215 –226.  Also see this source at 219 where it is 
explained that at the time, 39% of all prison inmates were 35 years and older.  The Mental Health 
Courts in this study were therefore more likely to deal with older offenders than would be the case in 
a normal criminal court. 
462  Steadman et al 2005 Behavoural Science and Law 215 at 219.  This conclusion was based on the 
fact that, at the time men made out approximately 90 to 94% of all inmates whilst male Mental Health 
Court participants comprised 60% of the total amount of Mental Health Court participants in this 
study.  Also see Frailing 2009 C.S.L.R 145 at 150 for detail on a study at the Marion County Mental 
Health Court of 305 participants that were diverted between April 1997 and April 1998, revealed that 
these courts are more likely to accept younger women and older men as participants.   
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20% of participants were homeless at the time of intake, and 30% were homeless in the five 
years prior to arrest.463  Education levels were low.464  The mental illnesses mostly 
diagnosed in the Brooklyn Mental Health Court are depression and bipolar disorder.465  
Almost half (46%) of the participants reported having been hospitalised for psychiatric 
treatment in the year prior to intake, and about a quarter of the participants were on 
medication at the time of intake.466  Most accused referred to the Mental Health Court are 
eventually diagnosed with a mental illness, with a small percentage found not to have any 
mental illness at all.467 
Once an accused arrives at the Mental Health Court, he generally goes through two main 
phases, labelled the admission phase and the programme phase.  Labelling the phases as 
such keeps the discussion in line with that of the Mental Health Court employed in 
Canada.468  Each phase, however, consists of a number of stages that differ from those in 
the Canadian model.  These stages are discussed below. 
 
                                                
463  Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 64. 
464  Only 40% of the participants had a high school diploma.  See Rossman et al Criminal Justice 
Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 64.  Other interesting demographical information is 
that 76% of the participants were male and the same percentage (men and women) were never 
married.  Alcohol and drug use in the 6 months prior to the intake into the Mental Health Court 
programme was very common among participants. 
465  Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 65.  Also see 
Steadman et al 2005 Behavoural Science and Law 215 at 220.  See further Frailing 2009 C.S.L.R 
145 at 151 ads that those diagnosed with Schizophrenia or Bipolar mood disorder, were found to be 
most likely to be accepted into the Mental Health Court program.  Mental Health Court participants 
were most frequently diagnosed with Schizophrenia, schizoid-affective disorder, bipolar disorder and 
depressive mood disorder   Also see Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 279 at 285 
where the mental illnesses that are most often found in the criminal justice system are discussed.  
These are Substance related disorders; Mental retardation; Delirium and dementia; personality 
disorders; Paraphilia; Dissociative disorders; Posttraumatic Stress Disorder; Mood disorders such as 
depression and bi-polar; schizophrenia.  For a diagnosis of schizophrenia to be made, the condition 
must have persisted for at least 6 months.  This serves as a precautionary measure to ensure that 
this diagnosis is not made in error where the real cause of the behaviour may be temporary 
psychosis due to external factors. 
466  Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 65. 
467  Steadman et al 2005 Behavoural Science and Law 215 at 220 explains that In five of the seven 
courts that formed part of the study, 20% of those referred to the Mental Health Court were found not 
to have a mental illness or it was uncertain if these individuals suffer from a mental illness.  The two 
other courts in the study, reported that 7% of their referrals were found not to have a mental illness.  
76% of those with serious mental illnesses were accepted into the Mental Health Court programme.  
44% of those with less serious mental illnesses such as depression and substance abuse disorders 
were accepted into the programme. 
468  The admission phase of the Mental Health Court in the United States of America is sometimes 
referred to as the “eligibility assessment phase”.  See Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and 
Human Behaviour 402 at 404.  The Mental Health Court model employed in Canada is discussed 
chapter 4 of this research. 
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7.4 Admission phase 
 The admission phase consists of four main stages, which are discussed separately below. 
7.4.1 First stage:  Initial screening 
 The initial eligibility screening determines if the case is in principle suitable for the Mental 
Health Court.469  During this stage, the legal and psychiatric screening criteria is 
considered.  The screening criteria used vary from one Mental Health Court to the next.  
Each Mental Health Court has its own “screen out factors” which disqualifies an individual 
from entering the Mental Health Court programme.  These factors may refer to a particular 
offence or diagnosis.470 
 With regard to the legal criteria, it may be that a particular Mental Health Court considers 
misdemeanours only or felonies as well.471 
The mental health diagnosis is further indicative of the accused’s eligibility for the Mental 
                                                
469  Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 405.  Put differently, this stage 
investigates how the accused was identified as a potential candidate for the Mental Health Court 
programme. 
470  Further examples of screening out criteria found by Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and 
Human Behaviour 402 at 409-411 in a study of 6 Mental Health Courts, are no cases involving 
extreme violence such as murder or very serious sex offences, or where a gun was used during the 
crime was considered.  An accused with more than 3 felony convictions in the past 10 years, or with 
any prior murder or sex offence convictions were excluded.  Traffic offences are not considered.  
Accused persons with a violent criminal history are excluded.  No felonies that have not been 
reduced to misdemeanour.  No one with prior multiple failures with Mental Health Court programmes 
and no one residing outside of the county is considered.  No violent felonies except if the crime 
closely linked to mental illness or if victim was a family members.  No cases where there is not a 
clear connection between the crime and mental illness.  See table 1 of this source for details of the 
screening-out criteria of a particular court.  
471  Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 406.  The criteria for accepting 
the cases of those accused of a felony, differed from court to court in that one court considered 
access to the Mental Health programme for those who committed felonies on a case-by-case basis, 
whilst others only accepted referrals for those who committed felonies if the charges were reduced to 
that of a misdemeanour.  Some accepted violent and non-violent felonies whilst others only accepted 
felonies (violent and non-violent) if they were in custody.  See Table 1 in Wollf, Fabrikant and 
Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 409-411.  Also see Redlich et al 2006 Law and 
Human Behaviour 347 at 354, 357 who indicate that half of all Mental Health Courts in existence in 
2005, considered both misdemeanours and felonies.  See further Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L 
Review 143 at 147 where it is indicated that from the early stages of the existence of Mental Health 
Courts, some of these courts considered felonies as well as misdemeanours.  See further Lurigio 
and Snowden 2009 The Justice System Journal 196 at 206 where it is explained that certain types of 




Health Court programme.472  The Brooklyn Mental Health Court allows individuals with a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia, schizo-affective, bipolar disorder, and major depression.473  Co-
occurring substance abuse or Axis II conditions are accommodated at most Mental Health 
Courts but not if it is the primary diagnosis.474    
In some cases, however, Mental Health Courts make use of filtering agents that perform 
the initial screening task for them.475  During this screening process, the individual’s criminal 
charges and criminal history, as well as evidence of the mental illness, are compared to the 
formal eligibility criteria of the particular Mental Health Court.476    
The last issue during stage one that has to be considered is consent factors.  Consultations 
with victims, prosecutors, and defence attorneys may be held to test their willingness to 
have the case referred to a Mental Health Court.477 
                                                
472  Different courts may allow accused persons with different diagnosis into their programmes.  Some 
may allow individuals with Axis 1 mental illness, dementia, organic brain disorder, developmental 
disabilities or chronic alcoholism with psychosis.  See Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and 
Human Behaviour 402 at 410, see the details in Table 1 for Court 3 for the eligibility criteria of this 
court.  Another Mental Health Court allowed individuals with a diagnosis of Bipolar, schizo-affective 
or schizophrenia into their programme with the additional requirement that they must be generally 
disengaged from community treatment.  See Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human 
Behaviour 402 at 410.  See the details in Table 1 for Court 4 that formed part of the study. 
473  Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 411, 412, see the details in 
Table 1 for Court 5 that formed part of the study. 
474  Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 410, see the details in Table 1 
for Court 3 that formed part of the study.  Allowing accused with co-occurring mental illness and 
substance abuse problems into the Mental Health Court programme, addresses the concern raised 
by Frailing 2009 C.S.L.R 145 at 153 that Mental Health Courts will fail to properly address the needs 
of their targeted participants if they do not incorporate programmes for substance abuse into their 
treatment options.  Also see O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 3 where a 
further alternative diversion programme has been developed for those with co-occurring mental 
illnesses who may be excluded from the Mental Health Court programme due to their coexisting 
mental illnesses. 
475  There are typically two filtering agents in this process through which “applications” for participation in 
the Mental Health Court flows, they are the district attorney or the Mental Health Court co-ordinator   
See Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 405.  The Mental Health 
Court co-ordinator is also referred to as the Mental Health Court Supervisor or Director.  The training 
level of the Mental Health Court coordinator performing the stage one screening, differed between 
the courts that formed part of the study.  One court stated that the coordinator has Masters or 
Doctoral level clinical training, whilst another made use of a Masters level clinician at the local jail to 
perform the screening.  See Table 1 in Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human 
Behaviour 402 at 409-411.  The primary function of the filtering agent, is two-fold.  Firstly, they serve 
a “clearinghouse” function as all referrals to the Mental Health Court are received centrally by the 
filtering agents.  Secondly, they perform the initial eligibility screening function where they determine 
if the case is in principle suitable for the Mental Health Court.   
476  Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 405 
477  Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 405.  At one of the six Mental 
Health Courts that formed part of this study, the clinical director acted as the filtering agent and  took 
the sole decision on if a case should be referred to the Mental Health Court or not.  The willingness 
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Once an accused meets the initial screening criteria in terms of the type of offence and type 
of mental illness, he moves on to the second stage of the admission phase. 
7.4.2 Second stage:  Assessment and eligibility screening 
  This stage of the assessment is conducted by the Mental Health Court Team and focuses 
on the assessment of behavioural health problems and related criminal history issues.478  
An accused will be screened for mental illness after his first appearance at the Mental 
Health Court.479  The first appearance and screening mostly take place on the same day.480     
 Competency assessments for participation in the Mental Health Court treatment 
programme are not done on all intended participants of the Mental Health Court 
programme, but only if a participant appears “grossly incompetent”.481  An accused must be 
able to identify the advantages and disadvantages of participating in the Mental Health 
Court programme.  This assessment consists of a psychosocial assessment done by a 
social worker and a psychiatric assessment that is conducted by the resident psychiatrist.482  
                                                                                                                                                   
of the victim, prosecutor or defence attorney to have the matter referred to the Mental Health Court  
proved to be irrelevant at this particular Mental Health Court.  Also see this source at 409, 410. 
478  Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 406, 409-411.  Some Mental 
Health Courts during this stage require a mental health assessment whilst others rely on a diagnosis 
obtained from a case record review.  Also see Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic 
Practice 171-176 where the various assessment tools are discussed and the strengths of each 
identified.  At two of the six Mental Health Courts that formed part of the study, no mental health 
screening was done.  The common denominator at these two courts was that the district attorney, as 
opposed to a Mental Health Court coordinator (who usually has some form of clinical knowledge) 
was the filtering agent.  In those Mental Health Courts where no mental health screening is done, the 
decision to allow the individual into the Mental Health Court programme is taken solely on the type of 
offence committed and the criminal history.  See Rogers and Shuman Fundamentals of Forensic 
Practice at 168 who cautions against the gathering of background information on the accused that 
includes his psychiatric history as such history might not be relevant to the current referral.  It is also 
pointed out in this source that the gathering of such information could raise concern regarding some 
ethical and privacy issues. 
479  Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 67, 69.  All the 
parties agree at this first appearance that the accused should be clinically screened. 
480  Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 69. 
481  Frailing 2009 C.S.L.R 145 at 152.  If an accused who is deemed to be not fit to stand trial, 
participates in the Mental Health Court programme the risk exists that critics may say that such 
participation is coerced in the sense that the participant was not in a position to truly “choose” to 
participate in the Mental Health Court programme or not.   
482  O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 20.  The psychiatric assessment in the 
Brooklyn Mental Health Court was done on average 11 days after first contact with the court with the 
legal eligibility assessment taking approximately 2 weeks.  Also see Rossman et al Criminal Justice 
Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 69 where it is pointed out that where eligibility 
psychiatric and legal assessments do not run concurrently, the eligibility assessments can take up to 
one month.  Also see D’Emic 2007 Criminal Justice 25 at 26.  Also see Rossman et al Criminal 
Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 67.  The social worker does the 
psychosocial assessment and the psychiatrist does the psychiatric assessment. 
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They each draft a report and these are made available to all parties involved.483  These 
reports have to show that the accused suffers from a serious and persistent mental illness 
for which there is a known treatment method since this is a requirement for admission into 
the court-monitored treatment programme.484  These reports contain a diagnosis, the 
psychiatric history of the accused and a risk assessment.485  An opinion on the accused’s 
eligibility for the Mental Health Court treatment programme is provided.486    
Where individuals met the required diagnostic criteria of the Mental Health Court, other 
clinical factors could be taken into consideration for eligibility, such as the fact that the 
accused is also suffering from a personality disorder which in itself will generally not grant 
the accused access to the Mental Health Court.487  Another factor that is considered is the 
individual’s history of treatment and, in particular, if he has a history of non-compliance with 
treatment, in which event it would be viewed negatively for purposes of eligibility.488  The 
link between mental illness and criminal behaviour is further considered together with the 
violence risk of the individual and his general suitability for the Mental Health Court 
programme.489  The clinical director takes the final decision as to the clinical eligibility of the 
accused.490 
With regard to the legal criteria, the current charges and criminal history of the individual 
are considered during this stage.491  Where the district attorney acted as a filtering agent 
and conducted the initial screening of the legal criteria (stage 1), this part of the 
assessment in the second stage will be brief, as it would have been done thoroughly during 
the initial screening stage.492  Where the initial screening was done by a Mental Health 
Court, the Mental Health Court would have focussed more on the mental health 
                                                
483  O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 20 points out that it is common for the 
clinical director to have had a discussion with the other parties prior to the Mental Health Court 
proceedings to discuss the evaluation of the accused. 
484  D’Emic 2007 Criminal Justice 25 at 26.   Also see O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court 
Evaluation at iii.  These illnesses would include depression, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia and 
schizo-affective disorder. 
485  D’Emic 2007 Criminal Justice 25 at 26.   Also see this source at 27 where it is indicated that 30% of 
the participants were diagnosed with depression, 24% with bipolar disorder and 21% with 
schizophrenia.  Almost half of all the court participants also have a drug addiction problem for which 
they require treatment.  See further O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 2 who 
confirms that depression, bipolar disorder and schizophrenia were the most common diagnosis 
made in the Brooklyn Mental Health Court.  
486  D’Emic 2007 Criminal Justice 25 at 26. 
487  Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 406. 
488  Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 406. 
489  Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 406. 
490  Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 67. 
491  Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 406. 
492  Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 406. 
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assessment during the first stage and less on the criminal history, hence this investigation 
will be more thorough during the second stage in these instances.493 
The final step in this stage entails a recommendation by the Mental Health Court Team 
pertaining to the accused’s suitability for the Mental Health Court programme. 494   
Participation in the Mental Health Court programme will not occur if the district attorney, 
probation officers, mental health care providers, or the defence attorney refuses to allow the 
case to proceed through the Mental Health Court.495   
Access to the Mental Health Court programme will further be denied if the accused is 
considered incompetent to make a decision regarding participation in the Mental Health 
Court programme.496    The rationale behind this is that an accused’s fitness to stand trial is 
presupposed if he is participating in the Mental Health Court programme.497 
An accused may, at the end of the second stage, be denied access to the Mental Health 
Court programme on diagnostic grounds,498 service availability grounds 499 or any other 
valid ground.500  Such “other” ground may include that the accused is not fit to stand trial. 
                                                
493  Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 406. 
494  Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 406.  The procedure of 
consideration by the Mental Health Court Team differed from court to court.  Some courts used a 
method where the team would meet and review cases to reach a decision whereas other courts 
used an assembly line where decisions are signed off by members of the Mental Health Court team. 
495  Steadman et al 2005 Behavoural Science and Law 215 at 222. 
496  Steadman et al 2005 Behavoural Science and Law 215 at 220, 222.  Acceptance into the Mental 
Health Court programme will however be denied if the individual is found to be too unstable too 
make an informed decision at the time to enrol and participate in the Mental Health Court.  Also see 
Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 151 who points out that, although it may seem 
obvious that a mentally ill accused will choose the Mental Health Court programme over traditional 
prosecutorial processing, a decision to so participate must be an informed one, well aware of the 
advantages and disadvantages that participation in the Mental Health Court programme may hold. 
497  See Frailing 2009 C.S.L.R 145 at 151 where it is stressed that the offender must be able to identify 
the advantages and disadvantages of participating in the Mental Health Court programme in order 
for him/her to be allowed into the relevant program. 
498  If the individual does not have an Axis I disorder or no disorder at all, or if the primary diagnosis is 
that of substance abuse or personality disorder.  Admission will also not be granted if the individual 
does suffer from an Axis I illness but is found not in need of intensive case management.  See 
Steadman et al 2005 Behavoural Science and Law 215 at 222.  Also see Wollf, Fabrikant and 
Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 406. 
499  The required treatment service is either not available or the accused does not meet the diagnostic 
treatment criteria for the particular service provider.  See Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and 
Human Behaviour 402 at 406. 
500  Admission will not be allowed if there is a weak connection between the criminal act and the mental 
illness, or if the accused has been assessed but is found not to be treatable.  Admission will also be 
denied if the accused is too prone to violence or if the demeanour does not fit the culture of the 
Mental Health Court.  See Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 
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7.4.3 Third stage:  Evaluation Eligibility screening 
This stage entails a final decision by the Mental Health Court judge as to if the accused 
should be allowed into the Mental Health Court programme or not.501  Some Mental Health 
Courts allow the judge to veto the decision by the clinical team to allow the accused to 
participate in the Mental Health Court programme.502  The practice in many Mental Health 
Courts is that the judge meets with the potential programme participant before taking a 
decision about whether he should be allowed into the Mental Health Court programme.503 
The Judge, however, mostly follows the clinical recommendations.504  
The accused has the right to refuse participation in the Mental Health Court programme 505 
even after the judge approved his participation in the Mental Health Court programme.506  
An accused may decide, after obtaining advice from his legal representative, that the 
Mental Health Court programme is not the best option for him in a particular set of 
circumstances.507 
A fact that might influence the decision of the accused to participate in the Mental Health 
Court programme is the dropping of the charges against him or the fact that the charges will 
be reduced from, for example, a felony to a misdemeanour upon completion of the 
                                                                                                                                                   
406.  The accused can also be denied access to the Mental Health Court programme if he is 
considered too hostile or unmotivated to participate in the Mental Health Care programme or if the 
accused is considered more appropriate for another speciality court such as a drug court.  See 
Steadman et al 2005 Behavoural Science and Law 215 at 220. 
501  Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 407. 
502  Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 409-411.  See Table 1 and in 
particular the detail captured with regard to Court 1 and Court 6.  One Court in the sample has the 
practice that the Judge must allow the accused to participate in the Mental Health Court programme 
based on the clinical findings in Stage 1 and 2 of the eligibility assessment.  See Table 1 and in 
particular the detail captured with regard to Court 3.  Another Court recorded that, even though the 
Judge is not obliged to allow the accused to participate as is the case with the previous Court 
mentioned, their experience is that the Judge almost always follows the clinical recommendations.  
See Table 1 and in particular the detail captured with regard to Court 4. 
503  Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 409-411.  See Table 1 and in 
particular the detail captured with regard to Court 1, 3 and 5.  Also see Fisher 2015 The Judge’s 
Journal 8 at 10 where the importance of the Judge’s interaction with the Mental Health Court 
participant is explained and the impact it has on perceived and actual procedural justice explained. 
504  Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 4409-411.   
505  Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 407.  The accused has to 
decide in this stage if he is willing to participate in the Mental Health Court programme or not. 
506  Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 407. 
507  Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 407.  Also see Bernstein and 
Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 152 where it is pointed out how important it is for the accused to 
be legally represented when opting to participate in the Mental Health Court programme as the 
accused is effectively waiving his right to a fair criminal trial by participating in the program. 
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programme.508  Facts such as these are often used as incentives to motivate the accused 
to participate in the Mental Health Court programme.509   
It has been suggested that the selection processes of Mental Health Courts should perhaps 
be better documented in order for future research to establish the level of penetration into 
the target population of Mental Health Courts.510  This will also assist in testing the validity 
of the criticism against the Mental Health Court movement that selection bias impacts on 
criminal justice outcomes of these Courts.511    
7.4.4 Fourth stage:  Acceptance stage 
If the accused is found eligible, the matter is adjourned to allow the district attorney to come 
up with a plea offer and for the treatment team to draft a unique treatment plan for the 
accused.512  The forensic coordinator establishes the availability of treatment facilities and 
programmes where the accused can be assisted.513   
Once the treatment plan is drafted, the participation contract and guidelines must be 
reviewed by the defendant and his legal representative before he enters his guilty plea.514  
The accused is usually thoroughly informed of the nature of the treatment programme and 
what it entails, for example, adhering to a treatment programme and taking prescribed 
                                                
508  Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 407, 409.  See Table 1 and in 
particular the detail captured with regard to Court 4 in the third stage of the eligibility evaluation 
process. 
509  Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 407. 
510  Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 409. 
511  Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 407. 
512  D’Emic 2007 Criminal Justice 25 at 26.  Also see O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court 
Evaluation at 21.  The clinical team responsible for drafting the treatment plan takes into 
consideration the psychiatric history of the accused, his criminal and family history as well as his 
medication needs, social support system and housing needs.  Also see Lurigio and Snowden 2009 
The Justice System Journal 196 at 212 where it is pointed out that a variety of services need to be 
made available to the Mental Health Court participants in order for its programmes to truly be 
effective and mentions housing, drug treatment and educational programmes as examples of such 
services. 
513  O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 21. 
514  O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 10.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and 
Heerema Mental Health Courts at 6, 89 who confirm that many Mental Health Courts in America 
requires a guilty plea as a condition for admission to the programme.  See further Lurigio and 
Snowden 2009 The Justice System Journal 196 at 211 where the negative consequences of a guilty 
plea, such as a criminal record is highlighted and it is further pointed out that this can cause the 
accused to encounter difficulty obtaining housing for instance after completion of the Mental Health 
Court programme.  Also see Stafford and Wygant 2005 Behavioral Sciences and the Law 245 at 
246.  See further Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 576 where it is pointed out 
that many Mental Health Courts required a “no-contest” plea where a guilty plea was not obtained. 
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medication.515  This disclosure should also include details about the consequences of 
remaining in the criminal justice system.516  This disclosure should be made prior to a 
decision taken by the accused to enrol for a Mental Health Court programme so that he can 
be free to decide to rather remain in the criminal justice process.  This would typically be 
the case where an accused committed a minor offence and realizes that the fastest way 
“out” for him is through the conventional criminal justice system, as his offence would 
probably not attract a long prison sentence.517 
It could be argued that some accused, in order to gain access to the Mental Health Court 
treatment programme, will be “forced” to plead guilty to an act they possibly did not commit 
or did not have the criminal capacity to form intent at the time of the alleged offence, 
rendering him not criminally liable due to mental illness.  For this reason, no accused 
should be allowed to participate in a Mental Health Court programme without having 
consulted a lawyer first. 518  Legal representation at this stage is further essential since the 
accused waives his right to a trial the moment that he consents to participate in the Mental 
Health Court programme. 519   
The defence attorney ensures that the accused understands the terms of the treatment 
plan, including the sanctions that could be employed for non-compliance.520  In order for the 
accused to be allowed into the Mental Health Court programme, he has to agree to 
participate in the programme.521  This agreement includes an undertaking to adhere to the 
treatment programme and conditions attached to it, including sanctions that can be 
                                                
515  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 92. 
516  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 92.  Also see Seltzer 2005 Psychology, 
Public Policy and Law 570 at 574, 575. 
517  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 92. 
518  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 6 and further at 89. 
519  Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 575.  In those Mental Health Courts where 
participants are allowed to withdraw from the programme at any time, it appears that such a waiver 
of the right to trial is reversible.  It is submitted that it should perhaps then rather be seen as a 
suspension of the person’s right to trial rather than a complete waiver, as waiver presupposes a 
permanent negation of a right.  Seltzer recommends that the only way to ensure that this waiver, or 
rather suspension of the right to trial in the process of consenting to the Mental Health Court 
programme, is done completely voluntarily, is to appoint legal counsel to the relevant person as soon 
as he has been identified as a possible candidate for the Mental Health Court. 
520  Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 68.  The accused 
has to be informed of all possible consequences of their decision to have their case resolved through 
the Mental Health Court.  See Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 574.  The 
author points out that Defence attorney are obliged to ensure that their clients are aware of all the 
consequences of choosing a particular court as an option through which to resolve his case. 
521  In order for participation in the Mental Health Court programme to be truly voluntary the agreement 
must not merely be a declaration but an agreement to the treatment terms, including the sanctions 




imposed for non - compliance, in order for him to be allowed into the Mental Health Court 
programme.522  The accused and the judge both sign these documents at the time of 
entering the guilty plea.523  The defendant must further sign a consent form to enable the 
Mental Health Court practitioners to share information with each other and the service 
providers.524 
In the Brooklyn Mental Health Court, the accused is required to plead guilty to the criminal 
charges against him in lieu of accepting him into the Mental Health Court programme.525  
                                                
522  Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 409-411.  See Table 1 and in 
particular the detail captured next to the term “Participation Requirements” in the third stage of the 
eligibility evaluation process.  Those found eligible were mostly referred to the Mental Health Court 
by defence attorneys or district attorneys.  Of those found eligible for the Mental Health Court 
programmes, approximately 80% agreed to the terms and enrolled in the programme.  O’Keefie The 
Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 22.  This is ascribed to the fact that defense attorneys 
and district attorneys know the defendant and his behaviour by the time the referral is made.  The 
others did not enrol because they almost served their entire terms or their eventual referral was 
vetoed by the ADA.  Approximately 40% of the accused that applied to the Mental Health Court, 
were ineligible because they did not meet the clinical eligibility criteria, were too dangerous to be 
considered for community treatment or because they were unfit to stand trial.  See O’Keefie The 
Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 22, 23.  Some accused persons referred to the Mental 
Health Court refused to co-operate with the assessment and hence could not be offered an 
opportunity to participate in the Mental Health Court because their eligibility could not be established.  
The participant must also agree to the sanctions that may be imposed in the event that he does not 
comply with the treatment programme.  See Parry Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law at 191.  
Also see Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 157 where it is explained that the 
sanctions for non-compliance should ideally be contained in a document that should be made 
available to the accused when entering the treatment programme so that the accused knows exactly 
what to expect in the event of non-compliance. 
523  O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 10.  The Brooklyn Mental Health Court has 
documents available explaining exactly the processes and implications of involvement in the 
Brooklyn Mental Health Court programme, including the sanctions that may be imposed.  This is 
done in an attempt to be transparent.  See D’Emic 2007 Criminal Justice 25 at 27.  Also see 
O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at iv, 10 who explains that the court in turn 
signs a memorandum of understanding with the relevant service provider who will be providing the 
necessary treatment to the defendant.  Most Mental Health Courts require the accused to officially 
accept the treatment programme after it has been proposed to him.  See Stafford and Wygant 2005 
Behavioral Sciences and the Law 245 at 246.  Also see Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and 
Law 570 at 574 who points out that a mere declaration by the mentally ill defendant is not sufficient 
for purposes of “voluntary participation” in the Mental Health Court programme.. 
524  O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 10.    
525  Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 402 at 409-411.  See Table 1 and in 
particular the detail captured next to the term “Participation Requirements” in the third stage of the 
eligibility evaluation process.  Note that in the case of Court 5 and 6 a guilty plea is not always 
required and in the case of Court 2, no plea is required.  Also see Draine, Wilson and Pogorzelski 
2007 Journal of Offender Rehabilitation 159 at 170.  The authors are critical of the fact that accused 
persons with mental illness who are not willing to admit their guilty, do not receive the mental health 
services available in the specialised court.  There is at least one court in New York that, however, 
does not require a guilty plea.  See Wollf, Fabrikant and Belenko 2011 Law and Human Behaviour 
402 at 410.  See Table 1 and in particular the detail captured with regard to Court 2 and next to the 
term “Participation Requirements” in the third stage of the eligibility evaluation process.  In the 
Brooklyn Mental Health Court, a guilty plea was required for anyone to enter the court monitored 
programme with sentencing deferred.  See D’Emic 2007 Criminal Justice 25 at 25.  Also see 
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The plea is, however, only entered once the treatment placement has been arranged.526  
The majority of the eligible accused referred to the Mental Health Court agreed to enrol in 
the Mental Health Court programme.527     
Once the accused meets the eligibility criteria and agrees to abide by the treatment 
programme, he proceeds to the programme phase of the Mental Health Court. 
7.5 Programme phase 
7.5.1 Treatment and monitoring 
After entering the guilty plea, the accused is released to treatment and required to appear 
in court weekly, then bi-weekly during the first three months of the treatment programme.528  
After the initial phase of the programme, the accused appears in court once a month.529   
 Treatment programmes in Mental Health Courts differ in length, and some courts place a 
limit on the maximum period of treatment, anything from one to two years.530  In the majority 
of cases, these limits exceed the possible duration of probation or incarceration that an 
accused will face if his case is processed through the traditional criminal court.531  The 
                                                                                                                                                   
O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 1, 27 who confirms that a guilty plea is 
required from the accused in the beginning of the proceedings.  See further Rossman et al Criminal 
Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 61 where it is explained that the accused 
enters a guilty plea and agrees to a sentence in the event that he does not complete the programme, 
but the actual sentencing is deferred till after the completion of the programme or to the point where 
it is clear that the accused will not complete the programme. 
526  Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 61.  It can take a 
number of days for the treatment to be arranged during which time the accused must wait in jail or 
out on bail depending on his circumstances.  Once the treatment plan is finalised and placement 
secured, the accused enters his guilty plea as agreed upon  – with sentencing options for if he 
completes the programme and for if he doesn’t.  See Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions 
for Offenders with Mental Illness at 68.  Also see D’Emic 2007 Criminal Justice 25 at 26.  See further 
O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 27 who states that the terms of the plea is 
agreed upon between the judge, prosecution and defense attorney. 
527  This was the result of a study conducted in 2005 of seven Mental Health Courts across the United 
States of America.  See Steadman et al 2005 Behavoural Science and Law 215 at 221. 
528  D’Emic 2007 Criminal Justice 25 at 26.  The accused is awarded certificates for every phase of the 
programme that he completes successfully.  See however O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health 
Court Evaluation at 28 who indicates that participants are required to appear in court bi-weekly.  Also 
see Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 68, 70. 
529  Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 68, 70. 
530  Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 156.  See also Lurigio and Snowden 2009 The 
Justice System Journal 196 at 207 where it is pointed out that some treatment programmes only last 
three months whereas the length of others, depending on the model used, links the length of the 
treatment programme to the maximum sentence that the accused would have received had his case 
been processed through the traditional criminal court system. 
531  Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 157.  The authors add that this may be a factor that 
discourages mentally ill persons from enrolling in the Mental Health Court programme.  Also see 
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duration depends heavily on the judge’s discretion.532  The defence attorneys were of the 
view that, If the Mental Health Court was planning to impose programmes of at least one 
year and potential jail sentences of a year or longer for programme failure, the court would 
be more suitable to hear felonies as these programme parameters would be 
disproportionately onerous for misdemeanour offenders facing short jail sentences.533  It 
could, however, be appropriate for chronic misdemeanour offenders who, because of their 
criminal histories of the severity of their current offences, were facing one-year jail 
sentences.534 
Different treatment programmes in the Brooklyn Mental Health Court are available to the 
accused depending on the seriousness of the offence.535  It was agreed that the treatment 
plan imposed in the Brooklyn Mental Health Court should never be longer than the 
sentence that the accused would have received had his case been processed through the 
traditional criminal justice system.536  Since persons convicted of misdemeanours generally 
serve a short period in jail, the Brooklyn Mental Health Court seemed more appropriate for 
felony offenders and chronic misdemeanour offenders.537  The individual treatment plans 
that are developed for the Brooklyn Mental Health Court participants take some time to 
develop, and in the case of an accused charged with a misdemeanour, the time that it takes 
to finalise a treatment programme may very well exceed the time that the accused would 
                                                                                                                                                   
Lurigio and Snowden 2009 The Justice System Journal 196 at 207. 
532  Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 156. 
533  Some Mental Health Courts (for example the Placer County Mental Health Court), have treatment 
programmes for misdemeanour offenders that last up to 3 years, much longer than the sentence that 
could have been imposed had the case been processed through the traditional criminal court.  See 
Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 578. 
534 Fisher  
http://www.courtinnovation.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.ViewPageandPageID=603andcurrentTop 
Tier2=true (Date of use:  7 March 2011) at 5. 
535 Fisher  
http://www.courtinnovation.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.ViewPageandPageID=603andcurrentTop 
Tier2=true (Date of use:  7 March 2011) at 6.  Also see D’Emic 2007 Criminal Justice 25 at 25 where 
it is indicated that the treatment plan for an accused charged with a misdemeanour, was not more 
than 12 months and a first time felony offender was between 12 and 18 months and for an accused 
who committed his second felony, the treatment period would be between 18 and 24 months.  Also 
see O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 1.  See further Rossman et al Criminal 
Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 61. 
536  O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at iii, 8.  This is also referred to as 
“proportionality”.  This was also the motivation behind not considering cases of persons accused of 
misdemeanours because persons convicted of misdemeanours generally served a short jail 
sentence, meaning that the treatment period is likely to exceed the time that the accused would have 
spent in custody had his case been processed through the conventional criminal justice channels. 
537  O’Keefie K The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 9.  The treatment programmes in the 
Brooklyn Mental Health Court range from 12 to 24 months depending on the seriousness of the 
charge against the accused. 
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have spent in jail under a traditional sentence.538  The individualisation of the treatment plan 
for each accused is a very important aspect that contributes to the probability of success in 
the Brooklyn Mental Health Court-monitored treatment programmes.539    
The clinical team is responsible for transporting the accused to the treatment facility and for 
ensuring that he has the medication that he needs for the initial days in treatment.540  The 
treatment providers give regular update reports to the court on the accused’s treatment.541   
The Mental Health Court staff regularly communicate with community service providers to 
implement the therapeutic intervention ordered by the Mental Health Court.  These might 
include; medication management, psychosocial rehabilitation, substance abuse treatment, 
job training and housing assistance.542  It is also important that the individual should 
continue to use the necessary medication after rehabilitation and upon re-entry into society.  
If this is not continued, the benefits of the treatment programme that the individual went 
through will disappear, and the risk of recidivism will rise.543  Assistance might be needed 
by him to apply for health insurance if he cannot afford the medication, as he will most 
probably be unemployed at the point in time at which he re-enters his community.544   
Upon completion of the treatment programme, charges against those charged with 
misdemeanours and those who are first-time-felony offenders are dismissed.545  The 
                                                
538  O’Keefie K The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 9. 
539  Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 68.  See Rich 2009 
Fordham Urban Law Journal 89 at 112, 113 who points out that rehabilitation programmes that are 
tailor made for the particular individual, has the best chance of success.  If someone with a mental 
illness, who also has a substance abuse problem, only receives treatment for the substance abuse, 
his mental illness will most probably deteriorate as most substance abuse programmes require their 
participants to stop the use of any medication during the substance abuse rehabilitation programme.     
540  O’Keefie K The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 27. 
541  D’Emic 2007 Criminal Justice 25 at 27.  Also see O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court 
Evaluation at 28 where it is explained that the accused must pass through four stages of treatment 
before he can graduate from the Mental Health Court.  These include adjustments in treatment that 
lasts for three months from plea date, engagement in treatment, progress in treatment and continued 
progress and preparing to graduate.  The Mental Health Court participant is awarded a certificate 
after completion of each stage to serve as motivation for continuing with the treatment. 
542 Watson et al 2001 Psychiatric Services at 477.  Also see Lurigio and Snowden 2009 The Justice 
System Journal 196 at 212. 
543  Rich 2009 Fordham Urban Law Journal 89 at 115.  Slate Mental Health Court  at 429.  
544  Rich 2009 Fordham Urban Law Journal 89 at 113.  Also see Draine, Wilson and Pogorzelski 2007 
Journal of Offender Rehabilitation 159 at 161 where it is stressed that the services provided to a 
mentally ill person should also cater for issues that such person may experience with substance 
abuse, poverty and homelessness.  If not, the effectiveness of the mental health care treatment will 
be limited, even if the accused has easy access to such treatment. 
545  O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 30.  Also see Rossman et al Criminal 
Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 69. 
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charges against those accused of violent felonies, are reduced to a misdemeanour.546  For 
the more serious offences (the felonies), the offender still has a criminal record, and his 
criminal behaviour history is not “deleted” by the fact that he participated in the Mental 
Health Court programme.547  Almost 74% of all those that enrolled in the court programme 
completed the programme.548  Mental Health Court participants stood at 7560 in 2005, and 
this number is likely to grow as Mental Health Courts become more established and new 
courts open their doors.549     
7.5.2 Sanctions for non-compliance 
Where an accused was enrolled in a Mental Health Court treatment programme and failed 
to complete the programme or comply with the treatment conditions, sanctions for non-
compliance are imposed.550  Sanctions take on many forms and include adjustment to 
treatment services and more frequent appearances in court.551  The accused’s participation 
in the treatment programme is monitored by regular contact of the Mental Health Court with 
the service providers.552 
A large number of Mental Health Courts use jail time as a sanction for non-compliance.553  
                                                
546  O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 30.  Also see Rossman et al Criminal 
Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 69. 
547 Fisher  
http://www.courtinnovation.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.ViewPageandPageID=603andcurrentTop 
Tier2=true (Date of use:  7 March 2011) at 7. 
548  Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 77. 
549  Redlich et al 2006 Law and Human Behaviour 347 at 353, 357.  One Mental Health Court reported to 
have had over 2000 new enrolments over a 12 month period.  
550  Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 158. 
551  Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 157.  158.  Sanctions are imposed for setbacks or 
non-compliance with a certain phase of treatment and the sanctions range from having to write an 
essay on a specific topic, to more frequent appearances and even short periods of incarceration.  
See D’Emic 2007 Criminal Justice 25 at 26, 27.  Also see O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health 
Court Evaluation at 28 who confirms that court appearances may be made more frequent as a 
sanction. 
552  O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 28. 
553  Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 158.  Also see Lurigio and Snowden 2009 The 
Justice System Journal 196 at 207.  Some Mental Health Courts use jail time as sanctions for non-
compliance with treatment programmes and Mental Health Court participants might therefore find 
themselves back in jail if they do not comply with treatment, the very place they were trying to avoid 
by agreeing to participate in the Mental Health Court programme.  See further Redlich et al 2006 
Law and Human Behaviour 347 at 355 point out that some Mental Health Courts however do not use 
jail time as a sanction at all.  Only a small number of courts use jail time as a sanction in more than 
50% of their cases.  They also found that smaller Mental Health courts with fewer participants who 
required their participants to appear before the judge more frequently, were more likely to use jail 
time as a sanction than the bigger Mental Health Courts with more participants who appeared before 
the judge less often (at 357).  Also see Frailing 2009 C.S.L.R 145 at 155.  See further D’Emic 2007 
Criminal Justice 25 at 25.  Also see O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at iii.  
See further Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 57. 
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This is counter-therapeutic and against the goal of reducing the incarceration of persons 
with mental illness.554  Courts should first establish if an accused was able to comply with 
the treatment programme and only punish him for non-compliance if it can be established 
that he was able to comply but chose not to do so.555  Changing the treatment plan may be 
a more appropriate response since non-compliance might have been caused by the 
symptoms of the very same mental illness that the accused is being treated in the 
programme for.556 
A small number of Mental Health Courts allow an accused to be dropped from the 
programme as a sanction for non-compliance.557  The latter is particularly unhelpful as an 
accused who relapses in mental health treatment is particularly in need of support 
services.558 
 Those who successfully complete the treatment programme receive a non-jail disposition, 
whilst those that do not complete serve a jail sentence as initially agreed upon when he 
entered his guilty plea.559  It is suggested that where cases revert to the criminal justice 
system and sentencing is imposed in the criminal court, the time that the accused spent in 
the Mental Health Court programme, even though he did not complete it, should be taken 
into account by the criminal court when considering the sentence. 560 
7.6 Mental Health Court’s role for accused persons who do not qualify for the programme 
phase of the Mental Health Court 
The Mental Health Courts in the US model do not seem to provide any form of support to 
those who do not qualify for the treatment programme of the court as they can be 
eliminated during the screening stage depending on the type of offence or mental illness 
involved. 
The American Mental Health Court model, therefore, does not provide assistance to 
                                                
554  Lurigio and Snowden 2009 The Justice System Journal 196 at 208 where this concern is also 
highlighted.  Also see Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 158.    
555  Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 158.  The authors reiterate that mental health care 
treatment is much harder to measure than drug treatment and these differences should be born in 
mind when considering appropriate sanctions for non-compliance with the program. 
556  Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 158. 
557  Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 158. 
558  Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 158. 
559  D’Emic 2007 Criminal Justice 25 at 25, 27.  Also see O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court 
Evaluation at 1, 30.   
560  Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 575. 
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mentally ill but fit accused persons who, for example, have a personality disorder as an only 
diagnosis and who wish to use the expertise of the Mental Health Court to apply for bail.  
The cases of these mentally ill but fit accused persons revert to the criminal court after 
being “screened out” during the very first stage of the admission phase. 
The lack of support for those mentally ill accused persons who do not qualify for the Mental 
Health Court programme is in contrast to the Mental Health Court model employed in 
Canada where the Mental Health Court assists with, inter alia, bail applications of those 
who do not qualify for the programme component of the Mental Health Court.   
8  EVALUATING THE SUCCESS OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS IN THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 
8.1 Introduction 
Diversion, as such, has many benefits for various parties involved in the criminal justice 
system.  These benefits are also evident in initiatives that serve as vehicles for diversionary 
initiatives such as the Mental Health Court.  The benefit of Mental Health Court diversion for 
the accused is that he will receive treatment rather than punishment.561  The criminal justice 
system benefits since its caseload is reduced when accused persons have diverted away 
from it,562 saving costs for the taxpayer in the process.563  
One thing that the opponents and proponents of Mental Health Courts agree upon is that 
alternatives to traditional prosecution are needed for persons with mental illness in order to 
stop the revolving door phenomenon.564  They also agree that mentally ill accused persons 
are generally disconnected from mental health services and enter the criminal justice 
                                                
561  Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 251.  Another benefit that the accused has if he opts 
for diversion is that, if the criminal charges are dropped, he will not have trouble finding employment, 
applying for a loan or being admitted to University during which process prior convictions are 
considered. 
562  Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 251 where the benefits for the prosecutor and the 
defense attorney are also discussed in that they can say that they did what was in the interest of 
justice.  The defense attorney can say that he spared his client the traditional criminal court 
experience whereas the prosecutor can still say that he was successful in the case to a certain 
extent because the accused did not go free but is detained, even if it is for treatment, for a certain 
period of time.  Also see Albanese Criminal Justice at 264, 265 where the problems of caseloads for 
the criminal justice system are discussed. 
563  Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 251.  The cost saving is labelled as a benefit for 
society as the courts can focus their time and resources on more serious offences.  Diversion, which 
implies treatment, may also reduce recidivism that leads to a safer society in that the accused is less 
likely to re-offend in future. 
564  Odegaard 2007 North Dakota Law Review 225 at 254. 
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system at an alarming rate.565 
Research on the true successes and challenges of Mental Health Courts is still in its 
infancy since problem-solving courts in this form are a relatively new phenomenon, and 
further research on its true successes and challenges are needed.566  Initial indicators, as 
discussed below, however, give a preliminary picture of the state of Mental Health Court in 
the United States of America. 
8.2 Success 
Initial indicators appear to hint towards the success of Mental Health Courts.  It should be 
noted, however, that many of these studies do not focus particularly on second-generation 
Mental Health Courts but on Mental Health Courts in general.567  The results are, 
nonetheless, useful to consider the success of the concept of a specialised Mental Health 
Court. 
8.2.1 Reduced recidivism 
This has a direct impact on public safety as reduced recidivism means less crime, which in 
turn means a safer society.  Research indicates that Mental Health Court participants are 
less likely to re-offend after completion of the Mental Health Court programme than those 
whose cases were processed through the traditional criminal justice process.568  Not only 
do those who completed the Mental Health Court programme recidivate less, but also less 
                                                
565  Odegaard 2007 North Dakota Law Review 225 at 254. 
566  Fisher 2015 The Judge’s Journal 8 at 10.  This is especially the case with Mental Health Courts.  A 
larger body of research exists with regard to drug courts since they have been in existence for 
longer.  Also see O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 4.  Also see Rossman et 
al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 15, 19. 
567  O’Keefie K The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 4. 
568  Frailing 2009 C.S.L.R 145 at 149.  Also see Christy et al 2005 Behav.  Sci Law 227 at 242 and in 
general Trupin E and Richards H “Seatle’s mental health courts:  Early indicators of effectiveness” 
2003 (26) International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 33-53.  Also see Fisher 2015 The Judge’s 
Journal 8 at 10.  See further O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 3.  Also see 
Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 18 where it is 
further explained that those who went through the Mental Health Court programme and who do 
offend again, take longer to re-offend than those who did not go through the Mental Health Court 
programme.  Also see Lurigio and Snowden 2009 The Justice System Journal 196 at 208 where it is 
confirmed that most Mental Health Court participants recidivate less but that in a study of the 
Broward County Mental Health Court, it was found that the recidivism rate amongst Mental Health 
Court participants and those whose cases were processed through the traditional criminal court, 
were the same.  See further Odegaard 2007 North Dakota Law Review 225 at 251 where it is 
pointed out that research indicates that those participating in Mental Health Court programmes 
recidivate less, reference is particularly made to the Broward County Mental Health Court.  More 
recent research confirms that recidivism is indeed reduced through involvement with a Mental Health 
Court.  See Fisher 2015 The Judge’s Journal 8 at 10. 
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violent crimes are committed by the participants.569 
 Programmes offered by the Brooklyn Mental Health Court are deemed an investment in 
treatment in order to prevent re-offending, particularly violent crime, by mentally ill 
persons.570  These courts have similar positive results to drug courts to which they are 
closely related.571 
 Outpatient treatment can also be linked with a reduction in crime as the seriously mentally 
ill will be less likely to commit minor offences, leaving jail cells available for serious 
criminals.  With the mentally ill under treatment, the police will also be able to focus their 
attention on combatting crimes that are more serious.572  Since the mentally ill will offend 
less and since treatment of the mentally ill reduces the potential for them to act violently, 
outpatient treatment will contribute to a safer society,573 which of course, cannot be 
measured in monetary terms.  The benefit of outpatient treatment rather than incarceration 
is also that a mentally ill person receiving outpatient care might be able to lead a productive 
life and by so doing contribute to the economy by obtaining and keeping employment.574   
Reduced recidivism simply means a safer society.    
8.2.2 Lower rate and shorter periods of incarceration 
 Mental health court participants spent less time in jail and more time in the treatment 
                                                
569  McNiel DE and Binder RL “Effectiveness of a mental health court in reducing criminal recidivism and 
violence” 2007 (164) American Journal of Psychiatry 1395-1403 at 1395.  Also see in general 
Herinckx HA, Swart SC, Ama SM, Dolezal CD and King S “Rearrest and linkage to mental health 
court services among clients of the Clark county mental health court program” 2005 (56) Psychiatric 
Service 853-857. 
570 These benefits have been acknowledged by district attorneys’ offices,  See Fisher  
http://www.courtinnovation.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.ViewPageandPageID=603andcurrentTop 
Tier2=true (Date of use:  7 March 2011) at 6.  Also see Fisher 2015 The Judge’s Journal 8 at 10 
where recidivism is stated as one of the consistent outcomes reported by those who conducted 
research on the state of Mental Health Courts in the United States of America. 
571  Frailing 2009 C.S.L.R 145 at 145, 148.  In a programme where prison bound felony offenders were 
diverted to drug treatment, it was found that, compared to a group of offenders that remained in 
prison, the treatment of felony offenders in drug rehabilitation centres, had the benefits of lower 
figures of re-arrest and re-incarceration as well as cost saving:  Treatment instead of incarceration 
results in cost saving for the criminal justice system.  Also see Frailing K 2008 C.S.L.R 63 at 67.  
Also see Fisher  
http://www.courtinnovation.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.ViewPageandPageID=603andcurrentTop 
Tier2=true (Date of use:  7 March 2011) at 6.  Also see Frailing 2009 C.S.L.R 145 at 148 who points 
out that the cost of treatment is significantly lower than incarceration costs. 
572  Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 56.  Also see Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L 
Review 143 at 161. 
573  Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 56-57. 
574  Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 57. 
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programme.575  Studies found that Mental Health Court participants also spend fewer days 
in psychiatric hospitals in the year after their graduation from the Mental Health Court 
programme than the year prior to their enrolment therein.576  The same results applied with 
regard to days spend in jail.577  
The criminal justice system is benefiting from Mental Health Court treatment programmes 
as the chances of these offenders returning to the criminal court is reduced by participation 
in such treatment programmes.578  This, in turn, reduces the anticipated future workload.    
8.2.3 Cost-saving 
The cost-saving associated with treatment as opposed to incarceration can also be labelled 
as an advantage for the criminal justice system brought about by Mental Health Courts.579 
The estimated cost per day to keep a mentally ill person in jail is approximately $46.580  
Having said that, that does not necessarily include psychiatric services, as these services 
are not available in all jails.581  Treating a mentally ill person as a psychiatric patient on an 
                                                
575  Albanese Criminal Justice at 243.  Also see O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation 
at 3.  The psychosocial functioning of Mental Health Court participants have been found to improve 
during the Mental Health Court treatment programme.  See Trupin and Richards 2003 (26) 
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 33 at 33 .  This was also the case in the Brooklyn Mental 
Health Court according to O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at viii, 3.  Also see 
Rossman et al Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness at 17 where it is 
pointed out that the functioning of those who participated in the Mental Health Court programme 
improved further than those who did not participate. 
576  Frailing 2010 Int J Law Psychiat 207 at 209.  Also see Albanese Criminal Justice at 243 who 
confirms that Mental Health Court participants are admitted to psychiatric hospitals less often than 
accused persons who do not participate in the programme.  Also see O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental 
Health Court Evaluation at viii where it is indicated that this was also the case for the Brooklyn 
Mental Health Court.  See further Lurigio and Snowden 2009 The Justice System Journal 196 at 
209. 
577  Frailing 2010 Int J Law Psychiat 207 at 209.  Also see Fisher 2015 The Judge’s Journal 8 at 10 who 
reports that fewer days spent in incarceration is a success of Mental Health Courts reported by those 
who conducted research on the outcomes across Mental Health Courts in the United States of 
America.  Also see O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 3 who explains that it 
was significantly less in the year subsequent to the completion of the Mental Health Court 
programme than the year prior to their enrolment therein.  
578  Frailing 2009 C.S.L.R 145 at 150.   
579  Fisher  
http://www.courtinnovation.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.ViewPageandPageID=603andcurrentTop 
Tier2=true (Date of use:  7 March 2011) at 6.  Also see  Frailing 2009 C.S.L.R 145 at 148 as well as 
Frailing K 2008 C.S.L.R 63 at 68 
580  Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 55. 
581  Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 55.  Also see Albanese Criminal Justice at 243 
who confirms the cost-saving for the criminal justice system through diversion. 
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outpatient basis costs in the region of approximately $12 per day.582   
There are long-term cost savings in opting for treatment rather than incarceration, in that 
the chances of the person being re-arrested declines, eliminating the costs of another stay 
in jail.583  Hospital bills are lower as the outpatient treatment reduces the need for long 
periods of hospitalisation.584  Outpatient treatment also results in less use of homeless 
shelters that in turn also results in a cost-saving for the relevant state.585   
The fact that less time is spent in hospital and in prison after completing the Mental Health 
Court programme translates into a cost-saving for the state in that services that had to be 
provided to these individuals who would come back to jail or hospital, again and again, are 
no longer required. 
8.3 Criticism 
A general point of criticism against diversion as such is that diversion programmes weaken 
the deterrence effect of the law 586 because treatment is favoured over punishment.  
                                                
582  Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 55.  See in particular Table 4.1 that sets out the 
costs for different types of Medical and Psychiatric services.  With regard to cost-saving, Model 
Outpatient and rehabilitation programmes offer outpatient psychiatric services, rehabilitation, social 
services, 24-hour crisis-intervention, medical and inpatient psychiatric services as needed  as well as 
room and board.  Estimated costs per day for outpatient psychiatric services, 24-hour crisis 
intervention and rehabilitation treatment is $22 day.  Short-term psychiatric hospitalisation and other 
medical services as needed are estimated at $16 per day.  Room and board offered to the seriously 
mentally ill who do not have another source of income, is estimated at $17 per day.  This amounts to 
$20 000.00 per mentally ill patient per annum.  See Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally 
Ill at 56. 
583  Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 56. 
584  Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 56.  Mentally ill accused who were sent to state 
psychiatric hospitals in the United States in the 1950’s were often sent there for indefinite periods of 
time without the option to challenge such decision for treatment.  This refers particularly to the 
situation during the 1950’s in the United States of America.  This stance has been attributed to the 
paternalistic system at the time.  Frailing K 2008 C.S.L.R 63 at 63.  The average time that a mentally 
ill person spent in a state hospital during this time was 20 years.  The paternalistic nature of the 
system is well illustrated by the case of Elizabeth Packard who was admitted involuntarily to a state 
hospital and declared morally insane, because she argued with her husband (who was a minister) 
about theology.  He had her admitted and after being declared morally insane, she lost custody of 
her children and ownership of her property.  She eventually had a trial in front of a grand jury who 
declared her legally sane but the custody of her children and ownership of her property was never 
restored.  See Slate, Buffington-Vollum and Johnson Criminalization of Mental Illness at 29.  See 
further Garner and Hafemeister 2003 Developments in Mental Health Law 1 at 4. 
585  Torrey et al Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill at 56   See in particular Table 4.1 that sets out the 
costs for different types of Medical and Psychiatric services.  Model Outpatient and rehabilitation 
programmes offer outpatient psychiatric services, rehabilitation, social services, 24-hour crisis-
intervention medical and inpatient psychiatric services as needed as well as room and board 
(Offered to the seriously mentally ill who do not have another source of income) at approximately 
$55 per day.  This amounts to $20 000.00 per mentally ill patient per annum. 
586  Albanese Criminal Justice at 262 where points of criticism against diversion is discussed.  
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Frailing 587 points out that this concern is particularly strong with regard to drug courts 
where treatment replaces punishment even where the use of certain drugs is illegal.  This 
concern is less warranted with regard to Mental Health Courts, as it is not illegal to have a 
mental illness.588 
The point has been raised that, instead of developing special courts to cater for a small 
group of persons with unique needs, the criminal justice system and its processes in the 
broader sense should rather be optimised to incorporate the special services and skills that 
these specialised courts have to offer.589  This should no doubt be the long-term goal of any 
criminal justice system, but the fact remains that mentally ill accused persons present 
unique procedural, logistical, evidentiary and legal challenges to the criminal justice system 
that is best served in a specialised court by specially trained professionals with an 
understanding of these issues.590  Some specific concerns are highlighted below. 
8.3.1 Voluntary participation 
Concerns exist about the possible coercive nature of Mental Health Court programmes and 
the stigma that goes along with it.591  The prospect of a more lenient disposition in the 
                                                
587  Frailing 2009 C.S.L.R 145 at 146. 
588  Frailing 2009 C.S.L.R 145 at 146.  Also see Frailing K 2008 C.S.L.R 63 at 68 who confirms that 
those participating in the drug court programme, does so because of their involvement in drugs 
which is illegal, whereas having a mental illness is of course not illegal. 
589  Draine, Wilson and Pogorzelski 2007 Journal of Offender Rehabilitation 159 at 166.  It is also 
pointed out that the speciality courts in turn cause the health system to deliver fragmented services 
according to the treatment needs identified by these courts.  The authors point out that the argument 
that the criminal justice system should seek holistic solutions to improve the system in its entirety 
rather than creating speciality courts, is most probably drowned out by the speed at which speciality 
courts  are established all over the United States of America.  Also see Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D 
C L Review 143 at 148 who promote a comprehensive system of prevention and intervention but 
who acknowledge that a more short term solution, until the entire system has been revamped, is 
Mental Health Courts.  Also see Fisher 2015 The Judge’s Journal 8 at 11 where this concern is 
raised, suggesting that some of the positive aspects of Mental Health Courts that enhances 
procedural justice – such as adjusting courtroom communication practices - could perhaps be 
applied in the traditional courts.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 
95.  The analogy is drawn between the issue of mental illness in the criminal justice system and 
racism in the criminal justice system.  The authors however criticise this analogy, as it has never 
been suggested that a specialised court be created for a certain race.  The suggestion to fix the 
current system instead of creating a new one, is viable and plausible as far as issues of racism is 
concerned, but is not the optimal solution for issues surrounding mentally ill offenders as the authors 
point out at 96 of this source. 
590  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 96.  Interim solutions must be implemented 
in order to contain the problem of the increased number of persons with mental illness in the criminal 
justice system.  See Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 148, 162 where it is stated that 
Mental Health Courts are not the ultimate solution but merely part of it in the broader scope of 
system reform towards catering better for the needs of accused persons with a mental illness. 
591  D’Emic 2007 Criminal Justice 25 at 27.   Also see O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court 
Evaluation at iv.  Concerns were also raised about coercing the accused to take medication against 
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Mental Health Court than what the accused would face in the traditional criminal court can 
be seen as luring the accused into the Mental Health Court programme, thus reducing the 
true voluntariness of choice to participate.592  Some scholars are of the view that a person 
suffering from a mental illness cannot participate “voluntarily” as he is not capable of 
making a rational decision to participate voluntarily.593  This concern is bolstered by the fact 
that most Mental Health Courts do not conduct competency assessments (for participation 
in the Mental Health Court programme) prior to accepting referrals but only conduct such 
                                                                                                                                                   
his will, since he has the right to refuse medication.  This concern was addressed by including the 
terms pertaining to the use of medication in the terms and conditions of participation.  It is explained 
in the guidelines for participation that the accused must use the prescribed medication and that 
failure to do so can result in sanctions being imposed by the Mental Health Court.  Since these 
provisions are included in the guidelines for participation that the accused agrees to when signing 
the contract at the acceptance stage, it is binding on him and he is deemed to have consented to 
taking any medication that he is required to take in the programme.  O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental 
Health Court Evaluation at 10.  Mental Health Services were concerned that the Mental Health Court 
process would “bypass” the normal process of having to apply to a civil court to administer 
medication to a mental health patient against his will.  The accused does however have an 
opportunity to explain the reason for non-compliance with the medication before a sanction is 
imposed by the Mental Health Court. 
592  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 6, 89, 95.  Also see Seltzer 2005 
Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 574 who points out that, if a defendant is placed before 
the choice of a criminal court, primarily aimed at punishment and a therapeutic court, the choice is, 
at first glance, an obvious one.  See, however, this source at 574, 575 for the concerns raised by the 
author with regard to voluntary transfer to the Mental Health Court.  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema 
propose that ensuring that participants in the Mental Health Court programme has legal 
representation, should address the concerns pertaining to voluntary participation.  It should also be 
born in mind that, most accused who are placed before the choice to participate in the Mental Health 
Court programme, is placed before that choice shortly after they have been arrested and 
incarcerated and perhaps after spending a night or two in jail.  They are thus under severe stress 
and may choose the Mental Health Court option in the hope that it will be a reprieve from their 
current situation and a way out of jail, even if only momentarily.  See Seltzer 2005 Psychology, 
Public Policy and Law 570 at 574. 
593  Odegaard 2007 North Dakota Law Review 225 at 253.  The concerns pertained to the ability of the 
accused to truly understand the consequences of entering a plea and enrolling in the Mental Health 
Court programme.  See O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at iv, 9.  It seems to 
be a recognised concern that if an accused is not at least able to identify the advantages and 
disadvantages of participating in the Mental Health Court programme, his participation can be 
perceived as coerced.  See Frailing 2009 C.S.L.R 145 at 152.  The concern is that those in contact 
with the criminal justice system will be “rerouted” into a programme of therapy that they would not 
have chosen out of own accord.  Treatment becomes a way to avoid prison, a lesser evil and the 
treatment is thus coercive.  See Casey T “When good intentions are not enough:  Problem solving 
courts and the impending crisis of legitimacy” 2004 (57) SMU L Rev 1459-1519 at 1459.  It is also 
argued that this is a form of paternalism of the State enforced over members who are less able to 
fight such paternalistic acts.  To counter this argument, it can be pointed out that study amongst 
those who have participated in Mental Health Court programmes, reported low levels of perceived 
coercion amongst the participants.  See Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 63.  
Also see Frailing 2009 C.S.L.R 145 at 153 and see further Poythress NG, Petrila J, McGaha A and 
Boothroyd R “Perceived coercion and procedural justice in the Broward mental health court” 2002 
(25) International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 517-533 at 519.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and 
Heerema Mental Health Courts at 64 who voice their concern about the view that offering a choice 
between two options (the criminal justice system and the Mental Health Court system) presents a 
problem in itself.  To suggest that all cases should revert to the criminal justice system simply to 
avoid putting the mentally ill accused before a choice is absurd.   
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assessments for participants who appear “grossly incompetent”.594  This raises concerns 
that there might be participants in the Mental Health Court programmes who do not 
comprehend the result of the choice that they exercised to participate in the programme 
rather than have their cases processed via the traditional criminal justice system.  If it is 
ensured that all mentally ill offenders have legal representation at the point in the process 
where they are required to make a decision as to if they want to participate in the Mental 
Health Court, the legal representative can ensure that his client is not coerced into 
participation and that he is well informed of all the options and consequences of having a 
case resolved via a particular forum. 
In response to this criticism, it is stressed that the accused is offered the option not to 
participate in the Mental Health Court programme and various diagnostic tools are available 
to determine if an individual was competently and rationally choosing to have his case 
processed through the Mental Health Court.595  The fact that someone is suffering from a 
mental illness does not necessarily mean that he is incapable of taking decisions regarding 
at least some aspects of his life.  Studies could, however, not find evidence that the Mental 
Health Court process was coercive and, in fact, found that judges are going the extra mile 
to ensure that the rights of those coming through the Mental Health Court are protected.596   
To ensure that the decision to participate in the Mental Health Court programme is both 
voluntary and informed, it is advisable that defence counsel with knowledge of mental 
health issues and available services should be appointed for the accused as soon as 
possible.597  Providing the accused the option to withdraw from the programme at any time 
and to allow his case to revert to the criminal court will further support the notion that 
                                                
594  Frailing 2009 C.S.L.R 145 at 152.    
595 Slate Mental Health Courts at 430. 
596 Slate Mental Health Courts at 430.  Participants on the Brooklyn Mental Health Court reported that 
they do not perceive the process as coercive.  See D’Emic 2007 Criminal Justice 25 at 28.  Also see 
O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation at 39.  The participants also reported to 
perceive a higher level of procedural justice, than those accused whose cases were processed 
through the traditional criminal justice system.  See Frailing 2009 C.S.L.R 145 at 154.  Also see in 
general Poythress et al 2002 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 517-533. 
597  To ensure that the accused has full understanding of the programme and its consequences.  The 
Brooklyn Mental Health Court has documents available explaining exactly the processes and 
implications of involvement in the Brooklyn Mental Health Court programme, including the sanctions 
that may be imposed.  This is done in an attempt to be transparent.  See D’Emic 2007 Criminal 
Justice 25 at 27.  Legal representation can explain the content to the accused and ensure that he 
has full understanding and should be appointed as soon as possible.  See Bernstein and Seltzer 




involvement in the Mental Health Court is voluntary.598  Many American Mental Health 
Courts do, however, not allow the accused’ to opt-out of the Mental Health Court 
programme once they have enrolled.599    
No constitutional challenges have been launched in either Canada or America against the 
Mental Health Court movement, based on the allegation that participation is not voluntary or 
that those who participate are not capable of taking a proper decision to participate or 
not.600  Criticism against the Mental Health Court movement, based on concerns regarding 
voluntariness, should therefore be considered as cautionary indicators of objections that 
may be raised against the practices of the Mental Health Court.  Such criticism could serve 
as a motivation to ensure the incorporation of safety measures for the accused against 
coercion and to streamline the processes in these areas of concern to eliminate similar 
criticism in future.  
8.3.2  Stigmatisation 
 Concern has been raised about the stigma attached to being singled out as a mentally ill 
person and that processing the case through a specialised Mental Health Court docket 
contributes to the marginalisation of the mentally ill accused.601   
A response to this argument offered by Slate is: 
..Surely, the possibility of avoiding a criminal record, obtaining appropriate treatment and 
averting future contact with the criminal justice system as a result of compliance with mental 
health court requirements and follow-up are less stigmatizing, more encouraging and more 
compassionate than the repeated and callous recycling of persons with mental illness 
through the system.602 
A further response to the concern is to stress the fact that the treatment that the mentally ill 
                                                
598  Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 152.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema 
Mental Health Courts at 63.  To curtail this criticism, it is recommended by Schneider Bloom and 
Heerema that participants in Mental Health Court programmes should be reminded constantly that 
their participation in the programme is voluntary and that they can revert to the traditional criminal 
justice system at any time. 
599  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 91.  Also see Seltzer 2005 Psychology, 
Public Policy and Law 570 at 575 who warns that participants should be allowed to withdraw from 
the programme at any given time in order for participation in the Mental Health Court programme to 
truly be recognised as voluntary. 
600  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 90 
601  Wolff N “Courts as therapeutic agents:  Thinking past the novelty of mental health courts” 2002 (30) 
Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry 431-437 at 434.  Also see Lamberti and Weisman 
2004 Psychiatr Q 151 at 162 where this concern has been raised with regard to diversion 
programmes in general. 
602 Slate Mental Health Court at 430, 431. 
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accused receive in the Mental Health Court is an improvement on the way their interests 
were served in the traditional criminal justice system.603   
 Some argue that due process is being violated by treating similar cases differently in the 
sense that a mentally ill accused charged with a particular offence may have the option of 
treatment instead of incarceration, whereas an accused, who does not suffer from a mental 
illness, does not have such an option.604  The fact that treatment is emphasised over 
procedural rules has been highlighted as a concern and as something, which reduces the 
protection of procedural rules.605   
 Some scholars argue that the existence of a Mental Health Court actually contributes to the 
criminalisation of the mentally ill by widening the net with which they can be caught, 
especially for minor offences.606  This has been referred to as the phenomenon of “net 
widening”, 607 where the mentally ill now comes into more frequent contact with the law than 
what would have been the case had there not been these specialised courts.608  The fact 
                                                
603  See in general Stephan S and Winick BJ “A dialogue on mental health courts” 2005 (11) Psychology, 
Public Policy and Law 507-526.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 
95. 
604  Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 103. 
605  Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 103. 
606 Slate Mental Health Courts at 430.  Also see Lamberti and Weisman 2004 Psychiatr Q 151 at 162 
who raises the concern of stigmatisation with regard to diversion programmes for the mentally ill 
offender in general.  Also see Redlich et al 2006 Law and Human Behaviour 347 at 348 where the 
criticism that these courts might actually increase the mentally ill’s involvement in the criminal justice 
system, is highlighted.  See further Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 252 where this is a 
point of criticism raised against diversion as such.  The argument is that previously, prior to diversion 
programmes, accused persons arrested for minor offences, might simply have been released 
because of a lack of evidence or because the court has more serious offences to deal with.  The 
diversion programme may lead to it that such a person, now remains in the criminal justice system 
through which he access treatment.  Also see Albanese Criminal Justice at 262 where it is pointed 
out that prosecutors may opt for diversion where they would not normally have proceeded with a 
prosecution due to for example lack of evidence.  In such a case a person will be kept under the 
monitoring eye of the court whereas he might have been released had his case gone through the 
normal criminal procedural channels.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health 
Courts at 72.  Also see in general Lamb HR, Weinberger LE and DeCuir WJ “The Police and mental 
health” 2002 (53) Psych Serv 1266-1271.  See further Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and 
Law 570 at 573 who points out that mentally ill individuals are arrested by police with the aim of 
“helping” them by getting them into a mental health care treatment programme, even though it is 
within the criminal justice system.  One of the points of criticism is that this type of court might 
encourage police to arrest mentally ill persons in order to ensure their entrance into the forensic 
system. 
607  Redlich et al 2006 Law and Human Behaviour 347 at 348 where the criticism that these courts might 
actually increase the mentally ill’s involvement in the criminal justice system, is highlighted. 
608  Slate Mental Health Court at 430.  Also see Redlich et al 2006 Law and Human Behaviour 347 at 
348 where the criticism that these courts might actually increase the mentally ill’s involvement in the 
criminal justice system, is highlighted.  Also see Odegaard 2007 North Dakota Law Review 225 at 
253 where the concern is highlighted that persons with mental illness might be arrested with the view 
on entering the Mental Health Court programme whereas persons without mental illness might not 
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that mentally ill individuals are arrested for purposes of accessing treatment through the 
Mental Health Court is, according to some critics, taking away the focus of the criminal 
justice system from the more serious offenders.609  
The argument is countered by placing the focus on the fact that diversion programmes 
compensates for the lack of resources in the criminal justice system and allow the court to 
handle cases that it would previously have been reluctant to dismiss but would have had to 
dismiss due to lack of resources.610  It is submitted further that once a proper process is 
established to channel the mentally ill accused to a Mental Health Court, the police will 
have more time and resources to focus on more serious offences and offenders as there 
will be certainty as to where these accused can get assistance, and it will no longer be the 
responsibility of law enforcement to find a suitable treatment for the individual, but they can 
merely divert him to the Mental Health Court that will channel the person to the relevant 
treatment services. 
Having regard to the negative effect that arrest and incarceration have on mentally ill 
individuals and the higher rates of arrests, the question is how it can be seen as a solution 
to implement a court where it is a requirement that a mentally ill person be arrested before 
being able to gain access to a Mental Health treatment programme offered by the court?611  
Seltzer warns that this could lead to an increase in the practice of arresting people with 
mental illnesses for committing misdemeanours, where such an arrest would not 
necessarily have taken place had the person not suffered from a mental illness.612    
8.3.3 Privacy concerns 
Due to the nature of the programmes offered in the Mental Health Court, where a multi-
                                                                                                                                                   
necessarily have been arrested under the same circumstances. 
609  Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 583. 
610  Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 252.  This argument is countered by pointing out the 
rarity of Mental Health Courts initiating prosecutions or imposing custody on participants and further 
that these courts are set up to foster alternatives to the traditional criminal justice process.  See Slate 
Mental Health Courts at 430. 
611  Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 573.  Seltzer proposes alternatives to Mental 
Health Courts.  See 584, 585 of this source. 
612  Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 582.  Also see Torrey et al Criminalizing the 
Seriously Mentally Ill at 49 where it is stated that a captain of the Los Angeles Police Department 
reported that mentally ill persons are often arrested and jailed for their own protection.  He phrased it 
as follows: “You arrest somebody for a crime because you know at least they’ll be put in some kind 
of facility where they’ll get food and shelter.  You don’t invent a crime, but it’s a discretionary 
decision.  You might not arrest everybody for it, but you know that way they’ll be safe and fed”. 
  
415 
disciplinary team is involved, information sharing about the accused is inevitable.613  
Concerns have been raised about the possible infringement of the participants’ privacy 
rights when disclosing his medical facts in the Mental Health Court.614    
It has been suggested that these concerns can be curtailed by ensuring that legal 
representation is appointed for the participant early on in the proceedings 615 and further by 
limiting the information that is made available to the judge and prosecutor to only what is 
necessary for them to take the necessary decisions.616   
Disclosing medical information in criminal proceedings further raises issues of doctor-
patient privacy.617  Mental Health Courts manage this concern in that disclosure of 
confidential information about the accused in open court is limited to what is necessary.618  
The accused could further simply signs consent to share information 619 , as is the case in 
the Brooklyn Mental Health Court.620  Most Mental Health Courts have policies in place to 
                                                
613  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 91. 
614  This has been highlighted as a concern rather than concrete criticism.  See Schneider, Bloom and 
Heerema Mental Health Courts at 91.  Also see Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 
at 581.  Also see Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 159.  Also see Lamberti and 
Weisman 2004 Psychiatr Q 151 at 157.  One of the major challenges in making decisions regarding 
mentally ill persons in criminal proceedings, is the lack of information about individuals and further 
that, if the much needed information is shared, such disclosure may possibly violate the mentally ill 
person’s right to privacy. 
615  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 91.  Also see Seltzer 2005 Psychology, 
Public Policy and Law 570 at 581 where it is stressed that the appointment of legal counsel for the 
mentally ill accused at an early stage in the proceedings, should assist in addressing some of the 
privacy concerns as the legal representative can filter for any potentially privileged information.  See 
further Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 152 where it is pointed out that most 
transfers to the Mental Health Court happens post-arraignment and that legal representation should 
be arranged for any accused before he takes the decision to transfer his case to the Mental Health 
Court. 
616  Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 581.  The same solution was suggested by 
Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 159. 
617  Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 159.   
618  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 91.  Also see Seltzer 2005 Psychology, 
Public Policy and Law 570 at 576 who opines that the disclosure of private treatment information can 
be limited if the defence attorney acting for the mentally ill accused, received proper training in 
mental health issues which includes communicating with a mentally ill accused.  The specially 
trained defence attorney may then also be of assistance to the court in facilitating consent for the 
disclosure of otherwise privileged information.  Also see Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 
143 at 159 who points out that this concern could further be managed by omitting medical 
information from the public record of court proceedings or having conversations about sensitive 
medical facts in chambers. 
619 Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 91. 
620  The defendant must further sign a consent form to enable the Mental Health Court practitioners to 
share information with each other and the service providers.  See O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental 
Health Court Evaluation at 10.  Legal representatives could be of assistance in this regard at an 
early stage in the proceedings when a legal representative is appointed for the mentally ill accused.  
See Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 91.  Also see Seltzer 2005 
Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 581 where it is stressed that the appointment of legal 
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safeguard the right to privacy of the Mental Health Court participants.621    
8.3.4 Opposition to long periods of treatment 
 Treatment under the Mental Health Court programme may take longer than the period that 
the accused would have spent in incarceration had his case been processed through the 
traditional criminal justice system.622  In response to the criticism, it is contended that what 
must be considered is the long-range goal of stopping the cycle of recidivism typical for this 
population.623  
It simply takes time to engage in treatment.  A longer course of substance abuse treatment 
will naturally produce better outcomes over the long run than a shorter one.624  Patients, 
who remain under outpatient treatment for a period of six to nine months, or more, while 
receiving intensive services show fewer hospitalisations, shorter hospital stays, greater 
adherence to community treatment, fewer acts of violence and fewer instances of 
victimisation than patients receiving similar services under outpatient commitment orders 
for shorter periods.625  
 Defence attorneys, during the planning phases of the Brooklyn Mental Health Court, 
                                                                                                                                                   
counsel for the mentally ill accused at an early stage in the proceedings, should assist in addressing 
some of the privacy concerns as the legal representative can filter for any potentially privileged 
information. 
621  Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 581.  Also see in general  Council of State 
Government’s Criminal Justice/ Mental Health Consensus Project:  Survey of Mental Health Courts 
(2003) http://consensusproject.org/topics/news/mhcsurvey(Date of use:  28 March 2014). 
622  Slate Mental Health Court at 420.  Also see Frailing K 2008 C.S.L.R 63 at 66 who draws attention to 
a study that found that those who pleaded not guilty because of insanity spent a much longer time in 
prison than those who committed similar crimes but who did not raise the defence of not guilty 
because of insanity.  The fears of longer “than usual” periods of confinement are thus well grounded 
in history.  Also see Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 577 who points out that 
at the time there was only one Mental Health Court (West-Virginia Mental Health Court), that placed 
a limitation on the duration of a treatment programme, the limitation being that it should not be longer 
than the maximum sentence that could have been imposed had the case been processed through 
the traditional criminal court.  See further Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 156.  Also 
see Odegaard 2007 North Dakota Law Review 225 at 254. 
623 Slate Mental Health Court at 430.  It Is reiterated that the focus should be on the long term goal  and 
benefit of a longer mental health care programme, instead of a shorter term of incarceration where 
no treatment or, at best, insufficient treatment is received without any positive results. 
624 A common sense approach to treatment periods seem to be promoted here by Fisher 
http://www.courtinnovation.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.ViewPageandPageID=603andcurrentTop 
Tier2=true (Date of use:  7 March 2011) at 2. 
625 The benefits of longer periods of treatment versus shorter ones are illustrated by Fisher 
http://www.courtinnovation.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.ViewPageandPageID=603andcurrentTop 
Tier2=true (Date of use:  7 March 2011) at 4.  Also see O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court 




stressed the importance of the proportionality principle in the Mental Health Court setting.  
This entails that the length of court supervision in a programme that is offered as an 
alternative to incarceration should never be longer than the period of incarceration or 
probation that the defendant would have received had he followed the normal process 
through the criminal justice system.626   
 The fact that participation in the treatment imposed by the Mental Health Court is voluntary 
and an alternative to the traditional criminal court process should not be disregarded when 
considering the above-mentioned concerns.627  An accused and his legal representative 
can therefore weigh up the advantages and disadvantages of participating in the mental 
health programme.  If the accused takes issue with the fact that he will be in treatment for 
longer than he would have been in jail for relating the particular offence, he can exercise an 
informed decision not to opt for the Mental Health Court alternative.  The negative 
consequence of this is that mentally ill offenders who committed minor crimes may be 
deterred from opting for the Mental Health Court programme628 because they are probably 
most likely to spend more time in a treatment programme than what they would have spent 
serving a sentence for an, especially minor offence.  
Lengthy periods of treatment could also contribute to discrimination against mentally ill 
accused persons who already face challenges in the criminal justice system.629  It is 
inappropriate for a court to continue to supervise services to an accused beyond the time 
that an accused would have been incarcerated.630  If treatment is required beyond the 
                                                
626  Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 DCL Review 143 at 157.  Proportionality is also explained by Fisher  
http://www.courtinnovation.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.ViewPageandPageID=603andcurrentTop 
Tier2=true (Date of use:  7 March 2011) at 4.  Also see O’Keefie The Brooklyn Mental Health Court 
Evaluation at 6.  The potential sentence a defendant faces for failing to comply with the conditions of 
release, or the treatment programme ordered by the Mental Health Court, should never be more 
severe than the sentence that would have been imposed in a conventional court.  Also see Frailing 
2009 C.S.L.R 145 at 156 who confirms that, due to jail time being imposed as sanctions for non-
compliance, the mentally ill offender may sometimes spend more time in jail whilst in the Mental 
Health Court programme, than he would have, had his case been processed through the 
conventional criminal justice process. 
627 The fact that the Mental Health Court treatment programme is completely voluntary must be stressed 
when the concerns in terms of privacy, stigmatisation and coercion is considered.  See Fisher   
http://www.courtinnovation.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.ViewPageandPageID=603andcurrentTop 
Tier2=true (Date of use:  7 March 2011) at 5. 
628  Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 578. 
629  Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 157.  Also see Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public 
Policy and Law 570 at 578 who adds that this could particularly be the case with persons accused of 
minor offences. 
630  Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 157.  The authors argue that the court’s 




period that the accused would have spent in jail or prison serving his sentence, such 
treatment should continue under the supervision of the mental health care system and not 
the judicial system.631  The underlying principle of this argument is probably to decriminalise 
mental illness in the sense that the mentally ill should have as little as possible contact with 
the law and, in particular, the criminal courts.  
 A view exists that the focus should fall on the therapeutic objective of the Mental Health 
Court treatment programmes, and the time that an accused remains under the Mental 
Health Court’s supervision should be guided by the programme needs.632  If the principle 
that no treatment programme should exceed the time period of the maximum sentence that 
could have been imposed in the criminal court as suggested above is applied strictly, this 
might result in treatment being disrupted or stopped completely for the sake of adhering to 
this ideal.  This could have dire consequences for a mentally ill accused who faces a 
relapse should his treatment be ceased abruptly.    
8.3.5 Sanctions for non-compliance 
Mental Health Courts use jail time as a sanction for non-compliance with a treatment 
programme in the Mental Health Court.633  The criticism against this practice in American 
Mental Health Courts is well articulated by Seltzer: 
if the goal is to lessen the incarceration of people with mental illnesses, then using 
incarceration as punishment is a perversion of the whole idea of mental health courts634 
                                                
631  Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 579.  Also see Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D 
C L Review 143 at 157.   
632  Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 157.  The authors opine that the length of treatment 
programmes should never exceed the amount of time that the accused would spend in incarceration 
or probation had his case been processed through the traditional criminal justice process.  Fisher  
http://www.courtinnovation.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.ViewPageandPageID=603andcurrentTop 
Tier2=true (Date of use:  7 March 2011) at 4 who reports that Ex-offenders with mental illness were 
of the opinion that treatment ordered by the Mental Health Court should last for at least 2 years 
whilst others suggested even longer periods 
633  Sirotich 2009 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry Law 461 at 470.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema 
Mental Health Courts at 90.  Also see Griffin PA, Steadman HJ and Petrila J ”The use of criminal 
charges and sanctions in mental health courts” 2002 (53) Psych Serv 1285-1289 at 1285.  Also see 
Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 579.  Also see Lurigio and Snowden 2009 
The Justice System Journal 196 at 207.  See further in general Redlich AD, Steadman HJ, Petrila J, 
Monahan J and Griffin PA “The second generation of mental health courts” 2005 (11) Psychology, 
Public Policy and Law 527-538. 
634  Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 579.  Also see Lurigio and Snowden 2009 
The Justice System Journal 196 at 212 where jail time as sanction for non-compliance with 
treatment programmes are criticised, as it is often not helpful for the mentally ill accused to receive 
jail time.  Also see Odegaard 2007 North Dakota Law Review 225 at 253 where jail time as a 
sanction for non-compliance is highlighted as a concern. 
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 The view that the only penalty that a participant in the Mental Health Court programme 
should face is that his case is treated in a conventional way through the criminal justice 
system, and only in the event of serious non-compliance 635 is supported. 
 Due to the nature of the conditions treated in the Mental Health Court programmes, 
relapses are expected and should not result in a penalty such as incarceration.636  Where 
non-compliance occurs, the cause thereof should be investigated to establish if such non-
compliance was perhaps a symptom of the mental illness.  Non-compliance could also be 
an indication that the treatment programme should be changed to better address the 
individual’s treatment needs.637  Punitive sanctions should only be considered once it has 
been established that the defendant was capable of complying with the treatment 
programme but deliberately chose not to do so.638  The individual’s participation in the 
Mental Health Court programme should only be stopped if he expresses the wish to opt-out 
of the programme.639 Withdrawal from the programme should not occur for purposes of 
“punishment” for non-compliance with the programme.  Punishing the individual by 
removing him from the treatment programme is counter-therapeutic and may set the 
recovery process back significantly.  If one of the main objectives of a Mental Health Court 
is to avoid the negative effects that detainment can have on a mentally ill individual, 
employing incarceration as a sanction will compromise this objective of the Mental Health 
                                                
635  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 90. 
636  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 90.  Also see Redlich et al 2005 
Psychology, Public Policy and Law 527 at 527.  Also see Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and 
Law 570 at 579 who reiterates that imposing jail time or terminating a treatment programme as a 
sanction for non-compliance with the treatment programme, is especially devastating for the 
participant who suffers from a mental illness.  Relapses and setbacks are common incidents for 
persons receiving mental health treatment.  Such setbacks occur in the process of establishing what 
the best possible treatment programme for the individual is and a good example is where a patient 
does not react favourably to a particular type of medication.  See Council of State Government’s 
Criminal Justice/ Mental Health Consensus Project: 
http://consensusproject.org/topics/news/mhcsurvey(Date of use:  28 March 2014) at 98.  Also see 
Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 580 who shares this view. 
637  Council of State Government’s Criminal Justice/ Mental Health Consensus Project: 
http://consensusproject.org/topics/news/mhcsurvey(Date of use:  28 March 2014) at 88, 89.  Also 
see Lurigio and Snowden 2009 The Justice System Journal 196 at 207 where it is indicated that a 
number of Mental Health Courts adjust the treatment programme if non-compliance occurs.  See 
further Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 90 where the authors suggest that a 
better response to non-compliance would be to adjust the treatment programme or to monitor the 
accused’s participation in the programme closer.  This view was also expressed by the Council for 
State Government in their report Council of State Government’s Criminal Justice/ Mental Health 
Consensus Project: http://consensusproject.org/topics/news/mhcsurvey(Date of use:  28 March 
2014) at 125. 
638  Council of State Government’s Criminal Justice/ Mental Health Consensus Project: 
http://consensusproject.org/topics/news/mhcsurvey(Date of use:  28 March 2014) at 89. 
639  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 91. 
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Court.640     
8.3.6 Guilty plea 
The practice in some Mental Health Courts in the United States that require the mentally ill 
accused to plead guilty 641 in order to participate in the Mental Health Court programme has 
also been criticised for contributing to the stigmatisation of the mentally ill accused.642  The 
mentally ill accused is burdened with a criminal record, which makes his reintegration into 
the community much harder.643  Such practices not only contribute to stigmatisation but also 
the criminalisation of mental illness.644  The guilty plea is potentially not voluntary, as it has 
been induced.645  Concerns have further been raised about the possible discriminatory 
nature of this practice since non-mentally ill accused persons are not required to plead 
guilty in order to access services.646  The accused’s rights are effectively reduced since 
they are compelled to incriminate themselves and plead guilty in order to gain access to the 
court-monitored treatment programme.647  The accused is, in effect, denied the right to be 
presumed innocent until proven guilty.648  Strong opinion exists that a guilty plea should not 
be required for participation in a Mental Health Court programme.649   
                                                
640  Setlzer shares this view.  See Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 579.    
641  Stafford and Wygant 2005 Behavioral Sciences and the Law 245 at 246. 
642  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts 96. 
643  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts 96.  The mentally ill accused might for 
example struggle to find employment due to his criminal record.  Also see Seltzer 2005 Psychology, 
Public Policy and Law 570 at 576-577 and 583.  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health 
Courts at 87.  Also see Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 576, 577 where it is 
highlighted that the fact that the mentally ill accused has a criminal record, will make it difficult for 
him to retain his housing provided by the state or employment once s/he completes the mental 
health programme.  Also see Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 153 where these 
concerns are reiterated.  Insisting on a guilty plea as part of the admission criteria into the treatment 
programme of the Mental Health Court, could hinder the goal of eventually successfully integrating 
the accused into the community since a guilty plea will affect the changes of the accused to qualify 
for housing and employment after completion of the programme since he will still have a criminal 
record.  See Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 161. 
644  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 95, 96.  Adds to criminalisation of the 
mentally ill accused, which is what the Mental Health Court is attempting to avoid by diverting the 
mentally ill accused away from the traditional criminal justice system.  Also see Seltzer 2005 
Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 577. 
645  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts 87.  Also see Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C 
L Review 143 at 160. 
646  Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 153. 
647  Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 103.  It is added that the standard of proof for the 
guilty of the accused is often dropped during problem solving court proceedings, which means that 
evidence is accepted that would not normally have been accepted to prove the accused’s guilt. 
648  Welch and Fuller American Criminal Courts at 103. 
649  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 96.  Also see Seltzer 2005 Psychology, 
Public Policy and Law 570 at 577 who substantiates this point by pointing out that Mental Health 
Courts are supposed to be less punitive than criminal courts, hence a guilty plea does not fit in with 
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 The guilty plea can, however, be viewed to benefit for the victim of a felony.  Should the 
offender fail in treatment, the offender is sentenced to the jail term agreed upon at the time 
of the guilty plea.650  This enables prosecutors to secure a felony conviction without having 
to conduct trials, thus saving resources and sparing witnesses who are often the victims of 
the crime from the unpleasant experience of testifying.     
8.4 Suggestions for improvement of the American Mental Health Court model 
8.4.1 Enforce Mental Health Court orders against service providers 
One major frustration with regard to the optimal functioning of Mental Health Courts is that 
these courts do not have the necessary authority to hold mental health service providers 
accountable for providing the desired services to the participants.651 Many service providers 
merely provide medication and occasionally provide counselling.652     
One way of giving courts this authority is by giving them the power to decide to which 
service provider the funds for the services should be channelled and further for the court to 
exercise its contempt powers.653 
 Another suggestion related to mental health service providers is to incorporate mental 
health services for offenders into the mainstream mental health system, rather than having 
a separate parallel court-monitored mental health system for offenders.654 This will address 
the frustration that Mental Health Courts are experiencing in terms of a limited amount of 
services being available to the court.655  This suggestion is supported by the view that the 
mental health system should be reformed to be more accessible to those with mental 
illness and that such system reform should be ongoing whilst Mental Health Courts are put 
in place to address the immediate problem of the growing number of mentally ill persons in 
the criminal justice system.656  The fact that the mental health care system is benefiting 
                                                                                                                                                   
this goal.  Yet, some Mental Health Courts, especially those in the Unites States of America tend to 
require a guilty plea as a condition for participation in the Mental Health Court.    
650 The delivery of justice to the victim of the crime is effectively secured by the accused entering a 
guilty plea prior to treatment so that, should he fail to complete it, he will be found guilty.  Fisher  
http://www.courtinnovation.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.ViewPageandPageID=603andcurrentTop 
Tier2=true (Date of use:  7 March 2011) at 6. 
651  Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 580.  Also see Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D 
C L Review 143 at 159. 
652  Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 582. 
653  Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 580. 
654  Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 581. 
655  Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 581. 
656  Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 160. 
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from Mental Health Courts in the sense that their financial obligations in terms of treating 
mentally ill accused persons have been shifted to the state correctional departments657 
might limit enthusiasm for the much-needed reform. 
8.4.2 Supplement with pre-booking programmes 
To optimise the impact of these speciality courts, they should not function in isolation but 
should have some pre-booking programme as well where law enforcement and mental 
health work together to avoid contact with the criminal justice system for persons with 
mental illness altogether.658 
 The importance of combining the services of the Mental Health Court with a pre-booking 
programme is stressed as an important factor to limit arrests of persons with mental 
illness.659  The absence of a pre-booking programme co-existing with the Mental Health 
Court programme might lead to mentally ill persons being arrested in the hope that they can 
access mental health services through the Mental Health Court 660 , which defeats the goal 
of the Mental Health Court movement, namely to limit the interaction of the mentally ill with 
the criminal justice system.  Seltzer motivates that crime prevention and/or pre-booking 
programmes 661 rather than post-booking programmes 662 would be more beneficial to the 
mentally ill in (potential) conflict of the law.  She warns that if a court such as the Mental 
Health Court is not accompanied by the development of pre-booking programmes, mentally 
ill individuals will continue to be arrested by the police with the goal of getting them into 
mental health care services.663  Approximately half of all Mental Health Courts operate in 
                                                
657  Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 161. 
658  Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 155, 162 where the co-operation is stressed as the 
way forward for the optimal treatment of persons with mental illness. 
659  Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 160. 
660  Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D C L Review 143 at 160. 
661  A crime prevention diversion programme is where the aim is to intervene prior to police intervention.  
See Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 70.  Prebooking diversion programmes 
is where the individual is diverted to the mental health care system, before a criminal charge is filed.  
See Sirotich 2009 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry Law 461 at 462.  Also see the discussion of diversion 
programmes earlier in this chapter.  Seltzer is of the view that the effectiveness of Mental Health 
Courts cannot be measured accurately, without considering whether there are initiatives being 
developed to make mental health care services available to those individuals who are at risk of 
arrest because of their mental illness.  See Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 
581. 
662  A post-booking diversion programme is where the accused is diverted after having been arrested 
and charged with a criminal offence.  See Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 
78.  Also see the discussion of diversion programmes earlier in this chapter. 
663  Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 581. 
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isolation, without joining forces with a pre-booking programme.664 
 Seltzer goes so far as to say that the increased inflow of those with mental illness into the 
criminal justice system could better be addressed by filling the treatment gaps with regard 
to mentally ill persons in the community and further by training police officers on the 
resources available to the mentally ill individual.665  If these measures are implemented, a 
specialised Mental Health Court, according to her, will not be necessary.666  
8.4.3 Provide specialised assistance to mentally ill accused who do not qualify for diversion 
 The fact that the Mental Health Court only assists those who qualify for diversion based on 
criteria such as the treatability of the accused’s condition disqualifies many fit but mentally 
ill accused persons from diversion.  The Mental Health Court in the United States should 
consider providing specialised assistance to those who do not qualify for diversion, yet 
suffer from a mental illness, regardless of the treatability thereof.  It is only through such an 
approach that the entire fit but mentally ill accused population will be reached and benefit 
from an initiative such as a Mental Health Court. 
9 COMPARISON OF DIVERSION IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WITH THE 
SOUTH AFRICAN SYSTEM 
9.1 Legislation 
 The United States legislation contains a presumption of fitness, whereas South African 
legislation lacks such a provision. 
Both the United States system and the South African system places an obligation on a 
presiding officer to refer an accused for observation once the issue of mental illness is 
raised.   
9.2 Fitness assessments 
 In the United States of America, two mental health practitioners must assess an accused’s 
                                                
664  Sirotich 2009 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry Law 461 at 464.   
665  Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 583, 585.  Seltzer opines further that Mental 
Health Courts are in any event not addressing the problem of over-representedness of the mentally 
ill in the criminal justice system.  Presumably because the arrest and accordingly the entrance of the 
mentally ill accused into the criminal justice system is required in order for him to benefit from the 
Mental Health Court programme. 
666  Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 583. 
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fitness to stand trial regardless of the seriousness of the offence. In South Africa, the 
number of persons that must assess an accused’s fitness depends on the seriousness of 
the charges against him. 
In the United States of America, a psychologist can, by default, be appointed to conduct a 
fitness assessment.   A psychiatrist need not be appointed to conduct the assessment with 
the psychologist as two psychologists can be appointed to conduct the assessment.   In 
South Africa, an application must especially be made for a psychologist to be appointed as 
part of the assessment team.  The psychologist alone, however, cannot conduct a fitness 
assessment.  This arrangement in South Africa arguably contributes to delays in fitness 
assessments due to the shortage of psychiatrists in South Africa, as pointed out above. 
Both jurisdictions provide for a third psychiatrist to conduct an assessment where the 
mental health practitioners who conducted the first fitness assessment do not agree on their 
finding or where the first assessment’s finding is opposed by the accused or the 
prosecution. 
 The default period for a fitness assessment in both jurisdictions is 30-days.  
9.3 Out-patient treatment 
 The New York CPL specifically makes provision for fitness assessments to be conducted 
on an outpatient basis where appropriate.  The South African legislation lacks such a 
provision, and the default position is that assessments are conducted on an inpatient basis.  
Some assessments on an outpatient basis have occurred in selected instances. 
9.4 72-hour assessment period 
After a finding of unfitness, an accused in respect of whom an order for detention is made 
may be released within 72-hours if they do not meet the criteria for voluntary or involuntary 
care in terms of the Mental Hygiene Law.  In South Africa, even though the Mental Health 
Care Act contains the 72-hour provision, it is arguably not applied to accused persons 
found unfit to stand trial and in respect of whom an order for detention is made pursuant to 






10  COMPARISON OF THE MENTAL HEALTH COURT MODEL IN THE USA WITH THAT 
OF CANADA 
10.1 Legislation 
 Both jurisdictions contain a legislative presumption of fitness. 
 The Canadian system leaves room for the judge to exercise his discretion in respect of 
referring an accused for a fitness assessment, whereas the US criminal justice system 
places an obligation to refer an accused for an assessment where a mental health issue 
arises.  
 In Canada, the assessment period for fitness is limited to 5-days, whereas in the USA, it is 
set at 30-days. 
 In Canada, the fitness assessment is conducted by one mental health practitioner, whereas 
it is conducted by two in the United States of America.  The seriousness of the charges 
against the accused is not a factor in deciding how many mental health practitioners should 
assess an accused, as is the case in South Africa.  
10.2 Fitness test 
 The fitness test used in the United States of America requires that the accused has a 
rational understanding of the case against him, whereas there is no such requirement in the 
Canadian fitness test.   
10.3 Mental Health Court model 
10.3.1 Goals of the Mental Health Court 
A goal that the Toronto Mental Health Court and the Brooklyn Mental Health Courts have in 
common is that they aim to divert mentally ill accused persons away from the criminal 
justice system into treatment programmes to address the underlying cause of the criminal 
behaviour. 
The Toronto Mental Health Court aims to expedite pre-trial issues with regard to fitness.  It 
is evident through its functioning, as explained in chapter 4, that the processes are all 
geared towards moving the accused out of the criminal justice system as soon as possible.  
The expeditious resolution of pre-trial issues is not one of the primary objectives of the 
Brooklyn Mental Health Court, although the court aims to establish fitness for diversion 
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within 21 days.   
The Brooklyn Mental Health Court is specifically aimed at enhancing the collaboration 
between the criminal justice system and the mental health care system and sets out to 
establish a model of Mental Health Court that can be transplanted in other jurisdictions.  
The Toronto Mental Health Court’s goals are more focused on its immediate community, 
where it aims to bridge the gap between the criminal justice system and the mental health 
resources available to those in the system. 
10.3.2 Referral to the Mental Health Court 
 In the United States of America and specifically in New York, it is compulsory to refer any 
case in which mental illness is an issue to the Brooklyn Mental Health Court.  In Canada, it 
is not compulsory to make such a referral as the criminal court may order an assessment 
and make a disposition where they deem it appropriate. 
In Canada, higher courts such as appellate courts often approach the Mental Health Court 
for assistance in matters involving mental illness.  This is presumably not the case in the 
United States of America since this court does not provide assistance to those with mental 
illnesses who do not qualify for diversion.   
In Canada, all accused persons may be referred to the Mental Health Court for a fitness 
assessment regardless of the seriousness of the offence.  Such an assessment may be the 
only function that the Mental Health Court performs in that particular case since persons 
accused of serious offences do not qualify for the diversion component of the Canadian 
Mental Health Court.  In the American Mental Health Court, persons accused of serious 
crimes will not necessarily be assessed for fitness by a Mental Health Court since being 
accused of a violent crime is one of the screen-out factors that is applied during the first 
stage of the Mental Health Court process, unless the Mental Health Court specifically 
decides to deal with violent crime.   
10.3.3 Eligibility criteria 
With regard to the psychiatric eligibility criteria, the American Mental Health Court places a 
lot of emphasis on the treatability of a certain mental health diagnosis for purposes of 
admission into the Mental Health Court treatment programme.  The Brooklyn mental health 
court requires that the accused must have a serious mental illness for which there is a 
known treatment.  The Canadian model focuses less on treatability, presumably because it 
provides services to those who do not qualify for the diversion component of the court as 
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well. For those accused who do qualify for diversion, a formal mental health diagnosis is not 
necessarily required.  The Toronto mental health court seems to assist accused persons 
with serious and less serious mental illnesses. 
Both systems exclude persons with mental retardation and personality disorders from their 
treatment programmes if an accused person has such a condition as an only diagnosis. 
With regard to the legal criteria, the American Mental Health Court considers cases 
involving serious violence as well, thus not only misdemeanours.  The Canadian Mental 
Health Court provides assistance to all accused persons, regardless of the seriousness of 
the offence but only allows those charged with minor offences into the diversion component 
of the Mental Health Court.  
10.3.4 Voluntary participation 
The practice that allows Mental Health Court participants to opt-out of the Mental Health 
Court programme at any time differs from the position in the Canadian Mental Health 
Courts where there are certain parts of the Mental Health Court proceedings during which a 
participant cannot leave the proceedings.  
Many Mental Health Courts in North America, however, do not allow participants to opt-out 
of diversion programme once enrolled.667  This practice can attract criticism from those 
already sceptical of the true voluntary nature of Mental Health Court participation.  
Voluntary participation in the Mental Health Court programme is absolutely imperative, and 
if this is not the case, singling out mentally ill individuals for separate and different treatment 
by the Mental Health Court could constitute a possible violation of equal protection 
guarantee under the American Constitution, as well as contravening the provision in the 
Americans With Disabilities Act 668  that prohibits discrimination by a state programme. 669 
10.3.5 Guilty plea 
 In the USA, a guilty plea is often set as a prerequisite for participation in the Mental Health 
 Court programme.  This is the practice in New York.  This attracts warranted criticism.  The 
                                                
667  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 91.  Also see Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D 
C L Review 143 at 152. 
668  1990 (42 U.S.C. § 12101 
669  Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 574.  Also see Bernstein and Seltzer 2003 D 
C L Review 143 at 150.  The 14th Amendment to the American Constitution guarantees equal 
protection to all under the law.   
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requirement of a guilty plea for participation presupposes fitness and criminal capacity, 
which may not necessarily, by default, be present in each particular case.   
 In Canada, the accused need only admit his involvement in the crime that he is accused of, 
and such admission may not be used against him in the event that his case is processed 
through the traditional criminal court at a later stage.  
10.3.6 Diversion programmes 
The Canadian Mental Health Court has a diversion component attached to the court but is 
not a diversion programme as such.  The American model seems to be a diversion 
programme as such since it does not assist an accused person who does not qualify for the 
court-monitored diversion programmes offered in the Mental Health Court.  
10.3.7 Sanctions for non-compliance with treatment programme 
The American Mental Health Court, and in particular the Brooklyn Mental Health Court, 
employs jail time as a sanction for non-compliance.  The Canadian Mental Health Court 
specifically avoids this sanction due to the potential anti-therapeutic nature thereof.  It is 
also clear how incarceration can be seen as contradicting the very goal of the Mental 
Health Court, namely to reduce the mentally ill accused person’s contact with the criminal 
justice system. 
11  CONCLUSION 
The problem-solving court movement gained significant momentum in the United States of 
America, as is evident from the high number of Mental Health Courts that have been 
established across the country. 
The fitness test, as laid down in the Dusky judgment, is widely accepted across the United 
States of America as clear and rational.  Even so, the standard set to be found fit to stand 
trial is not very high.  The majority of those sent for fitness assessments in the United 
States of America is found fit to stand trial. 
The American court structure and, particularly, the court structure in Brooklyn, New York, 
provides for all cases involving mental illness to be referred to the Brooklyn Mental Health 
Court.  This Mental Health Court has a strict initial screening phase during which screening 
out criteria with regard to the type of offence and type of illness is applied.  Many persons 
with mental illnesses may be screened out at this early stage and not have access to the 
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services offered at the Brooklyn Mental Health Court. 
The Mental Health Court model employed in the Brooklyn Mental Health Court is vastly 
different from that employed at the Toronto Mental Health Court.  The Brooklyn Mental 
Health Court considers serious offences for diversion as well, widening the net of persons 
that could benefit from the Mental Health Court treatment programmes.  The Brooklyn 
Mental Health Court, however, focus heavily on treatability as an eligibility element, which 
in turn could exclude a number of persons from the treatment programmes.   
Notably, the requirement of a guilty plea in the American model raises concerns, and the 
necessity thereof is questioned.  Similarly, the use of jail time as a sanction for non-
compliance with the court treatment programme is potentially counter-therapeutic and does 
not truly serve the objectives that the Mental Health Court aims to achieve. 
The fact that in both these systems, Mental Health Courts are allowed to determine their 
own processes makes the idea of a Mental Health Court viable in other jurisdictions and 
allows processes to be adjusted in line with the constitutional and procedural framework 
within which it functions. 
The next chapter will explore aspects of a viable Mental Health Court model for South 





MENTAL HEALTH COURTS FOR SOUTH AFRICA – A 
RECOMMENDATION 
1  INTRODUCTION 
 The previous chapters explored the position of the mentally ill accused person in the South 
African criminal justice system and explained the relevant psychological aspects related 
thereto.  Challenges facing the South African criminal justice system and the forensic 
system, in particular, were highlighted.  The suggestion of a South African Mental Health 
Court as a therapeutic response to mentally ill accused persons was made early on in this 
research, and the ways in which this court could address certain challenges in the current 
system were pointed out throughout. 
The Mental Health Court models as they are employed in Canada and the United States of 
America were analysed, and consideration was given to the concerns regarding each 
model.  The manner in which these courts contribute to the therapeutic outcomes of cases 
involving mentally ill accused persons became clear as the discussion of each of these 
models progressed. 
This final chapter summarises the research findings in each previous chapter and answers 
the main research questions posed.  Finally, this chapter proposes a Mental Health Court 
model for South Africa by suggesting procedural dynamics for such a court and some 
legislative amendments in order to facilitate this initiative.  This proposal is made by 
considering the positive attributes of the two Mental Health Court models considered earlier 
in this research with due regard to the unique South African context in which such a court 
will have to function. 
2  SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
2.1 Introduction 
 This section summarises the research findings of each chapter synoptically.  No new 
insights are offered in this section as it purely serves as an overview of the discussions 




2.2  Chapter 1 
This first chapter pointed out that mental illness can become relevant during criminal 
proceedings because of a lack of fitness to stand trial or criminal capacity.  Since this 
research focussed on pre-trial issues, aspects relating to fitness were discussed in detail 
rather than criminal capacity.   
The chapter explained that the research is motivated by the fact that the number of mentally 
ill persons in the criminal justice system is increasing globally.  Persons with mental illness 
are mostly arrested for petty crimes.   
The chapter explained that the majority of accused persons assessed for fitness to stand 
trial are found fit to stand trial.  It explained that an accused could, according to the current 
provisions of the South African Criminal Procedure Act, be found either fit to stand trial or 
unfit to stand trial.  It highlighted the fact that an accused can be found fit to stand trial 
despite the fact that he has a mental illness.  It was submitted that the latter group of 
accused persons form a third group in the fitness continuum, namely:  fit, but mentally ill. 
The chapter pointed out that the position of the fit but mentally ill accused is not regulated 
by the South African Criminal Procedure Act and the only option for such an accused is to 
proceed to trial through the normal criminal justice processes.  No further consideration is 
given to the mental illness unless the fitness issue is raised again later in the proceedings 
or unless the accused raises a lack of criminal capacity as a defence.   
The fit but mentally ill accused are often incarcerated awaiting trial. Incarceration has a 
detrimental effect on the mental state of a mentally ill accused. Mental health care in 
correctional facilities is not always available to those awaiting trial, and this lack of 
treatment could lead to inappropriate behaviour or re-offending.  This is known as the 
revolving door phenomenon where mentally ill accused persons come into conflict with the 
law repeatedly. 
 The chapter explained that this research was dedicated to exploring an alternative to 
traditional prosecution for the fit but mentally ill accused.  Such an alternative requires that 
skills from non-legal fields, especially mental health, be applied in the criminal justice 
system. 
This research proposed the implementation of Mental Health Courts as a specialised 
alternative to traditional prosecutions for mentally ill accused persons in South Africa.  The 
study of the Mental Health Court movement and its various models were explored in this 
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research with the ultimate aim to propose a similar alternative to traditional prosecution for 
South African accused persons who are fit to stand trial but nonetheless mentally ill. 
 Important concepts as they were used and relied on throughout the research were 
explained, and the research was demarcated here.  The choice of jurisdictions in the 
research, namely that of Canada and the State of New York in the United States of 
America, was motivated as predominantly guided by the Mental Health Court model they 
employ. 
 Finally, the limitations of the research were set out, in particular, that the research would 
not include detailed consideration of mental illness in the context of criminal capacity and 
would further not include the involvement of the mentally ill person in civil litigation.  Chapter 
1 concluded with a short overview of the chapters which followed. 
2.3 Chapter 2 
This chapter provided the background to the research and contextualised the issues 
involved. 
The chapter offered a brief overview of the historical treatment of mentally ill persons and 
what the causes of mental illness were believed to be.  The position in South Africa was 
highlighted throughout.  It was shown that mentally ill persons were treated badly in the 
past and that little consideration was given to their human rights. 
It was established that there is a link between mental illness and criminal behaviour despite 
disagreements on this issue.  Mentally ill persons are mostly arrested for petty crimes and 
most often suffer from schizophrenia.  Failure to take prescribed medication combined with 
homelessness is often associated with arrests of mentally ill persons.  
The forensic setting was explained as the environment in which the expertise of the legal 
field on the one hand, and those in the mental health care field on the other, meet in the 
criminal justice system to address issues of mental illness.  The interplay between these 
two fields was briefly pointed out, and the involvement of prisons and psychiatric institutions 
as facilities that mentally ill accused persons encounter were discussed.  Potential 
challenges were pointed out throughout the discussion, inter alia, overcrowding in prisons, 
lack of mental health care services in prisons, and the lack of available beds in psychiatric 
institutions where forensic assessments can be conducted.  Psychiatric facilities further lack 
the professional staff to conduct these assessments. 
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The chapter suggested that considering all the challenges of the current system, an 
alternative to traditional prosecution for the mentally ill accused should be considered.  
Diversion options as alternatives to the traditional criminal justice system were discussed 
with a brief overview of the main types of diversion.  This discussion on diversion was 
generic and not jurisdiction-specific since such jurisdiction-specific discussions are 
contained in chapters 3 to 5. 
Therapeutic jurisprudence as the driving force behind diversion programmes was discussed 
in detail with a particular focus on its nature and implementation in the criminal justice 
setting.  The criticism levied against therapeutic jurisprudence was explored and responses 
to such criticism offered.  The discussion on therapeutic jurisprudence concluded that the 
potential benefit of this approach outweighs the criticism levelled against it. 
A discussion of Mental Health Courts as a suggested new approach to the mentally ill in the 
criminal justice system was included, focussing on the underlying principles of therapeutic 
jurisprudence and the aims thereof.   
Mental Health Courts as an alternative to traditional prosecution for mentally ill accused 
persons was discussed with a focus on the general goals of such courts.  The emergence 
of Mental Health Courts in Canada and the United States of America was discussed as the 
backdrop against which the establishment of a Mental Health Court for South Africa should 
be considered since many of the reasons for the emergence in these jurisdictions are 
equally applicable in South Africa.  These reasons include the overrepresentation of 
persons with mental illnesses in the criminal justice system and the long delays 
experienced in finalising fitness issues during trial.  
A large portion of chapter 2 constituted discussions on non-legal issues, which are 
pertinently relevant to this research since the law has to adjust to address issues created in 
various fields of discipline.  
2.4 Chapter 3 
The South African legal framework within which the mentally ill accused’s case is 
processed formed the focus of this chapter.  The relevant legislative provisions were 
discussed to explain the parameters within which the case of a mentally ill accused person 
is considered.  The Constitution, Criminal Procedure Act, Mental Health Care Act, and 
Correctional Services Act were discussed in particular.  These Acts were discussed in detail 
since especially the Criminal Procedure Act and the Mental Health Care Act are ultimately 
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the legislative provisions that will have to be amended to make provision for a Mental 
Health Court in South Africa.  The development of these pieces of legislation was included 
to show some of the progress with the treatment of the mentally ill in the criminal justice 
system that has been made to date. 
The focus of the chapter shifted to procedural issues surrounding fitness to stand trial.  The 
purpose of a fitness assessment was explored first, followed by the order for a fitness 
assessment with a focus on the content of the order and the juncture at which it can be 
made.  The two-prong test for fitness was discussed.  The actual assessment was 
discussed with a focus on the duration and place thereof.   
Some provisions in the Criminal Procedure Act pertaining to the appointment of mental 
health professionals to conduct assessments were highlighted as problematic, and 
questions were posed about the true effectiveness thereof. 
The role and responsibility of these professionals during the fitness assessment were set 
out.  The personal and procedural consequences of a finding of fitness versus a finding of 
unfitness were discussed in detail.     
The chapter showed that detailed provision has been made for persons found unfit to stand 
trial and that the position of the unfit accused has recently even been considered by the 
Constitutional court.  The position of the fit accused is less complicated but not without 
problems in that no further consideration is given to an accused with a mental illness who is 
nonetheless found fit to stand trial.  A third category on the fitness continuum was thus 
identified, namely the fit but mentally ill accused whose position is not regulated by South 
African law.  The cases of this category of accused persons should ideally not be 
processed through the traditional criminal justice system.  Alternatives to traditional 
prosecution should be explored. 
The concept of diversion in South Africa was briefly explored with a focus on rehabilitation 
as the desired outcome of diversion.  This discussion elucidated the fact that there is 
currently no diversion option for the mentally ill accused in South Africa.  A case was made 
out that Mental Health Courts can provide a viable alternative to traditional prosecution for a 
fit but mentally ill accused.  The proposal is supported by the fact that the South African 
Department of Correctional Services has not only identified mentally ill accused persons as 
a special group of persons requiring specialised care but have shifted their focus to 
rehabilitation.  Specialised care for the mentally ill accused with a view on rehabilitation is 
what the Mental Health Court has to offer. 
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Chapter 3 highlighted the current challenges in the South African criminal justice system 
ranging from lack of space in prison for accused persons awaiting assessment to lack of 
space in psychiatric facilities to accommodate inpatient assessment and delays caused by 
these resource shortages.  Various suggestions were made to remedy these challenges in 
the current system, with the optimal solution being the implementation of a Mental Health 
Court. 
2.5 Chapter 4 
 The Mental Health Court model employed in Canada formed the focus of this chapter. 
 The chapter set out the legislative framework as it affects the mentally ill accused person in 
the Canadian criminal justice system with a specific focus on the Canadian Constitution, 
Criminal Code and Mental Health Legislation.  The Canadian system makes provision for a 
presumption of fitness and has clear provisions regarding fitness procedures.   
 The criminal court structure in Canada was set out to ascertain the place of the Mental 
Health Court in the court system.  Mental Health Courts were acknowledged as lower 
criminal courts that may consider less serious offences.  Review Boards as an important 
role player for mentally ill accused persons in the criminal justice system were explained, 
and their function highlighted.  These Review Boards are particularly relevant to those 
accused persons found unfit to stand trial. 
 Procedural aspects pertaining to the mentally ill accused person in the Canadian criminal 
justice system were explored with a specific focus on the content of the order for 
assessment,  the test employed to determine fitness to stand trial and the consequences 
of a finding of fitness versus unfitness.  Of significance is that the period for fitness 
assessment is set at 5-days, and a presumption exists that such assessment is conducted 
out of custody.   
The test for fitness to stand trial as it is understood in Canada and as it emerged through 
case law and legislation were explored, and criticism levelled against it discussed.  Concern 
has been raised about the low threshold that applies when assessing fitness to stand trial in 
accordance with this test.  Because of this low threshold, the majority of those sent for 
fitness assessments are found fit to stand trial and many persons who are potentially not fit 
to stand trial face the full force of the law and a criminal trial as a result.    
Consideration was given to alternatives in the criminal justice system for mentally ill 
accused persons.  Different types of diversion were considered, including Mental Health 
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Courts as a post-booking or post-charge diversion option.  The particular model of the 
Canadian Mental Health Court, and in particular the Mental Health Court in Toronto, formed 
the focus of the remainder of the chapter.  
 The goal of the Canadian Mental Health Court is to speed up pre-trial issues such as 
fitness assessments and to reduce recidivism.  Its underlying principles are voluntary 
participation, therapeutic jurisprudence and the involvement of a multi-disciplinary court 
team.  The procedural dynamics of the court was explored by considering how the accused 
is referred to the Mental Health Court, and the two main phases in the court process, 
namely, the admission phase and the programme phase, were explained.  Each phase has 
various stages, and these were discussed.  The Canadian Mental Health Court model is 
easy to understand, and the processes seem crystallised.  The eligibility criterion is clear, 
and the options for the accused once at the Mental Health Court are clear. 
 The Canadian Mental Health Court is not a diversion programme per se but has a diversion 
component attached to it.  The diversion component of the Toronto Mental Health Court is 
reserved for those accused of minor offences.  The Mental Health Court, however, offers 
assistance to those accused persons who do not qualify for diversion but who require the 
assistance of the Mental Health Court in which specialised skills are housed.  The Mental 
Health Court can be of assistance to these accused persons by assisting them with a bail 
application where the conditions of bail will have a treatment component built into it or can 
assist the accused person to resolve his case with a guilty plea in the Mental Health Court.  
On agreement between the parties, the Mental Health Court may also assist in cases where 
the accused enters the insanity defence. 
 The successes of the Canadian Mental Health Court model were identified as cost-saving, 
lower recidivism and reduced delays in fitness assessments.  Challenges were, however, 
also identified.  Specific challenges included concerns about the true voluntariness of 
participation in the Mental Health Court programme, and the concern that accused persons 
in the criminal justice system will receive preferential treatment in terms of mental health 
services at the disadvantage of those in the community that are in need thereof.  A limited 
pool of resources may have this result.  It was suggested that resources be allocated 
specifically for the Mental Health Court and that the Mental Health Court model be 
improved by supplementing it with an active pre-booking diversion programme.  
The chapter concluded with a brief comparison of some main aspects of the South African 
criminal justice system as it pertains to the mentally ill and that of Canada with due 
consideration to the fact that Canada makes use of a Mental Health Court as diversion for 
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the mentally ill but fit accused person. 
The Canadian Mental Health Court model succeeds in making its specialised skills 
available to mentally ill accused persons regardless of the seriousness of the offence 
because of the fact that it provides services to those who do not qualify for diversion due to 
the fact that they, for instance, committed a serious offence which does not qualify for 
diversion according to the Canadian Criminal Code. 
2.6 Chapter 5 
 The Mental Health Court model employed in the United States of America was explored in 
this chapter.  The structure of this chapter was similar to that of chapter 4, in which the 
Canadian Mental Health Court model was discussed.  The similarity in structure was aimed 
at assisting with the comparison between the two very different Mental Health Court models 
employed in these two jurisdictions. 
The legislative framework as it pertains to the mentally ill accused in the United States was 
discussed with specific reference to the American Constitution, the Criminal Code and 
mental health legislation.  The fact that a presumption of fitness applies was highlighted.  
Legislation, as it applies in New York, was singled out since the Mental Health Court model 
discussed in this chapter was mainly based on the model used in Brooklyn, New York.  The 
legislative framework and regulation of criminal law and procedure in America are much 
more complex than that of Canada because every state in America has its own constitution 
and its own legislation pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law and procedure. 
The dual court structure was explained, illustrating the place of Mental Health Courts in the 
hierarchy of courts.  The criminal court system in the United States does not incorporate 
Review Boards, as is the case in Canada.  
The concept of fitness as it applies in the United States was explored, followed by the order 
for fitness to stand trial and the test employed to establish it.  The test has crystallised 
through case law and is accepted as clear, although the threshold for being found fit to 
stand trial is very low, resulting in the majority of those sent for assessment being found fit 
to stand trial. 
The actual assessment was discussed by looking at who should conduct it, where it takes 
place, and how long it lasts.  Fitness assessments are ordered for 30-days at a time and 
may be conducted on either an inpatient or an outpatient basis depending on if 
hospitalisation is required for the assessment or not.   
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The personal and procedural consequences of finding of fitness were contrasted with a 
finding of unfitness.  Potential indefinite detention of those found unfit to stand trial has 
been resolved through case law and detailed measures put in place to ensure that 
detention is never indefinite for unfit accused persons. 
Diversion options in the United States were discussed with a particular focus on Mental 
Health Courts as a form of diversion.  The particular model of Mental Health Court 
employed in the United States formed the focus of the remainder of the chapter.  
The goals of the American Mental Health Court are diversion and rehabilitation.  The 
underlying principles were explored and established as similar to those of Canada, although 
the underlying principle of voluntary participation receives much criticism in the United 
States model.  The reason for this is that the Mental Health Court requires a guilty plea as a 
condition for participation in the court programme.  This requirement presupposes fitness 
and criminal capacity, which may very well be a misconception in some cases. 
The procedural dynamics of the Mental Health Court were discussed, and the phases are 
aligned with those in the Canadian model for ease of comparison.  The stages within these 
phases, however, differ and were discussed accordingly.  The court process in the 
American Mental Health Court seems less defined as compared to the Canadian 
processes.  This might be because this Mental Health Court considers serious offences as 
well, which require a different approach depending on the particular case.  The use of the 
term “assessment” potentially creates confusion as it is used for fitness assessments and 
eligibility assessments at the Mental Health Court. 
The eligibility criterion was discussed in detail since the American model is a diversion 
programme per se, and admission criteria are very particular.  The Brooklyn Mental Health 
Court allows accused persons charged with violent crimes into their diversion programme.  
Treatability of mental illness is one of the primary considerations for admission into the 
Mental Health Court programme. 
The successes and criticism of the model as it is employed in the United States were 
discussed.  The model attracts more criticism than the Canadian model, especially because 
of the fact that it requires the accused to enter a guilty plea before he is admitted to the 
Mental Health Court.  Other concerns include the stigmatisation of the accused and the 
sanctions employed for non-compliance.  The latter criticism is mostly against the use of jail 
time as a sanction. 
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The chapter included a brief comparison between the South African criminal justice system 
pertaining to the mentally ill accused and the American system with due consideration to 
the fact that the latter system makes use of a Mental Health Court for their mentally ill but fit 
accused person. 
A brief comparison of the main differences between the Mental Health Court model 
employed in Canada and in the United States of America concluded the chapter. 
3  ADDRESSING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The main hypothesis of this research was that the current South African criminal justice 
system does not constitute the ideal structure within which to process cases of persons with 
mental illness.  This applies in particular to accused persons found fit to stand trial but who 
nonetheless suffers from a mental illness, which may have contributed to the criminal 
behaviour from the outset.  Currently, the cases of these accused persons are processed 
through the traditional criminal justice system without any further consideration given to the 
existing mental illness.    
This research suggests that the current system could be supplemented with a Mental 
Health Court that functions within the current legislative and logistical framework but allows 
for persons with specialised knowledge and experience in mental health care to give their 
input in the processing of cases of mentally ill persons accused of crimes.  The Mental 
Health Court, as a speciality court, diverts the mentally ill accused away from the criminal 
justice system into court-monitored treatment programmes where mental health skills are 
applied.   
Mental Health Courts as a specialised solution will allow an alternative to prosecution for 
those who are found fit to stand trial after assessment but who are still mentally ill.  No such 
alternative currently exists for this category of accused persons in South Africa.  The need 
to divert mentally ill persons away from the criminal justice system is acknowledged by the 
Department of Corrections in its white paper where it states that:  
  It is the ideal that correctional centres should not accommodate mentally-ill offenders and 
that they should rather be diverted to institutions with the necessary knowledge to deal with 
them.1 
                                                
1  Department of Correctional Services “White paper on Corrections in South Africa” 
www.dcs.gov.za/AboutUs/COE/Documents/WhitePaper/WHITE%20PAPER%208.doc  (Date of use:  
22 August 2016) at 80. 
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These courts could further assist in cases where mental illness possibly affects the 
accused’s criminal capacity. 
In exploring the hypothesis, various research questions were posed to ascertain the 
possible benefits of such an alternative to traditional prosecution.  The main research 
questions are clarified below. 
3.1 Why should a specialised solution be explored for mentally ill accused persons in the 
criminal justice system? 
 Mentally ill persons in the criminal justice system have been identified by the Department of 
Correctional Services as a group that requires specific attention.2  Options have to be 
considered to better address the needs of mentally ill accused persons for the benefit of the 
criminal justice system and the public at large.3  Some specific reasons for considering 
such a specialised solution in the South African context are highlighted below. 
3.1.1 Overrepresentation of mentally ill persons in the criminal justice system 
The previous chapters illustrate that persons with mental illnesses are overrepresented in 
the criminal justice system.  This is a consequence of various factors, inter alia, the 
deinstitutionalisation movement where many psychiatric hospitals were closed down, and 
psychiatric patients were released into the community for care, but often without the 
required support systems being put in place.  The lack of community support leads to the 
increased contact of mentally ill persons with the criminal justice system.  Other factors that 
contributed to the increase of mentally ill persons in the criminal justice system are changes 
in legislation pertaining to involuntary admission to mental health care institutions that made 
dangerousness a primary requirement for admission, lack of training of police officers 
pertaining to mental health issues and non-compliance with medication. 
Accused persons awaiting psychiatric observation in court contribute to overcrowding in 
prison as these accused persons are most often detained in correctional facilities awaiting 
assessment.  Mental health treatment is generally not available to accused persons 
                                                
2  Department of Correctional Services “White paper on Corrections in South 
Africa”www.dcs.gov.za/AboutUs/COE/Documents/WhitePaper/WHITE%20PAPER%208.doc  (Date 
of use: 22 August 2016) at 11, 80. 
3  The benefit to the public lies therein that recidivism of those who committed offences because of 
their mental illness, will most probably be reduced as shown by studies conducted in other 
jurisdictions.  As a result, the public will be less at risk of falling victim to a crime committed by a 




awaiting psychiatric observation in prison and the position intensifies as the number of 
persons in need of mental health care increases. 
Mentally ill persons encounter the criminal justice system more often than non-mentally ill 
citizens and often cycle in and out of the criminal justice system, known as the revolving 
door phenomenon.  Reducing re-offending by persons with mental illnesses should be a 
priority and is in the interest of the accused and society as it translates into a safer society 
with less crime. 
Mentally ill persons housed in the criminal justice system, rather than in the mental health 
care system, amounts to criminalisation of mental illness.  This phenomenon should not be 
perpetuated and could be addressed by placing the responsibility for mental health care 
back with the health care system where the specialised mental health care skills are 
housed rather than with the criminal justice system.  Mere rerouting of the pathway of a 
mentally ill accused person from one system to the other will soon merely cause problems 
such as overcrowding and delays in the processing of cases.  For this reason, a unique 
diversion programme is needed that will keep mentally ill accused persons out of the 
criminal justice system and ensure that they get much-needed treatment without placing an 
undue burden on the mental health care system.    
3.1.2 Long delays in finalising fitness assessments 
What contributes further to a large number of mentally ill persons in the criminal justice 
system is the fact that those awaiting assessment for fitness to stand trial and criminal 
responsibility often have to wait in correctional facilities for the availability of a bed in a 
psychiatric facility where the assessment can be conducted.  In South Africa, these waiting 
periods range from anything between three months to up to 2 years in some cases. 
The fact that fitness assessments are routinely conducted on an inpatient basis for a 30-day 
period creates long waiting periods for those awaiting assessments.  The fact that there are 
only ten psychiatric facilities in South Africa where these assessments can be done 
contributes to the delays in the assessment process.  
Research shows that incarceration has a detrimental effect on a person with a mental 
illness and will, in all likelihood, causes a deterioration of the mental condition of such 
person.  The incarceration of mentally ill accused persons is therefore counter-therapeutic.  
In addition, appropriate treatment for mental illnesses is not always available in correctional 
facilities.  Delays in providing appropriate treatment as soon as possible have a negative 
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effect on the eventual treatability of the accused. 
Currently, long delays are caused in the processing of cases of persons with mental illness 
due to challenges pertaining to resources in the current forensic system.  This process must 
be expedited to protect the accused’s right to a speedy trial and the accused’s right to 
dignity. 
3.1.3 Fit but mentally ill accused not acknowledged 
The current criminal justice system acknowledges that an accused can be either fit to stand 
trial or unfit to stand trial.  No consideration is given to the situation of a person who is fit to 
stand trial yet who suffers from a mental illness, either a type of mental illness (in different 
ranges of seriousness) that does not affect his ability to follow proceedings, or a mental 
illness that does affect this ability but does not affect it enough in order for him to be found 
unfit to stand trial according to the test for fitness.  
This category arguably forms the largest part of the group on the fitness continuum.  If the 
fact that the reason for requesting a fitness assessment in the first place is a suspicion that 
a mental illness is present is considered, with the fact that the majority of persons sent for 
fitness assessments are found fit to stand trial, it cannot be denied that a large portion of 
those found fit to stand trial may suffer from a mental illness. 
It is, in particular, this category of persons for whom an alternative to traditional prosecution 
should be found. 
3.2 What is needed to address the unique challenges that mentally ill accused persons 
bring to the criminal justice system? 
The answer to this question is not one-dimensional and requires consideration of various 
aspects that could assist in paving the way for the implementation of a specialised solution 
for mentally ill accused persons.  Various considerations in this regard are highlighted 
below. 
3.2.1 Acknowledgement of the category of fit but mentally ill accused persons 
 As stated above, the majority of persons sent for fitness assessments are found fit to stand 
trial.  It appears from the research that the threshold to be found fit to stand trial is generally 
not very high. The finding of fitness does not imply that a mental illness is absent.  Many 
accused persons found fit might, therefore, very well suffer from a mental illness.  These 
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cases will be processed through the traditional criminal justice system under the current 
procedural framework with no further consideration to the existing mental illness. 
 If this third category of accused persons is acknowledged, specialised solutions can be 
considered and implemented for them.  Such specialised solutions can hold various 
potential benefits similar to the benefits that alternatives to traditional prosecution have had 
for other jurisdictions such as Canada and the United States of America.  Among these are 
reduced recidivism by this group of accused persons, relief of court caseload, and some 
relief from the overcrowding problem in correctional facilities. 
3.2.2 Alternatives to traditional prosecution for fit but mentally ill accused persons 
A fresh approach to dealing with cases of accused persons suffering from a mental illness 
should be explored and, more in particular, the implementation of therapeutic jurisprudence.  
Therapeutic jurisprudence places the focus on the underlying cause of the “criminal” 
behaviour and focuses on treatment rather than punishment. 
Specialised skills in mental health care are essential to deal effectively with cases of 
accused persons with mental illness.  This may entail special training for all those involved 
in dealing with cases of mentally ill persons, including the judge, prosecutor, and police 
officers. 
As part of a new approach, fitness assessments must be streamlined so that it takes up the 
least amount of time and allows for a fitness determination to be made as soon as possible 
so that the proceedings may continue and treatment of the accused may commence. 
Consideration should be given to the incorporation of diversion options into the existing 
criminal justice legislation to allow for persons who are fit to stand trial but who suffer from a 
mental illness to be diverted away from the criminal justice system with the assistance of 
officials with special training in mental health care matters.  Court-monitored diversion 
programmes should be developed and implemented using existing resources and 
supplementing them where necessary.  Such alternative measures could further provide 
specialised assistance to accused persons with mental illnesses who do not qualify for 
diversion for whatever reason but wish to make use of the specialised skills housed in this 
alternative measure to prosecution.  The proposed alternative is a Mental Health Court. 
3.2.3 Implement Mental Health Courts as alternatives to prosecution 
An alternative to traditional prosecution that this research focussed on is the Mental Health 
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Court initiative.  This is a specialised court within the criminal court structure that diverts the 
fit but mentally ill accused away from the criminal justice system into court-monitored 
treatment.  
These courts can assist in dealing with all cases involving mental illness and thereby 
lightening the load of the criminal courts that are currently overburdened with especially 
cases involving petty crimes.   
Mental Health Courts can take on various forms depending on the needs of the specific 
community that it aims to serve.  The underlying principle employed in a Mental Health 
Court, regardless of the form it takes on, is therapeutic jurisprudence.  Therapeutic 
jurisprudence aims to address the underlying cause of criminal behaviour, namely, mental 
illness.  Many crimes are committed due to mental illnesses going untreated or not treated 
properly.  These crimes could have been prevented had proper treatment been 
administered and support services been in place to ensure that necessary treatment is 
continued. 
These courts as alternatives to traditional prosecution can only be implemented if the 
benefits to the community at large are clear.  Benefits of these courts include reduced 
recidivism, which in turns means a safer community with less crime.  Therapeutic 
jurisprudence as a vehicle for restorative justice assists in restoring relationships in the 
community that have been tainted by the actions of the mentally ill accused.  These courts 
have further reduced the caseload of criminal courts and result in a cost-saving to the 
system as fewer accused persons are admitted to psychiatric institutions for forensic 
assessments, which are a costly exercise.  The delivery of justice to victims of crime is 
expedited in the process. 
It is proposed that a Mental Health Court will provide an opportunity to implement all that is 
needed to address the current major challenges that the criminal justice system is 
experiencing when processing cases of persons with mental illness.  It will allow for the 
application of therapeutic jurisprudence by specially trained staff with a view of diverting the 
mentally ill accused away from the criminal justice system into the mental health care 
system.  Delays in finalising cases of mentally ill accused persons will further be reduced 
significantly through the implementation of Mental Health Courts. 
4  UNIQUELY SOUTH AFRICAN ASPECTS TO CONSIDER WHEN DEVELOPING A 




 As stated during the Mental Health Court discussion, a Mental Health Court model is 
tailored to address the needs of the particular jurisdiction in which it is established.  In order 
for the Mental Health Court to be effective in the South African context, uniquely South 
 African considerations have to be taken into account when considering the model.  The 
process of implementing a Mental Health Court can start with a white paper documenting all 
the problems that the criminal justice system currently has in dealing with persons with 
mental illness.4 
Some issues or challenges that have been identified in the South African criminal justice 
and forensic setting are indicative of the fact that alternatives to traditional prosecution for 
mentally ill accused persons are needed.  Such a need has been expressed as discussed 
below.  These challenges and current suggestions on how to address them can be aligned 
with the suggestion of a Mental Health Court for South Africa.   
Some of the challenges that create an opportunity for a Mental Health Court to be 
established in South Africa are discussed below. 
4.2 Mentally ill persons in the criminal justice system acknowledged as a special group 
requiring special solutions 
The South African Department of Correctional Services identified remand detainees 
awaiting assessments and those with diagnosed mental illnesses as a special group in the 
system that requires specialised solutions.  The Department has also acknowledged that it 
is ideal for these persons not to be detained in a correctional facility.5 
Through implementing specialised solutions, the aim is to provide much-needed treatment 
to the accused and simultaneously reduce the number of remand detainees in correctional 
                                                
4  This was the process followed before establishing the Brooklyn Mental Health Court.  See O’Keefie 
K The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation:  Planning, Implementation, Courtroom Dynamics, 
and Participant Outcomes (Centre for Court Innovation New York 2006) at 6.  The Department of 
Correctional Services issued a white paper on remand detainees where the position of the mentally 
ill accused in the criminal justice setting is touched upon.  No separate document highlighting 
particular challenges regarding mentally ill accused persons in the criminal justice system exists at 
date of completion of this research. 
5  Department of Correctional Services “White paper on Corrections in South Africa” 
www.dcs.gov.za/AboutUs/COE/Documents/WhitePaper/WHITE%20PAPER%208.doc  (Date of use:  
22 August 2016) at 80 where it is stated  “It is the ideal that correctional centres should not 
accommodate mentally-ill offenders and that they should rather be diverted to institutions with the 
necessary knowledge to deal with them.” 
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facilities.  This, in turn, will reduce the overall number of persons detained in prisons and 
thus reduce the serious problem of overcrowding in South African prisons. 
As pointed out earlier in this research, mental health treatment is not always available to all 
in need thereof in correctional facilities.  Providing such much-needed treatment to the 
mentally ill accused will contribute to rehabilitation, which will, in turn, reduce recidivism. 
4.3 Section 77 and 78 processes in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act is causing 
confusion 
 A number of cases discussed throughout the research show that many South African 
presiding officers are not always sure of the correct procedure in terms of assessment 
orders and orders to be made after the assessment.  The line between the impact of a 
mental illness on the fitness of the accused versus the impact of the mental illness on the 
criminal capacity of the accused become blurred.  This might be an indication that the 
referral process needs to be streamlined to avoid confusion.  It might also emphasise the 
need for the involvement of mental health professionals at an earlier stage in the 
proceedings than at the assessment stage. 
As alluded to earlier, a Mental Health Court necessarily incorporates input from the mental 
health care profession.  Such input is sought throughout the Mental Health Court process.  
The involvement of mental health professionals as is provided for in the Mental Health 
Court will ensure that the best possible solution is sought in each particular case involving 
an accused person with a mental illness. 
4.4 The need for diversion of mentally ill accused in the South African criminal justice 
system identified  
Cassim suggests that the mentally ill accused in South Africa should be treated in the 
mental health care system rather than the criminal justice system.6  She points out that 
diverting the mentally ill accused away from the criminal justice system will relieve the 
burden of backlogs on the criminal courts with cost- and time-saving in the long run.7   
                                                
6  Cassim F “The accused person’s competency to stand trial – a comparative perspective” 2004 (45) 
Codicillus  17-27 at 27.  She suggested that South Africa should follow the British model where those 
that are unfit to plead, are dealt with by the mental health care system rather than the criminal justice 
system.  (See this source at 24-25). 
7  Cassim 2004 Codicillus 17 at 27. 
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Gagiano, Van Rensburg and Van Schoor 8 suggest that those with known psychiatric 
disorders, as well as those who clearly exhibit signs of mental illness, should not be 
referred for observation in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act.  They submit that the state 
should, in these instances and in particular where they are accused of minor offences, 
withdraw the charges and refer the accused for psychiatric treatment in terms of the Mental 
Health Act.9  In this way, these individuals are removed from the criminal justice system.   
This is what the Mental Health Court sets out to achieve, to remove, especially those who 
committed petty crimes, from the criminal justice system and divert them into some sort of 
therapeutic programme to enhance their chances at rehabilitation which might, in certain 
instances, merely entail placing the patient on proper and effective medication. 
There is currently no formal diversion programme in place for mentally ill accused persons 
in South Africa.  Formal diversion is, however, not a foreign concept in the South African 
Criminal justice system, as is evident from the diversion built into the Child Justice Act.  
Informal diversion away from the South African criminal justice system is, however, applied 
in the case of petty crimes 10 , although such informal diversion is not specifically aimed at 
accused persons with mental illness.  Where informal diversion is considered, the accused 
is required to acknowledge liability for the offence that he is charged with.11  Participation in 
such informal diversion programmes is completely voluntary.12  Compliance with the 
diversion programme will lead to a withdrawal of the charge(s) against the accused.13  Once 
the prosecutor decides to divert the accused, a note to this effect must be made in the 
                                                
8  Gagiano CA, Van Rensburg PHJ and Verschoor T “Unnecessary committals for forensic 
observation:  Section 77 and 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977” 1991 (108) SALJ 714-718 
  at 715.  
9 Gagiano, Van Rensburg & Verschoor 1991 SALJ 714 at 715.  Also see Kruger A Mental Health Law 
in South Africa (Butter This initiative was probably also motivated by the fact that mental 
illness is the leading cause of disability in these two jurisdictions.9worths 1980) at 159 who 
points out that it was common when the Criminal Procedure Act just came into operation, that 
charges against mentally ill accused persons charged with minor offences such as minor assault, 
was withdrawn. 
10  National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa Awaiting Trial Detainee Guidelines.  
http://www.lhr.org.za/sites/lhr.org.za/files/atd_guidelines_.pdf (Date of use 17 August 2016) at 29. 
11  National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa  
http://www.lhr.org.za/sites/lhr.org.za/files/atd_guidelines_.pdf (Date of use:  17 August 2016) at 29. 
12  National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa  
http://www.lhr.org.za/sites/lhr.org.za/files/atd_guidelines_.pdf (Date of use:  17 August 2016) at 29. 
13  National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa  
http://www.lhr.org.za/sites/lhr.org.za/files/atd_guidelines_.pdf (Date of use:  17 August 2016) at 29.  
The accused will have to submit a certificate of completion or some sort of proof of completion of the 
diversion programme.    
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docket of the accused, and the investigation diary must be endorsed with the outcome.14  
The need for a diversion programme that is specifically aimed at mentally ill accused 
persons is identified as a gap in the current criminal justice system. 
4.5 Lack of resources in the South African forensic setting acknowledged 
The current system where accused persons are routinely admitted to psychiatric facilities 
for fitness assessments creates huge problems in terms of resource availability in the 
forensic setting.15  In addition, mental health care services in correctional facilities where 
accused persons await assessment are inadequate.16 
Pillay 17 points out that there is no reason why forensic assessments only have to take 
place on an inpatient basis, which entails admitting a patient to a psychiatric facility for a 30-
day observation period.  Assessment on an outpatient basis has very recently been ordered 
by South African courts 18  and is supported by the view that all of the relevant aspects of 
the required examinations can be achieved during the day-visits.19  This applies to 
assessments for fitness to stand trial as well as criminal capacity and is promoted by South 
African psychologists.20  This view provides support for the notion of a Mental Health Court 
in South Africa as the Mental Health Court’s inter alia aim to expedite the assessment 
process by conducting assessments on site.21 Pillay further advocates for the inclusion of 
psychologists in the assessment process to alleviate some of the resource constraints 
caused by a shortage of psychiatrists in South Africa.  
                                                
14  National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa  
http://www.lhr.org.za/sites/lhr.org.za/files/atd_guidelines_.pdf (Date of use:  17 August 2016) at 30. 
15  See the discussion of the South African forensic setting in chapter 3 of this research where it is 
pointed out that there are only 10 facilities nationwide where forensic assessments can be one with 
some, such as Valkenberg hospital, only having capacity for 15 observation patients at a time – 
these include assessments for fitness and criminal capacity.  Such shortages obviously creates 
backlogs in the system in that accused persons awaiting fitness assessments wait in correctional 
facilities for a bed to become available for unduly long periods of time. 
16  The inadequacy of the mental health care services available in prisons was alluded to by the court in 
De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development CC case at [43]. 
17  Pillay AL “Could S v Pistorius influence reform in the traditional forensic mental health evaluation 
format?”  2014 (44) South African Journal of Psychology 377-380 at 378.  
18  S v Pistorius (CC113/2013) [2014] ZAGPPHC 793 (12 September 2014).  Pillay 2014 South African 
Journal of Psychology 377 at 378 point out that forensic assessment on an outpatient basis has 
been employed in the Limpopo province of South Africa for some time.  It is however not a popular 
or generally accepted practice. 
19  Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 377 at 378. 
20  Pillay AL “Competency to stand trial and criminal responsibility examinations: are there solutions to 
the extensive waiting list?”  2014 (44) South African Journal of Psychology 48-59. 
21  See the discussion of the various Mental Health Court models discussed in chapters 4 and 5 earlier 
in this research. 
 
449 
Having regard to the current resource challenges of the South African forensic system,22 
alternatives have to be sought to alleviate the situation.  Mental Health Courts employ 
mental health professionals on-site who can conduct fitness assessments.  Only those 
cases that require detailed observations are referred for off-site observation.  This will have 
a direct impact on the resources in psychiatric facilities and will free those resources up for 
persons in serious need of mental health care treatment.  Mentally ill accused persons 
referred for observation to psychiatric facilities are not necessarily in need of serious or 
urgent mental health care treatment, although they may be diagnosed with a mental illness. 
4.6 Speciality courts in South Africa are not a new invention 
The implementation of Mental Health Courts in other jurisdictions such as the United 
Kingdom,23 which does not yet have Mental Health Courts, is currently under consideration.  
The reason why authors such as Frailing 24 promote the introduction of Mental Health 
Courts in the United Kingdom is that problem-solving courts are not a foreign concept to the 
United Kingdom.  The United Kingdom has drug courts, community courts and domestic 
violence courts.  Frailing, therefore, suggests that the framework is in place to introduce 
Mental Health Courts as well.25   
 The above argument applies to the South African context as well.  Speciality courts such as 
domestic violence courts, children courts, commercial crimes courts, and equality courts 
have been part of the South African justice system for some time.  The concept of a 
speciality court is therefore not strange to the South African justice system.  Recently, child 
justice courts were introduced by the Child Justice Act, which creates a separate criminal 
process for children charged with criminal offences.  Children have diverted away from the 
traditional criminal justice system into the specially created one having regard to the unique 
characteristics of child offenders.   
The fact that there are various specialised courts in operation in the South Africa justice 
system confirms that South Africa is amenable to speciality courts.  Speciality courts are 
typically established to address the needs of a particular group of people, whom the justice 
system has identified as a group of people in need of a tailor-made solution that the 
traditional criminal justice system is not currently offering.  Alternatively, the introduction of 
                                                
22  See chapter 3 of this research where some of these challenges have been identified. 
23  Frailing K “The genesis of mental health courts in the United States and their possible applicability 
for the United Kingdom” 2008 C.S.L.R 63-73 at 71. 
24  Frailing 2008 C.S.L.R 63 at 71, 72. 
25  Frailing 2008 C.S.L.R 63 at 72. 
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speciality courts can be an acknowledgement of the fact that specialised skills are needed 
to adjudicate cases that fall in a particular field of the law, for example, sexual offences, 
equality, and commercial crimes.  Either reason can be employed in favour of establishing 
Mental Health Courts in South Africa.     
Having regard to the above, Mental Health Courts will merely build forth on principles and 
concepts already introduced into the South African criminal justice system.  It will merely 
focus on a different part of the population who, due to their mental illness, deserves both 
compassion and intervention. 
The remainder of this chapter deals with the proposed Mental Health Court model for South 
Africa.  The proposal is on a conceptual level, and only selected aspects of the suggested 
inner workings of the court are singled out. 
5  PROPOSED MENTAL HEALTH COURT MODEL FOR SOUTH AFRICA 
5.1 Introduction 
Mental Health Courts can serve as a therapeutic response to accused persons with mental 
illnesses in the South African criminal justice system. 
One of the reasons behind establishing Mental Health Courts in other jurisdictions is the 
view held by most advocates of the Mental Health Court movement that most mental 
illnesses are treatable conditions.26  If mental illness were not viewed as treatable, 
alternatives to incarceration for the mentally ill accused would serve no therapeutic 
purpose.27  Care should, however, be taken not to place too much emphasis on the 
treatability of a condition when considering the eligibility criteria of a Mental Health Court as 
this might exclude a large number of persons from the Mental Health Court treatment 
programme.  Persons with intellectual disabilities are by necessary implication excluded 
from Mental Health Court treatment programmes, as these conditions are not treatable.  
This should, however, not necessarily exclude persons with intellectual disabilities from 
benefiting from the specialised knowledge available at Mental Health Courts.    
                                                
26  Heerema M “An introduction to the mental health court movement and its status in Canada” 2005 
(50) Crim.L.Q 255-282 at 262.  This view is supported by the expectation that the state should 
assume responsibility of providing treatment and facilities for such treatment.   
27  Closely related to the belief that mental illnesses are treatable conditions, is the provision for hospital 
orders in the initial provisions of Bill C-30.  These provisions never made it into the promulgated 
version of the legislation, mainly because of concerns regarding logistics of executing the orders.  
See Barrett J and Shandler R Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law (Carswell Toronto 2006) at 
1-13.  See the discussion of the proposals for this Bill in chapter 5 of this research.    
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There is no “set” or “ideal” model of a Mental Health Court as each model is a response to 
the particular deficiencies in the particular mental health and criminal justice system.28  
Developing the ideal court for a particular jurisdiction should be a continuous evolutionary 
process as it becomes apparent which features of a particular model are efficient and which 
are less efficient and should be altered or replaced.29  What a Mental Health Court is or 
what it should be is determined within the framework of the particular jurisdiction, based on 
the prioritisation of the particular inefficiencies of the relevant systems and the available 
resources that can be employed to address these inefficiencies.30  South Africa can look to 
other jurisdictions for guidance on Mental Health Court models or aspects of various 
models that may work for the South African context.  
This research considered the Canadian and the American Mental Health Court models.  
The researcher opines that selected features from both models can be borrowed to compile 
a Mental Health Court model for the South African context.  This model should be informed 
by, inter alia, what would best serve justice, both for the victim(s) of the crime, the mentally 
ill accused and society.   
5.2 Comments on implementing a court model from another jurisdiction 
 Nolan 31 stresses that when one jurisdiction looks at another to “borrow” laws and practices, 
it should always be born in mind that law is shaped by the particular culture and history of 
the people in the society to which this particular law is applied.  It is therefore not always 
desirable to transfer laws directly from one jurisdiction to the next.  Whenever laws from 
another jurisdiction are transferred, it should be done gradually.32 
 Borrowing a system from one jurisdiction to transplant to another should be approached 
with caution.  Heeding this warning, the following goals for the South African Mental Health 
Court are proposed. 
                                                
28  Schneider RD, Bloom H and Heerema M Mental Health Courts – Decriminalizing the Mentally Ill 
(Irwin Law Canada 2007) at 6, 102 
29  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 6, 103.  
30  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 85. 
31  Nolan JL “The international problem solving court movement:  A comparative perspective” 2011 (37) 
Monash University Law Review 259-279 at 260.  Solutions for a particular jurisdiction’s problems are 
informed by cultural and historical factors that will shape the form of a particular problem solving 
court in a particular jurisdiction. 
32  See in general Nolan 2011 Monash University Law Review 259.  The author gained this knowledge 
by visiting over 50 problem-solving courts in 6 jurisdictions.  For more detail on his work, see Nolan 
JL Legal Accents, Legal Borrowing:  The International Problem Solving Court Movement (Princeton 
University Press 2009). 
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5.3 Goals of the South African Mental Health Court 
 Three proposed goals of the South African Mental Health Court are set out below with the 
envisaged consequence of achieving each goal. 
The first proposed goal is to divert mentally ill persons accused of minor offences away 
from the traditional criminal justice system towards treatment and rehabilitation.33  Should 
this goal be achieved, the unique treatment needs of the mentally ill accused will have been 
addressed, the caseload in criminal courts would be less and overcrowding in prisons 
would be relieved because persons with mental illness will no longer be part of the statistics 
of backlogs and overcrowding. 
The second proposed goal is to reduce recidivism by mentally ill accused persons through 
providing court-monitored treatment options to these accused persons aimed at 
rehabilitation.  Achieving this goal will result in a cost-saving for the criminal justice system 
as mentally ill persons will not encounter the criminal justice system repeatedly.  The 
caseload of criminal courts will be lightened, as there will be fewer cases due to reduced 
recidivism.  The most prominent benefit of succeeding in this goal will be the fact that 
society will be safer due to less recidivism. 
The third proposed goal of the South African Mental Health Court should be to significantly 
reduce pre-trial delays with regard to fitness issues in particular.  Should the Mental Health 
Court succeed in speeding up the assessment process, justice for all will be delivered 
sooner, and resource-strapped psychiatric and correctional facilities will be relieved from at 
least some of the load since persons will no longer wait as long for assessments and 
assessments need not necessarily be conducted at psychiatric institutions for lengthy 
periods of time.  Criminal courts will benefit from an even lighter caseload since cases 
involving mental illness and pre-trial issues associated with it will no longer be on the 
criminal court roll but referred to the Mental Health Court. 
In addition to the three main goals, South African Mental Health Courts should make its 
specialised skills available to those accused persons who, for whatever reason, may not 
qualify to participate in the diversion component of the Mental Health Court but may still 
                                                
33  The Mental Health Court in the United States of America is a diversion programme as such whereas 
the Mental Health Court in Canada has a diversion component attached to it but also assists 
accused persons who do not qualify for the diversion component.  This is suggested for the South 
African model as well.  This entails that, after assessment and determination of eligibility, a treatment 
programme is drafted for the accused to which he consents and subsequently participates in as an 
alternative to the traditional prosecution through the criminal court.   
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require the specialised skill of the court for purposes of a bail application for instance or to 
conduct a trial in the criminal court with the specialised assistance of the Mental Health 
Court in a case where lack of criminal capacity is raised as a defence. 
South African Mental Health Courts should strive to ensure that persons with mental health 
skills are involved in the criminal process for persons with mental illness.  Mental health 
professionals are involved on a full-time basis at the Mental Health Court for these 
purposes, and all the legal personnel must undergo special mental health training. 
5.4 Underlying principles of the South African Mental Health Court 
Therapeutic jurisprudence, voluntary participation and the use of a multi-disciplinary team 
should form the principles of the South African Mental Health Court.  These three 
underlying principles form the basis of the Mental Health Court models in Canada and the 
United States of America.  Each of these with specific reference to the South African 
context is discussed below. 
5.4.1 Therapeutic jurisprudence 
Therapeutic jurisprudence enables problem-solving courts such as Mental Health Courts to 
address the underlying cause of the offending behaviour.  Mental illness as the reason 
behind the criminal act is targeted.  This is done through treatment programmes aimed at 
rehabilitation and integration.    
Therapeutic jurisprudence also monitors the impact of the law and its processes on a 
mentally ill accused and is aimed at ensuring that such impact is not anti-therapeutic.  This 
underlying principle is the basis of the unique functionality of all Mental Health Courts and 
will inform its processes and rules.  Therapeutic jurisprudence also impacts the manner in 
which cases are conducted in that cases in the Mental Health Court are generally 
conducted in a more relaxed atmosphere where the accused is addressed directly rather 
than through his legal representative. 
Therapeutic jurisprudence uses the law as an agent to achieve therapeutic outcomes for 
those involved in the criminal justice process.    
5.4.2 Voluntary participation 
Voluntary participation can refer to two aspects of the accused’s involvement in the Mental 
Health Court.  Firstly, it can refer to the initial referral from the criminal court to the Mental 
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Health Court and secondly, it can refer to the accused’s participation in the Mental Health 
Court treatment programme.  
Initial referral to the Mental Health Court from the criminal court is not necessarily 
compulsory depending on the model that is followed.  In the Canadian model, the criminal 
court has an option to refer the matter to the Mental Health Court.  This model further 
allows an accused to remain in the criminal court and refuse initial referral to the Mental 
Health Court altogether.  Where there is such refusal, the criminal court will make the 
necessary arrangements for a fitness assessment. 
In the American model in the Brooklyn Mental Health Court, in particular, it is compulsory 
for the criminal court to refer all matters that involve mental illness to the Brooklyn Mental 
Health Court.  Since this is a compulsory process for the court, the accused has no option 
to refuse initial referral to the Mental Health Court. 
It is suggested that South African criminal courts must be under an obligation to refer any 
case involving mental illness to the Mental Health Court, regardless if it pertains to 
suspicion of lack of fitness or lack of criminal capacity.  The motivation behind such an 
obligation is to ensure that the case is considered by persons with specialised skill in 
mental health.   
Once at the Mental Health Court, the accused must undergo a fitness assessment, which is 
not optional, and the accused does not have a choice in this instance.  The position is thus 
similar to the current position in the South African criminal justice system in that an accused 
may not refuse to undergo a fitness assessment.  It should be permitted for the court to 
draw a negative inference from the fact that the accused refuses to co-operate with a 
mental health professional for the purpose of assessment for either fitness to stand trial or 
criminal capacity.  Once these obligatory parts of the process are completed, the process 
becomes voluntary for the accused in the sense that he can opt for his case to revert to the 
criminal court at any point in time after the assessment. 
Participation in the Mental Health Court treatment programme must, however, always be 
voluntary regardless of the model that is followed.  The Brooklyn Mental Health Court that 
follows the American model requires prospective participants to enter a guilty plea as a 
prerequisite for admission into the treatment program.34  This requirement contradicts the 
                                                
34  See the discussion of the model in chapter 5 of this research where the reasons for requiring a guilty 
plea are explained.  It is, inter alia, requested to speed up prosecution in the event that the accused 
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voluntariness requirement and faces serious criticism.35  The South African model of the 
Mental Health Court must not require a guilty plea as a prerequisite for participation in the 
treatment phase of the Mental Health Court. It is submitted that the South African model 
could employ “acknowledgement of responsibility” as a standard for admission as opposed 
to requiring the accused to plead guilty.  This is currently the requirement for informal 
diversion in South Africa, as mentioned earlier.  
The Canadian model requires the accused to accept responsibility for the crime that he is 
charged with, which is just short of a guilty plea, but this practice is motivated by the fact 
that diversion is only possible in Canada if there is a strong case against the accused in the 
first place.  This is proposed for the South African model as well.  
Accused persons in the Mental Health Court in Canada and the United States of America 
are required to consent to the unique treatment programme drafted for them (once they 
have been found eligible for the treatment programme) and consent to the possible 
sanctions that can be employed for non-compliance of the treatment programme.  Once an 
accused signed up for the treatment programme, non-compliance therewith will attract 
sanctions since the accused voluntarily signed up for the programme and agreed to submit 
himself to the treatment conditions and sanctions for non-compliance.  This is the case in 
both the Canadian and the American model. 
The choice to participate in the programme should be exercised without coercion.  
Participation in the programme phase should therefore be completely voluntary. Where 
doubt exists about the accused’s capacity to consent/agree to treatment, further 
investigation into his capacity should be undertaken before he is accepted into the 
treatment programme.  There are ways to ensure that participation is voluntary by, inter 
alia, ensuring that the accused is well informed of the content of the programme and the 
sanctions that can be employed for non-compliance.  The accused can further be requested 
to sign a consent form in which he agrees to participate in the programme drafted by the 
multi-disciplinary team.  
5.4.3 Multi-disciplinary team 
                                                                                                                                                   
does not complete the Mental Health Court program.  Proponents of this requirement explain that If 
this is not a requirement, then anyone in need of mental health care can simply hand themselves 
over the police on a charge of theft for example and qualify for the Mental Health Court diversion 
component.  It has to be limited to those whose mental illness causes them or is at the very least a 
contributing factor to their criminal behaviour as the aim is to reduce recidivism. 
35  See chapter 5 for the criticism levied against this practice. 
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The Mental Health Court requires a specially selected and trained Mental Health Court 
team 36 consisting of professionals from both the mental health and legal fields.  Working 
with mentally disordered persons within the criminal justice system requires a greater 
measure of tolerance and dedication and, most importantly, creative thinking.37  Stefan and 
Winick 38 opine that those working in the Mental Health Court, in particular the judges and 
lawyers, must have well developed interpersonal skills, must eschew paternalism and must 
treat the individual in the court with respect and dignity.  They must also have an 
understanding of the psychological dimensions of the interventions that the court aims to 
advance.   
 Problem-solving court judges are activist judges who are very aware of the discretion that 
they have in the problem-solving court and who are not afraid to use it.39  Some speciality 
court judges, however, caution against giving speciality court judges too much discretion 
and emphasise that the judge should still maintain some distance from the case and the 
people involved therein in order to fairly and impartially dispense justice.40 
A mental health practitioner working in the Mental Health Court must have knowledge and 
experience of working with the mentally ill accused.41  These mental health practitioners 
must be particularly familiar with the community resources available in respect of particular 
diagnostic categories within which the participants mostly fall, including schizophrenia42  
and substance abuse disorders.  The court support workers 43 in the Mental Health Court 
are mainly responsible for establishing essential links with community resources where 
                                                
36  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 114. 
37  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 114.  
38  Stephan S and Winick BJ “A dialogue on mental health courts” 2005 (11) Psychology, Public Policy 
and Law 507-526 at 508. 
39 Nolan 2011 Monash University Law Review 259 at 263.  
40  Nolan 2011 Monash University Law Review 259 at 264. 
41  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 115 and 116.  Mental Health practitioners 
with a lack of training or experience in forensic mental health issues would naturally shy away from 
treating mentally ill offenders.  The issue of mental health practitioners having to wait in court to 
testify and having to explain or substantiate their treatment of the mentally ill accused, serves as 
deterrents for mental health practitioners to work with mentally ill accused. 
42  Schizophrenia is the most common mental illness with which mentally ill accused present in the 
criminal justice system.  See Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 115.  Also see 
Torrey EF, Stieber J, Ezekiel J, Wolfe SM, Sharfstein J, Noble JH and Flynn LM Criminalizing the 
Seriously Mentally Ill.  The Abuse of Jails as Mental Hospitals (Public Citizen’s Health Research 
Group and the National Alliance for the Mentally ill 1992) at 46 where it is indicated that individuals 
with paranoid schizophrenia are more likely to face charges of assault as they may feel the need to 
“protect” themselves from someone who they believe is either following them or trying to hurt them. 
43  See Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 120,121 for details on what the other 
functions of Mental Health Court support workers are. 
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treatment can be provided to the Mental Health Court participants.44   
Further to the essential knowledge required by these mental health practitioners, they must 
be comfortable working with lawyers, judges, law enforcement, and corrections.45  They 
should further be familiar with the relevant psycho-legal issues pertaining to mentally ill 
accused, including fitness to stand trial, criminal responsibility and bail applications, 46 as 
these are all functions envisaged for the South African Mental Health Court as well. 
Since those in the legal profession have a punitive orientation towards violations, they are 
bound to disagree with mental health care workers, whose focus is more on rehabilitation 
and therapy than on punishment.47  For this reason, the cooperation between the mental 
health care workers and the legal personnel in the Mental Health Court should be 
monitored.48  Not following this approach could forecast failure for the particular Mental 
Health Court.49  Working in the Mental Health Court can be draining, and care must be 
taken and measures put in place for Mental Health Court staff to preserve their own mental 
health.50 
The above approach by the presiding officer in a problem-solving court and, in particular, 
the Mental Health Court, which is under consideration here, most, certainly suggests at the 
very least the introduction of some elements of an inquisitorial judicial system within the 
South African adversarial criminal justice system.  This is due to the practice of therapeutic 
jurisprudence, which, by its very nature, requires inquisitorial elements in a justice system. 
6  PROCEDURAL DYNAMICS OF SOUTH AFRICAN MENTAL HEALTH COURT 
                                                
44  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 119. 
45  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 115, 116. 
46  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 116.  The legal profession relies heavily on 
the advice of mental health care professionals in these matters and it has even been suggested that 
defense attorneys should have a team of clinicians to their disposal who only does assessments for 
the defense during bail hearings to determine if they should be considered for the Mental Health 
Court programme or not.  See Seltzer T ““Mental health courts:  A misguided attempt to address the 
criminal justice system’s unfair  treatment of people with mental illnesses” 2005 (11) Psychology, 
Public Policy and Law 570-586 at 576. 
47  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 119. 
48  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 118 where it is suggested that period 
meetings be held with the Mental Health Court staff as a monitoring tool.  Also see Slate RN “From 
the jailhouse to Capitol Hill:  Impacting mental health court legislation and defining what constitutes a 
mental health court” 2003 (49) Crime and Delinquency 6-29 at 7.  And further see Watson A, 
Hanrahan P, Luchins D and Lurigio A “Mental health courts and the complex issue of mentally ill 
offenders” April 2001 (52) 4 Psych Serv 477-481 at 478.    
49  Watson et al 2001 Psych Serv 477 at 479.  Also see Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health 
Courts at 118. 




 For Mental Health Courts to function effectively, a careful balancing exercise between the 
rights of the mentally ill, society and the victim of the crime is required.  Procedural fairness 
has to play a fundamental part in the process, and justice has to prevail.  Furthermore, for 
these courts to operate effectively, therapeutic jurisprudence has to be practiced in these 
Courts, as these are problem-solving Courts aimed at ensuring that the deed is punished, 
the condition is treated, and the person rehabilitated.    
Practical considerations should play an important role in shaping a model for South Africa, 
such as available resources, logistics, and procedures.  Since each Court determines its 
own procedures in rules of court, this research does not attempt to suggest the operation of 
a Mental Health Court in the finest detail.  Suggestions are made in broad terms to give 
effect to the suggested goals of the South African Mental Health Court and its underlying 
principles as discussed above.  
The discussion of the proposed procedural framework of the South African Mental Health 
Court is divided into 3 phases.  Phase 1 comprises the initial referral to the Mental Health 
Court by the criminal court and the assessment of fitness to stand trial.  Phase 2 comprises 
the assessment of the accused’s eligibility to enter Phase 3, the diversion component of the 
Mental Health Court. 51  Each phase has various stages that are discussed below.  In 
addition to the three-phased approach, some miscellaneous functions proposed for the 
South African Mental Health Court are discussed.  These miscellaneous functions are 
aimed at the mentally ill accused who does not qualify for the diversion component of the 
Mental Health Court.  
Before the three-phased process is discussed, consideration is given to the status of the 
proposed Mental Health Court within the South African legal and legislative framework. 
The proposed model is illustrated by a diagram attached to this research as Annexure F 
that explains the flow of proceedings in the South African criminal justice system where 
Mental Health Courts are acknowledged as an alternative to traditional criminal justice 
proceedings for those accused in respect of whom mental illness is an issue.  
                                                
51  The discussion of the two Mental Health Court models in chapter 4 and 5 of the research had only 
two phases, the admission phase and the programme phase.  Since many aspects are included 
under the admission phase, the first phase is effectively broken down into two parts, the first dealing 
with the first appearance and presentation of the accused to the Mental Health Court as well as 
assessment for fitness and the second phase dealing mainly with the eligibility criteria for, and the 
acceptance of, the treatment plan designed for the diversion component of the Mental Health Court.   
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6.2 Status of the South African Mental Health Court 
Since the crime level in South Africa is very high, and courts are generally overburdened 
with caseloads, the Mental Health Court model for South Africa should be a comprehensive 
one and should aim to accommodate assessments for fitness to stand trial for all accused 
persons with a mental illness regardless of the seriousness of the crime.  Only such a 
model will achieve a reduction in the caseloads of the criminal court and a reduction of 
delays with regard to finalising pre-trial issues such as fitness assessments.  This South 
African Mental Health Court should thus be established on a regional magistrate court 
level.52 A regional magistrate court has jurisdiction over all offences except treason.53  It is, 
however, suggested that the diversion component of the Mental Health Court be served for 
those accused of minor crimes. 
Any criminal court should be able to refer the accused to the Mental Health Court.  It is 
proposed earlier that such referral to the Mental Health Court should be compulsory in any 
criminal matter involving mental health issues.  Referral to the Mental Health Court forms 
part of the first phase of the proposed Mental Health Court model, as discussed below. 
6.3 Phase 1:  Referral and assessment phase  
 This phase consists of the initial referral of the accused by the criminal court to the Mental 
 Health Court and the assessment for fitness to stand trial. 
6.3.1 Referral to the Mental Health Court by the criminal court 
It is suggested that referral to the Mental Health Court in the South African context should 
be compulsory, as is the case in the Brooklyn Mental Health Court in the United States of 
America.54  This is the only way to ensure that the caseload in criminal courts will indeed be 
                                                
52  Regional Magistrates courts are established in terms of the Magistrate Courts Act 32 of 1944.  (as 
amended).  The jurisdiction of Regional Magistrates Courts in respect of offences are set out in 
section 89 which reads as follows:  “Jurisdiction in respect of offences (1) The magistrate's court 
shall have jurisdiction over all offences except treason, murder and rape.  (2) The regional court shall 
have jurisdiction over all offences except treason.”  If the Mental Health Court is established on a 
regional level, the only offence that will thus be excluded from the Mental Health Court, is treason. 
53  Regional Magistrates courts are established in terms of the Magistrate Courts Act 32 of 1944.  (as 
amended).  Section 89(2).  Establishing the Mental Health Court on a regional level, will eliminate 
concerns regarding whether the authority for referral to fitness is reserved for courts with jurisdiction 
over the trial of the offence.  See in particular the concerns raised with regard to the provisions of 
section 77(6) read with section 77(5) of the Criminal Procedure Act as discussed in chapter 3 of this 
research. 
54  Steadman HJ, Redlich AD, Griffin P, Petrila J and Monahan J ”From referral to disposition: Case 
processing in seven mental health courts” 2005 (23) Behavioural Science and Law 215-226 at 219.  
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lightened as judges and magistrates might be hesitant to make referrals to these courts 
initially since its exact functioning might be uncertain.  As with any new initiative, it will take 
time to settle, and it will take time for the criminal justice community to gain confidence in 
referring cases to these courts.  The duty to refer an accused for assessment, especially for 
fitness, is in line with the current legislative obligation in terms of section 77(1), which does 
not leave the presiding officer with the discretion of referral for a fitness assessment.55  The 
only difference would be that, instead of the court ordering assessment at a specific 
psychiatric institution, the court refers the matter to the Mental Health Court who will take 
care of the assessment in terms of its rules and procedures. 
Another motivation for making referrals to the Mental Health Court compulsory is to ensure 
that persons with mental health expertise handle cases involving mental illness.  If referral 
to the Mental Health Court is optional, there will still be cases where the position of the 
mentally ill accused persons are considered by persons with no specialised skill, or interest, 
in mental health matters. 
In order to achieve the goal of reducing caseloads, expediting pre-trial issues and ensuring 
that persons with specialised skill are involved, referral to the Mental Health Court must be 
compulsory.  This rule applies in all cases where mental illness is at issue, regardless of if it 
pertains to fitness or criminal capacity, even though not all these persons may qualify for 
the diversion component of the Mental Health Court.  
It is suggested that the criminal court still makes the order for psychiatric observation in 
terms of section 77 or 78, or both as the case is currently since the issue may be raised by 
any party to the proceedings before the criminal court.  It is suggested, however, that the 
format of the order should change.  Currently, the order is very specific, stating that the 
accused’s fitness must be investigated at a specific psychiatric institution by specific mental 
health practitioners (mostly psychiatrists).  The new model would function optimally if the 
order simply reads that the issue of fitness or criminal capacity should be enquired into in 
accordance with section 79 of the Criminal Procedure Act.  As soon as the general order for 
assessment in terms of section 77 or 78 or both is made, the matter is referred to the 
Mental Health Court to deal with in terms of its own rules and procedures.   
                                                                                                                                                   
In Brooklyn, all individuals referred for competency evaluations to determine fitness to stand trial or 
criminal capacity, must be referred to the Mental Health Court.  Also see the discussion of the 
Brooklyn Mental Health Court model as discussed chapter 5 of this research.  
55  Section 77(1) states that the court shall cause the matter to be enquired into.  This implies a lack of 
discretion.  Also see the discussion of the grounds for ordering a fitness assessment as discussed in 
chapter 3 of this research where the South African criminal justice system is discussed. 
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The eligibility criterion for referral to the Mental Health Court in the first place is simply that 
a mental health issue must be involved.  All accused persons with mental health issues are 
accommodated in the first phase of the Mental Health Court regardless of the type of 
mental illness.  Since a comprehensive Mental Health Court model is proposed for South 
Africa, this Mental Health Court should assist all mentally ill accused persons in this initial 
phase of the process regardless of the charge.56   The diversion phase of the Mental Health 
Court should, however, be reserved for accused persons charged with non-violent crimes. 
The question may arise if it is truly appropriate to refer an accused who is charged with a 
violent offence to the Mental Health Court during this initial phase.  There should be no 
objection to this, since the Mental Health Court will, in such a case, only assist with the 
assessment of fitness to stand trial or assist in making arrangements for assessment for 
criminal capacity, and such an accused will not qualify for the diversion component of the 
court if the eligibility criteria for that component is set up to determine that diversion is 
reserved for those accused of non-violent offences.  The manner in which the Mental 
Health Court can assist those who committed violent offences which may not qualify for the 
diversion component of the court is discussed under miscellaneous issues below.  Not 
allowing accused persons charged with violent crimes into the diversion component of the 
Mental Health Court ensures that the public’s sense of justice is not offended.  It is 
submitted, however, that this will form a smaller portion of the group of accused persons 
referred to the Mental Health Court since the majority of persons with mental illness, as 
explained in previous chapters, commit petty crimes. 
The first phase of the Mental Health Court should take in all accused persons with 
suspected mental illness or intellectual disability.  Since the therapeutic pathways of 
persons with mental illness differ from those with intellectual disability, the eligibility of the 
accused for purposes of the diversion component of the court will be decided later in the 
process.  At these first stages of the court process, it should not matter since the 
assessment will also confirm the suspected diagnosis and determine the desired way 
forward to best serve the treatment needs of the accused and the therapeutic objective of 
the Mental Health Court.  The diagnosis is arrived at during the psychiatric inquiry to 
determine fitness to stand trial, which is the second stage in this first phase of the proposed 
Mental Health Court model for South Africa. 
                                                
56  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 6 and further at 100 states that a 
comprehensive Mental Health Court model should assist all mentally ill accused persons regardless 




6.3.2  Assessment of fitness to stand trial and arrangements for criminal capacity 
assessments 
It is proposed that the Mental Health Court should assist with the assessment of fitness to 
stand trial for all accused, regardless of the seriousness of the offence.57  The first phase 
should further entail assistance to arrange assessments for criminal capacity. 
Fitness assessments are clinically less complex than assessments for criminal capacity,58 
and for this reason; Mental Health Courts can conduct fitness assessments on-site and 
within very short periods.59  The same is not necessarily true for assessments for criminal 
capacity; hence this should not be a primary focus of the court, although its expertise could 
be available for such assessments and to assist those who intend to raise the lack of 
criminal capacity as a defence during the trial.60   
Where an assessment for criminal capacity is required, the Mental Health Court can assist 
with arrangements for the assessment to be conducted at an appropriate mental health 
facility.  Mental Health Court will be more likely to have contact with psychiatric facilities 
where these assessments can be conducted than the traditional criminal courts.  To make 
the process even more effective and expedient, more psychiatric facilities should be 
licenced to conduct psychiatric observations.  Currently, there are only ten such facilities in 
South Africa nationwide.   
Since space in the dedicated facilities may not be available immediately, the Mental Health 
Court may consider and grant bail to an accused awaiting assessment for criminal capacity.  
Where an assessment of the criminal capacity as well as the accused’s fitness was ordered 
by the criminal court (it seems to be practice to order that both assessments be done 
simultaneously) the Mental Health Court process in terms of fitness assessment and 
considering the accused’s eligibility for diversion may continue pending the accused’s 
referral to the relevant facility for assessment of criminal capacity.  Once a space is 
                                                
57  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 6, 88.  This is also the case with the Nova 
Scotia Mental Health Court.  See Rieksts M “Mental health courts in Canada” LawNow 2008 (33) 31-
34 at 33. 
58  Pillay 2014 South African Journal of Psychology 48 at 50.  
59  See chapter 4 for the discussion of the Canadian model and chapter 5 for the model in the United 
States of America. 
60  This is one of the services that the Toronto Mental Health Court offers to participants who are fit to 
stand trial but who do not qualify for the diversion component of the court.  See the discussion of the 
Canadian Mental Health Court model as discussed in chapter 4 of this research. 
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available for such an assessment, the accused should be referred to the relevant 
psychiatric facility and return to the Mental Health Court for the fitness process to continue 
upon his return.   
It would have been ideal to postpone the assessment for criminal capacity until the accused 
completes the Mental Health Court programme or until the accused regains fitness in the 
event that he is unfit to stand trial.  This is, however, not advisable since it is essential that 
the assessment for criminal capacity takes place as soon as possible as it relates to the 
alleged offence committed, and passage of time may hamper a fruitful investigation into the 
true state of mind of the accused at the time of the commission of the offence.   
The alternative would be to finalise the assessment for criminal capacity first and then 
commence with the fitness proceedings.  This will, however, result in mentally ill but fit 
accused persons not receiving mental health treatment through the Mental Health Court 
since they are first awaiting assessment for criminal capacity.  It can also be argued that 
where an accused is diverted into the treatment programme of the Mental Health Court, 
there will most likely not be a trial at all, provided the accused completes the treatment 
programme, in which case criminal capacity becomes irrelevant as charges are often 
dropped after completion of the programme.  An assessment for criminal capacity might, in 
the end, turn out to have been completely unnecessary.  Where an accused, however, does 
not complete the treatment programme and his case reverts to the criminal court for a trial, 
criminal capacity will be relevant.  The assessment cannot be postponed until the time that 
it is clear whether the accused will face the traditional criminal court or not due to the 
urgency of conducting a criminal capacity assessment as soon as possible, as pointed out 
earlier.  The best working solution, therefore, seems to be to address the fitness issue 
immediately and refer the accused for the criminal capacity assessment as and when the 
facilities become available, wherever in the Mental Health Court process this might happen. 
Fitness assessments can be conducted on-site by the mental health care professionals at 
the court, as is the case in, especially, Canada.  If, after the on-site assessment, the court is 
of the view that a more in-depth assessment is required, the accused may be assessed at 
an alternative facility but not necessarily as an inpatient.  Assessments for fitness to stand 
trial should be limited to 5-days, as is the case in Canada, and only when a more in-depth 
review is required should it be extended by a period not exceeding 30-days.  The Mental 
Health Court, through its court workers, can make the necessary arrangements for such an 
assessment. 
It is stated earlier that the inquiry into fitness to stand trial is distinctly different to that into 
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criminal capacity and that the fitness assessment considers the current state of mind of the 
accused and that the investigation into fitness is not retrospective in that the state of mind 
at the time of the offence is considered.  Hence, the offence is not of central importance 
during this inquiry.  The question arises then why the South African Criminal Procedure Act 
has specific provisions for fitness assessments, in terms of the number of professionals that 
have to assess the accused, depending on the seriousness of the offence?  If the inquiry is 
truly not retrospective, then the type of crime should not matter.  Bear in mind further, as 
pointed out in the De Vos matter, that an assessment for dangerousness is not done during 
the fitness assessment, which makes the seriousness of the offence even less relevant.  Is 
a distinction possibly drawn between the fitness assessment for accused persons who are 
charged with serious versus less serious crimes because a different level of fitness is 
required from the one group versus the other?   
 Of course, a finding of unfit to stand trial has the consequence that the trial against the 
accused does not continue (but only for as long as he is unfit).  The community may feel 
offended if a mentally ill person who committed murder and rape, for example, is found unfit 
and then not prosecuted.  It is submitted, however, that subjecting such an accused to 
assessments by more than one mental health professional will not make the prospect less 
likely. Perhaps a more effective process would be to subject the initial finding of fitness or 
unfitness to a review by a panel of specially skilled persons, such as the Mental Health 
Review Board.  This proposal is fleshed out later in this chapter. 
In Canada, only one mental health professional assesses an accused for fitness at the 
Mental Health Court.  In the Brooklyn Mental Health Court, one psychiatrist, appointed on 
contract, conducts a psychiatric evaluation within approximately one hour, during which a 
diagnosis is made and appropriate treatment identified.  The Brooklyn Mental Health Court 
specifically includes assessment of persons charged with serious offences meaning that 
these persons are assessed for fitness by a single psychiatrist.  Other members of the 
multi-disciplinary team, such as the psychologist and/or social worker, conduct various 
types of assessments on the accused to determine his suitability for diversion. 
Considering the shortage of psychiatrists in South Africa, it is recommended that the fitness 
assessment is conducted on-site and need only be conducted by a single psychiatrist 
regardless of the seriousness of the offence.61  The services of clinical psychologists should 
                                                
61  Under the current Criminal procedure Act an accused charged with a non-violent crime need only be 
assessed by one psychiatrist.  An accused charged with violent crime, must be assessed by more 
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also be considered to fulfil this role.62 
The mental health professional that conducted the fitness assessment drafts a report to 
submit to the Mental Health Court.  This report would usually be submitted to the criminal 
court in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act but is now submitted to the Mental Health 
Court for consideration by the multi-disciplinary team and forms part of the court record.  
If the multidisciplinary team’s finding is that the accused is unfit to stand trial, the accused 
should not revert to the criminal court for an order in terms of section 77(6).  It is submitted 
that the accused must be referred to the Mental Health Review Board to decide on an 
appropriate disposition for the accused.  If the purpose of the Mental Health Court is truly to 
divert all persons with mental illness away from the criminal justice system, persons found 
unfit to stand trial should also not have to face a criminal court at various junctures.  The 
trial on the facts, as currently provided for in section 77(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 
could perhaps be held by the Mental Health Court before the accused is referred to the 
Review Board for the disposition.  The Mental Health Court should have jurisdiction to make 
a “get fit” order, as is the case in Canada, where the accused can be treated in a psychiatric 
facility for a 60-day period in order for him to recover to the extent where he is fit to stand 
trial.  If an accused is still unfit after this time, he is referred to the Review Board for an 
appropriate disposition.  The accused will then remain under the jurisdiction of the Review 
Board for as long as his unfitness persists.  If the accused regains fitness, the accused can 
again be referred back to the Mental Health Court, where the process will run from phase 1 
again.    
If the accused is found fit to stand trial, he may proceed to the next phase in the Mental 
Health Court proceedings.  Since the process after the establishment of fitness is voluntary, 
the accused may opt-out of the Mental Health Court at this point and choose for his case to 
be heard by the traditional criminal court. 
An accused referred to the Mental Health Court for a criminal capacity assessment only 
cannot progress past the first phase since criminal capacity has an impact on the accused 
                                                                                                                                                   
than one.   See section 79 of the Criminal Procedure Act where the composition of the panel for 
assessment is set out.  
62  See the discussion of the position of clinical psychologists in South Africa with regard to 
assessments for fitness to stand trial as discussed in chapter 3 of this research.  Also see Pillay 
2014 South African Journal of Psychology 48 at 50.  Pillay points out that there are four times as 
many clinical psychologists in South Africa than psychiatrists and those they are properly trained in 
conducting forensic assessments.  He advocates for the more frequent appointment of clinical 
psychologists to panels for purposes of psychiatric assessments.  
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sentencing in the criminal court and will be reverted to that court upon completion of the 
criminal capacity assessment.  The Mental Health Court may, however, be requested to 
assist the criminal court at the stage when the criminal capacity of the accused is 
considered. 
If an accused is fit to stand trial and does not opt-out of the Mental Health Court at this 
juncture, he may continue to the next phase where his legal and psychiatric eligibility for the 
diversion component of the Mental Health Court is assessed.  
6.4 Phase II:  Assessment of Eligibility criteria for Mental Health Court diversion 
component 
As discussed in the previous chapters, there are generally legal eligibility criteria and 
psychiatric eligibility criteria for entrance into a Mental Health Court diversion programme.  
Based on the proposal that the South African Mental Health Court should be a 
comprehensive Mental Health Court with a diversion component attached to it, the following 
eligibility criteria are proposed for the diversion component. 
The criteria that span across both legal and psychiatric criteria is that the accused must be 
fit to stand trial.  This was established during the first phase and an accused only proceeds 
to the second phase if fitness has been established. 
6.4.1 Legal eligibility 
The legal criteria entail that the accused must be fit to stand trial and must be charged with 
a crime. 
The American model allows accused persons charged with violent crimes into the Mental 
Health Court treatment programme if the prosecuting authority agrees to such diversion.  
Persons accused of rape and murder are, however, not eligible regardless of the accused’s 
circumstances.  In the Canadian model, only minor crimes are allowed into the diversion 
component of the Mental Health Court. 
Considering the high crime rate in South Africa and the threat that this brings about to the 
daily safety of society, it is suggested that the South African Mental Health Court should 
initially only allow persons accused of minor and/or non-violent crimes into the diversion 
component of the Mental Health Court.  This would be in line with the current diversion 
practices in South Africa, where only non-violent crimes qualify for diversion.  This practice 
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will also serve the community’s sense of justice.  The Court could, perhaps, at a later stage, 
consider diversion of more serious offences on a case-by-case basis (perhaps with the 
consent of the prosecution and the victim) once the initial diversion process has been 
streamlined.  This was the case in the Brooklyn Mental Health Court where only non-violent 
crimes were initially considered for diversion, but felonies were later included on a case by 
case basis, provided that the prosecuting authority had the right to veto any such diversion.  
The South African Mental Health Court should, however, assist those accused persons who 
do not qualify for diversion because of the seriousness of the alleged offence by assisting 
such an accused with a bail application, for instance.  
6.4.2 Psychiatric eligibility 
Some American Mental Health Courts set treatability of the mental illness as a requirement 
for admission into the diversion component of the Mental Health Court.  This is not as 
explicitly stated in the Canadian context but is illustrated by the fact that neither the 
Canadian Mental Health Court nor the American Mental Health Court allows persons with 
personality disorders as their only diagnosis into the Mental Health Court treatment 
programme.  If they have a co-existing mental illness, they are, however, accepted, and 
treatment is focussed on the co-existing mental illness.   
The same applies to persons with mental retardation.  As stated earlier, mental retardation 
cannot be “treated”; hence diverting such an accused into a treatment programme will serve 
no therapeutic purpose.  The risk of enrolling such a person into a treatment programme is 
that, because the condition is not curable, the chances of this person ever completing the 
treatment programme is slim if the measurable outcome is that such person must be 
“cured”.  Such a person will not complete the programme and will encounter sanctions for 
non-compliance which may, depending on the sanction, be even further counter 
therapeutic. 
Having these cases revert to the criminal court would, however, be unjust as these persons 
still suffer from a mental illness and should not face the traditional criminal justice system.  
It is suggested that the Mental Health Court should have jurisdiction to make a suitable 
order with regard to such a person who does not qualify on psychiatric grounds.  These 
may include assistance from organisations providing special care for persons with mental 
retardation, for example, or an order entrusting him to the care of his family under some 
sort of probation.  The determination of such alternatives for persons who do not qualify for 
diversion due to their mental illness is best determined by mental health practitioners. 
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Once the accused meets the legal and psychiatric eligibility criteria, he moves on to phase 
three of the Mental Health Court process. 
6.5 Phase III:    Diversion component (treatment) 
6.5.1 Development and acceptance of treatment programme 
Once the eligibility of the accused is established, the multidisciplinary team can draft a 
treatment plan for the accused that uniquely caters for his needs.  The actual treatment that 
the accused should undergo is determined by the mental health care professionals and 
social workers that form part of the Mental Health Court team.  The treatment programme 
can consist of various aspects, including taking medication and attending therapy or 
vocational training, for instance.   
Once the treatment programme is designed, the court workers contact their community 
network and find a space for the accused in the appropriate institution that will be willing 
and able to provide the required assistance to the accused. 
Legal representation must be provided to an accused in the Mental Health Court.  This is in 
line with the current obligation in the Criminal Procedure Act that a legal representative 
must be appointed for an accused whose mental state is at issue if it will be a travesty of 
justice not to do so.  It is the duty of the legal representative to explain the implications of 
choice to participate in the diversion programme to the accused. 
The accused has to accept the programme and agree to comply with it.  Such consent also 
includes acknowledgement of the sanctions that can be employed in the event of non-
compliance.  A consent form setting out the treatment plan and the sanctions for non-
compliance should be signed by the accused.  Issues of information sharing with regard to 
the medical information of the accused for treatment purposes have to be included in such 
consent form.  This should also be signed by the Mental Health Court judge and made an 
order of the Mental Health Court. 
Should the accused choose not to accept the treatment programme, his case reverts to the 
criminal court unless he decides to resolve his case with a guilty plea in the Mental Health 
Court. 
This is an important step in the process because it confirms that the treatment is voluntary.  
The choice to participate in the treatment programme is completely up to the accused.  It is 
important to remember that, even though someone may have a mental illness, it does not 
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necessarily mean that the person is incompetent to take any decision whatsoever.  
Evidence of this is the categories of mental health care users described in mental health 
care legislation.63   
6.5.1.1 Duration of treatment 
Some Mental Health Courts employ the principle that the treatment should not exceed the 
maximum time that the person would have spent in jail had he pleaded guilty to the charges 
against him. 
From a treatment perspective, placing a time limitation on treatment could be anti-
therapeutic.  It is suggested that, in principle, treatment programmes should not exceed the 
time that the accused would have spent in jail had he pleaded guilty but, the treatment can 
exceed this time if the accused agrees thereto or if good clinical reasons exist.  It is 
suggested that this should be included in the consent form that the accused is required to 
sign before entering the Mental Health Court treatment programme.  Strict time limits on 
treatment programmes may be counter-therapeutic. 
6.5.1.2 Availability of treatment options 
 In order for a Mental Health Court to function efficiently, law enforcement, correction and 
probation services, psychiatric hospitals, psychiatric wards in general hospitals, community 
mental health care clinics, and social services 64 will have to declare their willingness to and 
actively participate in achieving the goals of the Mental Health Court.65     
Where a treatment programme has been designed for the accused and a service provider 
for the mental health treatment identified, such service provider should ideally consent to 
the provision of the service in terms of the treatment programme that has been made an 
order of the court as explained above.   This ensures that services are indeed provided and 
                                                
63  See for example the description of voluntary mental health care user in the Mental Health Care Act 
17 of 2002 in South Africa, which user is capable of consenting and willing to receive treatment.  
What is more is that the regulations to the Act provide for a mental health care user to give consent 
to a medical intervention if a need would arise for such an intervention to be performed on him.  This 
illustrates that, even though a person may suffer from a mental illness, it is not assumed that s/he 
has lost the ability to take decisions regarding other aspects of his/her life or treatment. 
64  This may include programmes in the community aimed at providing housing, marriage counselling, 
substance abuse or domestic violence programmes, community recreational programmes, food 
banks, special programmes aimed at the elderly, formal education and support groups.  See 
Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 122. 
65  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 121, 122.  Also see David L Criminalization 
of People with Mental Illnesses:  The Role of Mental Health Courts in System Reform (Bazelon 
Centre for Mental Health Law Washington D.C 2003) at 17.    
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that an undue load is not placed on mental health care providers since they will have the 
option of declining to provide such services if they do not have the capacity to do so.   
6.5.2 Sanctions for non-compliance 
Relapses and setbacks are often part of the recovery process in the mental health care 
treatment context.66  Sanctions for non-compliance should be imposed with this in mind.   
Some sanctions used in Canada for non-compliance include more frequent appearances in 
front of the Mental Health Court judge.  The treatment plan is also adjusted in an attempt to 
avoid future non-compliance.  The American model employs similar sanctions and other 
creative sanctions, such as requiring the accused to write an essay on the reason for non-
compliance.   
Some American Mental Health Courts, including the Brooklyn Mental Health Court, use jail 
time as a sanction for non-compliance.67  Faraci 68 points out further that if one of the main 
objectives of a Mental Health Court is to intervene as soon as possible in the criminal 
justice process to avoid the negative effects that detainment can have on a mentally ill 
individual, incarceration as a sanction cannot be used without this objective of the Mental 
Health Court being compromised.69  This practice contributes to the criminalisation of 
mental illness as the participant is “punished” for relapsing or having a setback.  This is 
something that is often not within his control, as it happens in the process of establishing 
the best treatment method for the individual.70  Before imposing punitive sanctions for non-
compliance, the court should conclude that the defendant was capable of complying but 
                                                
66  Council of State Government’s Criminal Justice/ Mental Health Consensus Project:  Survey of 
Mental Health Courts (2003) http://consensusproject.org/topics/news/mhcsurvey(Date of use:  28 
March 2014).at 89.  Also see the discussion of sanctions for non-compliance in chapter 4 of this 
research.  
67  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 90.  Also see Griffin PA, Steadman HJ and 
Petrila J ”The use of criminal charges and sanctions in mental health courts” 2002 (53) Psych Serv 
1285-1289 at 1285.  Also see Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 579.  Also see 
in general Redlich AD, Steadman HJ, Petrila J, Monahan J and Griffin PA “The second generation of 
mental health courts” 2005 (11) Psychology, Public Policy and Law 527-538. 
68  Faraci SM “Slip Slidin’ away?  Will our Nation’s Mental Health Court Experiment Diminish the Rights 
of the Mentally Ill?”  2004 (22) Quinnipiac Law Review 811-848 at 837. 
69  Setlzer shares this view.  See Seltzer T ““Mental Health Courts:  A misguided attempt to Address the 
Criminal Justice System’s Unfair Treatment of People with Mental Illnesses” (2005) 11(4) 
Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570-586 at 579. 
70  Setlzer shares this view.  See Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 580.  An 
example is where an individual’s medication is changed and he simply does not respond positively to 
the particular type of medication.  This is not due to the unwillingness of the participant or his 
stubbornness and he should not be punished for this.   
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chose not to.71   
Jail time as a sanction for non-compliance to the Mental Health Court programme is not 
recommended for the South African context.  The criticism against this type of sanction for 
non-compliance is valid, in particular, the concern that such sanction is particularly counter-
therapeutic for the mentally ill accused.72   
Imposing jail time as a sanction for non-compliance with the treatment programme also has 
the potential to defy the very goal of a Mental Health Court, which is to reduce the number 
of mentally ill offenders in prison through diversion.73  In the South African context, in 
particular, overcrowded prisons will not be able to accommodate those who are sent to 
prison to serve out their sanction time.  Treatment programmes should rather be adjusted if 
non-compliance with the initial programme is detected.74 
6.5.3 Procedure upon completion of the treatment programme 
Where the treatment programme is successfully completed, the charges against the 
accused should be dropped.  The accused will not have a criminal record after successfully 
completing the treatment programme.   
The accused should, after completion, be put into contact with community services where 
he can get future assistance if he is in need thereof.  This will ensure that the progress that 
has been made with the treatment during the programme is sustained and that future 
relapses could possibly be avoided or at least detected at an early stage to avoid possible 
future contact with the criminal justice system. 
Those accused persons who do not complete the programme due to reasons other than 
ones related to the treatment (such as a change in medication etc.) will revert to the 
                                                
71  Council of State Government’s Criminal Justice/ Mental Health Consensus Project: 
http://consensusproject.org/topics/news/mhcsurvey(Date of use:  28 March 2014) at 100. 
72  Arrest and incarceration per se can be debilitating to a mentally ill accused.  See Schneider, Bloom 
and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 116.  Also see Seltzer 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and 
Law 570 at 572 who confirms that contact with the criminal justice system has negative 
consequences for anyone who is arrested and/or incarcerated and even more so for those who 
suffer from mental illnesses.  Mentally ill offenders generally do not cope well in the criminal justice 
system.  (See Seltzer at 573). 
73  See 2005 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 570 at 579.  Also see Faraci 2004 Quinnipiac Law 
Review 811 at 837.  See further the discussion of sanctions for non-compliance in chapter 4 of this 
research. 
74  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 90.  Also see chapter 4 of this research for 
a discussion of sanctions for non-compliance and the criticism levied against the practice of using 
jail-time as a sanction. 
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criminal court and their cases will be dealt with in the conventional way.  Consideration can 
be given to the possibility for the criminal court to consider as mitigating the fact that the 
accused participated in the treatment programme during the sentencing phase, as is the 
practice in both Canada and the United States of America. 
6.6 Miscellaneous functions of the proposed South African Mental Health Court  
It will defeat the purpose of a Mental Health Court if access to the expertise of the Mental 
Health Court is restricted to accused persons charged with non-violent crimes as the skills 
of the Mental Health Court will not reach the entire group of mentally ill accused persons.75   
Miscellaneous matters that the court will address include trials of accused persons who are 
fit to stand trial but who intend to file the insanity plea.  They may also consider bail 
applications by persons found fit to stand trial that chose to have their cases processed 
through the Mental Health Court.  Persons who do not qualify for diversion can have their 
cases resolved in the Mental Health Court by filing a guilty plea.  In these cases, mental 
illness will not arise again, for instance, in the form of the insanity plea, as the insanity plea 
amounts to a plea of not guilty.  These are secondary functions of the Mental Health Court. 
It is a secondary objective of the Toronto Mental Health Court to assist in cases of those in 
respect of whom fitness to stand trial is not at issue but who wish to enter a plea of not 
criminally responsible.76   These hearings do not take place in the Mental Health Court, but 
the Mental Health Court can offer its skills to assist in whichever way possible. 
The Mental Health Court can assist with bail hearings of accused persons referred to it for 
assessments.  The bail conditions could possibly include some treatment at a psychiatric or 
community facility.  
Accused persons who are fit to stand trial and who do not qualify for the diversion 
component can opt to remain within the Mental Health Court should they wish to enter a 
guilty plea and end the matter.  The Mental Health Court will then hand down a sentence 
with a therapeutic element attached to it where appropriate. 
The American Mental Health Court model does not provide such assistance to persons who 
                                                
75  Lurigio RJ and Snowden J “Putting therapeutic jurisprudence into practice: The growth, operations, 
and effectiveness of mental health courts” 2009 (2) The Justice System Journal 196-218 at 213 
where it is pointed out that, only addressing minor crimes excludes persons with serious mental 
illness accused of violent crimes from the opportunity to receive court monitored treatment. 
76  Schneider, Bloom and Heerema Mental Health Courts at 98. 
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do not qualify for diversion to the Mental Health Court.  This practice arguably excludes a 
large portion of mentally ill accused persons from the specialised skills that the Mental 
Health Court team has to offer.   
Since the model proposed for SA is a comprehensive one, assistance in the form of bail 
applications and ending a matter by entering a guilty plea in the Mental Health Court should 
be provided to those who do not qualify for the diversion component of the Mental Health 
Court.  Assistance in trials for those who intend to enter a plea of not criminally responsible 
could be provided on a case-by-case basis initially until it is clear in which way the court can 
assist in such matters. 
7  ADDITIONAL SUGGESTIONS FOR THE OPTIMAL TREATMENT OF PERSONS 
WITH  MENTAL ILLNESS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
7.1 Early intervention by police 
As suggested in chapters 4 and 5 of this research, the Canadian and American Mental 
Health Court models could benefit from supplementing the Mental Health Court services by 
implementing pre-booking interventions.  This requires the cooperation of the police service 
to a large extent.  Training of the police on mental health issues will go a long way to 
sensitise the police to the unique challenges that mentally ill persons bring to the criminal 
justice system.  The same applies to the South African context. 
Police should, in particular, be made aware and trained on the use of the provision in the 
Mental Health Care Act that provides for the police to take a person that appears to suffer 
from a mental illness to a treatment facility for observation, rather than arresting the person 
for a crime that might very well be the result of an untreated but treatable mental illness. 
Pre-booking diversion programmes are the only way to avoid contact with the criminal 
justice system for the accused altogether and should receive serious attention.  
7.2 Unfit accused persons 
Even though the position of the unfit accused was not the primary focus of this research, it 
formed a necessary part of the discussion since the position of the accused found fit to 
stand trial had to be contrasted with the position of the accused found unfit to stand trial.  
Even though the position of the unfit accused is regulated in the South African criminal 




The manner of detention of a person found unfit to stand trial differs depending on whether 
he is found to have committed an offence or not.  An accused charged with a violent crime 
but found not to have committed it is detained as a state patient, whereas an unfit accused 
charged with a non-violent crime and found to have committed it is detained as an 
involuntary mental health care user. Discharge from detention as a state patient is much 
harder than discharge from detention as an involuntary mental health care user.  The 
reason for this distinction is unclear.  If fitness is truly distinctly different from the inquiry into 
criminal capacity and concerned with the present state of mind, surely the order as to the 
manner of detention should be dictated by the mental health care needs of the accused 
rather than the type of charges against him?  This is especially so considering that no 
provision for the assessment of the dangerousness of the accused is made during the 
fitness assessment. 
 It is suggested that the Canadian model could be looked at to supplement the current 
system.  In Canada, findings by courts that an accused is unfit to stand trial are sent for 
review to the Mental Health Review Board, and the latter usually decides on an appropriate 
disposition for the relevant accused, taking into account the safety of the community and 
the position of the accused.  The Review Board can also make a “get fit” order that subjects 
the accused to treatment with the view of making him fit to stand trial.  The accused 
remains under the jurisdiction of the Review Board for as long as he is unfit.  This includes 
periodic reviews of the mental state of the accused by the Review Board. 
In Canada, the Criminal Code provides for the examination of the evidence against an unfit 
accused bi-annually.77  Where a prima facie case against the accused cannot be proven, or 
where the court is of the view that evidence is no longer sufficient, the accused may be 
acquitted.78    
 South Africa has Review Boards in place, but they are not tasked with the review of findings 
of unfitness or the periodic reviews of such persons.  They are tasked with reviewing the 
                                                
77  Section 672.33 of the Criminal Code provides for these inquiries into the evidence against the 
accused every two years until the accused is tried or acquitted.  Also see Barret and Shandler 
Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 1-12.   Section 672.33(1.1) provides that the period for 
the review of the evidence may be extended if it is in the interest of the proper administration of 
justice.    
78  As provided for in section 672.33(6) of the Criminal Code.  Coughlan Criminal Procedure at 292 who 
points out that the procedure for these hearings, to determine if there is still sufficient evidence, is 
not set out in the Criminal Code and can be conducted by way of affidavit.  See further Van der Wolf 
et al 2010 International Journal of Forensic Mental Health 245 at 250.  Also see Byrick K and 
Walker-Renshaw B A Practical Guide to Mental Health and the Law in Ontario (Ontario Hospital 
Association Toronto 2012) at 91.  
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mental state of mentally ill prisoners, assisted and involuntary mental health care users.  
The suggestion is that their powers should be extended to review findings of unfitness 
made by courts, to make “get fit” orders and assist the court in arriving at appropriate 
dispositions for accused persons found unfit to stand trial or not criminally responsible and, 
finally, to conduct period reviews of such persons.  Review Boards should further be 
empowered to make assessment orders where further information may be required to make 
an appropriate disposition. 
8  PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE PROPOSED 
MENTAL HEALTH COURT MODEL FOR SOUTH AFRICA 
8.1 Introduction 
 In order to give effect to the initiative of a South African Mental Health Court, legislative 
amendments are required.  
These amendments could be incorporated into existing legislation, more particularly the 
Criminal Procedure Act and the Mental Health Care Act and possibly the Correctional 
Services Act.  Alternatively, a separate piece of legislation could be drafted to provide for 
the incorporation of the Mental Health Court into the existing criminal justice system. 
Since this research intimates that the Mental Health Court can be incorporated into the 
existing logistical and procedural framework of the criminal justice system, the approach 
followed here is to propose amendments to the current legislation. 
The proposed amendments are set out below in general terms.  These proposals focus on 
the Criminal Procedure Act and the Mental Health Care Act.   The exact wording thereof is 
best left to the legislature. 
8.2 Criminal Procedure Act 
 The proposed amendments to sections 77 to 79 of the Criminal Procedure Act are 
discussed below.  The main objective of these amendments is to incorporate the Mental 
Health Court into the existing system to be of assistance to accused persons with mental 
health issues and, in particular, those accused persons who are fit but mentally ill. 
8.2.1 Proposed amendments regarding fitness to stand trial generally 
− Insert a presumption of fitness to stand trial; 
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− All assessments for fitness to stand trial shall be the responsibility of the Mental 
Health Court to deal with in terms of its specific rules and procedures.79 
− The period for fitness assessment should not exceed 5-days 80 with the provision 
that it can be extended by 30-days in the event that an in-depth assessment is 
required. 
- Only one mental health professional is required to conduct the fitness assessment.81  
 Such mental health professional may either be a psychiatrist or a clinical 
psychologist with the appropriate forensic training.82  
- Insert presumption that fitness assessment will take place out of custody.83  This 
                                                
79  Fitness assessments could be conducted on site as is the case with the Canadian and the American 
Mental Health Courts.  Only more complex matters that require intense assessment will be done 
over a longer period of time.  The minimum prescribed time for fitness assessments should apply. 
80  This is the position in the Canadian system as provided for in the Criminal Code. 
81  Since the type of crime that the accused is charged with is strictly irrelevant for purposes of  fitness 
to stand trial, there is no need to draw a distinction between the number of mental health 
professionals that must assess an accused charged with a minor crime versus an accused charged 
with a serious one.  South Africa currently allows for one psychiatrist to assess an accused charged 
with a minor crime.  For serious offences, the South African system currently requires an accused to 
be assessed by at least 2 psychiatrists and possibly a third and /or a clinical psychologist.  South 
Africa is experiencing a severe shortage of psychiatrists and it is causing delays in the system to 
require up to three psychiatrists to assess an accused for fitness. The Canadian system only 
requires one psychiatrist to assess an accused for fitness regardless of the seriousness of the 
offence.  In the American system, two mental health professionals must assess an accused for 
fitness.  Should the proposal of one mental health practitioner to conduct an assessment be 
implemented, the rules in the Criminal Procedure Act pertaining to hearing evidence from those who 
conducted the assessment need to be amended as well.  If the suggestion that findings of unfitness 
should routinely be reviewed by a Review Board is implemented, this will provide a safety net for 
accused persons found unfit to stand trial regardless of if they are assessed for fitness by one or 
multiple mental health professionals. 
82  Since a fitness assessment may require a diagnosis of a physical condition, the accused may, after 
the assessment by the psychologist (if the initial assessment is done by a psychologist) be referred 
to a psychiatrist or physician for such diagnosis.  This will assist in alleviating the skills shortage that 
is currently experienced in South Africa with regard to psychiatrists.  The suggestion has been made 
that South African courts should rely more on psychologist to fulfil the assessment function as their 
training includes training on forensic issues.  In the American system where assessments must be 
done by two mental health professionals, it is specifically stated that these professionals may be two 
psychiatrists, two psychologists or one from each profession. 
83  A statutory presumption exists in the Canadian Criminal Code that the assessment for fitness to 
stand trial, will take place out of custody.  This presumption applies to assessment orders made by 
courts as well as Review Boards.  Section 672.16 of the Criminal Code reads as follows:   
 “672.16 (1) Subject to subsection (3), an accused shall not be detained in custody under an 
assessment order of a court unless the court is satisfied that on the evidence custody is necessary 
to assess the accused, or that on the evidence of a medical practitioner custody is desirable to 
assess the accused and the accused consents to custody; 
 (b)  custody of the accused is required in respect of any other matter or by virtue of any other 
 provision of this Act; or 
 (c) the prosecutor, having been given a reasonable opportunity to do so, shows that detention 
 of the accused in custody is justified on either of the grounds set out in subsection 515(10).” 
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presumption applies to assessment orders made by Mental Health Courts as well as 
 Review Boards.84   
- Provide for compulsory referral of a matter to Mental Health Court at any time during 
the court proceedings and as soon as the criminal court or either party identifies the 
issue of mental illness.  
− Mental Health Court may find, after fitness assessment, that an accused: 
   is fit to stand trial with no mental illness present; 
   is fit to stand trial but mentally ill; or 
  is unfit to stand trial. 
8.2.2 Proposed amendments in respect of an accused found fit to stand trial 
- An accused found fit to stand trial with no mental illness present shall proceed to the 
criminal trial in the criminal court.  The Mental Health Court has no jurisdiction over 
such an accused.85 
− An accused found fit to stand trial but who is mentally ill remains under the 
 jurisdiction of the Mental Health Court provided that: 
                                                                                                                                                   
 Also see Schneider RD Annotated Ontario Mental Health Statutes 4th ed (Irwin Law Toronto 2007 at 
xv.  See further Barret and Shandler Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law at 2-21.  The New 
York CPL also makes provision for fitness assessments to take place out of custody where the 
accused is not detained in a correctional facility at the time when the assessment is ordered.  See 
the New York CPL 730.40. 
84  See section 672.16 of the Canadian Criminal Code for the presumption where an assessment order 
was made by a court.  See section 672.121 of the Canadian Criminal Code for the presumption 
where an assessment is ordered by a Review Board.  In the latter case, assessments shall take 
place out of custody unless   
 (a)  the accused is currently subject to a disposition made under paragraph 672.54(c); 
 (b)  the Review Board is satisfied on the evidence that custody is necessary to assess the 
 accused, or that on the evidence of a medical practitioner custody is desirable to assess the 
 accused and the accused consents to custody; or 
 (c)  custody of the accused is required in respect of any other matter or by virtue of any other 
 provision of this Act. 
85  Where no mental illness is present, the expertise of the Mental Health Court is not essential and 
such an accused reverts to the traditional criminal justice system.  The Mental Health Court is 
reserved for cases involving mental illness only.  Even though the accused may have had mental 
health issues at the time of referral, this is no longer the case if he is found fit with no mental illness 
and he has nothing to gain from the Mental Health Court.   The option of applying for bail in the 
Mental Health Court does not apply to this persons since bail conditions set by the Mental Health 
Court has a treatment element attached to it and an accused found fit with no mental illness has no 
need for such treatment. 
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a)  the accused must be assessed for eligibility for the diversion component of 
 the Mental Health Court 
b)  the accused may opt-out of the Mental Health Court process at this juncture 
 prior to assessment for diversion since the diversion component of the 
 Mental Health Court is voluntary 
c)  only non-violent offences shall qualify for Mental Health Court diversion 
d)  If the accused does not qualify for diversion due to the serious nature of 
charges against him, he may: 
i) Choose for his case to revert to the criminal court 
ii) Choose for his case to remain within the Mental Health Court for a 
bail application.  Bail conditions will incorporate a treatment element 
iii) Choose to resolve his case with a guilty plea in the Mental Health 
Court 
e)  Mental Health Courts may determine their own psychiatric eligibility criteria 
 guided by available treatment programmes provided that: 
i) The Mental Health Court shall have the discretion to make any 
appropriate order in respect of an accused with an intellectual 
disability 
− Charges against accused found fit and eligible to participate in Mental Health Court 
 diversion programmes are suspended pending completion of treatment programme 
− Charges against an accused who completes Mental Health Court treatment 
programme are to be dropped 
− The case against an accused who does not complete the Mental Health Court 
treatment programme should revert to criminal court for trial.  Accused’s 
participation in the treatment  programme may be taken into consideration during 
sentencing 
8.2.3 Proposed amendments in respect of an accused found unfit to stand trial 
− Insert provisions to the effect that any finding of unfitness to stand trial must be 
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 reviewed by the Review Board immediately after order is made and thereafter 
 periodically 
− Insert provision that empowers Review Boards to make assessment orders to 
 determine fitness to stand trial 
− Review Board may make a  “get fit to stand trial” order not exceeding 60-days after 
 the finding of unfitness by the Mental Health Court or Review Board (where the 
 Review Board ordered assessment to determine fitness) 
- Allow orders to “keep fit to stand trial” where fitness is regained, but concern exists 
that the accused may become unfit if kept in a facility other than a  psychiatric 
facility.  Such an order can be made by the Review Board or Mental Health Court 
− The Review Board must decide on an appropriate disposition for an accused found 
 unfit to stand trial 
− An unfit accused remains under the jurisdiction of the Review Board for as long as 
he is unfit to stand trial. 
8.2.4 Proposed amendments in respect of an accused in respect of whom criminal capacity 
is at issue 
− Provide for compulsory referral to Mental Health Court at any time during the court 
 proceedings and as soon as the criminal court or either party identifies the issue of 
 mental illness 
− All arrangements for criminal capacity assessments to be made by Mental Health 
 Court 86  
− Inset provision that specifically allows for criminal capacity assessments to take 
 place out of custody 
− Allow for the criminal court to call on Mental Health Court expertise during a trial in 
 which lack of criminal capacity is at issue 
                                                
86  Even though the trial of an accused found to lack criminal responsibility will not take place in the 
Mental Health Court, provision is made for the Mental Health Court to make arrangements for 
assessment of criminal capacity to lighten the administrative load of criminal courts in this regard.  
The suggestion that assessments for criminal capacity could take place out of custody could assist in 
expediting this process as well. 
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− Insert provision to the effect that any finding of  not  criminally responsible must be 
 reviewed by the Review Board 
Relevant forms will either have to be amended or designed to provide for the proposed 
referral to the Mental Health Court, as discussed earlier in this chapter. 
8.3 Mental Health Care Act 
The proposed amendments to the Mental Health Act are mainly in support of those 
suggested in respect of the Criminal Procedure Act.  It mainly pertains to the powers of the 
Review Board.  
The proposed amendments to the Mental Health Care Act will aim to achieve the following: 
− Extend the powers of the Review Board in line with the suggested functions as set 
 out under the proposed amendments to the Criminal Procedure Act 
− Provide for a category of mental health care, treatment and rehabilitation that will 
 accommodate accused persons under “get fit” or “keep fit” order made by the 
 Review Board and as suggested under the proposed amendments to the Criminal 
 Procedure Act 
It is reiterated that this research mainly concerned itself with pre-trial issues pertaining to 
fitness to stand trial.  Issues surrounding criminal capacity and the assessment thereof are 
incidental to this research, and the suggestions above are included for the sake of 
completeness and to encourage further research and investigation into the possibility that 
criminal capacity assessments should not be administered by traditional criminal courts. 
9  CONCLUSION  
This research was aimed at suggesting an alternative to traditional prosecution for the 
mentally ill but fit accused.  The focus of the research was to investigate the functionality of 
well-established and successful Mental Health Courts within two different jurisdictions.  The 
successes and challenges of each model were pointed out. 
The research proposes an alternative to traditional prosecution for the mentally ill accused 
in the form of a Mental Health Court in South Africa.  Drawing from the Mental Health Court 
models in Canada and the United States of America, the best attributes of these two 
models were combined into the proposed functioning of a South African Mental Health 
Court.  Such court will house specialised mental health care skills and will make use of 
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legal professionals with special training in mental health matters. 
A South African Mental Health Court can reduce the caseload on criminal courts by 
referring all matters involving mental illness to the Mental Health Court.  Referring all 
matters to the Mental Health Court can assist in reducing the number of awaiting trial 
prisoners, especially those awaiting psychiatric assessments in prison, since fitness 
assessments can be conducted on-site at these courts.  Mental Health Courts can divert 
mentally ill persons accused of minor crimes into a treatment programme and can provide 
specialised assistance to accused persons with mental illness who do not qualify for such 
diversion. 
Mental Health courts will significantly reduce delays in the finalisation of pre-trial issues of 
mentally ill accused persons and will lighten the load on the resource-strapped forensic 
mental health care system since they will no longer have to admit accused persons for 30-
day fitness assessments.  Increasing the involvement of clinical psychologists in fitness 
assessments may further assist in lightening the load.   
The mentally ill accused is rehabilitated through the appropriate and timeous treatment of 
his mental illness that in turn improves the likelihood of reduced recidivism by such an 
accused.  Diversion of the mentally ill accused has proved to reduce recidivism, which in 
turn results in a safer society.   
Mentally ill accused persons, as a group of accused persons in respect of whom 
specialised solutions should be sought, will benefit greatly from a Mental Health Court.  So 
will the criminal justice system, the forensic mental health care system, and society at large. 
The research also proposed some changes to the legislative framework that currently 
regulates the criminal justice system to improve the manner in which those found unfit to 
stand trial or not criminally responsible are treated.  These suggestions pertained mostly to 
the powers of the Review Board and entailed that their powers be extended to include the 
review of a finding of unfitness and/or lack of criminal responsibility by a criminal court and 
further that these Review Boards should be approached for input on what the best possible 
disposition for a particular accused would be.  
The implementation of Mental Health Courts as a specialised court, which is not a new 
phenomenon in South Africa, could be the first step towards a complete overhaul of the 
criminal justice system’s approach to mentally ill accused persons, as alluded to in the De 
Vos matter.  In support of such a first step, current structures, such as Review Boards, can 
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be redefined and aligned to optimise the manner in which criminal cases involving mental 
illness are dealt with in the South African criminal justice system.  
Therapeutic jurisprudence should be used as an agent within the criminal justice system to 
ensure that the law has a constructive effect on a mentally ill accused person.  Therapeutic 
jurisprudence is one of the underlying principles of any Mental Health Court and is 
proposed as an appropriate therapeutic response to accused persons with mental illness in 
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ANNEXURE C – AMERICAN ASSESSMENT ORDER 
(FORM 16(a)) 
C.P.L. Article 730 FORM 16-a 3/90 
 
ORDER FOR PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION 
 
 
_________ COURT OF _________ COUNTY OF _________ ____________x 
 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,  ORDER FOR PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION – against – Docket 
No. Indictment No.______ Defendant.____________ x……………………………………………. 
 
The above named defendant having been charged with __, in violation of __, and the court being of the opinion 
that the defendant may be an incapacitated person, 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is 
ORDERED that, pursuant to Article 730 of the Criminal Procedure Law, the Director of Community Mental 
Health Services or the Director of __Hospital for the (County) (City) of __ shall cause an examination to be 
made of said defendant to determine whether said defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacks 
capacity to understand the proceedings against him or her or to assist in his or her defense, and it is further 
ORDERED that such examination be conducted in the manner specified in the paragraph checked below (check 
only one): 
1. said defendant, having heretofore been released on bail or on (his) (her) own recognizance and not being in 
custody, such examination shall be conducted on an outpatient basis, and said defendant is hereby ordered to 
report for examination at a time and place to be designated by the said Director 
2. said defendant, being now in custody, such examination shall be conducted at the place where (he) (she) is 
being held, unless the Director shall determine that hospital confinement of the defendant is necessary for an 
effective examination, in which event the (Sheriff) (Commissioner of Correction of the City of New York) is 
hereby directed to deliver the defendant to a hospital designated by the Director and to hold the defendant in 
custody therein, under sufficient guard, until the examination is completed, for a period not exceeding thirty (30) 
days (if the defendant subsequently has been released on bail, the foregoing paragraph (1) shall apply) 
and it is further 
 
ORDERED that upon the completion of said examination, reports thereof be submitted by the Director to this 
Court pursuant to section 730.20, subdivision 5, of the Criminal Procedure Law, and that the Clerk of the Court 
furnish a copy of said reports to the attorney for the defendant and to the District Attorney. 
Dated: ______   Judge or 
Justice………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Please indicate relevant reason(s) for referral for: Art. 730 
Eval. 
Probation Referral 
Disruptive, confused or bizarre behavior   
Threatening or violent behavior   
Suicidal behavior   
Uncooperative with defense counsel   
Appears dishevelled; not taking care of self   
Appears not to understand charges or court processes   
History of past psychiatric problems   
History of drug or alcohol abuse   
History of suicidal behavior   
Extreme or bizarre type of offense   
Other:   
Persons who may be contacted for more information, if needed:   
Judge: Phone:  
Defense Counsel: Phone:  
District Attorney: Phone:  




COMMENTS OF THE COURT (if any) …………  
BAIL CONDITIONS: ________________________________________ 
  






Hospitalization of Defendant not in Custody 
 
TO: The above named court 
 
This Court, having directed that the defendant be examined on an out-patient basis by reason of the defendant's 
being released on bail or on (his) (her) own recognizance, the Director now informs the Court that hospital 
confinement of the defendant is necessary for an effective examination, for the following reasons: 
  
  
and designates the following hospital 
  
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 





Signature of Director 
 
The Court having directed that the defendant be examined on an out-patient basis by reason of the defendant's 
being released on bail or on (his) (her) own recognizance, and the Court having been informed by the Director 
that hospital confinement is necessary for an effective examination, the Court hereby directs the (Sheriff) 
(Commissioner of Correction of the City of New York) to take custody of the said defendant and to transfer (him) 
(her) to __ Hospital, for such examination, for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days. 
 
Dated: ______ Judge or Justice………………………………………………………………………………………… 
  
Additional Hospital Confinement To: The above-named court 
 
The Director hereby applies for additional hospital confinement of the defendant for a period not to exceed thirty 
(30) days, for the following reasons:  
  




Signature of Director 
 
The Court being satisfied that a longer period is necessary to complete the examination of the defendant, the 
Court does hereby authorize hospital confinement of the said defendant for an additional period, not to exceed 
thirty (30) days, for such examination. 
 
Dated:______ Judge or Justice……………………………………………………………………………………… 
  
  
Hospitalization of Defendant in Custody To: The (Sheriff) (Commissioner of Correction of the City of New York) 
 
The Director hereby determines that hospital confinement of the defendant is necessary for an effective 
examination and, pursuant to order of the Court herein, directs that you deliver the defendant to __ Hospital and 
hold the defendant in custody therein, under sufficient guard, until the examination is completed, but not to 





Signature of Director  
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